The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
deal with Amin work? Where do the officers who were ‘purchased’ by Amin serve? Inwhich military detachments? And would those detachments support Amin if he attemptedto overthrow Taraki militarily? How would they act then? Which members of theRevolutionary Council and the Central Committee of the PDPA would support Amin in hisconflict with Taraki?”Gulabzoi was thinking. His dark eyes seemed to have darkened even more.“At this moment, I can provide you with only a few facts. However, I will be able togive you more information in a couple of days.”“Please make some brief notes in regards to these questions that are of interest tous,” said Starostin, and gave the minister a pen and a blank page from his notebook.He repeated the questions again. The guest noted them on the paper: “Who? Howmuch? Verbal discourse? Promises? Positions? Numbers? Members of the Rev. Council,Central Committee, etc.?”“I will collect the information that you request in the nearest future,” he promised,and put the piece of paper with the notes into his appointment book.“Could you write the information down in Dari? I would like to be able to present ascomprehensive and as detailed a report as possible to the Soviet authorities.”“I will do my best. However, I will have to ask others to assist me here.” Gulabzoiseemed to be calculating something in his head.“Are those people reliable? They will not tell Amin or anybody else about ourcontact?”“This is out of the question. They are absolutely reliable. They will not say a word toanybody.”482
“Who are they?”“There are very reliable people,” repeated Gulabzoi, who was unwilling to name hisfriends.“How would you explain your intention to compile the lists to them?”“This is my business. I am not going to explain anything to them. I am confident thatthey will not ask me about anything.”“Would you be able to give me these materials the day after tomorrow, on the day ofEid al-Fitr?”“Fine. This is a happy holiday and the best day of the year for faithful Afghans. It willbe very convenient for me to meet with you on that day.”“Do the logistics of meeting as we did today work for you?”“Yes, that’s fine with me.”“Then let’s meet on Saturday, August 23 at 8:10 p.m. near the bridge across theRiver Kabul on the road from Mikrorayon. I will arrive from Mikrorayon, so you shouldwait for me on the right side of the road.”“Why aren’t we meeting at 8 p.m. sharp? Why at 8:10 p.m.?” asked Gulabzoi withconfusion in his voice.“To be more precise,” responded Starostin vaguely. ****Starostin’s report about his meeting with Gulabzoi made a strong impression onIvanov and Osadchiy. The head of the KGB Representative Office, Bogdanov, was away onvacation at the time.* According to the rules of covert procedures, operatives were advised to avoid scheduling meetings on thehour.483
- Page 432 and 433: example, what was the purpose of Am
- Page 434 and 435: “This is what happened,” began
- Page 436 and 437: Ivanov hesitated. There was a silen
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- Page 442 and 443: paratroopers, disguised in aviation
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- Page 452 and 453: eported and objectively interpreted
- Page 454 and 455: countries, including Iran, Pakistan
- Page 456 and 457: officers took a seven-month-long co
- Page 458 and 459: Glotov and Alexander Dolmatov were
- Page 460 and 461: You will be assisting me in special
- Page 462 and 463: was surprised to find out that not
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- Page 468 and 469: “Valery, you should meet with Gul
- Page 470 and 471: ***Major General Zaplatin was very
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- Page 480 and 481: Afghanistan. Comrade Taraki is faci
- Page 484 and 485: “It looks like the situation with
- Page 486 and 487: analysts in the International Depar
- Page 488 and 489: 1. Find a way to remove H. Amin fro
- Page 490 and 491: water has such healing properties t
- Page 492 and 493: the other leaders of the faction wh
- Page 494 and 495: was burning our hearts. We simply c
- Page 496 and 497: carry out a coup d’etat by overth
- Page 498 and 499: indignation of Czech citizens watch
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- Page 506 and 507: that is happening behind my back.
- Page 508 and 509: Petrov responded sternly, briefly s
- Page 510 and 511: clear to him that he had to return
- Page 512 and 513: statement without the support of th
- Page 514 and 515: There were also several plain-cloth
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- Page 520 and 521: greeting, he informed me that Amin
- Page 522 and 523: Alexander Mikhailovich Puzanov, Sov
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“Who are they?”“<strong>The</strong>re are very reliable people,” repeated Gulabzoi, who was unwilling <strong>to</strong> name hisfriends.“How would you explain your intention <strong>to</strong> compile the lists <strong>to</strong> them?”“This is my business. I am not going <strong>to</strong> explain anything <strong>to</strong> them. I am confident thatthey will not ask me about anything.”“Would you be able <strong>to</strong> give me these materials the day after <strong>to</strong>morrow, on the day ofEid al-Fitr?”“Fine. This is a happy holiday and the best day of the year for faithful Afghans. It willbe very convenient for me <strong>to</strong> meet with you on that day.”“Do the logistics of meeting as we did <strong>to</strong>day work for you?”“Yes, that’s fine with me.”“<strong>The</strong>n let’s meet on Saturday, August 23 at 8:10 p.m. near the bridge across theRiver Kabul on the road from Mikrorayon. I will arrive from Mikrorayon, so you shouldwait for me on the right side of the road.”“Why aren’t we meeting at 8 p.m. sharp? Why at 8:10 p.m.?” asked Gulabzoi withconfusion in his voice.“To be more precise,” responded Starostin vaguely. ****Starostin’s report about his meeting with Gulabzoi made a strong impression onIvanov and Osadchiy. <strong>The</strong> head of the KGB Representative Office, Bogdanov, was away onvacation at the time.* According <strong>to</strong> the rules of covert procedures, operatives were advised <strong>to</strong> avoid scheduling meetings on thehour.483
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