The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

eason Ivanov did not fall prey to such influence. Andropov’s representative was obviouslynot impressed by Amin. In fact, Ivanov scared Amin. At that very first meeting, Amin sensedin the general a smart psychologist who lent little weight to words, but was able to peerinto one’s soul. Amin felt as though Ivanov was looking right through him.Ivanov also didn’t like Amin. As an experienced intelligence operative, heimmediately suspected lack of sincerity in Amin. He saw right through Amin’s rhetoricaltactics. At that very first meeting, a sense of mutual dislike emerged that would continue tostrengthen with time.Ivanov valued in KGB operatives loyalty and competence more than anything else. Itwas impossible for anybody to trick him by presenting some fabricated outcome ratherthan true results. Both Bogdanov and Osadchiy knew that very well. Each of them wouldhave liked to present their subordinates in the best light possible, showing off the bestqualities of their operatives. However, it was more difficult for Bogdanov because his officehad been organized more recently. They did not have a sufficient number of specialists onAfghanistan in the Center, and often sent operatives who didn’t know the language or localcustoms. This is why it was Bogdanov himself, or his deputy Chuchukin, or acommunications officer who would report to Ivanov most of the time.Ivanov knew most of the senior operatives in the resident’s group and the KGBRepresentative Office. He knew Vladimir Chuchukin from their joint work in the UnitedStates, when B.S. was the resident there.Osadchiy, having received an interesting report about a meeting with an agent orother important information from his operatives, would call the general and ask him toreceive his operative. Ivanov always listened to KGB operatives intently, never judging396