The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

Unexpectedly, Andropov moved to support Kosygin. Something must havehappened overnight for Yuri Vladimirovich, who had abstained the day before from sayinganything of substance, to voice an opinion that shifted the vector of the discussion 180degrees. His change of heart had a tremendous impact on the proceedings. PerhapsAndropov had a conversation with Brezhnev himself the night before, and the two hadcome to a consensus. It is also possible that on Sunday morning, Gromyko, Andropov, andUstinov had an impromptu meeting and very frankly discussed the situation once again.“Comrades, I have come to the following conclusion,” said Andropov softly. “Weshould very, very seriously consider exactly for what cause we would be bringing ourtroops into Afghanistan. It is absolutely clear to all of us that this country is not prepared tosolve its problems in a socialist way. Religion is oppressive there. Illiteracy is rampant. Theeconomy is backward, so on and so forth. Consider Lenin’s theory about a revolutionarysituation. Can one even talk about a revolutionary situation in Afghanistan? Such asituation simply does not exist there. We could uphold their revolution only with ourbayonets, and this is impermissible for us. We cannot expose ourselves to this risk.”As if he was waiting for just this turn of events, the minister of foreign affairs tookthe floor.“I fully support Yura’s suggestion to exclude the option of military intervention. Byentering Afghanistan, our army will become the aggressor. Against whom would our armedforces fight? They would fight against the Afghan people! The international détente andarms control that we have achieved through our tremendous efforts, all of it would benullified. All Non-Aligned Movement countries would turn their backs on us. This would bea nice gift to China. Any plans for Leonid Ilyich to meet with Carter would be discarded.370