The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
possible contingency. Any unforeseen element could jeopardize the revolution, the failureof which would mean the immediate execution of everybody participating in the uprising,as well as their family members, friends, and colleagues. The authorities would bemerciless; nobody would be spared. Daoud and his entourage only waited for a reason toslaughter their enemies.It wasn’t by chance that the colonel was asked to play a decisive role in therevolution. By then Abdul Qadir had become a professional behind military coups d’etat.Just five years earlier he participated in Daoud’s overthrow of the king. At that time heacquired priceless experience in coordinating the actions of different military divisions.A shrewd political operative, Daoud knew about the secret ties between Qadir andthe PDPA. He also could foresee many officers following Qadir, something he had to takeinto consideration.Qadir was not an ideological warrior. He stood apart from the leaders of the PDPA,Taraki and Karmal, who had dedicated their lives to politics since youth. His path wasdifferent. He was selected to be trained as a pilot in the Soviet Union along with some otherAfghan officers. Upon their return to Afghanistan, a group of like-minded military officerswas formed. The group was named the Military Revolutionary Youth Organization. Therewere seven members in the group at its inception in 1963. All were equal; there was noleader.The group had no program, no code of conduct, no membership. They held longconversations concerning the future of their country. They discussed methods of reformand modernization and puzzled about how to overcome backwardness in Afghanistan.Several years after the inception of the group, they learned of the Khalq and Parcham36
factions, but couldn’t grasp what kept the two groups apart. PDPA’s noble, progressive, anddemocratic goals appeared compatible with the Military Revolutionary Youth members’goals, but Khalqis and Parchamis harbored such animosity and uncompromisingaggression towards one another. Qadir’s comrades sent him to find out about the essenceof the conflict between the two factions. Members of Parcham arranged a generousreception for him: shish kebabs, vegetables, and vodka were served. They immediatelybegan to invite the officers to join the ranks of the party.“But why are you fighting each other?” asked Qadir.“This is a technical question. With time things will settle down,” Babrak Karmalresponded.“In that case, we will wait until you unite with each other.”Qadir, while not particularly well educated, was a naturally shrewd, intelligent, andcautious political operator. With patience, he usually achieved his goals. Later, when theMilitary Revolutionary Youth Organization had grown to include more than a hundredofficers, one of Daoud’s trusted representatives came to him. He informed Qadir that Daoudhimself requested a meeting with him. The idea of an anti-monarchical coup was ripe inAfghanistan, but the support of the army was crucial and still lacking.The consideration of this military aspect was what brought Qadir and hisorganization into the fold. Initially the pilot was very cautious about supporting Daoud. Butwhen Daoud promised that the overthrow of the monarchy would clear the way forsocialism, Qadir quickly became optimistic, and convinced his comrades of the merit ofDaoud’s plan. Daoud promised that the socialism would be Islamic in essence, a socialismfounded upon the natural Afghan identity.37
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possible contingency. Any unforeseen element could jeopardize the revolution, the failureof which would mean the immediate execution of everybody participating in the uprising,as well as their family members, friends, and colleagues. <strong>The</strong> authorities would bemerciless; nobody would be spared. Daoud and his en<strong>to</strong>urage only waited for a reason <strong>to</strong>slaughter their enemies.It wasn’t by chance that the colonel was asked <strong>to</strong> play a decisive role in therevolution. By then Abdul Qadir had become a professional behind military coups d’etat.Just five years earlier he participated in Daoud’s overthrow of the king. At that time heacquired priceless experience in coordinating the actions of different military divisions.A shrewd political operative, Daoud knew about the secret ties between Qadir andthe PDPA. He also could foresee many officers following Qadir, something he had <strong>to</strong> takein<strong>to</strong> consideration.Qadir was not an ideological warrior. He s<strong>to</strong>od apart from the leaders of the PDPA,Taraki and Karmal, who had dedicated their lives <strong>to</strong> politics since youth. His path wasdifferent. He was selected <strong>to</strong> be trained as a pilot in the Soviet Union along with some otherAfghan officers. Upon their return <strong>to</strong> <strong>Afghanistan</strong>, a group of like-minded military officerswas formed. <strong>The</strong> group was named the Military Revolutionary Youth Organization. <strong>The</strong>rewere seven members in the group at its inception in 1963. All were equal; there was noleader.<strong>The</strong> group had no program, no code of conduct, no membership. <strong>The</strong>y held longconversations concerning the future of their country. <strong>The</strong>y discussed methods of reformand modernization and puzzled about how <strong>to</strong> overcome backwardness in <strong>Afghanistan</strong>.Several years after the inception of the group, they learned of the Khalq and Parcham36