The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

this government. But can our troops be of help in this case? No. In this case, tanks andarmored vehicles cannot be the solution. I think we need to tell Comrade Taraki this.”“Perhaps we should invite him here and inform him that we will increase ourassistance but will not bring in troops,” suggested Kosygin. “We will not bring in troopsbecause they will have to fight the Afghan people. That would entail only losses for us,without gains.”Kirilenko attempted to spearhead the discussion again. “We gave them everything,and for what? What has come out of it? Nothing good transpired for them as a result. Theyhave executed innocent people. To justify this, they point to us and say that we alsoexecuted people under Lenin. Such good Marxists! I think we shall have to report our pointof view to Leonid Ilyich, and invite Comrade Taraki to Moscow to inform him of theoutcome of these discussions.”“If we begin the military intervention and begin killing Afghans, we will surely beconvicted of aggression. There will be no other way around it,” came Chernenko’s timid,asthmatic voice. Chernenko had just returned from Zavidovo late at night, before themeeting.“I think we should ask for Leonid Ilyich’s input immediately, and send an airplane toKabul for Taraki,” proposed Kosygin. “In regards to our suggestions yesterday for providingassistance, our position has not changed, except for ruling out military intervention.”“Yes, that option should be excluded,” the minister of defense confirmed.When the relaxed and refreshed general secretary appeared in the CentralCommittee on Monday, March 19, Chernenko invited all of the participants of the previousday’s meeting, plus Head of the General Staff Ogarkov, to a new meeting. Brezhnev, who372

with great pleasure shared stories of his hunting adventures in Zavidovo with hiscolleagues, as was customary for Mondays, had to change the subject to Afghan affairs. Sothat his present colleagues would harbor no doubt of his competence, he assured them thathe had been monitoring the developments in the neighboring country with the utmostattention. Then Leonid Ilyich approved the proposals from the weekend’s Politburosessions and agreed that “now is not the time to get sucked into this war.” He offeredGromyko, Ustinov, Andropov, and Kosygin the opportunity to voice their opinions onceagain, at which point they could conclude the current phase of organizing the SovietUnion’s emergency response.Gromyko basically repeated what he had said the day before, adding the argumentthat “the hand of the United States” was undoubtedly orchestrating these events.Kosygin reported on his latest communications with Taraki. The head ofAfghanistan had repeated his pleas for help in the face of imminent collapse. “I asked him,‘Are there workers in Herat?’ His response was that there were only about two thousandworkers there,” said Kosygin. According to the Afghan leader, once Herat falls, all of thosewho are dissatisfied with the new authorities will unite and attack Kabul, which wouldherald the end of his government. This is why he has asked for our troops on the ground.”Kosygin suggested issuing a serious warning to Pakistan and Iran about non-interference inthe domestic affairs of Afghanistan, and then again, in Brezhnev’s presence this time, raisedthe issue of replacing the Soviet ambassador in Kabul.The minister of defense told of his last conversation with Amin, who had alsoinsisted on dispatching Soviet military force. Ustinov, however, mentioned that thesituation in Herat had somewhat improved for the moment. He reported that two Soviet373

this government. But can our troops be of help in this case? No. In this case, tanks andarmored vehicles cannot be the solution. I think we need <strong>to</strong> tell Comrade Taraki this.”“Perhaps we should invite him here and inform him that we will increase ourassistance but will not bring in troops,” suggested Kosygin. “We will not bring in troopsbecause they will have <strong>to</strong> fight the Afghan people. That would entail only losses for us,without gains.”Kirilenko attempted <strong>to</strong> spearhead the discussion again. “We gave them everything,and for what? What has come out of it? Nothing good transpired for them as a result. <strong>The</strong>yhave executed innocent people. To justify this, they point <strong>to</strong> us and say that we alsoexecuted people under Lenin. Such good Marxists! I think we shall have <strong>to</strong> report our poin<strong>to</strong>f view <strong>to</strong> Leonid Ilyich, and invite Comrade Taraki <strong>to</strong> Moscow <strong>to</strong> inform him of theoutcome of these discussions.”“If we begin the military intervention and begin killing Afghans, we will surely beconvicted of aggression. <strong>The</strong>re will be no other way around it,” came Chernenko’s timid,asthmatic voice. Chernenko had just returned from Zavidovo late at night, before themeeting.“I think we should ask for Leonid Ilyich’s input immediately, and send an airplane <strong>to</strong>Kabul for Taraki,” proposed Kosygin. “In regards <strong>to</strong> our suggestions yesterday for providingassistance, our position has not changed, except for ruling out military intervention.”“Yes, that option should be excluded,” the minister of defense confirmed.When the relaxed and refreshed general secretary appeared in the CentralCommittee on Monday, March 19, Chernenko invited all of the participants of the previousday’s meeting, plus Head of the General Staff Ogarkov, <strong>to</strong> a new meeting. Brezhnev, who372

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!