The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

mistakes that they have made. Even today, they continue to execute dissidents. Theircampaign of terror has extended past the elimination of Parcham political leaders toinclude the mid-level members of Parcham.”Kosygin seemed to have prepared well for this meeting. He had studied the KGB’sand GRU’s foreign intelligence cables and counterintelligence materials provided by theMinistry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee. His colleagues in the Politburoappreciated his preparedness, but dreaded the prospect of choosing a side on the issue ofwhether to send in troops. Kosygin had voiced his opinion. Ustinov was next to take thefloor. Ustinov was well versed in bureaucratic politics and became a narkom, as Kosyginhad under Stalin. He did not openly state his position, opting instead for an indirectapproach.“We have developed two scenarios for military action. The first is that within 24hours we send the 105th Paratrooper Division to Afghanistan, send a motor rifledetachment to Kabul, and simultaneously bring the 108th and the Fifth Divisions closer tothe border. In order for this to take place, as was correctly stated earlier, it is necessary toprepare a political resolution.”Kirilenko rushed to support the minister of defense. “Comrade Ustinov is raising theissue correctly. We need to act against the rebel forces. At the same time, if we areconsidering sending in our troops, we can use this to pressure Taraki. We cannot bring inSoviet troops without an appropriate request to us from the Afghan government. Tarakineeds to know about it.”“But we also have a second variant,” continued Ustinov more confidently. “It is alsofully developed. The second variant is to send in two divisions.”364