The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
thirty of them. Two of them were immediately deemed unfit by Zaplatin. One of them was Taraki’spersonal assistant, Gulabzoi, a twenty-five-year-old officer of military transportation aviation. Hiscandidacy was proposed for one of the top positions at the political directorate of the armedforces. During the interview, Gulabzoi stated that he would like to combine his work in thepolitical branch of the armed forces with the position of the aide-de-camp to the head of state. Itbecame obvious during the interview that this revolutionary was not particularly enthusiasticabout the ideological party work. Zaplatin didn’t like that.“It won’t work that way,” Zaplatin told Gulabzoi. “You’ll need to choose one or the other.”“I would have a reliable deputy; he would take care of things.”“You have no idea how important the position is that you would like to take. This personwill become the heart and engine of the political branch of the armed forces. There can be noshared responsibilities.”“We’ll see,” grinned Gulabzoi, and walked out of the office.The general had no idea that Gulabzoi was like an adopted son to Secretary General Taraki,who adored him. The next day, Taraki attempted to softly convince Zaplatin to show moreappreciation for Gulabzoi’s wishes. But Zaplatin remained stubbornly unconvinced.“If you want to create a functioning organization, then trust me. If you want to create animpostor, then do as you wish.”Taraki had to agree with Zaplatin. Amin’s nephew, a graduate of the Leningrad Academy ofCommunications, was appointed to the position instead of Gulabzoi. He spoke good Russian andZaplatin found him suitable for the task. As a result of it, Zaplatin’s reputation in the eyes of Amingrew significantly, without particular effort on the part of the Soviet general.He maintained good relations with Taraki as well. The head of state received Zaplatin more162
often than any of his other Soviet friends. Even the head of the Soviet military advising mission, Lt.Gen. Gorelov, could not visit Palace Ark as informally as Zaplatin. Neither Taraki nor Amin couldmake peace with the fact that Lt. Gen. Gorelov was Daoud’s trusted associate, who accompaniedDaoud in his trips across the country. Zaplatin spent a lot of energy trying to convince Afghanleaders that Lev Nikolayevich Gorelov was loyal to the spirit of the revolutionary changes and thathis extraordinary military experience would be very useful to them. Eventually Taraki and Aminmade peace with Gorelov’s presence, but they never fully trusted him.Zaplatin enthusiastically started to educate selected officers. It was not easy for him todevise a curriculum. He was not quite sure how to begin. What should the first, the most importanttopic be? As a political apparatchik of the Soviet school, he suggested formulating the topic assuch: “The Great October Revolution, Its Historical Meaning, Lessons, Conclusions, and the Need toSafeguard Its Results.” It sounded quite good from the point of view of a Soviet political operative,but Amin had his doubts. “Who will write about it? Nothing is yet stable in our party, and there islittle clarity in regards to many issues. Let’s wait.”Most probably, Amin had in mind that he was the one who eventually should be featured inthe discourse as the inspiration behind the success of the April Revolution, but now he had toshare his celebrity status with Taraki, Qadir, and Watanjar. In addition, Karmal could mix thingsup.After some thoughts, Vasily Petrovich offered a variant on the title: “Our NorthernNeighbor, the Soviet Union.”Amin was pleased with this suggestion. He wanted Zaplatin to spend as much time asnecessary covering this topic.Zaplatin allocated ten hours to studying the USSR and soon realized that this was the right163
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thirty of them. Two of them were immediately deemed unfit by Zaplatin. One of them was Taraki’spersonal assistant, Gulabzoi, a twenty-five-year-old officer of military transportation aviation. Hiscandidacy was proposed for one of the <strong>to</strong>p positions at the political direc<strong>to</strong>rate of the armedforces. During the interview, Gulabzoi stated that he would like <strong>to</strong> combine his work in thepolitical branch of the armed forces with the position of the aide-de-camp <strong>to</strong> the head of state. Itbecame obvious during the interview that this revolutionary was not particularly enthusiasticabout the ideological party work. Zaplatin didn’t like that.“It won’t work that way,” Zaplatin <strong>to</strong>ld Gulabzoi. “You’ll need <strong>to</strong> choose one or the other.”“I would have a reliable deputy; he would take care of things.”“You have no idea how important the position is that you would like <strong>to</strong> take. This personwill become the heart and engine of the political branch of the armed forces. <strong>The</strong>re can be noshared responsibilities.”“We’ll see,” grinned Gulabzoi, and walked out of the office.<strong>The</strong> general had no idea that Gulabzoi was like an adopted son <strong>to</strong> Secretary General Taraki,who adored him. <strong>The</strong> next day, Taraki attempted <strong>to</strong> softly convince Zaplatin <strong>to</strong> show moreappreciation for Gulabzoi’s wishes. But Zaplatin remained stubbornly unconvinced.“If you want <strong>to</strong> create a functioning organization, then trust me. If you want <strong>to</strong> create animpos<strong>to</strong>r, then do as you wish.”Taraki had <strong>to</strong> agree with Zaplatin. Amin’s nephew, a graduate of the Leningrad Academy ofCommunications, was appointed <strong>to</strong> the position instead of Gulabzoi. He spoke good Russian andZaplatin found him suitable for the task. As a result of it, Zaplatin’s reputation in the eyes of Amingrew significantly, without particular effort on the part of the Soviet general.He maintained good relations with Taraki as well. <strong>The</strong> head of state received Zaplatin more162