The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
Politburo would be unpredictable. Suslov and Ponomaryov would surely approve it, so it wasbetter not to voice any opinions now. Let these generals bask in their intelligence and wit. At themoment it was more appropriate for him to remain silent.Medyanik changed the topic. “Do you think that Khalq and Parcham really made peace witheach other? For any extended period of time? When they begin to divide portfolios in government,both factions will resume their squabbles. They will even possibly start killing each other.”“Too bad,” sighed Leonov. “It’s unfortunate that we couldn’t convince the CentralCommittee that the intelligence services shouldn’t deal with Afghan party politics, calm themdown, wipe away their snot.”Kryuchkov looked at his interlocutor with reproach and shook his head. Is he criticizingparty leadership? It was permitted to an extent within their circle, but one had to be careful ofcrossing the line. Although, in general, Leonov was correct. Why bother intelligence with theseissues? Khalqis, Parchamis—even their value as sources of political information was doubtful.There were never problems with obtaining information in Afghanistan. Highly placed governmentbureaucrats, heads of special services and the military, always willingly collaborated with Sovietintelligence. We had our agents even in the closest circle of the king, and then Daoud. These oldmen in the Central Committee—Ponomaryov, Ulyanovsky, Brutenz—were still thinking along thelines of Communist International, which was long gone. They would only trust intelligenceoperatives to transfer funds and instructions to “friends.” The intelligence services even had todeal with taking care of the personal affairs of Afghan party functionaries. The contacts of ouroperatives with members of the underground opposition party could be very dangerous. In anycountry, an accusation of involvement in covert anti-state actions could lead to severepunishment.116
“By the way, Yakov Prokofievich.” A constructive thought had dawned on Kryuchkov.“Don’t you think that this presents a good opportunity to invite comrades from the CentralCommittee to participate in the project? I am ready to contact the leadership with a proposal tosend a group of competent Communist Party advisers to Afghanistan. How do you think ourAfghan friends would react to that?”“They will support it,” agreed Medyanik enthusiastically.“They will be grateful,” confidently confirmed Leonov.Kryuchkov stood up. The conversation was over. It was time to call Andropov.***Moscow reacted very quickly to the Kabul KGB Residency’s offer to upgrade ties with thePDPA to a higher level. Puzanov received the following instruction: “You should conduct anunofficial meeting with the leader of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, NurMohammad Taraki, who will most probably be proclaimed a leader of the Afghan state in the nearfuture. During the conversation, make an effort to receive information regarding his immediateplans for the new Afghan regime in the areas of domestic and foreign policy and the realization ofeconomic reforms. It’s desirable to find out who will be appointed to the highest state positions.Taraki should be warned in particular not to permit the unleashing of baseless retaliation againstrepresentatives of the former regime. The need to attract qualified specialists and bureaucratswho are not hostile towards the Afghan revolution must be pointed out. Establishing a goodpersonal rapport with Taraki will prove to be an important asset.”The ambassador called Orlov-Morozov to his office. He shared the cable with the deputyresident.“No problem, Alexander Mikhailovich. When would you like to meet with Taraki?117
- Page 66 and 67: well-prepared speech that touched u
- Page 68 and 69: Youth”) in the 1940s. Babrak also
- Page 70 and 71: eally need to act a year ago, becau
- Page 72 and 73: After Daoud’s visit to Moscow, th
- Page 74 and 75: that could be leveled against me or
- Page 76 and 77: looming in the fields, to be handed
- Page 78 and 79: “And what about Daoud?”“I don
- Page 80 and 81: sent the commander of the President
- Page 82 and 83: another Central Committee member, t
- Page 84 and 85: forces in the country, which had be
- Page 86 and 87: explosions in the night sky. Only a
- Page 88 and 89: When the bodies were removed from t
- Page 90 and 91: Chapter 2:“We Knocked Out Their T
- Page 92 and 93: deputy resident gave Valery an indi
- Page 94 and 95: trusted the deputy resident, who wa
- Page 96 and 97: Alexander Victorovich puffed his pi
- Page 98 and 99: As evening came, the city was shrou
- Page 100 and 101: honor, religion, and property, we d
- Page 102 and 103: evolution and kill the president if
- Page 104 and 105: theory, thinks as if the Pashtun
- Page 106 and 107: analyst’s intentions.***The morni
- Page 108 and 109: Vladimir Alexandrovich was accustom
- Page 110 and 111: intelligence officers, yet they wer
- Page 112 and 113: “He thinks that he will recover s
- Page 114 and 115: Three years ago, General Leonov was
- Page 118 and 119: Tomorrow? What time? I think it’s
- Page 120 and 121: During the meeting, the issues of A
- Page 122 and 123: institutions. Afghan special servic
- Page 124 and 125: to prepare him to work in Afghanist
- Page 126 and 127: favor, and inquired as to the natur
- Page 128 and 129: “We will take care of all funding
- Page 130 and 131: services, and to discuss the budget
- Page 132 and 133: was short, without a moustache desp
- Page 134 and 135: children, and myself—and for the
- Page 136 and 137: “Yes guys, this list is extraordi
- Page 138 and 139: This time, General Zaplatin headed
- Page 140 and 141: through Reuters? Do we not have our
- Page 142 and 143: much to discuss.Ulyanovsky started
- Page 144 and 145: enewed force.“According to our fo
- Page 146 and 147: ***One evening Starostin was called
- Page 148 and 149: Parcham officers were passive on th
- Page 150 and 151: operative boss,” mused the deputy
- Page 152 and 153: glad that the Soviet comrades had a
- Page 154 and 155: wasn’t involved in any affairs of
- Page 156 and 157: the April Revolution.”The ministe
- Page 158 and 159: do.”“I have no doubt that we wi
- Page 160 and 161: invited to meet with Minister of Fo
- Page 162 and 163: thirty of them. Two of them were im
- Page 164 and 165: decision. The Afghans listened to h
“By the way, Yakov Prokofievich.” A constructive thought had dawned on Kryuchkov.“Don’t you think that this presents a good opportunity <strong>to</strong> invite comrades from the CentralCommittee <strong>to</strong> participate in the project? I am ready <strong>to</strong> contact the leadership with a proposal <strong>to</strong>send a group of competent Communist Party advisers <strong>to</strong> <strong>Afghanistan</strong>. How do you think ourAfghan friends would react <strong>to</strong> that?”“<strong>The</strong>y will support it,” agreed Medyanik enthusiastically.“<strong>The</strong>y will be grateful,” confidently confirmed Leonov.Kryuchkov s<strong>to</strong>od up. <strong>The</strong> conversation was over. It was time <strong>to</strong> call Andropov.***Moscow reacted very quickly <strong>to</strong> the Kabul KGB Residency’s offer <strong>to</strong> upgrade ties with thePDPA <strong>to</strong> a higher level. Puzanov received the following instruction: “You should conduct anunofficial meeting with the leader of the People’s Democratic Party of <strong>Afghanistan</strong>, NurMohammad Taraki, who will most probably be proclaimed a leader of the Afghan state in the nearfuture. During the conversation, make an effort <strong>to</strong> receive information regarding his immediateplans for the new Afghan regime in the areas of domestic and foreign policy and the realization ofeconomic reforms. It’s desirable <strong>to</strong> find out who will be appointed <strong>to</strong> the highest state positions.Taraki should be warned in particular not <strong>to</strong> permit the unleashing of baseless retaliation againstrepresentatives of the former regime. <strong>The</strong> need <strong>to</strong> attract qualified specialists and bureaucratswho are not hostile <strong>to</strong>wards the Afghan revolution must be pointed out. Establishing a goodpersonal rapport with Taraki will prove <strong>to</strong> be an important asset.”<strong>The</strong> ambassador called Orlov-Morozov <strong>to</strong> his office. He shared the cable with the deputyresident.“No problem, Alexander Mikhailovich. When would you like <strong>to</strong> meet with Taraki?117
Change language