The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

General Staff for his ruthless execution of over two hundred people at once.Taraki returned to Kabul from Moscow on March 25. In a day, a Supreme DefenseCouncil was created in Afghanistan, with Taraki as its chairman.Having returned to Afghanistan, Taraki discovered with great surprise that thedesired unity among the Khalqis was no more. The heroes of the revolution, Watanjar andGulabzoi, publically accused Amin at a meeting of the Revolutionary Council of having aninappropriate attitude towards the armed forces. They accused him of deploying troopsagainst peaceful citizens, although such matters were under the jurisdiction of the Ministryof the Interior. The “educational measures” that had been undertaken by the Soviet leadersdemanded that Taraki address this situation. He dared to remove his favorite pupil Aminfrom supervising the armed forces. It was recommended that Amin focus on economic anddomestic political issues instead. Watanjar was appointed as minister of defense, andMazdouryar, another opponent of Amin’s, became the minister of the interior.However, Hafizullah Amin was compensated handsomely, as Taraki transferredprime ministerial duties to his “beloved pupil.” These changes in the highest echelons ofpower were accompanied by the adoption of a number of legal amendments regarding theRevolutionary Council and the government. The position of prime minister was eliminatedand replaced by the post of “first minister.” Other amendments turned the chairman of theRevolutionary Council into the head of state and subordinated members of his cabinet tohim.Taraki had formally strengthened his position, and it could even appear to externalobservers that he had conclusively outperformed Amin in the struggle for absolute power.However, subsequent events revealed that in reality the situation was very different.390

On March 17, in view of the worsening situation, a group of KGB operatives headedby Lt. General B.S. Ivanov was sent to Kabul. General Ivanov was the first deputy ofKryuchkov in PGU. He was in charge of political intelligence. His position corresponded tothat of Frank Carlucci, the second man in the CIA, who would later become a nationalsecurity adviser and secretary of defense in the Reagan Administration. Boris Semyonovichwas considered to be a prominent expert in U.S. and European affairs. He served two longterms in the United States as a KGB resident. He worked in the official Soviet delegationsduring negotiations with Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter. It was Ivanov who developedand implemented the exchange of the Chilean communist Luis Corvalan. He participated inOperation “Dunai” (Danube), the regime-changing Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia.General Ivanov was also the one who created “special economic intelligence” and brieflyheaded the most secretive department of PGU, Department Thirteen. But perhaps BorisSemyonovich’s most important achievement was the fact that by the late 1970s, he hadbecome one of the most trusted colleagues of the chairman of the KGB. Ivanov was able tocontact Andropov, as well as some other members of the Politburo, directly, bypassing hisimmediate superior, Kryuchkov.Perhaps that was the most important factor when the decision was made regardingthe appointment of the person in charge of all KGB activities in Afghanistan, who wouldinform the political leadership of the Soviet Union about the real situation in the country.Andropov needed a man in Kabul whom he could fully trust, a man who could rise abovethe petty rivalries of the Soviet colony, and who had a high degree of authority amongdiplomats, politicians, and military officials. Andropov needed a man who could make391

On March 17, in view of the worsening situation, a group of KGB operatives headedby Lt. General B.S. Ivanov was sent <strong>to</strong> Kabul. General Ivanov was the first deputy ofKryuchkov in PGU. He was in charge of political intelligence. His position corresponded <strong>to</strong>that of Frank Carlucci, the second man in the CIA, who would later become a nationalsecurity adviser and secretary of defense in the Reagan Administration. Boris Semyonovichwas considered <strong>to</strong> be a prominent expert in U.S. and European affairs. He served two longterms in the United States as a KGB resident. He worked in the official Soviet delegationsduring negotiations with Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter. It was Ivanov who developedand implemented the exchange of the Chilean communist Luis Corvalan. He participated inOperation “Dunai” (Danube), the regime-changing Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia.General Ivanov was also the one who created “special economic intelligence” and brieflyheaded the most secretive department of PGU, Department Thirteen. But perhaps BorisSemyonovich’s most important achievement was the fact that by the late 1970s, he hadbecome one of the most trusted colleagues of the chairman of the KGB. Ivanov was able <strong>to</strong>contact Andropov, as well as some other members of the Politburo, directly, bypassing hisimmediate superior, Kryuchkov.Perhaps that was the most important fac<strong>to</strong>r when the decision was made regardingthe appointment of the person in charge of all KGB activities in <strong>Afghanistan</strong>, who wouldinform the political leadership of the Soviet Union about the real situation in the country.Andropov needed a man in Kabul whom he could fully trust, a man who could rise abovethe petty rivalries of the Soviet colony, and who had a high degree of authority amongdiplomats, politicians, and military officials. Andropov needed a man who could make391

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!