The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
“I am working, Leonid Ilyich!” exclaimed Kozin. “I can’t drink.”Brezhnev was obviously nonplussed by his response. He looked at the interpreterdisapprovingly. “And I suppose you think we are vacationing here?” The general secretaryhimself was drinking Zubrovka, which was poured for him from a special decanter.“May I ask to sample what you’re drinking Leonid Ilyich?” Kozin asked the generalsecretary.Brezhnev gestured to the waiter, who filled Kozin’s glass with Zubrovka from thespecial decanter. Then the general secretary tapped the microphone with his finger, eitherchecking the microphone’s connection or motioning for those present to be silent. Then hestood up with difficulty.“I’d like to propose a toast—to our interpreter!”Everybody at the table rose, clearly confused as to the nature of the toast. Thisyoung man had hardly spent two days in the Kremlin. Why this special treatment?Nevertheless, they all complied and drank to Kozin. Later, Kozin’s colleagues in the ForeignMinistry inquired as to why the general secretary acted with such respect towards him.Kozin’s diplomatic rank was immediately raised by two positions, just in case.The results of the visit were characterized as positive in a classified memorandumthat had been prepared by the Central Committee. It emphasized that relations betweenthe USSR and the DRA had been raised to a new level, and were now based on class valuesand filled with the spirit of camaraderie and revolutionary solidarity. The DRA leadershipwas told that it could firmly rely on Soviet assistance and support in matters of therevolutionary reorganization of Afghan society.266
The authors of this classified memorandum did not neglect to note the delicate issueof Taraki’s and Amin’s requests for support in their campaign for the “Great Pashtunistan.”“Afghan leaders expressed their concern regarding anti-Afghan activities based onthe territory of Pakistan, and they emphasized disagreements with Pakistan concerning theissue of Pashtuns and Baluchi,” read the classified Central Committee memorandum. “Ourside tactfully expressed the undesirability of employing any extreme measures that couldbe taken advantage of by the external and domestic enemies of Afghanistan.”***One evening, Starostin was told that Nikolai Alexandrovich Dvoryankov, a professorof Moscow State University, would arrive on an Aeroflot flight in Kabul the following day.Valery knew that he had to put everything aside to greet the scholar.Dvoryankov visited Afghanistan regularly in the sixties and seventies. He was aleading specialist of Pashto and the history of Afghanistan who was known for deliveringbrilliant presentations at scholarly conferences in Kabul. During his visits, NikolaiAlexandrovich eagerly gave interviews on Afghan Radio. Those interviews were alwayswell-received, and stirred the minds of Afghan intellectuals. One of the reasons was thatthey had difficulty understanding how a foreigner could speak so eloquently in theirlanguage. Not only could he speak Pashto, but he wrote poetry and translated Pushkin andMayakovski from Russian into Pashto.Dvoryankov was an old friend of Taraki’s. When they first met, Taraki was known inAfghanistan as a would-be writer, an author of sentimental stories detailing the difficultiesof life among the poor in Afghanistan.267
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<strong>The</strong> authors of this classified memorandum did not neglect <strong>to</strong> note the delicate issueof Taraki’s and Amin’s requests for support in their campaign for the “Great Pashtunistan.”“Afghan leaders expressed their concern regarding anti-Afghan activities based onthe terri<strong>to</strong>ry of Pakistan, and they emphasized disagreements with Pakistan concerning theissue of Pashtuns and Baluchi,” read the classified Central Committee memorandum. “Ourside tactfully expressed the undesirability of employing any extreme measures that couldbe taken advantage of by the external and domestic enemies of <strong>Afghanistan</strong>.”***One evening, Starostin was <strong>to</strong>ld that Nikolai Alexandrovich Dvoryankov, a professorof Moscow State <strong>University</strong>, would arrive on an Aeroflot flight in Kabul the following day.Valery knew that he had <strong>to</strong> put everything aside <strong>to</strong> greet the scholar.Dvoryankov visited <strong>Afghanistan</strong> regularly in the sixties and seventies. He was aleading specialist of Pash<strong>to</strong> and the his<strong>to</strong>ry of <strong>Afghanistan</strong> who was known for deliveringbrilliant presentations at scholarly conferences in Kabul. During his visits, NikolaiAlexandrovich eagerly gave interviews on Afghan Radio. Those interviews were alwayswell-received, and stirred the minds of Afghan intellectuals. One of the reasons was thatthey had difficulty understanding how a foreigner could speak so eloquently in theirlanguage. Not only could he speak Pash<strong>to</strong>, but he wrote poetry and translated Pushkin andMayakovski from Russian in<strong>to</strong> Pash<strong>to</strong>.Dvoryankov was an old friend of Taraki’s. When they first met, Taraki was known in<strong>Afghanistan</strong> as a would-be writer, an author of sentimental s<strong>to</strong>ries detailing the difficultiesof life among the poor in <strong>Afghanistan</strong>.267