The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

Kryuchkov remained silent, digesting Bogdanov’s report. Bogdanov took severalsheets from his folder and presented them to his boss. “Here, Vladimir Alexandrovich. Thisis a typical example of Amin’s rhetoric. It’s a transcript of his recent meeting with ourdelegation from the Academy of Sciences—a very representative document.”Kryuchkov took the papers and began to read. “Having greeted the Sovietdelegation, H. Amin said that the April Revolution was a direct consequence of the GreatSocialist October Revolution and would serve as an example for many countries. ‘Wealways found inspiration in the ideas of the October Revolution. Many Afghanrevolutionaries were brought up by the great Lenin’s works.’ Talking about Soviet-Afghanrelations, Amin mentioned that the Afghans were always very close and sincere with theirSoviet friends who ‘gave us comprehensive assistance and support. This is the guarantee ofthe victory of our revolution. From the very first day of our party’s creation, we have saidthat following the Soviet model is the main condition for our success.’ Amin promised toassist the work of the Soviet delegation and in conclusion said, ‘We don’t have secrets fromour Soviet friends because we always seek to nurture four main qualities among our partymembers: patriotism, Marxism, Sovietism, and internationalism.’”“Nothing new,” remarked Kryuchkov after he finished reading. “I heard the samefrom him when I was in Kabul.”“In principle, this is the case,” agreed Bogdanov. “But more and more, I sense thatthis person is not so simple. I have a persistent feeling that all of his high-style speeches areonly smoke and mirrors, part of a game plan that we still don’t understand.”Bogdanov hesitated. With difficulty, he held back his desire to tell Kryuchkov thatAmin once said straightforwardly that he would like to see a different Soviet ambassador in244

Kabul. According to Amin, Puzanov compromised himself by having worked in Afghanistanunder the king and under Daoud, didn’t understand the essence of the April Revolution,and sent distorted information to Moscow about the situation in Afghanistan. Bogdanovwas greatly surprised to hear this account. From what he understood, Puzanov thoughtvery highly of Amin and tended to exaggerate Amin’s impact in his telegrams. The Afghanleader, having expressed his wish, was certain that it would be immediately forwarded toMoscow, but he miscalculated. The colonel was too smart for that. He considered itdangerous to become an intermediary in this sort of intrigue. Besides, who knows whatAmin said about him to others, or about other Soviet representatives?However, the Afghan vice-premier hadn’t forgotten about his conversation withBogdanov. He tried to check through other channels whether his wish was relayed to theCenter.Having concluded his meeting with Bogdanov, Kryuchkov invited his deputy,General Medyanik, who was in charge of Oriental affairs. He asked Medyanik to share histhoughts regarding Amin. Yakov Prokofievich was not surprised when he was asked this.He reported the following:“Our colleagues in the American section and we are just beginning to work out theissue of Amin’s stay in the United States. We don’t have much information yet. Whenstudying at Columbia, Amin was close with Pazhvak—the former minister of education anda fervent anti-communist. They drank together and enjoyed each other’s company. On theway back from the States, Amin stopped in Western Germany to visit the Afghanambassador in Bonn, Ali Ahmad Popal, an openly pro-Western and anti-Soviet politician.We don’t know details of their conversations. The question is, what do this self proclaimed245

Kryuchkov remained silent, digesting Bogdanov’s report. Bogdanov <strong>to</strong>ok severalsheets from his folder and presented them <strong>to</strong> his boss. “Here, Vladimir Alexandrovich. Thisis a typical example of Amin’s rhe<strong>to</strong>ric. It’s a transcript of his recent meeting with ourdelegation from the Academy of Sciences—a very representative document.”Kryuchkov <strong>to</strong>ok the papers and began <strong>to</strong> read. “Having greeted the Sovietdelegation, H. Amin said that the April Revolution was a direct consequence of the GreatSocialist Oc<strong>to</strong>ber Revolution and would serve as an example for many countries. ‘Wealways found inspiration in the ideas of the Oc<strong>to</strong>ber Revolution. Many Afghanrevolutionaries were brought up by the great Lenin’s works.’ Talking about Soviet-Afghanrelations, Amin mentioned that the Afghans were always very close and sincere with theirSoviet friends who ‘gave us comprehensive assistance and support. This is the guarantee ofthe vic<strong>to</strong>ry of our revolution. From the very first day of our party’s creation, we have saidthat following the Soviet model is the main condition for our success.’ Amin promised <strong>to</strong>assist the work of the Soviet delegation and in conclusion said, ‘We don’t have secrets fromour Soviet friends because we always seek <strong>to</strong> nurture four main qualities among our partymembers: patriotism, Marxism, Sovietism, and internationalism.’”“Nothing new,” remarked Kryuchkov after he finished reading. “I heard the samefrom him when I was in Kabul.”“In principle, this is the case,” agreed Bogdanov. “But more and more, I sense thatthis person is not so simple. I have a persistent feeling that all of his high-style speeches areonly smoke and mirrors, part of a game plan that we still don’t understand.”Bogdanov hesitated. With difficulty, he held back his desire <strong>to</strong> tell Kryuchkov thatAmin once said straightforwardly that he would like <strong>to</strong> see a different Soviet ambassador in244

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