The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

understanding what was happening around him. His entourage tried to shield the generalsecretary from bad news. Ustinov, who was receiving information not only from PGU, butalso from GRU and his own military advisers, had not yet decided in August who he wouldbet on. Gromyko also was reading not only the cables from the KGB Residency, but alsodocuments sent by Puzanov and party advisors, which maintained that Taraki was not indanger. The foreign minister, as usually, did not rush to conclusions. He waited and put outfeelers for the “leadership line” in order to support it at an opportune moment. Andropovwas the most informed man at the Politburo then, but he was also very aware that thestakes were very high and required a lot of caution.It is possible to conclude with certainty that in August there was not yet any specificplan for removing Amin. The seed, planted by Kryuchkov, had not yet germinated. ButMoscow had begun to take some steps. Karmal’s name had reappeared. Andropov gaveorders for the quiet engagement of agents and trusted friends to find out about the currentlife of the Parcham leader—his mood, contacts, and health.***It was early summer when Babrak Karmal and his family members were transferredby Czechoslovak security agents to a new residence. Ever since Karmal fled Amin’s agentsin the fall, he had been hiding out at a secret State Security dacha near Karlovy Vary. Thistime they moved even further from Prague, which had become more dangerous, toSlovakia. They were allocated several furnished rooms at the sanatorium of an aluminumcombine. They were given full board, swimming pool passes, and authorization to receivefree medical services.“Take advantage of it,” their Czechoslovak comrades told them. “The local mineral489