The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

“You personally signed the note that we sent to the Center. It didn’t mention Heratspecifically, but described possible scenarios that could occur in Kabul or any other Afghancity. Such a scenario was fully confirmed by the developments in Herat. We sent that noteto the Center via mail, and most likely, our colleagues in Moscow paid no attention to it.“Fine, then let’s send such documents by telegraph,” suggested Osadchiy.Khotyaev was not done. “And you think they will be treated any differently if they’resent by telegraph?”“Well, these messages will be read by at least Kryuchkov and Medyanik,” replied theresident.“Vilior Gavrilovich, I understand that the question of how to send documents,whether by mail or by telegraph, is very important,” began Orlov-Morozov quietly.“However, it seems to me that the content of these documents is much more important. Iam referring to the sort of prognoses we will present to the leadership. A lot of optimisticinformation is being sent to Moscow using all of our channels—the kind of information thatsuggests that the revolution is growing in strength, that our Afghan friends are achievingsuccess in revolutionary reforms, that they are expanding their social base. However, weknow this not to be the case. We know that the situation in the country is very dangerous.How will our analyses be perceived against a generally optimistic background? Would theybe listened to in earnest by the leadership?”“It all depends on what we write and how we present this information,” remarkedOsadchiy. “You, Valery, tell us your prognosis regarding the future of the April Revolution.”Starostin ceased counting the raisins in the crystal vase and responded, “The mostpessimistic.” He then began to expand on his view. “You know, I was an excellent student of399