The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

directly pointing out that Taraki and Amin had consolidated all power in their hands,frequently made mistakes, and violated the law. There was a lack of broad support for thenew regime in the country. The local organs of self-governance had not yet been created,while “the recommendations of our advisers regarding these issues are not being put intopractice by the Afghan leadership.” The memo also stated that the measures taken by theDRA to stabilize the government were not efficient, and that the efforts of counterrevolutionwere focused on the disintegration of the Afghan army: “Different means, suchas religious fanaticism, bribes, and threats are being used to achieve that goal. Officers arebeing approached individually to sway them towards acts of treason. Such reactionarypractices are being conducted on a large scale and can have dangerous consequences forthe revolution.”As standard methodology required, the informational narrative in the memorandumwas followed by a set of recommendations. These measures included sending a letter onbehalf of the Politburo to the Central Committee of the PDPA, the purpose of which was toexpress the Soviet leadership’s concern and anxiety in a friendly tone and to voicesuggestions for strengthening the people’s power. It was also proposed to strengthen thestaff of the PDPA adviser and to authorize the allocation of party advisers to city andregional councils. It also was proposed that an experienced general and a group of officersbe sent to work in the Afghan armed forces in order to help the head of the Soviet advisorycontingent. In addition, the suggestion was made to send fifty military advisers, includingmilitary political specialists, as well as military counterintelligence officers.However, the most important, and classified, part of the memorandum was thefourth item. It said the following: “Upon agreement with the Afghan side, a battalion of441