The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

necessary to justify possible military intervention in Afghanistan.“This should be prepared in the format of a memorandum for the Central Committeeby tomorrow morning,” stated Gromyko harshly, looking above his colleagues’ heads.The subordinates, who were accustomed to Gromyko’s severe character,understood that it was better to not ask questions. However, his first deputy, Korniyenko,mustered the courage to ask if it was really true that the Politburo had decided to intervenemilitarily.“We have yet to reach such a decision. However, if the situation requires, we areprepared to intervene,” responded the minister slowly. “Under no circumstances can welose Afghanistan,” he repeated. “You must understand that if today we leave Afghanistan,tomorrow we will have to defend our borders from Muslim hordes somewhere inTajikistan or Uzbekistan.”***The next day, the same Politburo members reconvened. The chairman of thegovernment reported about his conversations with Taraki.“Per our agreement yesterday, I spoke twice with Comrade Taraki,” Kosygin beganhis detailed report. “He informed me that the situation in Herat is very complicated. Hisview is that if the Soviet Union does not assist now, they will be unable to maintain controlof the city. If Herat falls, they will lose everything. I asked him, ‘If you have a standing armyof 100,000 in Afghanistan now, why not form several divisions to deploy in Herat?’ Heexplained to me that by the time they form those divisions, there would be no garrisonloyal to the government left in Herat. Instead, they are asking us to send tanks and armoredvehicles to support them. Then I asked if they had enough tank drivers to operate those368

tanks. ‘No,’ he said. ‘That is why we are asking you to send the Tajiks who serve in yourtank divisions to become our tank crews. Just give them Afghan military uniforms.’ Myresponse was that we would be unable to conceal this, and the whole world would knowthat Soviet tank crews were fighting in Afghanistan.“Then I asked, ‘Comrade Taraki, isn’t it possible to form detachments from theresidents of Kabul to send to provinces where the situation is dangerous, equip them, andarm them?’ He responded that there would be nobody to train them. ‘How can this be?’ Iasked, ‘when so many Afghans received military training in the Soviet Union, and so manyprofessional military cadres from the past regime switched their loyalty to the people’sgovernment? How is it that there is nobody who can train your people to fight? Who is thensupporting you?’ And do you know what Taraki says to me? Without blinking an eye, Tarakisays that there is almost nobody supporting them. And then he sings the same tune, sayingthat ‘if Herat falls, the revolution is under a direct threat. Your support is needed.’”“There are nine thousand people in the Seventeenth Division,” replied Kirilenko.“Are they all inactive? Or have they all sided with the rebels?”“According to Taraki, half of the division has switched sides. Those who remain areunreliable—they are unlikely to support the government vigorously, if at all.”“Dmitry Fedorovich, what is your view?” Kirilenko asked Ustinov.“When I spoke with Amin, he also said that the fate of the revolution is fully in thehands of the Soviet Union,” the minister of defense replied.“So their only hope is our tanks and armored vehicles?”“Most probably, yes,” agreed Kosygin. “But before we make any decisions, we needto weigh all possible consequences. This is very serious business.”369

tanks. ‘No,’ he said. ‘That is why we are asking you <strong>to</strong> send the Tajiks who serve in yourtank divisions <strong>to</strong> become our tank crews. Just give them Afghan military uniforms.’ Myresponse was that we would be unable <strong>to</strong> conceal this, and the whole world would knowthat Soviet tank crews were fighting in <strong>Afghanistan</strong>.“<strong>The</strong>n I asked, ‘Comrade Taraki, isn’t it possible <strong>to</strong> form detachments from theresidents of Kabul <strong>to</strong> send <strong>to</strong> provinces where the situation is dangerous, equip them, andarm them?’ He responded that there would be nobody <strong>to</strong> train them. ‘How can this be?’ Iasked, ‘when so many Afghans received military training in the Soviet Union, and so manyprofessional military cadres from the past regime switched their loyalty <strong>to</strong> the people’sgovernment? How is it that there is nobody who can train your people <strong>to</strong> fight? Who is thensupporting you?’ And do you know what Taraki says <strong>to</strong> me? Without blinking an eye, Tarakisays that there is almost nobody supporting them. And then he sings the same tune, sayingthat ‘if Herat falls, the revolution is under a direct threat. Your support is needed.’”“<strong>The</strong>re are nine thousand people in the Seventeenth Division,” replied Kirilenko.“Are they all inactive? Or have they all sided with the rebels?”“According <strong>to</strong> Taraki, half of the division has switched sides. Those who remain areunreliable—they are unlikely <strong>to</strong> support the government vigorously, if at all.”“Dmitry Fedorovich, what is your view?” Kirilenko asked Ustinov.“When I spoke with Amin, he also said that the fate of the revolution is fully in thehands of the Soviet Union,” the minister of defense replied.“So their only hope is our tanks and armored vehicles?”“Most probably, yes,” agreed Kosygin. “But before we make any decisions, we need<strong>to</strong> weigh all possible consequences. This is very serious business.”369

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