The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
“It looks like the situation within PDPA’s leadership is about to explode,” BorisSemyonovich said with great concern. “It seems that Amin is in a hurry to remove Taraki atany price, by accusing him of inability to control the situation in the country. Sarwari andthe three ministers appear to be the biggest obstacle for him in this endeavor. Under suchcircumstances, we must send a very strong message about the evolving conflict to YuriVladimirovich. We should use the same expressions as Gulabzoi and make sure that themessage fully reflects the gravity of the situation. Prepare a short preamble in thebeginning of the document. Remind them that we informed the Center about the situationseveral times in the past. Include Gulabzoi’s short bio and mention his particular loyalty toTaraki. In the end of the cable, mention that we have no doubt about the truthfulness of theinformation shared with us by the minister of communications of the DRA and that inconnection with this information, we would like to receive recommendations regardingpossible means to prevent the escalation of the conflict. Mention that a separate cablecontaining specific information regarding Amin’s recruitment of participants of the plannedstate coup d’etat will be sent around August 24.”When giving these instructions, the senior operative seemed very calm andconfident. However, Osadchiy and Starostin, who knew Ivanov’s style quite well, sensedthat it was not easy for Boris Semyonovich to authorize such a direct message. It waspossible that deep down, Ivanov still harbored some doubts.The cable signed by Ivanov was reported by Andropov to Brezhnev and some othermembers of the Politburo. It seemed to have left a strong impression on the Soviet leaders.Previous KGB analyses about disagreements among the leaders of the PDPA arriving fromKabul were not reported to the “very top” and none of them sounded as dramatic as this484
last one. The previous cables seemed to leave open the possibility that the sources hadexaggerated the danger to the Afghan leader. They highlighted the evolving battle betweenAmin and Taraki in a way that made it seem plausible that one might overcome the currenttensions without resorting to any emergency measures.A lot of thinking was underway in Moscow. Detailed studies of the situation weretaking place in high offices, as were consultations with experts, working meetings, and theinitiation of various proposals.The Center was even more alarmed by the second cable, which arrived from Kabulon August 24. It was addressed to Kryuchkov. The cable contained lists of members of theCentral Committee of the PDPA, officers and high-level state apparatchiks, who wereinvolved with Amin in the plot against Taraki. The military detachments that would sidewith the rebels were listed as well. The Soviet leaders were shocked by the quotations thatwere cited from the conversations between Amin and his allies. They contained specificreferences to Amin’s plans to overthrow and physically eliminate Taraki. That cable, as wellas the preceding one, quoted Gulabzoi as saying that Amin was suspected to be a CIA agent.It said that he intended to capture power in order to compromise the politics of the USSRtowards developing countries and turn Afghanistan in the future into a U.S. military base atthe Soviet Union’s southern borders.Those who received this information agonized over what to do in this situation. Itwas obvious that they had to make a decision quickly. At the same time, everybody realizedthat hasty action could lead to detrimental consequences that were not confined to thedevelopment of Soviet-Afghan relations. The information related to Amin’s preparation ofthe coup d’etat was given “top secret” classification. However, at the same time, the best485
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- Page 452 and 453: eported and objectively interpreted
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- Page 494 and 495: was burning our hearts. We simply c
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“It looks like the situation within PDPA’s leadership is about <strong>to</strong> explode,” BorisSemyonovich said with great concern. “It seems that Amin is in a hurry <strong>to</strong> remove Taraki atany price, by accusing him of inability <strong>to</strong> control the situation in the country. Sarwari andthe three ministers appear <strong>to</strong> be the biggest obstacle for him in this endeavor. Under suchcircumstances, we must send a very strong message about the evolving conflict <strong>to</strong> YuriVladimirovich. We should use the same expressions as Gulabzoi and make sure that themessage fully reflects the gravity of the situation. Prepare a short preamble in thebeginning of the document. Remind them that we informed the Center about the situationseveral times in the past. Include Gulabzoi’s short bio and mention his particular loyalty <strong>to</strong>Taraki. In the end of the cable, mention that we have no doubt about the truthfulness of theinformation shared with us by the minister of communications of the DRA and that inconnection with this information, we would like <strong>to</strong> receive recommendations regardingpossible means <strong>to</strong> prevent the escalation of the conflict. Mention that a separate cablecontaining specific information regarding Amin’s recruitment of participants of the plannedstate coup d’etat will be sent around August 24.”When giving these instructions, the senior operative seemed very calm andconfident. However, Osadchiy and Starostin, who knew Ivanov’s style quite well, sensedthat it was not easy for Boris Semyonovich <strong>to</strong> authorize such a direct message. It waspossible that deep down, Ivanov still harbored some doubts.<strong>The</strong> cable signed by Ivanov was reported by Andropov <strong>to</strong> Brezhnev and some othermembers of the Politburo. It seemed <strong>to</strong> have left a strong impression on the Soviet leaders.Previous KGB analyses about disagreements among the leaders of the PDPA arriving fromKabul were not reported <strong>to</strong> the “very <strong>to</strong>p” and none of them sounded as dramatic as this484
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