The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

Morozov, Khotyaev, and Starostin to his office. When they entered his office, he locked thedoor to prevent any interruptions. Freshly brewed tea with sugar was served on a sidetable. That signaled a substantive conversation.“So, comrades, we did what we could during the uprising. Our performance cannotbe qualified as either excellent or poor,” started Osadchiy. “We were quite efficient withrelaying up-to-date information to the Center and keeping them informed about such-andsuchmilitary detachments defecting, or an outraged crowd attacking this and that. Thatwas made possible due to information flow from the counterintelligence network and theirtrusted contacts in the Soviet colony. Such information is undoubtedly necessary; whenthere is a fire in the house, one needs to know which side of the house to approach to dousethe flame. However, all the analyses arrived in hindsight of events that had already takenplace. Bogdanov, Gorelov’s people, and party advisers all sent matching accounts ofhappenings on the ground, but that represents the limit to what they can do. They haveother tasks. We should work to provide analytical perspectives on what will happen, ratherthan what has already happened. We must present a prognosis for events that are poised tohappen in the country. We are the political intelligence!”Having finished his last phrase, Osadchiy glanced at his colleagues and smiled.Orlov-Morozov continued looking upon his boss with a calm gaze that revealed littlefeeling. Starostin seemed to be counting the raisins in the crystal vase located right in frontof him. Khotyaev, the only one who perceived Osadchiy’s words as reproachful, grewagitated and responded: “Vilior Gavrilovich, we have prepared prognoses before. Just twomonths ago, we predicted a rebellion in Herat.”“I saw no such prediction,” objected a surprised Osadchiy.398