The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

analysts in the International Department of the Central Committee of CPSU, at the ForeignMinistry, Ministry of Defense, and KGB were tasked to develop recommendations regardingthe situation in Afghanistan.The KGB’s First Chief Directorate sent an important document, signed byKryuchkov, to Andropov, who presented it at a meeting of the Politburo. The document didnot refer directly to Amin’s plotting, but contained broader proposals regarding thesituation.It is possible that this very document became the basis for further politicalrecommendations put forth by the Soviet leadership. Among other things, the documentstated: “Domestic situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan continues to rapidlydeteriorate. Activities of armed groups of counter-revolutionaries which receivecomprehensive support from the United States, China, England, Pakistan, Iran, and SaudiArabia continue to expand. As a result of a direct military offensive, the rebels managed togain full control over the provinces bordering Pakistan, captured a considerable part of theterritory of Central Afghanistan, created a dangerous climate in most of the provincesadjacent to Kabul, and intensified their activities in northern areas adjacent to the Sovietborder. They continue provocations in provinces bordering Iran. Recently, thereactionaries organized open military offensives in the capital. During the last two months,two serious attempts to overthrow the current regime were undertaken in Kabul. Thesituation in Kabul is aggravated by the fact that it is de facto cut off from the majority ofother provinces that supply food to the capital. Only one highway of three, Salang, whichconnects Kabul with the Soviet border through the mountain range Hindu Kush, is more orless operable. However, this highway has also been frequently blocked by the rebels in the486

last few days.“Realization of social-economic reforms, which were introduced in a hurriedmanner and without necessary preparation, is put on hold because of the current situationinvolving the approaching state of civil war in the country. The government of Taraki andAmin is losing authority among the people of Afghanistan. Anti-Soviet sentiment among thepopulation appears to be on the rise.“Advice and recommendations to bolster propaganda activities among the people inorder to strengthen the broader social base of the regime that were given to Taraki andAmin by Soviet representatives are not being implemented. Taraki and Amin continue toturn to military force as the main means for resolving all domestic political problems. Asbefore, they make important state decisions without consulting other members of thePolitburo of the PDPA Central Committee; they continue to pursue the politics ofunfounded repression against their own population…”Further, the head of the PGU reminded the reader about the elimination ofParchamists, repression directed at patriotic officers, clerics, and intellectuals. Hementioned the PDPA leaders’ failure to work with Pashtun and Baluch tribes. He gravelyconcluded that Taraki and Amin themselves did not believe in the loyalty of their armedforces, and therefore were insisting that the Soviet leadership send Soviet militarydetachments to the DRA, including for their personal protection.“In the current state of crisis, it is possible that the achievements of the AprilRevolution may be lost and the interests of the Soviet Union in this important region of theworld may be gravely affected,” Kryuchkov’s analysis continued. “Under suchcircumstances, the following recommendations should be considered:487

analysts in the International Department of the Central Committee of CPSU, at the ForeignMinistry, Ministry of Defense, and KGB were tasked <strong>to</strong> develop recommendations regardingthe situation in <strong>Afghanistan</strong>.<strong>The</strong> KGB’s First Chief Direc<strong>to</strong>rate sent an important document, signed byKryuchkov, <strong>to</strong> Andropov, who presented it at a meeting of the Politburo. <strong>The</strong> document didnot refer directly <strong>to</strong> Amin’s plotting, but contained broader proposals regarding thesituation.It is possible that this very document became the basis for further politicalrecommendations put forth by the Soviet leadership. Among other things, the documentstated: “Domestic situation in the Democratic Republic of <strong>Afghanistan</strong> continues <strong>to</strong> rapidlydeteriorate. Activities of armed groups of counter-revolutionaries which receivecomprehensive support from the United States, China, England, Pakistan, Iran, and SaudiArabia continue <strong>to</strong> expand. As a result of a direct military offensive, the rebels managed <strong>to</strong>gain full control over the provinces bordering Pakistan, captured a considerable part of theterri<strong>to</strong>ry of Central <strong>Afghanistan</strong>, created a dangerous climate in most of the provincesadjacent <strong>to</strong> Kabul, and intensified their activities in northern areas adjacent <strong>to</strong> the Sovietborder. <strong>The</strong>y continue provocations in provinces bordering Iran. Recently, thereactionaries organized open military offensives in the capital. During the last two months,two serious attempts <strong>to</strong> overthrow the current regime were undertaken in Kabul. <strong>The</strong>situation in Kabul is aggravated by the fact that it is de fac<strong>to</strong> cut off from the majority ofother provinces that supply food <strong>to</strong> the capital. Only one highway of three, Salang, whichconnects Kabul with the Soviet border through the mountain range Hindu Kush, is more orless operable. However, this highway has also been frequently blocked by the rebels in the486

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