The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

doubts as to the old Communist warrior’s enduring allegiance to the ideas of theCommunist cause, and would include this assessment in their reports to the Center.The impact of his trip was negligible. The mass repression continued. The Afghanrevolutionaries continued to behave as they pleased.Moreover, Amin himself became more aggressive. When meeting Bogdanov, hewould open a black notebook and name some Soviet staff member in Kabul, stating thatthis person was “conducting subversive activities against Afghanistan.” Once, the person inquestion happened to be an officer in the KGB Residency, working under a consulate cover.Another time, it was the director of the Soviet Cultural Center. After some analysis, itbecame obvious that the reason for such accusations was always either secret or overtcontacts by the Soviet citizens with Parchamists. As it was later revealed, Amin created aspecial group within the security services to follow Soviet citizens and record all theirconversations and contacts, regardless of their nature.Hafizullah Amin differed from other friends of the Soviet Union from countries onthe path to socialism. On more than one occasion, Bogdanov had to appeal to Amin torelease the Afghans linked to Soviet Intelligence Services. Sometimes Amin received adirect explanation about why Moscow was concerned about the fates of those people.Among them were former Vice-Premier Charkh, former Head of Police and GendarmerieAzhar, and former member of the Revolutionary Council Raffi. Normally Amin would evadeMoscow’s requests or explain that the person in question was a member of a terroristgroup. “Okay,” he would say sarcastically, “we are prepared to free your man right away.We can even appoint him as minister, but only under your personal responsibility. Do youagree to these terms?”234