The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
Preparations for the first state visit were underway in Afghanistan. The text of theTreaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, and Cooperation was discussed with Afghanleaders. When preparing the document, both sides were led by Lenin’s principles of theTreaty of 1921, which was signed by Soviet Russia and Afghanistan, with the addedconsiderations of the new reality. Experts honed the wording and argued aboutpunctuation. Ambassador Puzanov was constantly in touch with the Afghan Ministry ofInternational Affairs to keep the minister of foreign affairs abreast of the evolution of thedocument. Hafizullah Amin, leafing through the document, admired the culture of Sovietdiplomacy and the perfection of the translation into Dari, but didn’t seem to be particularlyinterested in the substance of the treaty. If the Soviets wrote the document, it must havebeen correct.The state leaders of Afghanistan didn’t particularly concern themselves with thistreaty, much like the other treaties they had previously signed. Afghans did not attachparticular significance to such papers and documents. They kept to the spirit of agreementsonly so long as it was to their benefit.Not only politicians were preparing for the visit. Officers of the Ninth Directorate ofthe KGB were researching the gastronomic preferences of Comrade Taraki and themembers of his delegation in order to organize their meals in Moscow accordingly. Itturned out that the arriving Afghans were not particularly fussy about cuisine. They dranktea in the morning and ate flatbread with goat cheese. For lunch they preferred vegetablesoup with carrots, onions, and turnips. In the evening they ate kerai—fried eggs with lamband onion. On special occasions, they would eat pilaf and shish kebab.252
A discussion regarding the languages to be used during the meetings was held, andit was decided that the leading Soviet experts in Dari, diplomats Dmitry Rurikov andStanislav Gavrilov, would handle interpretation during the meeting of the leaders. Theprotocol staff agreed on the ceremony for greeting the Afghan delegation at the airport anddiscussed what ties and sports jackets the leaders should wear.On November 27, a plenary session of the Central Committee of the PDPA was heldthat was supposed to mark the end of intra-party turmoil. The following day, the KabulTimes published an article about the event. The article contained the customary set ofideological clichés: “The plenary session is a historical step forward in the workers’movement”; “The plenary session demonstrated the PDPA’s commitment to proletarianinternationalism and the defense of global peace”; “The plenary was the expression of thebrilliant leadership of the party and of the people by Comrade Taraki.”Decree Number Eight of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA, “Regarding the Issueof Land Reform,” was discussed and approved. The most important goal of the meeting—todeliver a final blow to the Parchamis—was achieved. Seven members of the CentralCommittee and two members of the Revolutionary Council (Babrak Karmal, Nur AhmadNur, Keshtmand, Anahita Ratebzad, Baryalai, Vakil, Najib, Qadir, and Raffi) were officiallyexpelled from the PDPA, “for their participation in a traitorous plot against the Great AprilRevolution, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and our glorious party.” Four moremembers of the Central Committee were subjected to softer punishment; they werereduced in the rank from members to candidates, “in order to be re-educated based oncriticism and self-criticism.”253
- Page 202 and 203: should ask your colleagues to be mo
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A discussion regarding the languages <strong>to</strong> be used during the meetings was held, andit was decided that the leading Soviet experts in Dari, diplomats Dmitry Rurikov andStanislav Gavrilov, would handle interpretation during the meeting of the leaders. <strong>The</strong>pro<strong>to</strong>col staff agreed on the ceremony for greeting the Afghan delegation at the airport anddiscussed what ties and sports jackets the leaders should wear.On November 27, a plenary session of the Central Committee of the PDPA was heldthat was supposed <strong>to</strong> mark the end of intra-party turmoil. <strong>The</strong> following day, the KabulTimes published an article about the event. <strong>The</strong> article contained the cus<strong>to</strong>mary set ofideological clichés: “<strong>The</strong> plenary session is a his<strong>to</strong>rical step forward in the workers’movement”; “<strong>The</strong> plenary session demonstrated the PDPA’s commitment <strong>to</strong> proletarianinternationalism and the defense of global peace”; “<strong>The</strong> plenary was the expression of thebrilliant leadership of the party and of the people by Comrade Taraki.”Decree Number Eight of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA, “Regarding the Issueof Land Reform,” was discussed and approved. <strong>The</strong> most important goal of the meeting—<strong>to</strong>deliver a final blow <strong>to</strong> the Parchamis—was achieved. Seven members of the CentralCommittee and two members of the Revolutionary Council (Babrak Karmal, Nur AhmadNur, Keshtmand, Anahita Ratebzad, Baryalai, Vakil, Najib, Qadir, and Raffi) were officiallyexpelled from the PDPA, “for their participation in a trai<strong>to</strong>rous plot against the Great AprilRevolution, the Democratic Republic of <strong>Afghanistan</strong>, and our glorious party.” Four moremembers of the Central Committee were subjected <strong>to</strong> softer punishment; they werereduced in the rank from members <strong>to</strong> candidates, “in order <strong>to</strong> be re-educated based oncriticism and self-criticism.”253
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