The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

last one. The previous cables seemed to leave open the possibility that the sources hadexaggerated the danger to the Afghan leader. They highlighted the evolving battle betweenAmin and Taraki in a way that made it seem plausible that one might overcome the currenttensions without resorting to any emergency measures.A lot of thinking was underway in Moscow. Detailed studies of the situation weretaking place in high offices, as were consultations with experts, working meetings, and theinitiation of various proposals.The Center was even more alarmed by the second cable, which arrived from Kabulon August 24. It was addressed to Kryuchkov. The cable contained lists of members of theCentral Committee of the PDPA, officers and high-level state apparatchiks, who wereinvolved with Amin in the plot against Taraki. The military detachments that would sidewith the rebels were listed as well. The Soviet leaders were shocked by the quotations thatwere cited from the conversations between Amin and his allies. They contained specificreferences to Amin’s plans to overthrow and physically eliminate Taraki. That cable, as wellas the preceding one, quoted Gulabzoi as saying that Amin was suspected to be a CIA agent.It said that he intended to capture power in order to compromise the politics of the USSRtowards developing countries and turn Afghanistan in the future into a U.S. military base atthe Soviet Union’s southern borders.Those who received this information agonized over what to do in this situation. Itwas obvious that they had to make a decision quickly. At the same time, everybody realizedthat hasty action could lead to detrimental consequences that were not confined to thedevelopment of Soviet-Afghan relations. The information related to Amin’s preparation ofthe coup d’etat was given “top secret” classification. However, at the same time, the best485