The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

as accomplices, received long-term prison sentences. It was during Daoud’s rule, not underthe PDPA leadership as some assert, that the exodus of Muslim fundamentalists fromAfghanistan began. Following another failed attempt to organize anti-government actions,a group of Muslim extremists including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ahmed Shah Massoud, andothers left the country. At that time, very few people knew those young men. Later, afterthe Soviet military intervention, those exiles became leaders of powerful private armiesand influential politicians.At the time, Soviet diplomats and official guests from Moscow who visitedAfghanistan did not even attempt to conceal their pleasure regarding Daoud’s campaignagainst the Islamic reactionaries. In Moscow, certainty grew that the “Red Prince” (thenickname given to Daoud by some journalists), supported by young, pro-Soviet, Afghanpoliticians, and propped up by Soviet assistance, would be inclined to build, if not socialism,at least a society in which the Soviet Union’s Afghan friends would actually shape politicaldecisions. In other words, the chimera of the Sovietization of Afghanistan was born.In reality, Daoud’s plans were different. He had no intention of changing thefundamental foundation of society that had evolved over the course of many centuries. As atrue nationalist, he had a deep respect for tradition. His reforms were not to dismantle thepolitical system, but to improve it. In his foreign policy, Daoud strove to balance betweenthe superpowers and attempted to gain the maximum advantage for his country in theprocess. There was a popular joke in Kabul, “He uses Soviet matches to light Americancigarettes.” After Daoud managed to defeat radical Islamic groups and suppress theuprisings of ethnic minorities in the north of the country, he decided to get rid of his Sovietleaningministers, his former allies from the time of the coup.16