The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

Ivanov hesitated. There was a silence in the room, as Andropov’s envoy was not in ahurry to voice his conclusion.Summing up the conversation, Boris Semyonovich said to Osadchiy: “Please preparea cable to the Center. Address it to Andropov. The telegram should contain all of theinformation relayed by Victor Andreyevich as well as the essence of your analysis. Pleaseinclude what Sarwari told Leonid Pavlovich in early May. I will sign it.”Ten days later, more information about the deepening fissures among the Khalqielite arrived from Mahmoud. Now, according to the agent, the anti-Amin group had beenformed and included Head of AGSA Sarwari, Minister of Defense Watanjar, Minister ofCommunications Gulabzoi, and Minister of the Interior Mazdouryar. Demonstratively, thefour ministers refused to work with Amin and addressed Taraki directly on all questionsand issues. Moreover, Hafizullah Amin began to avoid having any meetings or contacts withWatanjar. Once, Taraki, noticing that Amin was absent from a meeting of the RevolutionaryCouncil, called him: “Comrade Amin, this is not the first time you have been absent from ameeting of the Revolutionary Council, and other such meetings. What is the reason for yourabsence?”“Watanjar said that if he sees me anywhere, he will kill me immediately,” Aminresponded, sounding insulted.“Well, Watanjar is a serious man. If he has so promised, then he would certainly gothrough with it,” Taraki responded, and smiled at the members of the RevolutionaryCouncil.“But under these circumstances, I cannot fulfill my responsibilities,” continuedAmin.436

“Okay, let’s discuss this situation tête-à-tête,” Taraki responded seriously.Another cable, describing this episode, signed by Ivanov, Bogdanov, and Osadchiy,went to the Center.***Unlike Bogdanov and Osadchiy, who were permitted to leave Kabul only underexceptional circumstances, General Ivanov traveled to Moscow quite frequently. Not onlycould Ivanov travel to Moscow, he was also included in the official Soviet delegation to thesummit meeting with President Jimmy Carter in Vienna. Vienna was the site of the summitwhere the important arms control treaty SALT II was to be signed.According to protocol, the treaty signing ceremony was supposed to take place inWashington because U.S. Presidents Nixon and Ford had previously visited the USSR twotimes in a row. It was therefore Brezhnev’s turn to fly across the ocean. However, hisdoctors objected to such a journey because of the general secretary’s poor health. Afterlengthy consultations, a mutual agreement was finally reached to meet in Vienna.The Soviet delegation arrived in the capital of Austria by train. The delegation wasled by Brezhnev and three other senior members of the Politburo: Gromyko, Ustinov, andChernenko. Boris Semyonovich Ivanov, officially listed as the Ministry of Foreign Affairsexpert at the rank of adviser, was the KGB point man in the delegation.Ivanov was present at almost all stages of the negotiations, which lasted for severaldays and were finalized by the signing of the SALT II Treaty. The deterioration ofBrezhnev’s health was very obvious to everyone. Ivanov noticed with anxiety that thegeneral secretary could not maintain even a basic dialogue on his own with the president ofthe United States. All of the speeches that Brezhnev read were typed in large font on a437

Ivanov hesitated. <strong>The</strong>re was a silence in the room, as Andropov’s envoy was not in ahurry <strong>to</strong> voice his conclusion.Summing up the conversation, Boris Semyonovich said <strong>to</strong> Osadchiy: “Please preparea cable <strong>to</strong> the Center. Address it <strong>to</strong> Andropov. <strong>The</strong> telegram should contain all of theinformation relayed by Vic<strong>to</strong>r Andreyevich as well as the essence of your analysis. Pleaseinclude what Sarwari <strong>to</strong>ld Leonid Pavlovich in early May. I will sign it.”Ten days later, more information about the deepening fissures among the Khalqielite arrived from Mahmoud. Now, according <strong>to</strong> the agent, the anti-Amin group had beenformed and included Head of AGSA Sarwari, Minister of Defense Watanjar, Minister ofCommunications Gulabzoi, and Minister of the Interior Mazdouryar. Demonstratively, thefour ministers refused <strong>to</strong> work with Amin and addressed Taraki directly on all questionsand issues. Moreover, Hafizullah Amin began <strong>to</strong> avoid having any meetings or contacts withWatanjar. Once, Taraki, noticing that Amin was absent from a meeting of the RevolutionaryCouncil, called him: “Comrade Amin, this is not the first time you have been absent from ameeting of the Revolutionary Council, and other such meetings. What is the reason for yourabsence?”“Watanjar said that if he sees me anywhere, he will kill me immediately,” Aminresponded, sounding insulted.“Well, Watanjar is a serious man. If he has so promised, then he would certainly gothrough with it,” Taraki responded, and smiled at the members of the RevolutionaryCouncil.“But under these circumstances, I cannot fulfill my responsibilities,” continuedAmin.436

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