The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

Indeed, there would be many more Soviet party advisers in Afghanistan, from provinces,republican Central Committees, and even from the Soviet Central Committee. Some of them,without thinking, would enthusiastically try to transfer the success of Soviet development ontoAfghan soil. They would create party committees, conduct party meetings, and organize partyschools, all in the Soviet style. Their speakers would quote Lenin, Brezhnev, and Taraki (and laterAmin, Karmal, and Najibullah). Their oaths would pledge loyalty to the achievements of the greatApril Revolution. Communist subbotniki * , classes dedicated to studying Lenin’s writing, socialistcompetitions, delegates, congresses—in short, all of the Soviet ideological infrastructure—wouldbe mimicked in Afghanistan. All of the emptiness, the hypocrisy, and the formalism would bedragged there from the Soviet Union. In fairness to Kharazov, he rose above such superficiality. Hetruly wanted to get to the essence of reforming life in Afghanistan, and if he gave any advice, hegave it sincerely and thoughtfully.Kharazov found a fervent pupil in Amin, with whom he met frequently. Amin wanted toknow in great detail about the infrastructure of the CPSU, the role of average party members, andthe leading organs of the party. Once, he mentioned that it would be a good idea to name theAfghan party the “Communist Party” as in the Soviet Union, until Kharazov managed to dissuadehim.Amin was very quickly rising in the power structures. Not only was he the minister offoreign affairs, but he also handled the armed forces, special forces, and police. He became deeplyinvolved in economic issues and the development of the party ideology. Gorelov and Zaplatin likedhim. Both generals were fond of Amin’s enormous energy, industriousness, and his eagerness totake on responsibility. Amin was perceived in a much more favorable light in comparison with* Weekend civic projects where Soviet citizens “volunteered” to work. [Translators note]182

other bureaucrats. The military advisers objected to Kharazov’s concerns. Yes, he was rigid, butthis was the Orient. In Afghanistan, it couldn’t be otherwise—you are either on the top or on thebottom. He may be assuming too much responsibility, but he is not usurping it from anybody.Taraki regularly bestows more and more authority upon him, iterating his belief that nobody isbetter suited to take on his tasks. Isn’t that the case? He may be merciless towards the Parchamis,but the Parchamis could be blamed for lots of things. They were malcontents, demagogues, andliars. Among Soviet military advisers, Amin was highly respected. He was considered to be themain hero of the revolution, the engine behind the current regime’s momentum, and the futurepower of Afghanistan.Kharazov was in no hurry to arrive at any conclusions about the situation in Afghanistan.He was watching, listening to different opinions. One thing that became obvious to him was thatno negotiations or promises would help achieve peace or agreement within the PDPA. The divisiveprocess had become irreversible. This meant that the Soviets would eventually have to make achoice.During the three months that Kharazov worked in Kabul, Taraki saw him only twice, and itwas obvious that he wasn’t particularly eager to receive him. The Afghan leader, who was greatlyenjoying his reign, was not eager to take advice on how to rule his party from some provincialSoviet adviser from Lithuania. Taraki was rapidly losing his grip on reality. He had come toconsider himself as a historical figure, as the father of the nation. He spoke of the forthcomingvictory of socialism as a matter that had already been decided. What did Kharazov have to offerhim? Some comrades from the Soviet Union obviously did not understand the peculiarities ofAfghanistan. They did not appreciate the significance of the April Revolution, nor did they believein the imminent arrival of socialism. What was there to talk with them about?183

other bureaucrats. <strong>The</strong> military advisers objected <strong>to</strong> Kharazov’s concerns. Yes, he was rigid, butthis was the Orient. In <strong>Afghanistan</strong>, it couldn’t be otherwise—you are either on the <strong>to</strong>p or on thebot<strong>to</strong>m. He may be assuming <strong>to</strong>o much responsibility, but he is not usurping it from anybody.Taraki regularly bes<strong>to</strong>ws more and more authority upon him, iterating his belief that nobody isbetter suited <strong>to</strong> take on his tasks. Isn’t that the case? He may be merciless <strong>to</strong>wards the Parchamis,but the Parchamis could be blamed for lots of things. <strong>The</strong>y were malcontents, demagogues, andliars. Among Soviet military advisers, Amin was highly respected. He was considered <strong>to</strong> be themain hero of the revolution, the engine behind the current regime’s momentum, and the futurepower of <strong>Afghanistan</strong>.Kharazov was in no hurry <strong>to</strong> arrive at any conclusions about the situation in <strong>Afghanistan</strong>.He was watching, listening <strong>to</strong> different opinions. One thing that became obvious <strong>to</strong> him was thatno negotiations or promises would help achieve peace or agreement within the PDPA. <strong>The</strong> divisiveprocess had become irreversible. This meant that the Soviets would eventually have <strong>to</strong> make achoice.During the three months that Kharazov worked in Kabul, Taraki saw him only twice, and itwas obvious that he wasn’t particularly eager <strong>to</strong> receive him. <strong>The</strong> Afghan leader, who was greatlyenjoying his reign, was not eager <strong>to</strong> take advice on how <strong>to</strong> rule his party from some provincialSoviet adviser from Lithuania. Taraki was rapidly losing his grip on reality. He had come <strong>to</strong>consider himself as a his<strong>to</strong>rical figure, as the father of the nation. He spoke of the forthcomingvic<strong>to</strong>ry of socialism as a matter that had already been decided. What did Kharazov have <strong>to</strong> offerhim? Some comrades from the Soviet Union obviously did not understand the peculiarities of<strong>Afghanistan</strong>. <strong>The</strong>y did not appreciate the significance of the April Revolution, nor did they believein the imminent arrival of socialism. What was there <strong>to</strong> talk with them about?183

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