The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

with obvious Soviet participation was nothing less than audacious. It envisaged the SovietUnion lending support to Pakistani Pashtuns, Baluchi, and other opposition elements inPakistan. This assistance would become widely known. The government of Pakistan wouldvoice its justified indignation about subversive activities conducted by the Soviet Union.The Soviet relationship with the United States and its allies would immediately sour. Inshort, the chances of success for this plan bordered on zero, while its inevitablecomplications would last for decades.Kosygin looked at Amin attentively. Either this man was extremely naive aboutissues of global politics, he decided, or he was intent on some sort of provocation. TheChairman of the Council of Ministers calmly and firmly responded that promotingsubversive activities on the territories of sovereign states, even states that were hostile tothe USSR and its allies, was against the principles of Soviet foreign policy.On the same day, Brezhnev and Taraki had a one-on-one meeting in the “WinterGarden” of the Kremlin. Rurikov, who was interpreting at the meeting, was prepared forany surprises. However, the Afghan leader, who seemed to have been warned by Aminabout the premier’s uncompromising stance, didn’t say anything unexpected. He onlyrepeated what his deputy said an hour or two ago, without going into the history of theSecond British-Afghan War. Leonid Ilyich listened to Taraki and nodded his head, althoughhe had no idea what his guest wanted from him. Brezhnev didn’t give any responseregarding the thrust of the Afghan leader’s message, although he promised that the issueraised by Taraki would receive thorough consideration.In order to give Taraki an opportunity to speak in front of representatives of theWest, the program of the visit—at Gromyko’s initiative—included a meeting with high-264