The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

“As for negotiations with Taraki, it seems to me that it would be best for Kosygin tospeak with him,” suggested Andropov, diplomatically moving away from discussing themain topic.The Politburo members voiced their support for Andropov’s motion. “I agree thatwe should develop a political document,” continued the KGB chairman in a quiet voice. “Butwe should keep in mind that we will surely be labeled as aggressors. Yet,” he raised his eyesto his colleagues, “under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan.”Kosygin looked down. The bags under his eyes seemed to have swollen even more.So the candidate to the Politburo, Ponomaryov, also supported the idea of dispatchingground troops, albeit somewhat indirectly. Kosygin sensed that he had to join the commonline of thinking, but he also wished to trump the minister of defense, whom he disliked. Hedisliked Ustinov for his hawkish approach to foreign policy, for his endless requests foradditional defense funds at the expense of the country’s economy, for his coziness with thegeneral secretary and history of resolving issues behind the scenes, without anypreliminary discussion at the Council of Ministers or at the Politburo. Kosygin was irritatedby the way Ustinov looked, down to the way he wore his military uniform. He knew thatmany military officials from Ustinov’s entourage also did not embrace him as the ministerand gossiped behind his back, referring to him by an offensive nickname.“The question arises—how would we appear in the face of international publicopinion?” asked Kosygin. “If we decide to send the troops in, we need a sound reason to doso.” He paused. “Perhaps one of our distinguished comrades can travel to Afghanistan toclarify the situation on the ground? Perhaps Comrade Ustinov might go?” He paused again.“Or perhaps Comrade Ogarkov,” he added.365