The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

struggle had become a historical legacy, the subject of books, memoirs, and mythology.They recognized those ideals as vital to their own cultural history and accepted that arevolutionary struggle was taking place in Afghanistan, directly outside their door. Thebattle of good versus evil that they regarded as a real and integral aspect of their identitytook shape with renewed force in Afghanistan. Long live freedom! Away with exploitation!With few exceptions, Afghans today remember those Soviet advisers in a favorablelight. Afghans appreciated their courage and altruism, and sensed in their Soviet friends asincere desire to help. Bad incidents were forgiven and the positive contributions areremembered to this day.The greatest number of Soviet advisers was allocated to the Armed Forces ofAfghanistan. Behind every Afghan general, colonel, and major were Soviet generals,colonels, and majors. Soviet military advisers worked in every military unit, headquarters,school, and academy.Meanwhile, the political influence of the head of the Soviet military advisorymission, General Gorelov, grew exponentially. Lev Nikolayevich was becoming more andmore prominent in Afghan affairs.He openly sympathized with Amin and considered him, not without merit, the realruler of the country. Amin recognized this fact. By then Amin had perfected his system ofmonitoring Soviet specialists, particularly those who held the most power. At one point,Amin asked Gorelov to give him weekly lessons in military theory. Gorelov obliged, andduring long sessions introduced the Afghan leader to strategy, tactics, weaponry,ammunition, military technology, and details of military law. Gorelov’s admiration of theenergetic and curious Afghan politician, who stood out among other Afghan ministers who348

did not bother to learn, continued to grow as a result of these sessions.Amin often asked Generals Gorelov and Zaplatin, with an increasing sense of insult,for the reasons that their Soviet comrades in Moscow remained sympathetic to theParchamis instead of rejecting them outright, or, better yet, handing them over toAfghanistan’s security services in order that they be “tried.” On one occasion he broke intoa diatribe in an attempt to explain the irreconcilable divide between the two factions to hisSoviet friends.“Why, in your opinion, have the two factions done nothing but quarrel sinceestablishing the PDPA?” Amin asked the generals.“Different views regarding tactics and strategy,” Zaplatin replied cautiously.“Khalqis come from the lowest strata of society, while Parchamis represent the midandtop-level bourgeoisie and feudal circles,” Gorelov observed less diplomatically. “In myopinion, this is part of the larger issue of class divisions.”“All of this is correct,” said Amin, “but now allow me to name the main reason. I hopeyou will share this with your leadership and open the eyes of our comrades who stillblindly trust Karmal. The split in the party is a result of imperialist and feudal reaction.Parchamism was conceived artificially in the depths of our special services, the secretpolice, and military counterintelligence. Karmal and his allies are agents who wererecruited during the monarchical regime. I’m sure that their true bosses work far fromKabul, either in the United States or in Bonn.”The generals exchanged meaningful glances. Lev Nikolayevich remembered wellthat a high-level KGB official mentioned in passing at the banya that Karmal, Taraki, andAmin himself had all worked very closely with the KGB in the time leading up to the April349

did not bother <strong>to</strong> learn, continued <strong>to</strong> grow as a result of these sessions.Amin often asked Generals Gorelov and Zaplatin, with an increasing sense of insult,for the reasons that their Soviet comrades in Moscow remained sympathetic <strong>to</strong> theParchamis instead of rejecting them outright, or, better yet, handing them over <strong>to</strong><strong>Afghanistan</strong>’s security services in order that they be “tried.” On one occasion he broke in<strong>to</strong>a diatribe in an attempt <strong>to</strong> explain the irreconcilable divide between the two factions <strong>to</strong> hisSoviet friends.“Why, in your opinion, have the two factions done nothing but quarrel sinceestablishing the PDPA?” Amin asked the generals.“Different views regarding tactics and strategy,” Zaplatin replied cautiously.“Khalqis come from the lowest strata of society, while Parchamis represent the midand<strong>to</strong>p-level bourgeoisie and feudal circles,” Gorelov observed less diplomatically. “In myopinion, this is part of the larger issue of class divisions.”“All of this is correct,” said Amin, “but now allow me <strong>to</strong> name the main reason. I hopeyou will share this with your leadership and open the eyes of our comrades who stillblindly trust Karmal. <strong>The</strong> split in the party is a result of imperialist and feudal reaction.Parchamism was conceived artificially in the depths of our special services, the secretpolice, and military counterintelligence. Karmal and his allies are agents who wererecruited during the monarchical regime. I’m sure that their true bosses work far fromKabul, either in the United States or in Bonn.”<strong>The</strong> generals exchanged meaningful glances. Lev Nikolayevich remembered wellthat a high-level KGB official mentioned in passing at the banya that Karmal, Taraki, andAmin himself had all worked very closely with the KGB in the time leading up <strong>to</strong> the April349

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