The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

authority. They figured that the most likely figure behind Safronchuk was Andropovhimself. What was interesting was that Andropov’s actual envoy, B. S. Ivanov, remainedunrecognized as such by the Americans at the time.The message of the cables sent from the U.S. embassy in Kabul to Washington wasthat Safronchuk could become the “behind-the-curtain director” of the drama of regimechange, which “most probably would include the departure, or even better, the death, ofAmin.”It is important to mention that the Americans, although understaffed and under a lotof pressure from Afghan special services, were quite precise in their analyses of thesituation in the summer of 1979. In particular, they predicted the forthcoming rapidchanges in Afghan power structures.“The Russians are very concerned by the worsening of the situation in Afghanistan,knowing that the regime has very little support and is losing control over the situation inthe country,” one of the cables reported. “Amin, who is unilaterally in charge of thegovernment, is making miscalculations. Moscow thinks that a new, strong prime minister,who is not involved in current politics, is needed. According to the source, Safronchuk istasked to see to it that Amin is replaced. The source says that ‘now we witness theconcluding chapter of the activities of this government, and August is going to be hot. I donot have the weather in mind.’”According to some unconfirmed information, the “anonymous source” feedingAmericans fables about Safronchuk was the German Democratic Republic ambassador toKabul, Hermann Schweisau. It is also possible that a behind-the-scenes gambit of thespecial services was taking place. However, there is another possible scenario—the East424

German diplomat was collaborating with the Americans. In order to raise his standing intheir eyes, he concocted the story of Vasily Safronchuk’s secret mission. The fact that inAugust, Schweisau allegedly broke his leg and departed from Kabul forever supports thisscenario. It is known that in such cases, GDR counterintelligence always responded in anuncompromising manner.Whatever it was, our Vasily Stepanovich continued to work according to his officialmandate. He continued to advise Amin, who kept the portfolio of the foreign minister.Following the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee, Safronchuk tried to convince theAfghan leaders to put an end to the intra-party squabbles and to begin to expand the socialbase of revolution. He appealed to them to forgive the Parchamis and to bring them back totheir positions in the party and the government. He was helping Dost to set up the workinginfrastructure of the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.As a true diplomat, Safronchuk maintained good relations with everybody. He metwith Amin regularly, at least once a week. At first, he was charmed by this energetic andengaged person. However, Safronchuk soon realized that the prime minister was not assimple as he appeared to be, and that his convictions (or his imitations of convictions) wereextremely dangerous. But although Safronchuk would argue with Amin, he never crossedthe line, and always left the last word to the Afghan leader. Once, they discussed theevaluations of the Afghan revolution in an article written by the deputy head of theInternational Department of the Central Committee, R. A. Ulyanovsky. The article waspublished in the journal Kommunist. Ulyanovsky put the DRA in the category of nationaldemocratic states such as Laos, Burma, Ethiopia, and the Yemen Democratic Republic.Amin disagreed with Ulyanovsky’s analysis: “We belong to a group of countries that bypass425

German diplomat was collaborating with the Americans. In order <strong>to</strong> raise his standing intheir eyes, he concocted the s<strong>to</strong>ry of Vasily Safronchuk’s secret mission. <strong>The</strong> fact that inAugust, Schweisau allegedly broke his leg and departed from Kabul forever supports thisscenario. It is known that in such cases, GDR counterintelligence always responded in anuncompromising manner.Whatever it was, our Vasily Stepanovich continued <strong>to</strong> work according <strong>to</strong> his officialmandate. He continued <strong>to</strong> advise Amin, who kept the portfolio of the foreign minister.Following the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee, Safronchuk tried <strong>to</strong> convince theAfghan leaders <strong>to</strong> put an end <strong>to</strong> the intra-party squabbles and <strong>to</strong> begin <strong>to</strong> expand the socialbase of revolution. He appealed <strong>to</strong> them <strong>to</strong> forgive the Parchamis and <strong>to</strong> bring them back <strong>to</strong>their positions in the party and the government. He was helping Dost <strong>to</strong> set up the workinginfrastructure of the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.As a true diplomat, Safronchuk maintained good relations with everybody. He metwith Amin regularly, at least once a week. At first, he was charmed by this energetic andengaged person. However, Safronchuk soon realized that the prime minister was not assimple as he appeared <strong>to</strong> be, and that his convictions (or his imitations of convictions) wereextremely dangerous. But although Safronchuk would argue with Amin, he never crossedthe line, and always left the last word <strong>to</strong> the Afghan leader. Once, they discussed theevaluations of the Afghan revolution in an article written by the deputy head of theInternational Department of the Central Committee, R. A. Ulyanovsky. <strong>The</strong> article waspublished in the journal Kommunist. Ulyanovsky put the DRA in the category of nationaldemocratic states such as Laos, Burma, Ethiopia, and the Yemen Democratic Republic.Amin disagreed with Ulyanovsky’s analysis: “We belong <strong>to</strong> a group of countries that bypass425

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