The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

should ask your colleagues to be more sympathetic to our struggle. Think of your revolution—howmany enemies did you have? And how mercilessly, and over how long a time did your leadershiphave to purge them from the party ranks? Doesn’t our campaign against the opportunists insideour party remind you of your own struggle with the Mensheviks? We have simply taken yourlessons to heart.”“Still, Comrade Taraki,” softly responded the ambassador, “I would like to pass along arequest from the Soviet leadership to show some humanity to those whom you have arrested andallow them to live.”The Afghan leader stood up and paced across his office with his chest thrust forward.“We treat the opinion of our Soviet comrades with great respect,” he said. “Your words arelaw for us. But remember Lenin’s words, that one should be merciless to the enemies of therevolution. Remember that in order to achieve the full victory of the October Revolution, you hadto eliminate millions of enemies. I agree—repression is an extraordinarily sharp weapon. But thewhole history of your country has taught us that we should not hesitate to use this weapondecisively.”At the embassy, Puzanov wrote a cable to the Center: “In our opinion, the actions of theleadership of the PDPA are leading to the cementing of revolutionary authority, strengthening therole of the party in all spheres of Afghan society, foremost in the Afghan military forces. As to thearrest of Minister of Defense Abdul Qadir, according to our observations he was a politicallyimmature person, inclined to adventurism and lacking perspective.”***On August 2, “Comrade Vladimirov,” the code name of Vladimir Kryuchkov, arrived inKabul on a covert mission. He was accompanied by Colonel Bogdanov, who would become the first202

head of the KGB Representative Office in Kabul, and General Kalugin from PGU, the director ofForeign Intelligence. Kryuchkov received a number of warnings from his colleagues about thecareless rhetoric of the young general. By the time of their trip to Kabul, Kryuchkov had amassedan impressive file of compromising material regarding Kalugin, who had been suspected ofmisdeeds ranging from incompetence to being a CIA agent. Without any idea that his career inForeign Intelligence was soon to be axed, Kalugin accompanied his boss on his first trip toAfghanistan.Vladimir Alexandrovich had an unusual way of dealing with colleagues with questionablerecords. He liked to “study his people” in an intimate environment. For example, he eagerlyparticipated in parties celebrating promotions of his colleagues to the rank of general. Kryuchkovhimself almost never drank, but would instead use the banquets as opportunities for probing thecharacter of those who had been promoted, while they were “ under the influence” and moreexposed.Now, Kalugin was brought along to see how he would behave in extreme situations andhow he would act in close proximity to his chief. While the trip to Kabul was just another shorttermadventure for Kalugin (Kabul today, Moscow tomorrow, and on to Prague, Warsaw, andHavana), his colleague Colonel Bogdanov arrived there with a very different mindset. He had tostay in Afghanistan indefinitely, and he had no desire to go in the first place, let alone stayindefinitely.Leonid Pavlovich Bogdanov had no particular feelings towards Afghanistan. It wasuninteresting to him both from the point of view of working and of living there. His interests andaspirations lay elsewhere. Bogdanov had had very successful tours in India and Indonesia. InJanuary 1977 he returned from Iran, where he also had a successful appointment. When, several203

head of the KGB Representative Office in Kabul, and General Kalugin from PGU, the direc<strong>to</strong>r ofForeign Intelligence. Kryuchkov received a number of warnings from his colleagues about thecareless rhe<strong>to</strong>ric of the young general. By the time of their trip <strong>to</strong> Kabul, Kryuchkov had amassedan impressive file of compromising material regarding Kalugin, who had been suspected ofmisdeeds ranging from incompetence <strong>to</strong> being a CIA agent. Without any idea that his career inForeign Intelligence was soon <strong>to</strong> be axed, Kalugin accompanied his boss on his first trip <strong>to</strong><strong>Afghanistan</strong>.Vladimir Alexandrovich had an unusual way of dealing with colleagues with questionablerecords. He liked <strong>to</strong> “study his people” in an intimate environment. For example, he eagerlyparticipated in parties celebrating promotions of his colleagues <strong>to</strong> the rank of general. Kryuchkovhimself almost never drank, but would instead use the banquets as opportunities for probing thecharacter of those who had been promoted, while they were “ under the influence” and moreexposed.Now, Kalugin was brought along <strong>to</strong> see how he would behave in extreme situations andhow he would act in close proximity <strong>to</strong> his chief. While the trip <strong>to</strong> Kabul was just another shorttermadventure for Kalugin (Kabul <strong>to</strong>day, Moscow <strong>to</strong>morrow, and on <strong>to</strong> Prague, Warsaw, andHavana), his colleague Colonel Bogdanov arrived there with a very different mindset. He had <strong>to</strong>stay in <strong>Afghanistan</strong> indefinitely, and he had no desire <strong>to</strong> go in the first place, let alone stayindefinitely.Leonid Pavlovich Bogdanov had no particular feelings <strong>to</strong>wards <strong>Afghanistan</strong>. It wasuninteresting <strong>to</strong> him both from the point of view of working and of living there. His interests andaspirations lay elsewhere. Bogdanov had had very successful <strong>to</strong>urs in India and Indonesia. InJanuary 1977 he returned from Iran, where he also had a successful appointment. When, several203

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