The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
crucial decisions in complex situations without wasting any time coordinating his moveswith the Center. For these reasons, the expert on the United States, Ivanov, was appointedover Medyanik, another deputy head at PGU, who was then in charge of Middle Easternoperations.Needless to say, that appointment caught Vladimir Alexandrovich Kryuchkov bysurprise. He would now have to take into consideration that the KGB chairman would becomparing information arriving from Kabul from the KGB Residency (Vilior Osadchiy) andthe KGB Representative Office (Leonid Bogdanov) with the information received directlyfrom Andropov’s personal representative. On the other hand, the head of PGU had reasonsto be grateful for such an unexpected turn of events. General Ivanov was too independent,too highly respected, and too professional to be working as a regular deputy head of PGU.Kryuchkov constantly sensed mistrust of his actions on the part of Ivanov, who was a muchbetter qualified professional than his superior. A man like Ivanov, with such deep andpowerful connections “at the very top,” would be better kept as far away from Kryuchkov’sagency as possible. It was a stroke of luck that the Politburo decided to send Ivanov toAfghanistan * . Kryuchkov had to thank providence for such an unexpected gift.B.S. (this is how subordinates usually referred to Ivanov) received his appointmentin Kabul calmly; he considered it an important party and work assignment, the goal ofwhich was to “protect the interests of the Soviet Union in one of the tactical areas mostcrucial for its foreign policy objectives.” However, as he left for Afghanistan the generalrealized that he would never return to his former post. Perhaps he was even glad to be* It is interesting that in the writing of this book, we discovered a telling detail that was very characteristic ofIvanov. Unlike the majority of his colleagues, who wrote memoirs and gave interviews to Russian and foreignjournalists generously in the nineties, not once did Ivanov act or speak publically.392
deployed to Kabul, as it was an opportunity for him to change his routine and dedicatehimself to new challenges. Ivanov’s wife had died recently, and the general had a difficulttime adjusting to that loss.B.S. arrived in Kabul quietly and incognito, as a man of his profession should.Osadchiy and Bogdanov met the representative of the Center at the airport. BorisSemyonovich settled into a two-room apartment on the territory of the ambassador’sresidence. He was assigned the modest office of the deputy resident in charge ofcounterintelligence that was located on the second floor of the embassy. The first twomeetings that Ivanov held were with the KGB representative and the KGB resident. Helistened to detailed reports about the political situation in the country. He was especiallyinterested in the mechanism that opponents of the regime used most frequently toorganize anti-government actions. Ivanov inquired about his colleagues’ opinionsregarding the use of intelligence capabilities to undermine counter-revolutionary forcesfrom within. He asked for the characteristics of the Afghan leaders, their worldviews, andbusiness and personal qualities. He asked Bogdanov and Osadchiy to describe the situationin their respective operative groups. They agreed that both colonels and their deputieswould report to him all of the latest information, which would be formatted as officialreports. However, Ivanov wanted to ensure that if any operative received important orurgent information, it would be forwarded directly to him immediately, regardless of thetime of day or his whereabouts.Boris Semyonovich understood well that his arrival in Afghanistan would impactBogdanov’s ambitions to become the senior KGB man in Afghanistan and subjugateOsadchiy and his group to Bogdanov himself. That was why Ivanov was deliberately tactful393
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deployed <strong>to</strong> Kabul, as it was an opportunity for him <strong>to</strong> change his routine and dedicatehimself <strong>to</strong> new challenges. Ivanov’s wife had died recently, and the general had a difficulttime adjusting <strong>to</strong> that loss.B.S. arrived in Kabul quietly and incogni<strong>to</strong>, as a man of his profession should.Osadchiy and Bogdanov met the representative of the Center at the airport. BorisSemyonovich settled in<strong>to</strong> a two-room apartment on the terri<strong>to</strong>ry of the ambassador’sresidence. He was assigned the modest office of the deputy resident in charge ofcounterintelligence that was located on the second floor of the embassy. <strong>The</strong> first twomeetings that Ivanov held were with the KGB representative and the KGB resident. Helistened <strong>to</strong> detailed reports about the political situation in the country. He was especiallyinterested in the mechanism that opponents of the regime used most frequently <strong>to</strong>organize anti-government actions. Ivanov inquired about his colleagues’ opinionsregarding the use of intelligence capabilities <strong>to</strong> undermine counter-revolutionary forcesfrom within. He asked for the characteristics of the Afghan leaders, their worldviews, andbusiness and personal qualities. He asked Bogdanov and Osadchiy <strong>to</strong> describe the situationin their respective operative groups. <strong>The</strong>y agreed that both colonels and their deputieswould report <strong>to</strong> him all of the latest information, which would be formatted as officialreports. However, Ivanov wanted <strong>to</strong> ensure that if any operative received important orurgent information, it would be forwarded directly <strong>to</strong> him immediately, regardless of thetime of day or his whereabouts.Boris Semyonovich unders<strong>to</strong>od well that his arrival in <strong>Afghanistan</strong> would impactBogdanov’s ambitions <strong>to</strong> become the senior KGB man in <strong>Afghanistan</strong> and subjugateOsadchiy and his group <strong>to</strong> Bogdanov himself. That was why Ivanov was deliberately tactful393