The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

economic reforms as the solutions. It is not an accident that from his first steps as theleader of the PDPA he invested a great deal of time in creating underground, covert groupsin the armed forces, the ones that played a decisive role in the armed uprising of April 27,1978.“The initial rivalry with Babrak Karmal evolved into open hostility that occurredsimultaneously in several areas. They jealously monitored the relative political statuses oftheir factions. For example, Taraki could not forgive Karmal for the fact that PresidentDaoud, after having overthrown the king, handed several ministerial appointments toParchamis and their supporters. Karmal, on the other hand, desired a majority share of theallocated Soviet assistance and was jealous of Taraki’s trips to the USSR, which, before theApril Revolution, Taraki did under the auspices of the Union of Soviet Writers. Taraki alsodid not trust Karmal because of his origins from a prominent family, the status of whichhad made him close to the king and Daoud. Karmal, in turn, always labeled his political rivalas an overt Pashtun nationalist.“So there are many reasons for animosity between the two—many more thancauses to cease the rivalry. But I want to emphasize that this is my personal take on thesituation,” Kozin said. “Because you’re asking me to be as open as possible, and Iunderstand that our conversation is confidential, I would like to add the following.Although most regard Taraki as the leader of the PDPA and admire his contribution to theparty right after its inception, many of his supporters have noticed that, as new challengesbegan to arise after the triumph of the April Revolution, Taraki did not act as a strong andenergetic leader. He has neither the skills nor the experience necessary for the conditionsof fighting various counter-revolutionary forces. He doesn’t have a clear idea of how to378

ealize the needed socio-economic reforms. He has failed to stifle intrigues within the partyleadership. Besides, we are told that he has a propensity to drink, has a weakness for emptypraise, and avoids the behind-the-scenes hard work that his position requires, preferringpurely representative functions instead. With this in mind, you can understand howComrade Amin has gained such political clout.”“The plane has arrived, Alexei Nikolayevich,” said Kosygin’s assistant tactfully.Taraki emerged from the airplane alone. The Soviet premier, the Afghan generalsecretary, and the interpreter boarded a car bound for the Kremlin. Kosygin notified Tarakithat Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev would meet with him later that night. In the car, AlexeiNikolayevich began to share his concerns about the situation in Afghanistan with Taraki.“You do not control, as you used to, a considerable portion of the country’s territory.The rebels are attacking on all fronts.”“This is true,” conceded Taraki bitterly. “But backing our enemies are thereactionary forces of the world—the United States, Pakistan, Iran, and China. We are in adifficult situation.”“I agree, but it seems to us that you are making mistakes in your domestic politics.Your activities have angered your people and strengthened the hand of the enemies of therevolution.”Taraki was silent. He understood that the forthcoming conversations would bedifficult. He quickly surmised that he had not been brought to Moscow to be informed ofthe acceptance of his requests for military intervention. So he decided to dodge thediscussion and preserve his arguments until the proper moment.When approaching Moscow’s city center, Kosygin decided to lift the mood of the379

ealize the needed socio-economic reforms. He has failed <strong>to</strong> stifle intrigues within the partyleadership. Besides, we are <strong>to</strong>ld that he has a propensity <strong>to</strong> drink, has a weakness for emptypraise, and avoids the behind-the-scenes hard work that his position requires, preferringpurely representative functions instead. With this in mind, you can understand howComrade Amin has gained such political clout.”“<strong>The</strong> plane has arrived, Alexei Nikolayevich,” said Kosygin’s assistant tactfully.Taraki emerged from the airplane alone. <strong>The</strong> Soviet premier, the Afghan generalsecretary, and the interpreter boarded a car bound for the Kremlin. Kosygin notified Tarakithat Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev would meet with him later that night. In the car, AlexeiNikolayevich began <strong>to</strong> share his concerns about the situation in <strong>Afghanistan</strong> with Taraki.“You do not control, as you used <strong>to</strong>, a considerable portion of the country’s terri<strong>to</strong>ry.<strong>The</strong> rebels are attacking on all fronts.”“This is true,” conceded Taraki bitterly. “But backing our enemies are thereactionary forces of the world—the United States, Pakistan, Iran, and China. We are in adifficult situation.”“I agree, but it seems <strong>to</strong> us that you are making mistakes in your domestic politics.Your activities have angered your people and strengthened the hand of the enemies of therevolution.”Taraki was silent. He unders<strong>to</strong>od that the forthcoming conversations would bedifficult. He quickly surmised that he had not been brought <strong>to</strong> Moscow <strong>to</strong> be informed ofthe acceptance of his requests for military intervention. So he decided <strong>to</strong> dodge thediscussion and preserve his arguments until the proper moment.When approaching Moscow’s city center, Kosygin decided <strong>to</strong> lift the mood of the379

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