Prentiss Sullivan v. Centers for New Horizons, Inc. - State of Illinois

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charge.As a result, there is a genuine issue of material factregarding the connection between Complainant’s protected act andhis discharge. Thus, it appears that Complainant may well beable to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.He was less successful on his claim of sex discrimination.To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination in adischarge situation, Complainant would have to prove fourelements.He would have to prove 1) that he is in a protectedclass, 2) that he was meeting Respondent’s reasonableexpectations, 3) that he was discharged, and 4) that similarlysituated persons outside his protected class were not discharged.Yarbrough and Ryder Distribution Resources, D.P.D., ___ Ill. HRCRep. ___, (1988CF2549, October 5, 1992).Complainant clearly canestablish the first and third elements. On the basis of theexisting record, though, it is clear that he cannot establisheither of the remaining two elements.Certainly, Complainant was not meeting Respondent’sreasonable expectations.On two separate occasions, in July of1998 and again in January of 1999, the City of Chicago found thatComplainant’s program was not in compliance with its contract.In fact, in January of 1999, the city found that Complainant’sprogram had “never operated during the contract year.” Inresponse, Complainant does not maintain that he was incompliance. Instead, he claims that he would have been incompliance if Respondent had provided him the proper support.In10
other words, Complainant does not contest that his program didnot comply with its contract. Since operating within thecontract’s terms is a reasonable expectation for Respondent tohave, Complainant’s concession that he did not meet those termsis fatal to his attempts to establish the second element of hisprima facie case.The fact that Complainant worked for Respondent for years isinsufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact on that element.After all, there is no allegation that Respondent was aware ofthe shortcomings of Complainant’s program until the City ofChicago conducted its audit.Similarly, it means nothing that Complainant’s formersupervisor, Gregory Washington, wrote a letter of reference forhim.The letter in question is dated September 22, 1998, beforethe city found that Complainant’s program was not operating.Moreover, the letter itself indicates that that Washington leftRespondent’s employ in May of 1995, long before the auditproblems surfaced. There is no indication whatsoever thatRespondent ever believed that Complainant’s performance metRespondent’s expectations after the results of that audit werereleased.Thus, at the time of the discharge (and apparently forquite some time before that), Complainant was not meeting hisemployer’s expectations.Finally, it should be noted that Complainant’s immediatesupervisor in 1999, Ethelyn Taylor, claims that, when she asked11
Page 3 and 4: 7. For 1999, Respondent was require
Page 8: The method of proving such allegati
Page 13 and 14: affidavit to indicate how he knows
Page 15: (1991CF2143, October 10, 2001).He f

Prentiss Sullivan v. Centers for New Horizons, Inc. - State of Illinois

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