The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU listened to Bogdanov’s concernssilently before asking some insignificant questions. On the morning of September 26, hemet with Taraki and Amin and tactfully expressed Moscow’s concern. To emphasize theconfidential nature of those meetings, Ponomaryov conducted the meetings individuallywith the PDPA’s leaders. Not even the Soviet ambassador had been invited. Both Afghanleaders, who had been forewarned of the subject matter of these conversations, werenoticeably tense. It was obvious that they had difficulty restraining their objections. Atmore than one point, Taraki could not hold back.“We never trusted Parchamis,” he responded emotionally. “Our union was aformality. Parchamis did not participate in the military uprising. After the victory of therevolution they demanded that all of the leading positions in the government be dividedequally between Khalq and Parcham. Is this just? When we declined to satisfy theirdemands, they started to threaten us with an uprising. There was only one way out. It waseither us or them.”Taraki’s body language betrayed his contempt for the conversation. He slouched inhis chair with his legs crossed. His normally kind and welcoming face assumed a blankexpression, masking his disgust.Ponomaryov could consider his mission formally accomplished. He did what he hadbeen tasked to do. He handed the Afghan leaders gifts along with greetings from the SovietPolitburo and “Leonid Ilyich personally.” He chose not to meet with the Politburo membersof the PDPA, which they found offensive. However, in the evening he gathered a smallgroup of the upper echelon of the Soviet colony at the embassy, asking them to once again,“honestly and principally,” evaluate the situation. Everything went well at that meeting231