The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

me without second thought.” They parted.The senior party adviser, Valery Kharazov, was not told anything about the nocturnalincident involving the Parchamis. For some reason, Kharazov did not have any rapport with theKGB operatives. It’s possible that his friendship with Gorelov was the reason for that. Gorelov’sopinions regarding a number of issues differed from those of the KGB operatives by that time. Or,perhaps another reason was Kharazov’s independent character. He enjoyed a close relationshipwith Ambassador Puzanov and spent a good deal of time talking with the military, but did notmeet with the KGB operatives even once during his three-month stay in Kabul. He suspected thatthe information that he sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU differed greatly from the KGBoperatives’ analyses.Once, the Soviet economic adviser, who had working contacts with the Afghan minister ofplanning, told Kharazov that Sultan Ali Keshtmand wanted to meet with him. ValeryInnokentievich suggested they meet in a modest residence where party advisers worked.Keshtmand refused (“I don’t want this to be reported to Amin immediately”), and proposed tomeet behind the apartment buildings of Mikrorayon instead. This time, Kharazov refused. Theofficial representative of the CPSU Central Committee was above and beyond participating inthose cloak-and-dagger games. Within several days, Keshtmand was arrested as a plotter, aforeign agent, and an enemy of the revolution.Soon after Babrak Karmal settled down as ambassador in Prague, he received an orderfrom the PDPA leadership to immediately return to Afghanistan, allegedly for a new appointment.He sensed that something was wrong, and with the help of the Czechoslovakian security services,he left Prague and went into hiding at one of their secret dachas not far from the Karlovy Varyresort. Amin was beside himself. He sent a group of assassins to Czechoslovakia, but the Czech189