The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

Vova burst out laughing, “Well, you had quite a meeting. Good for you! What a funny styleof reporting….” Gvozd was fond of his friend’s funny introduction to the report about his meetingwith the American diplomat. Khotyaev knew that a serious analysis would follow this lightheartedintroduction. He also knew that his friend excelled in Russian grammar, but on occasion wouldwrite sloppily to free himself from the constraint of the rules.“During our conversation, Consul of the United States in Afghanistan Marik Warrenexpressed his opinion that, as a result of yesterday’s ‘Communist coup,’ the Soviet Union gottrapped. Now, according to Warren, the USSR is limited to two options in its Afghan policy, both ofwhich are lose-lose scenarios.“The first option would be to participate in the realization of the utopian program of thePDPA, which suggests building socialism in Afghanistan. Such participation would demand aninvestment of enormous material resources by the Soviet Union. Human resources will also berequired—highly qualified, disciplined, and familiar with the specifics of Afghanistan. However,according to Warren, the Soviet Union is currently lacking sufficient material and humanresources. The return from the investment of Soviet resources would be minimal. So we, theSoviets, would give everything available to Afghanistan without receiving much in return. Ourcountry, having to materially support ‘the socialist blossoming of the southern neighbor’ wouldend up refusing itself in many aspects, most importantly in defense programs. And what will bethe outcome? The United States would benefit!“The second option, according to Warren, is the following. We, the Soviet Union, will notadequately invest in Afghanistan. As a result, in a month or two our Afghani friends will be forcedto think about deliverables to the population, which will expect some progress from them. Thepeople will ask them, ‘Why did you aspire for supreme power? Why did you commit this bloody101