1 - Voice For The Defense Online

US. Supreme Courthttp://supct.law.corneU.edu/supct*** Summaries from website.CASTILLO ef aI. v. UMTGD STATES,No. 99-659, Cert. to the 5th Circuit(179 F.3d 321) Reversed andRemanded, 6/5/99; Opinion: Breyer.Petitioners were ind~cted for, amongother things, conspiriug to murder federalofficers. At the time of their trial, 18U.S.C. 5 924(c)(1) read in relevant part."Whoever, during and in relat~on to allycrime of violence. , uses or carrres afireann, shall, in addition to the punishmentprovided for such crime. , be sentencedto imprisomnent for five years, .and if the firearm is[, e.g.,] a machinegun,. to imprisonment for th~rlyears!'The jnry determined that petitioners hadviolated this section, and at sentencing,the judge found that the firearms includedmachineguns and imposed themandatory 30-year prlson sentence. TheFifth Circuit affirmed, concluding thatstatutory words such as "machinegun"create sentencing factors, not elementsof a separate crime.Held: Section 924(cl(l) usesthe word "machine~un"(and similarwords) to state an element of a seaa--ravated crime. The statute'slanguage, structure, context, history, audother factors helpful in determining itsobjectives lead to th~s conclusion. First,while the statute's literal language, takenalone, appears neutral, its overall stmclurestrongly favors the "new cnme"interpretailon. The first part of§924(c)(l)'s openmg sentence clearlyestabl~shes the elements of the basic federaloffnlse of usmg or carrying a gunduring a crnne of violenoc, andCongress placed that element and theword machinegun m a single sentence,not broken up with dashos or separatedinto subsections. That, along with thefact that the next three sentences referdirectly to sentencing, strongly suggeststhat the entire first sentence defiuescrimes. Second, courts have not typicallyor traditionally used fireann types(such as "machinegun") as sentencingfactors where the use or canying of thefirearm is itself the substantive crimc.See Jones 1! Uitiled Smles, 526 US. 227,234. Third, to ask a jury, rather tl~an ajudge, to decide whether a defendantused or carried a machinegun wouldrarely complicate a trial or risk unfairness.Cf.Almenda~ez-Torrs 1! United Stales, 523US. 224, 234-235. Fourth, the legislativehistory favors interpreting $924(c)as setting forth dements rather than sentencingfactors. Finally, the length andseverity of an added maudatory seutencethat turns on the presence orabsence of a "machinegun" (or any ofthe other listed firearm types) weighs iafawr of treating such offense-relatedwords as referring to an element in thiscontext. Such considerations make this astronger "separate crime" case thaneither Jones or Almendarez-Torrescasesin which this Court was closelydivided as to Congress' likely intent.WITED STATES a HUBBELL, No.99-166, Cert. to D.C. Circuit (167 F.3d552) Affirmed, 6/5/00; Opinion:Stevens; Dissenk Rehuquist.As part of a plea agreement, rcspondentpromised to pmvide theIndependent Counsel investigating mattersrelating to the WhitewaterDevelopment Corporation with informationrelevant to his investigation.Subsequently, the Independent Counselserved respondent with a subpoena callingfor the production of 11 categories ofdocmuents before a grand jury in LittleRock, Arkansas. Respondent appearedbefore that jury, invoked his FifthAmendment privilege against selfincrimination,and refused to statewhether he had the documents. Theprosecutor then produced an orderobtained pursuant to18 U.S.C. 5 6003(a)directing respondent to respond to thesubpoena and granting him immunity tothe extent allowed by law. Respondentproduced 13,120 pages of documentsand testified that those were all of therespousive docun~ents in his control.The Independent Counsel used the documents'contents in an investigation thatled to this indictment of respondent ontax and fraud charges. TheDistrict Conrtdismissed the indiclment on the gro~mdthat the Independent Counsel's use of thesubpoenaed documents violated 18U.S.C. 3 6002-which provides for useand derivative-use immunity-because allof the evidence he wonld offer againstrespondent at trial derived either directlyor indirectly from the testimonialaspects of respondent's immunized actof producing the documents. In vacatingand remanding, the Conrt of Appealsdirected the District Court to detenninethe extent and detail of theGovernment's knowledge of respondent'sfinancial affairs on the day tb subpoenaissued.If the Government could not demonstratewith reasonable particularity aprim awareness that the documentssought existed and were in respondent'spossession, the indictment was tainted.Acknowledging that be could not satisfythe reasonable particularity standard, theIndependent Counsel entered into a conditionalplea agreement providing fordismissal of the indictment unless thisCourt's disposition of the case makes itreasonably likely that respondent'sinununity would not pose a siguificautbar to his prosecution. Because theVoice 30 - JulyIAugust 2000 - Sign~ficant Decissions Repurt