The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

ased on the Bolshevik experience. For instance, it was recommended that the Afghans payspecial attention to creating a unified national front, and create committees consisting ofimpoverished peasants from rural areas. The goal of such committees was to organize“deterrents to feudal lords and capitalist landlords.” It was recommended to broaden thescope of political propaganda and seal the borders with Pakistan and Iran. Thememorandum also explained why Soviet military intervention made no sense.Taraki, in his response, having correctly surmised the tone of the conversation, gavea convenient lie, saying that the unified national front “was de facto created in the format ofparty, komsomol, and trade union organizations.” He again complained about the meddlingof external enemies. He rejected the idea of sealing the borders (“it would createunhappiness among Afghani and Pakistani Pashtuns and Beluji and would bring significantdamage to the prestige of the current authorities”). To conclude his short speech, the guestformally thanked “dear Leonid Ilyich” for the opportunity to exchange opinions.They then parted. Taraki went to his embassy to celebrate the holiday of Navruz, theAfghan New Year, which arrives on the day of the spring equinox, March 21. Brezhnev, whowas supported by his assistant with great care, walked toward the exit. Kozin was left totranscribe the conversation. Brezhnev’s assistant, Samoteikin, arranged a place for him inthe adjacent room and supplied him with a notebook. A silent waitress arrived with tea,pretzels, and sandwiches. Vladimir, trying to remember every word that had been spoken,began to write down the conversation.The item “Regarding the situation in Afghanistan” was again listed first on theagenda for the Politburo meeting on March 22. Brezhnev emphasized again that hisposition and all the actions related to it were absolutely correct. He shared the details of his386