The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
factions. The document mentioned that many prominent Khalqis had been killed, removedfrom party work, or expelled from the army and state organs. Many found themselvesabroad as political emigrants.The document placed major emphasis on the theme of crackdowns and abuse ofpower: “Many commanders, seeing that their colleagues are arrested and disappear, lackconfidence and fear their own arrests. This was proven by the events of Herat, where notonly a considerable part of the population but also some army detachments defected to theside of the rebels, per the initiative of their commanders.”The authors of the document stated with disappointment that they had broughtcases of abuse of power and evidence of mistakes and excesses to the attention of DRAleaders more than once. However, they found that the Afghan leaders “demonstratedinsufficient political flexibility and lack of experience and were not prepared to take thisadvice into consideration.”This was followed by the most important part of the document, which dealt with theAfghan leaders’ request for Soviet military intervention: “Our decision not to send Sovietmilitary detachments to Herat was absolutely correct. This line of thinking should bemaintained in case of new anti-government actions in Afghanistan, the possibility of whichcannot be excluded in the foreseeable future.”The following immediate measures to stabilize the domestic situation in the DRAwere proposed:• To raise the military capability of the Afghan army and theeffectiveness of its security organs, and to increase additional supplies ofweapons and equipment.414
• Issues related to economic assistance to Afghanistan, “particularlythose that would assist in strengthening the position of the revolutionarydemocratic regime, should be resolved quickly.”• The political base of the revolutionary regime should be expanded:“The leaders of the DRA should be encouraged to consider the importance ofcontinuing to realize the planned social and economic transformations,including land reform. They should work thoughtfully, without abusing theirauthority or making rash decisions…Peasants should realize that theyreceived land precisely due to the April Revolution, and if they do not defendthe revolutionary power, they face the loss of their land.”• The unity of leadership and regular party members should bestrengthened, along with an increase in their numbers.• Work should be conducted among the Muslim clergy “in order todivide and undermine the influence of reactionary Muslim leaders among themasses.”• Maintaining a certain legal order that is based on a revolutionarylaw framework is necessary, as well as a more balanced approach to applyingpunitive measures.• Measures should be taken against interference in the domesticaffairs of Afghanistan by other countries.This document was discussed during the Politburo meeting of April 12. Its contentswere taken into consideration.But Afghan leaders, ignoring common sense, continued to bombard the Kremlin415
- Page 364 and 365: mistakes that they have made. Even
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• Issues related <strong>to</strong> economic assistance <strong>to</strong> <strong>Afghanistan</strong>, “particularlythose that would assist in strengthening the position of the revolutionarydemocratic regime, should be resolved quickly.”• <strong>The</strong> political base of the revolutionary regime should be expanded:“<strong>The</strong> leaders of the DRA should be encouraged <strong>to</strong> consider the importance ofcontinuing <strong>to</strong> realize the planned social and economic transformations,including land reform. <strong>The</strong>y should work thoughtfully, without abusing theirauthority or making rash decisions…Peasants should realize that theyreceived land precisely due <strong>to</strong> the April Revolution, and if they do not defendthe revolutionary power, they face the loss of their land.”• <strong>The</strong> unity of leadership and regular party members should bestrengthened, along with an increase in their numbers.• Work should be conducted among the Muslim clergy “in order <strong>to</strong>divide and undermine the influence of reactionary Muslim leaders among themasses.”• Maintaining a certain legal order that is based on a revolutionarylaw framework is necessary, as well as a more balanced approach <strong>to</strong> applyingpunitive measures.• Measures should be taken against interference in the domesticaffairs of <strong>Afghanistan</strong> by other countries.This document was discussed during the Politburo meeting of April 12. Its contentswere taken in<strong>to</strong> consideration.But Afghan leaders, ignoring common sense, continued <strong>to</strong> bombard the Kremlin415
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