The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

influence. This topic was last discussed by the leaders of the United States and the USSR inYalta at the end of World War II.However, upon return to Moscow, Soviet leaders, including B.S. Ivanov, subjectedCarter’s words to a thorough analysis. Ustinov and Andropov’s interpretation was that theAmericans were proposing that the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula should fallwithin the American sphere of influence, while the Soviet Union would receive Iran andAfghanistan. Ustinov believed that they should immediately accept such a proposal.Gromyko cooled him down: “In Vienna, Carter did not speak about the division of spheresof influence, but only appealed to mutual restraint in all matters related to Afghanistan andIran. This is the first point. The second point is that we should agree that the Persian Gulfstates are in the geopolitical sphere of interests of the United States.” In this regardAndropov was also not a supporter of the idea of such negotiations with the Americans. Heconsidered that Afghanistan was already in Moscow’s orbit, while Iran was, for the timebeing, lost to both the United States and the USSR.After long discussions, the following decision was made: the proposal voiced byCarter was to be ignored, while the situation in the Middle East was to be very closelymonitored. Growing American involvement in Pakistan, particularly the obvious U.S.support of Afghan counter-revolutionaries, was of great concern to Moscow.On June 29, members of the Soviet Politburo discussed the memorandum signed byGromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomaryov, and agreed that the situation inAfghanistan was becoming more complicated. The phrasing of this memorandum reflectedthe growing concern in the Soviet power ministries.When analyzing the causes of the situation’s deterioration, Politburo members were440