The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

As Surnin predicted, a CIA operative in Kabul who was in charge of “developing” theSoviet citizen told the young Azeri that a very powerful, high-ranking official of the U.S.government would soon arrive from Iran. That important man, he explained, would like tomeet their “Soviet friend” in order to establish confidential collaboration with him. TheSoviet interpreter, per Surnin’s recommendation, said that he understood the situation. Hesaid that it was possible that he, an Azeri nationalist, whose ancestors fought theBolsheviks as members of the Musavat Party, would agree to collaborate, on the conditionthat the Americans fulfill his life-long dream of owning a genuine American Colt. “I am anAzeri, a man of the Caucasus. According to our ancient tradition, giving a weapon is a signof the highest trust and respect.”A few days after that conversation, the “American friend” called the interpreter andinformed him that the high-ranking official, who had arrived from Tehran, would expect tosee him in a certain Kabul restaurant later that evening.An agent of the Kabul KGB Residency, codenamed “Fateh,” was also involved in theSoviet counter-operation. Fateh was an Afghani, a mid-level official of the Afghangendarmerie. He had been tasked by Surnin to write a report in advance to his boss. Thereport would contain important information about the arrival of a dangerous internationalterrorist in Kabul, a Palestinian member of the organization Black September. At the time,shortly after the hostage crisis involving the Israeli Olympic team in Munich, the world wasfearful of Palestinians. Fateh, with a group of commandos, hid in the back of the restaurantbefore the meeting of the Soviet interpreter and the American official. When the importantAmerican visitor (the deputy chief of the CIA Residency in Iran * ) and the Soviet interpreter* William Casey, the future director of the CIA, was then CIA chief in Iran.226