The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
wife were staying in the room. Veselov himself had left for work early that morning, but hiswife categorically refused to open the door. She was scared to death by the sounds thatcame from the corridor and the large number of armed people running around outside thehotel. Bakhturin tried very hard to convince the woman to let him in and implored her towait out the situation in the relative safety of the restaurant on the ground floor.Some hotel guests were afraid to leave their rooms, more fearful that they mightlose some of the exotic items they had acquired abroad than they were of the immediateterrorist threat. Afghanistan was certainly a poor country, but it was possible to buy allsorts of goods that were highly desirable for Soviet citizens in Afghan bazaars: taperecorders, electronic watches, jeans, and shearling coats. Nothing like this could be found inthe Soviet Union. This is why the Soviet citizens who had been evacuated from their roomshad in tow massive bags and suitcases filled with goods purchased in Afghanistan. Needlessto say, the Americans regarded this procession with astonishment.The operation at the hotel was led by the Afghan police (Tsarandoi). Major Tarun,the head of Tsarandoi, and Saifuddin, the chief of police, were in charge of the operation.The Afghans sought Alexander Kliushnikov’s advice repeatedly. The colonel eagerly gaveprofessional instructions to his Afghan counterparts. When the terrorists demanded ahandgun be given to them, Kliushnikov recommended that they give them a faulty one. Theplan was to storm Room 117 at the moment the handgun was delivered to the terrorists.The terrorists, however, must have sensed danger and refused to open the door of theroom.Gradually, the leaders of the rescue operation, along with Kliushnikov, Bakhturin,and Kutepov, moved from the second floor to the third floor, where it was a bit calmer.294
Charlie kept repeating to Bakhturin that they should refrain from storming the room,urging them to stall for as long as possible and to pursue negotiations with the terrorists,but he did not suggest an alternate plan to free the ambassador.Suddenly, there was movement in the hotel corridor. AGSA officers, dressed inplainclothes, entered the hall. AGSA was the Afghan special services. It had only recentlybeen formed, but already instilled fear in anybody who might possibly be perceived to bean enemy of the Afghan revolution. The appearance of the representatives of the competingAfghan special services annoyed Major Tarun. Tarun, a cocky fellow, who was one ofHafizullah Amin’s favorites, interrupted his conversation with a staff member of theAmerican embassy’s security services and quickly approached the AGSA group. They beganan animated discussion in Pashto, after which the AGSA group vanished as quickly as it hadappeared.***That winter, a syndrome akin to gold rush fever could be observed among Westerndiplomats. The imaginations of Americans, Brits, and other Westerners was excited by thediscovery of a golden treasure by the Soviet archaeologist Sarianidi near the town ofShibergan in the north of Afghanistan. Sarianidi unearthed the burial site of six Bactrianprinces from the second millennium B.C. Archaeologists found about seven kilograms ofextraordinary gold jewelry at the site.Discovery of the treasure became the hot topic at diplomatic receptions. Everybodyaddressed questions about the treasure to Valery Starostin, who knew a lot about Bactriaand those archaeological digs.295
- Page 244 and 245: Kryuchkov remained silent, digestin
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- Page 260 and 261: him as though considering their con
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- Page 270 and 271: As soon as they entered Dvoryankov
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wife were staying in the room. Veselov himself had left for work early that morning, but hiswife categorically refused <strong>to</strong> open the door. She was scared <strong>to</strong> death by the sounds thatcame from the corridor and the large number of armed people running around outside thehotel. Bakhturin tried very hard <strong>to</strong> convince the woman <strong>to</strong> let him in and implored her <strong>to</strong>wait out the situation in the relative safety of the restaurant on the ground floor.Some hotel guests were afraid <strong>to</strong> leave their rooms, more fearful that they mightlose some of the exotic items they had acquired abroad than they were of the immediateterrorist threat. <strong>Afghanistan</strong> was certainly a poor country, but it was possible <strong>to</strong> buy allsorts of goods that were highly desirable for Soviet citizens in Afghan bazaars: taperecorders, electronic watches, jeans, and shearling coats. Nothing like this could be found inthe Soviet Union. This is why the Soviet citizens who had been evacuated from their roomshad in <strong>to</strong>w massive bags and suitcases filled with goods purchased in <strong>Afghanistan</strong>. Needless<strong>to</strong> say, the Americans regarded this procession with as<strong>to</strong>nishment.<strong>The</strong> operation at the hotel was led by the Afghan police (Tsarandoi). Major Tarun,the head of Tsarandoi, and Saifuddin, the chief of police, were in charge of the operation.<strong>The</strong> Afghans sought Alexander Kliushnikov’s advice repeatedly. <strong>The</strong> colonel eagerly gaveprofessional instructions <strong>to</strong> his Afghan counterparts. When the terrorists demanded ahandgun be given <strong>to</strong> them, Kliushnikov recommended that they give them a faulty one. <strong>The</strong>plan was <strong>to</strong> s<strong>to</strong>rm Room 117 at the moment the handgun was delivered <strong>to</strong> the terrorists.<strong>The</strong> terrorists, however, must have sensed danger and refused <strong>to</strong> open the door of theroom.Gradually, the leaders of the rescue operation, along with Kliushnikov, Bakhturin,and Kutepov, moved from the second floor <strong>to</strong> the third floor, where it was a bit calmer.294