The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

their conversations. The secretive nature of the meetings between Amin and Amstutz wasused against Amin later. KGB operatives, who had found out about it, concluded that theAfghan leader had begun his own game behind Moscow’s back, and it was a good enoughreason to eliminate him.It seemed as though some high-level officials in Moscow and Washington developeda sort of mutual paranoia at that time. The Soviets suspected the Americans of undertakingsecret preparations to capture Afghanistan, while the United States endeavored to convincethemselves and their allies that the Soviets were about to send tanks southwards tocapture the oilfields of the Persian Gulf.In the summer of 1979, the Islamic armed opposition (future mujahadeen, and laterTaliban) began to receive American assistance via ISI. Soviet intelligence learned about itimmediately. After the information was analyzed, the Central Committee of the CPSU tookthe bait of the information war by involving Soviet, East European, and Third Worldcountries’ mass media, as well as left-leaning Western newspapers. The State Departmentorchestrated an adequate response via diplomatic channels when the wave of accusationsagainst Americans was raised in world media.Ambassador Puzanov received a request for a meeting with the American embassy’sacting chargé d’affaires, Flatin. Flatin informed Puzanov that Amstutz had left forWashington for consultations and he, Flatin, was assigned to present a State Departmentmemorandum to the Soviet side entitled “False Statements about American Interference inAfghanistan.” It was a short diplomatic note that sluggishly downplayed the United States’involvement. Having read it, Puzanov decisively rejected all accusations directed againstthe Soviet Union. He attempted to assure his guest that the Soviet mass media correctly451