The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
political situation developing in the country. On the one hand, Muslim fundamentalistgroups were becoming more influential and preparing for an armed struggle. On the otherhand, those dissatisfied with the medieval state of affairs in Afghanistan were exhibiting agrowing determination to challenge the ruling regime. If those people had been simplepeasants, workers, or bureaucrats, the situation would not be so dangerous. But these wereyoung officers, the backbone of the Afghan army. In such a volatile political atmosphere,Zahir Shah could easily find himself in an unenviable position. He had had his fair share ofdistressing situations over the years and now, guided by experience, he considered itprudent to “retreat” and transfer his authority to someone more willing to grapple with thegrowing unrest and direct the country back to the traditional course of moderatenationalism. The man for the job was Mohammad Daoud, an out-of-favor prime ministerand a close relative of the king. Before the “state coup d’etat” was carried out, the king,joined by his relatives and entourage, left the country for Italy to be spared the usualunpleasantries that follow transfers of power.News of the “monarch’s blessing of Daoud to conduct the republican coup” wasrelayed to Moscow, but it went unnoticed among the enthusiasm surroundingAfghanistan’s transition to a “new stage of progressive development.” The enthusiasm waswell merited. In his first speech on Kabul radio the morning after seizing power, the newAfghan leader assured his fellow citizens that from now on the country would developalong a path of social-economic democratization. He proclaimed the abolition of social andethnic inequalities through the establishment of just land reforms that would allow Afghanpeasants to own their own land. Daoud expressed his intention to put an end tobureaucratic corruption and to introduce state control over prices in the service and trade14
sectors. There were proclamations of other good intentions as well. And to be fair, it shouldbe noted that during his rule, Daoud earnestly attempted to realize the reforms promised inhis inaugural address.The new head of state, commenting on the foreign policy of the republican regime,emphasized his intention to strengthen the friendship with “the great northern neighbor,”as well as to resist “pro-imperialist ventures” within his borders. The foreign policy tilttowards Moscow was emphasized because Daoud’s recent ascent to power had beenenforced by young officers who had received their military training in the Soviet Union.Many of them were members of the PDPA and had collaborated closely with BabrakKarmal. Once his presidency was established, Daoud was obliged to reward them withappointments to high-level government positions.Daoud traveled to the Soviet Union on his first state visit. He was warmly received.The visit included many meetings that determined the course of comprehensivedevelopment for Soviet-Afghan relations.Daoud, an experienced politician and an intelligent and pragmatic man, decided toassert his political authority over his enemies with immediate and decisive action. Thesuppression of Islamic fundamentalists was his first goal. Islamists had thrown acid in thefaces of girls who walked uncloaked by their hijabs. They committed terrorist acts and hadeven attempted to organize pockets of armed resistance in several regions of the country.Daoud arrested and imprisoned Ghulam Mohammad Niazi, the dean of the theologicaldepartment and a founder of the Islamic extremist group “Muslim Youth.” Some monthslater, in December 1973, another radical Islamic leader, Habibullah Rahman, was arrestedand executed on the conviction of plotting to overthrow the regime. His friends, convicted15
- Page 6: Chapter 1:VIRUS: How the invasion o
- Page 9: arranged meeting point for the emer
- Page 12 and 13: that Orlov-Morozov wrote to the Cen
- Page 16 and 17: as accomplices, received long-term
- Page 18 and 19: World War II, Prince Daoud Khan, th
- Page 20 and 21: “Can you imagine, Comrade General
- Page 22: no idea that some destructive polit
- Page 28 and 29: General Gorelov was particularly co
- Page 30 and 31: ascent. One plane, flying low above
- Page 32 and 33: would retrieve vodka along with gla
- Page 34 and 35: laid down on the couch. He felt pre
- Page 36 and 37: possible contingency. Any unforesee
- Page 38 and 39: In July 1973, Major Qadir and his g
- Page 40 and 41: the Parcham faction, also became mi
- Page 42 and 43: the military transport division of
- Page 44 and 45: on the morning of April 27, the off
- Page 46 and 47: there were passwords. I think Amin
- Page 48 and 49: commander suddenly stopped and turn
- Page 50 and 51: in the lead tank, which was compris
- Page 52 and 53: KGB colleagues, exiting the embassy
- Page 54 and 55: married?”“I wonder whose side t
- Page 56 and 57: detachments. The analyst of the Res
- Page 58 and 59: front of the airport and drove back
- Page 60 and 61: complained to him, “Your trade re
- Page 62 and 63: “What’s wrong? Should I call a
political situation developing in the country. On the one hand, Muslim fundamentalistgroups were becoming more influential and preparing for an armed struggle. On the otherhand, those dissatisfied with the medieval state of affairs in <strong>Afghanistan</strong> were exhibiting agrowing determination <strong>to</strong> challenge the ruling regime. If those people had been simplepeasants, workers, or bureaucrats, the situation would not be so dangerous. But these wereyoung officers, the backbone of the Afghan army. In such a volatile political atmosphere,Zahir Shah could easily find himself in an unenviable position. He had had his fair share ofdistressing situations over the years and now, guided by experience, he considered itprudent <strong>to</strong> “retreat” and transfer his authority <strong>to</strong> someone more willing <strong>to</strong> grapple with thegrowing unrest and direct the country back <strong>to</strong> the traditional course of moderatenationalism. <strong>The</strong> man for the job was Mohammad Daoud, an out-of-favor prime ministerand a close relative of the king. Before the “state coup d’etat” was carried out, the king,joined by his relatives and en<strong>to</strong>urage, left the country for Italy <strong>to</strong> be spared the usualunpleasantries that follow transfers of power.News of the “monarch’s blessing of Daoud <strong>to</strong> conduct the republican coup” wasrelayed <strong>to</strong> Moscow, but it went unnoticed among the enthusiasm surrounding<strong>Afghanistan</strong>’s transition <strong>to</strong> a “new stage of progressive development.” <strong>The</strong> enthusiasm waswell merited. In his first speech on Kabul radio the morning after seizing power, the newAfghan leader assured his fellow citizens that from now on the country would developalong a path of social-economic democratization. He proclaimed the abolition of social andethnic inequalities through the establishment of just land reforms that would allow Afghanpeasants <strong>to</strong> own their own land. Daoud expressed his intention <strong>to</strong> put an end <strong>to</strong>bureaucratic corruption and <strong>to</strong> introduce state control over prices in the service and trade14