The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
would retrieve vodka along with glasses from the trunk of the car. Everyone was poured afull glass of warm vodka. Alexander Mikhailovich would then toast to a successful fishingtrip, and everyone present had to drink their glasses to the bottoms. Refusal was notpermitted. The ambassador customarily was very attentive to the way people drank.Alexander Mikhailovich Puzanov had another simple hobby. In the evenings hewould lure senior diplomats into his residence to have them play Lotto with him and hiswife, Tatyana Alexeyevna. Normally his partners would pretend that nothing in their livescould be more important and joyful than taking balls with numbers out from the cotton bagand then shouting out those numbers. Very few dared to refuse the ambassador when theywere invited to this dubious form of entertainment. Some, however, dared to rejectPuzanov’s invitations. Among those were the KGB and GRU chiefs. Alexander Mikhailovichdid not like them, and was possibly even a little apprehensive of them.The Soviet ambassador in Kabul had a good life. His responsibilities were not tooburdensome; his days were filled with receptions, meetings, and strolls through thefragrant ambassadorial garden. On Fridays he went fishing. That was how things werebefore the dark day, April 27, arrived.Detailed reports about the events taking place beyond the boundary of the embassycompound had to be relayed to Moscow. What was there to report? How could one explainthat the loyal and friendly regime that was fully supported by the USSR could topple at anymoment? And that its executioners were not Islamic reactionaries or members of extremistMaoist groups, but friends who were also supported by the Soviet Union. What wouldLeonid Ilyich and other members of the Politburo think? Why had our trusted friends notinformed us in advance about their preparations for the coup? Why didn’t the plotters ask32
for our advice? What will happen later? What happens if Daoud wins? Will we have toaccuse the participants of the coup of being political adventurists? And what if the rebelswin? Should we be the first to recognize the new regime? The ambassador was bewilderedby these questions.It was apparent that the questions “who will win?” and “what shall we do with theoutcome?” posed difficulties not only to Puzanov. Since early morning, Moscow had beenbarraging the ambassador and both residents with inquiries about the developments inKabul and the prospects of the rebels.Once again the senior diplomats, both KGB and GRU chiefs, as well as the head of theSoviet military advisory mission, were summoned for a meeting at the ambassador’s.General Gorelov reported, “Capturing Ark will not be easy. It is a real fortress with two setsof walls that are impossible to penetrate using tank shells. The palace guard consists of twothousand troops. They have T-54 tanks. There are also anti-tank missiles and heavymachine guns deployed at the gates of the palace.”“But you are neglecting one important detail,” the GRU chief observed gloomily.“These revolutionaries can engage the air force. Capturing the air force bases in Bagramand Shindand is certainly a part of their plan. And let me remind you that Commander ofthe Air Force Colonel Qadir, the one who deposed the king, is in charge.”Gorelov agreed. “Then Daoud’s chances are slim.”Somebody remembered that Daoud was scheduled to have a cabinet meeting thatday. “The future of the PDPA and its imprisoned leaders was to be determined in thatmeeting,” Osadchiy added.After the meeting, Puzanov walked out of his office and into the antechamber and33
- Page 6: Chapter 1:VIRUS: How the invasion o
- Page 9: arranged meeting point for the emer
- Page 12 and 13: that Orlov-Morozov wrote to the Cen
- Page 14 and 15: political situation developing in t
- Page 16 and 17: as accomplices, received long-term
- Page 18 and 19: World War II, Prince Daoud Khan, th
- Page 20 and 21: “Can you imagine, Comrade General
- Page 22: no idea that some destructive polit
- Page 28 and 29: General Gorelov was particularly co
- Page 30 and 31: ascent. One plane, flying low above
- Page 34 and 35: laid down on the couch. He felt pre
- Page 36 and 37: possible contingency. Any unforesee
- Page 38 and 39: In July 1973, Major Qadir and his g
- Page 40 and 41: the Parcham faction, also became mi
- Page 42 and 43: the military transport division of
- Page 44 and 45: on the morning of April 27, the off
- Page 46 and 47: there were passwords. I think Amin
- Page 48 and 49: commander suddenly stopped and turn
- Page 50 and 51: in the lead tank, which was compris
- Page 52 and 53: KGB colleagues, exiting the embassy
- Page 54 and 55: married?”“I wonder whose side t
- Page 56 and 57: detachments. The analyst of the Res
- Page 58 and 59: front of the airport and drove back
- Page 60 and 61: complained to him, “Your trade re
- Page 62 and 63: “What’s wrong? Should I call a
- Page 64 and 65: awaiting further instructions. My a
- Page 66 and 67: well-prepared speech that touched u
- Page 68 and 69: Youth”) in the 1940s. Babrak also
- Page 70 and 71: eally need to act a year ago, becau
- Page 72 and 73: After Daoud’s visit to Moscow, th
- Page 74 and 75: that could be leveled against me or
- Page 76 and 77: looming in the fields, to be handed
- Page 78 and 79: “And what about Daoud?”“I don
- Page 80 and 81: sent the commander of the President
for our advice? What will happen later? What happens if Daoud wins? Will we have <strong>to</strong>accuse the participants of the coup of being political adventurists? And what if the rebelswin? Should we be the first <strong>to</strong> recognize the new regime? <strong>The</strong> ambassador was bewilderedby these questions.It was apparent that the questions “who will win?” and “what shall we do with theoutcome?” posed difficulties not only <strong>to</strong> Puzanov. Since early morning, Moscow had beenbarraging the ambassador and both residents with inquiries about the developments inKabul and the prospects of the rebels.Once again the senior diplomats, both KGB and GRU chiefs, as well as the head of theSoviet military advisory mission, were summoned for a meeting at the ambassador’s.General Gorelov reported, “Capturing Ark will not be easy. It is a real fortress with two setsof walls that are impossible <strong>to</strong> penetrate using tank shells. <strong>The</strong> palace guard consists of twothousand troops. <strong>The</strong>y have T-54 tanks. <strong>The</strong>re are also anti-tank missiles and heavymachine guns deployed at the gates of the palace.”“But you are neglecting one important detail,” the GRU chief observed gloomily.“<strong>The</strong>se revolutionaries can engage the air force. Capturing the air force bases in Bagramand Shindand is certainly a part of their plan. And let me remind you that Commander ofthe Air Force Colonel Qadir, the one who deposed the king, is in charge.”Gorelov agreed. “<strong>The</strong>n Daoud’s chances are slim.”Somebody remembered that Daoud was scheduled <strong>to</strong> have a cabinet meeting thatday. “<strong>The</strong> future of the PDPA and its imprisoned leaders was <strong>to</strong> be determined in thatmeeting,” Osadchiy added.After the meeting, Puzanov walked out of his office and in<strong>to</strong> the antechamber and33
Change language