The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan. We have been living in peace as goodneighbors for sixty years. If we lose Afghanistan now, it would mean a serious blow to ourpolitics.”The Politburo members grew quiet. They began to direct their attention to theminister of defense. Ustinov, his face ridden with tension, confirmed that the leadership ofAfghanistan was indeed concerned by the situation. The minister had spoken with GeneralGorelov several times and had a good sense of the situation. It seemed that the chiefmilitary adviser had done everything in his power to gain control of the situation, and ofthe demoralized Afghan servicemen. He launched the Il-28 bombers to Herat and orderedthe artillery units to fire upon the rebellious mob. But the situation was growing worse bythe hour. Yesterday the minister of defense, in a state of irritation, ordered Gorelov to armand mobilize the working class. The adviser attempted to object, saying, “I am not apolitician, I am a military man,” but Ustinov’s reply was uncompromisingly harsh, and leftthe general with little choice. One can only imagine what Gorelov thought about Ustinov atthat moment, knowing all too well that all the ideological platitudes about the Afghanworking class were nothing more than empty rhetoric.“Tomorrow morning, operative units will be sent from Kabul to Herat to fight therebels,” Ustinov told the quiet participants of the meeting. “We recommended thatComrade Taraki send several detachments to the region, but he said that it was not feasiblebecause of the volatile situation in other regions of the country. To make a long story short,they are expecting a widespread assault on the ground and in the air.”“And they expect us to strike the rebels?” asked Andropov incredulously.“Here, dear comrades, a key question arises. Whom will our troops fight, should we361