The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
conversation. “I would like to inform you, Comrade Taraki, that the rebellion in Herat hasbeen suppressed,” Kosygin offered.“How do you know?” Taraki was stirred up.The premier winked to the interpreter. “From the newspapers.”“That’s good news, very good news,” Taraki said, missing the joke.Kozin, while waiting for the plane to arrive from Kabul, had seen out of the corner ofhis eye a secret cable from General Gorelov among Kosygin’s documents. The text read,“Herat uprising suppressed.”The Kremlin was ready to receive their Afghan guest. Kosygin, Gromyko, Ustinov,and Ponomaryov sat on one side of the table. On the other side sat Taraki and Kozin. Alsopresent was Stanislav Gavrilov, an official of the Foreign Ministry who was there totranscribe the talks. The meeting was too secretive to invite a professional stenographer.Kosygin explained that at first they were going to give the floor to Taraki, but thendecided to begin with outlining the Soviet position regarding the situation. After theperfunctory assurances of friendship, Kosygin began, “There are different ways to resolvethe problems that you are facing, but the best way is the one that would uphold theauthority of your government among the people without ruining the relationships betweenAfghanistan and its neighbors or damaging the DRA’s international reputation.” Toillustrate his point, Kosygin cited Vietnam as a country that had survived a difficult warwith the United States and at the time was fighting Chinese aggression on its own.“There are sufficient forces in your country to deter counter-revolutionary attacks,”Kosygin continued in an even voice. “For example, let us look at Herat. When you becameserious about dealing with it, you gained control over the situation. We have just received a380
message this morning that the military base where the rebellious segment of theSeventeenth Infantry Division deployed was captured after bombing raids by a battalion ofparatroopers, supported by tanks that had arrived from Kandahar.“We will provide you with assistance by all possible means. However, our militaryintervention would immediately agitate the international community and would bringsharply negative consequences in a number of areas. Our common enemies are sitting andwaiting for Soviet troops to enter Afghan territory. One cannot but see that our troopswould have to fight not only the external aggressor, but also some segment of the Afghanpeople. People do not forgive such transgressions.”Kosygin pronounced these arguments smoothly, only occasionally glancing at thepapers that were arrayed before him. It was not difficult to translate his message intoPashto. The premier made necessary pauses for the interpreter and patiently waited asKozin relayed his words to the guest. Pashto is a difficult language for interpretation. Sincethe predicate is found at the end of the sentence, it is difficult to translate until the entirephrase has been uttered. Words then must be configured as figures in a game of chess.Having finished the last sentence, the interpreter looked at Taraki, noticing how hisusually kind eyes were tensed and fiery. It did not seem as though the good news fromHerat had convinced him that he had to give up the idea of inviting the Soviet troops.“We came to the conclusion,” continued Kosygin, “that at this stage, the mosteffective support for you would be exerting our political influence on the countriesneighboring Afghanistan and providing you with significant and multi-faceted assistance.These are the considerations that we wish to relay to you in an open and friendly way,” thechairman of the Soviet government finished, leaning against the back of his chair with a381
- Page 330 and 331: Badruddin Bahes was close to Muslim
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- Page 362 and 363: decide to send them to Afghanistan?
- Page 364 and 365: mistakes that they have made. Even
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conversation. “I would like <strong>to</strong> inform you, Comrade Taraki, that the rebellion in Herat hasbeen suppressed,” Kosygin offered.“How do you know?” Taraki was stirred up.<strong>The</strong> premier winked <strong>to</strong> the interpreter. “From the newspapers.”“That’s good news, very good news,” Taraki said, missing the joke.Kozin, while waiting for the plane <strong>to</strong> arrive from Kabul, had seen out of the corner ofhis eye a secret cable from General Gorelov among Kosygin’s documents. <strong>The</strong> text read,“Herat uprising suppressed.”<strong>The</strong> Kremlin was ready <strong>to</strong> receive their Afghan guest. Kosygin, Gromyko, Ustinov,and Ponomaryov sat on one side of the table. On the other side sat Taraki and Kozin. Alsopresent was Stanislav Gavrilov, an official of the Foreign Ministry who was there <strong>to</strong>transcribe the talks. <strong>The</strong> meeting was <strong>to</strong>o secretive <strong>to</strong> invite a professional stenographer.Kosygin explained that at first they were going <strong>to</strong> give the floor <strong>to</strong> Taraki, but thendecided <strong>to</strong> begin with outlining the Soviet position regarding the situation. After theperfunc<strong>to</strong>ry assurances of friendship, Kosygin began, “<strong>The</strong>re are different ways <strong>to</strong> resolvethe problems that you are facing, but the best way is the one that would uphold theauthority of your government among the people without ruining the relationships between<strong>Afghanistan</strong> and its neighbors or damaging the DRA’s international reputation.” Toillustrate his point, Kosygin cited Vietnam as a country that had survived a difficult warwith the United States and at the time was fighting Chinese aggression on its own.“<strong>The</strong>re are sufficient forces in your country <strong>to</strong> deter counter-revolutionary attacks,”Kosygin continued in an even voice. “For example, let us look at Herat. When you becameserious about dealing with it, you gained control over the situation. We have just received a380
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