The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

keep hostages in captivity. In other words, it’s good when the situation is more or less clear.Then one can foresee the evolution of the situation with a sufficient degree of certainty.One can undertake certain steps directed at forestalling the terrorists’ actions. It is goodwhen experienced operatives, who know each other well, work together while trying tosave hostages, when they report to a single central command, and when externalconditions are favorable to the team.In the case of Adolph Dubs, everything was bad. Soon both Bakhturin andKliushnikov understood that the terrorists felt as if they were the hostages of the situation,even more so than the captured ambassador. They felt themselves to be prisoners of anunmanageable affair that they should never have started. It seemed that here, in Room 117of Hotel Kabul, the terrorists were not making their own decisions, but were directed bysomebody’s evil will. While they seemed quite calm and collected during the capture of theambassador, now something had shattered that calm, and something unforeseen wasgradually becoming more and more obvious to them. One could feel that they werebecoming increasingly agitated, inevitably approaching the state of nervous breakdownthat could be provoked by the most innocuous trigger. If such a breakdown were to occur,they—spirited by nature—would not seek a logical way out. On the contrary, they wouldact irrationally, and possibly, like desperate predators, would attack those who wouldarrive to free the ambassador.On the other hand, the Americans were also acting very strangely. They behaved asif they knew more than what the Soviet officers had been told. It seemed as if they werewaiting for some kind of evolution of events known only to them. They acted as if they hadno doubt that the situation’s conclusion would occur exactly as expected. It appeared as if302

freeing the ambassador was not a top priority to them at the time, as if something else,even more important and known only to them, was on their minds.But that was not the strangest thing that occurred on the morning of February 14 atKabul Hotel.It appeared that Major Tarun was not only leading the operation to free theambassador, but also was seeking a way out of the extremely sensitive, uncomfortablesituation that had evolved because of the morning incident. The Americans wouldfrequently lose sight of him, as he would disappear to meet often and privately with hisclosest advisers to explain something or to seek advice. Tarun tensed when Amstutz askedhim whether the Afghan leaders knew of the capture of the ambassador, and if so, whattheir reaction was. “I called Comrade Amin, but he is nowhere to be found,” the majorresponded, looking both embarrassed and incensed by this question.Meanwhile, what was happening at the hotel had turned into a separate reality,almost a mystical space like the one between life and death. Most prosaic were the juniorpolicemen, guerillas who were trained only to kill and destroy. They stared at the massiveoak door of Room 117 more and more frequently, as if assessing the options available tothem. They seemed not to believe that in their country, it was possible to take advantage ofclever tricks and sophisticated devices that were in possession of the special services ofother, more developed, countries. And seemingly, they were not that far away from thetruth.Tanks of gas that had been given as a gift to the Afghan police by the FederalRepublic of Germany during Daoud’s rule, or possibly even earlier than that, were broughtin. Hoses were attached to the tanks and the valves were opened. The tanks hissed. Then it303

freeing the ambassador was not a <strong>to</strong>p priority <strong>to</strong> them at the time, as if something else,even more important and known only <strong>to</strong> them, was on their minds.But that was not the strangest thing that occurred on the morning of February 14 atKabul Hotel.It appeared that Major Tarun was not only leading the operation <strong>to</strong> free theambassador, but also was seeking a way out of the extremely sensitive, uncomfortablesituation that had evolved because of the morning incident. <strong>The</strong> Americans wouldfrequently lose sight of him, as he would disappear <strong>to</strong> meet often and privately with hisclosest advisers <strong>to</strong> explain something or <strong>to</strong> seek advice. Tarun tensed when Amstutz askedhim whether the Afghan leaders knew of the capture of the ambassador, and if so, whattheir reaction was. “I called Comrade Amin, but he is nowhere <strong>to</strong> be found,” the majorresponded, looking both embarrassed and incensed by this question.Meanwhile, what was happening at the hotel had turned in<strong>to</strong> a separate reality,almost a mystical space like the one between life and death. Most prosaic were the juniorpolicemen, guerillas who were trained only <strong>to</strong> kill and destroy. <strong>The</strong>y stared at the massiveoak door of Room 117 more and more frequently, as if assessing the options available <strong>to</strong>them. <strong>The</strong>y seemed not <strong>to</strong> believe that in their country, it was possible <strong>to</strong> take advantage ofclever tricks and sophisticated devices that were in possession of the special services ofother, more developed, countries. And seemingly, they were not that far away from thetruth.Tanks of gas that had been given as a gift <strong>to</strong> the Afghan police by the FederalRepublic of Germany during Daoud’s rule, or possibly even earlier than that, were broughtin. Hoses were attached <strong>to</strong> the tanks and the valves were opened. <strong>The</strong> tanks hissed. <strong>The</strong>n it303

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