The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

“Certainly,” he began with his Belorussian accent, “today the situation is unclear for manyof us. One thing is clear, which I have already mentioned. We cannot afford to giveAfghanistan away to our enemies. We need to think about how we can achieve thatobjective. Perhaps bringing troops in will not be necessary,” he reasoned.Sensing a shift in the mood of his colleagues, Kosygin decided to take a step towardsthem.“We are united in this opinion. Afghanistan must not be given away. We shouldutilize all of our political means to help stabilize the Afghan leadership, to provide theassistance that we have committed to, and to leave the option of military engagement as afinal measure.”“Let us summarize,” suggested Kirilenko, and in ten points, formulated all of thesuggestions that had been voiced at the Politburo meeting. “If you don’t object, I will nowtry to get in touch with Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko to relay our suggestions toLeonid Ilyich.”Kirilenko walked to the adjacent communications room. Having returned after a fewminutes, he reported, “Comrade Chernenko believes that our suggestions are valid, and willinform Leonid Ilyich of our findings. Let’s finish for the day.”In the evening, having returned to the ministry in Smolenskaya Square, Gromykocalled his staff to convene for a meeting. As those who were present at that meeting recall,the minister was in a bad mood. Gromyko decided not to inform his colleagues about thedetails of the Politburo discussion. Instead, he began issuing orders. He asked his staff tourgently prepare a note to Pakistan that warned against intervening in the domestic affairsof neighboring countries. He also asked them to consider the arguments that would be367