The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

military divisions had been deployed in the Turkestan military district and one in theCentral Asian military district, which meant that three detachments were within threehours of reaching Afghanistan. But the marshal said that this information was meant simplyto emphasize their readiness. He asked for permission to conduct tactical maneuvers at theborder, and stated in conclusion that, like his comrades, he did not support the idea ofmilitary intervention.Andropov also repeated his position from yesterday, and subjected the Afghanleaders to sharp criticism. He accused them of failing to control the situation, having toofew resources to support their regime, failing to engage in ideological work with theirpopulation, and continuing crackdowns. Andropov suggested replacing the primaryCommunist Party adviser, Veselov, with somebody with a higher degree of authority,possibly from the Central Committee. Secretary of the Central Committee Kapitonovobjected to this last point. “Veselov is a good specialist. He worked as an inspector in theCentral Committee apparatus and was the second secretary of the Bashkir Regional PartyCommittee. He is a young and energetic person.”The general secretary seemed pleased with the discussion. Brezhnev liked when hisclosest allies were not arguing with each other, and when the Politburo was unified. He wasnot fond of lengthy meetings. In this instance, they managed to make balanced decisionswithin one hour’s work.“I think we should approve the measures that have been formulated during the lastseveral days,” concluded Brezhnev. “We have decided to invite Comrade Taraki to theSoviet Union tomorrow, on March 20. Kosygin, Gromyko, and Ustinov will conduct talkswith him, then I will receive him personally.”374

***Vladimir Kozin, a thirty-year-old student of the Diplomatic Academy, was notsurprised when he was told to arrive at the International Department of the CentralCommittee on Tuesday morning. His task was to work with high-level Afghan guests. It wasthe second time that Kozin was asked to interpret from Pashto at the important talks in theKremlin. On March 20, Kozin found himself in the pavilion of the government airportVnukovo-2, where Nur Mohammad Taraki was due to arrive from Kabul. Because this wasan unofficial visit, in essence a secret one, only Kosygin was there to meet the Afghanleader.While waiting for the airplane to arrive, Kosygin studied some documents inpreparation for his meeting with Taraki. On top of the pile of papers was Taraki’sbiography, which had been prepared per Kosygin’s request. The biography consisted of adry list of dates, positions, and books that had been written by Taraki, which made itdifficult to better understand the man with whom Kosygin was due to begin serious talks.So Kosygin asked the interpreter to join him.“You worked in Afghanistan. Tell me about Taraki,” said Kosygin.“He was born in 1917,” Kozin began readily. “He graduated…”“No, no, no,” Kosygin interrupted him. “I don’t need dates and diplomas. I want toknow what sort of person he is. Tell me about personal characteristics that will help meunderstand the essence of his nature.”Vladimir was embarrassed. “I understand, Alexei Nikolayevich. Allow me to startagain. Nur Mohammad Taraki was born in the year of the October Revolution, in a Pashtunpeasant family. His father was a herder. He was destined to repeat the life of his father, to375

military divisions had been deployed in the Turkestan military district and one in theCentral Asian military district, which meant that three detachments were within threehours of reaching <strong>Afghanistan</strong>. But the marshal said that this information was meant simply<strong>to</strong> emphasize their readiness. He asked for permission <strong>to</strong> conduct tactical maneuvers at theborder, and stated in conclusion that, like his comrades, he did not support the idea ofmilitary intervention.Andropov also repeated his position from yesterday, and subjected the Afghanleaders <strong>to</strong> sharp criticism. He accused them of failing <strong>to</strong> control the situation, having <strong>to</strong>ofew resources <strong>to</strong> support their regime, failing <strong>to</strong> engage in ideological work with theirpopulation, and continuing crackdowns. Andropov suggested replacing the primaryCommunist Party adviser, Veselov, with somebody with a higher degree of authority,possibly from the Central Committee. Secretary of the Central Committee Kapi<strong>to</strong>novobjected <strong>to</strong> this last point. “Veselov is a good specialist. He worked as an inspec<strong>to</strong>r in theCentral Committee apparatus and was the second secretary of the Bashkir Regional PartyCommittee. He is a young and energetic person.”<strong>The</strong> general secretary seemed pleased with the discussion. Brezhnev liked when hisclosest allies were not arguing with each other, and when the Politburo was unified. He wasnot fond of lengthy meetings. In this instance, they managed <strong>to</strong> make balanced decisionswithin one hour’s work.“I think we should approve the measures that have been formulated during the lastseveral days,” concluded Brezhnev. “We have decided <strong>to</strong> invite Comrade Taraki <strong>to</strong> theSoviet Union <strong>to</strong>morrow, on March 20. Kosygin, Gromyko, and Ustinov will conduct talkswith him, then I will receive him personally.”374

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