Journal of European Integration History 1/2013 - Centre d'études et ...

Harold JAMESDesigning a Central Bank in the Run-Up to Maastricht ................................. 105Desmond DINANFrom Treaty Revision to Treaty Revision: The Legacy of Maastricht .................. 123Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen ................................ 141PHD Theses – Thèses de doctorat – Doktorarbeiten ..................................... 163Information – Informations – Informationen ............................................. 167Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen ............................................. 169Contributors – Auteurs – Autoren ........................................................... 179Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher .................................. 181ImpressumEditorial Secretariat: Charles Barthel, director (V.i.S.d.P.) | Centre d’études et de recherches européennes| Robert Schuman | 4 Rue Jules Wilhelm | L-2728 Luxembourg | Tel.: (00 352) 24 78 22 90 | Fax.: (00 352)42 27 97Website: www.zgei.nomos.deAnnual subscription: 79,– €, annual subscription | Single issues: 43,– €, Prices do not include postageand packing.Payments can be made:– By cheques payable to Nomos Verlag– By bank transfers to Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Postbank Karlsruhe: bank code 660 100 75, accountno. 73636-751 or Sparkasse Baden-Baden Gaggenau: bank code 662 500 30, account no. – 5-002266.Please ensure your quote „JEIH“ when instructing your bank and enclose a copy of your instructionsto the bank with your order.– By credit card (VISA, Masters, Eurocard).Orders: Subscriptions and orders should be sent to: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, D-76520 Baden-Baden, Germany.Inquiries concerning advertisements should be sent to the Editorial Secretariat, Centre d’études et derecherches européennes Robert Schuman, 4 rue Jules Wilhelm, L-2728 Luxembourg.Cancellation Period: Termination within 3 months notice to the end of the year.Production and Publishing: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, Waldseestr. 3-5, D-76530 Baden-Baden, Telefon 0 72 21 / 21 04-0, Telefax 0 72 21 / 21 04-27, E-Mail: nomos@nomos.de.Advertisement: Sales friendly, Verlagsdienstleistungen, Pfaffenweg 15, 53227 Bonn, Telefon 0228 / 9 7898-0, Fax 02 28 / 9 78 98-20, E-Mail: roos@sales-friendly.de.Copyright and Right of Publishing: The journal, including all contributions and images, is protected bycopyright. For every application, the permission of the publishing company is required.ISSN 0947-9511

The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important internationalsymposium that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg to launch historical research on Europeanintegration. The committee is composed of historians of the European Union member countrieswho work on contemporary history.The Liaison Committee:– gathers and conveys information about work on European history after the Second World War;– advises the European Union on research projects concerning contemporary European history.Thus, the Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of theCommunity institutions;– enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources;– promotes research meetings to get an update of work in progress and to stimulate new research:seven research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published.The Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne – Zeitschriftfür Geschichte der europäischen Integration is in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Committee.Being the first history journal to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration, the Journaloffers the increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporary Europe, apermanent forum.The Liaison Committee works completely independently and according to historians' criticalmethod.*Le Groupe de liaison des professeurs d'histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission des Communautéseuropéennes s'est constitué en 1982 à la suite d'un grand colloque que la Commission avaitorganisé à Luxembourg pour lancer la recherche historique sur la construction européenne. Il regroupedes professeurs d'université des pays membres de l'Union européenne, spécialistes d'histoire contemporaine.Le Groupe de liaison a pour mission:– de diffuser l'information sur les travaux portant sur l'histoire de l'Europe après la Seconde Guerremondiale;– de conseiller l'Union européenne sur les actions scientifiques à entreprendre avec son appui; ainsile Groupe de liaison a assuré une mission concernant la mise à la disposition du public des archivesdes institutions communautaires;– d'aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposition(archives, cources orales...);– d'encourager des rencontres scientifiques afin de faire le point sur les connaissances acquises etde susciter de nouvelles recherches: sept grands colloques ont été organisés et leur actes publiés.L'édition du Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne –Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration se situe dans le droit fil des préoccupations duGroupe de liaison. Première revue d'histoire à se consacrer exclusivement à l'histoire de la constructioneuropéenne, le Journal se propose de fournir un forum permanent au nombre croissant de jeunes historiensvouant leurs recherches à l'Europe contemporaine.Le Groupe de liaison organise ses colloques et publications en toute indépendance et conformémentà la méthode critique qui est celle des historiens.

Editorial noticeArticles for inclusion in this journal may be submitted at any time. The editorial board will then arrange forthe article to be refereed. Articles should not be longer than 6000 words, footnotes included. They may be inEnglish, French or German.Articles submitted to the Journal should be original contributions and not be submitted to any other publicationat the same time as to the Journal of European Integration History. Authors should retain a copy of their article.The publisher and editors cannot accept responsibility for loss of or damage to authors’ typescripts or disks.The accuracy of, and views expressed in articles and reviews are the sole responsibility of the authors.Authors should ensure that typescripts conform with the journal style. Prospective contributors should obtainfurther guidelines from the Editorial Secretariat.Articles, reviews, communications relating to articles and books for review should be sent to the EditorialSecretariat.CitationThe Journal of European Integration History may be cited as follows:JEIH, (Year)/(Number), (Page).© 2013 NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden and the Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaineauprès de la Commission européenne. Printed in Germany.All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmittedin any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission ofthe publishers.

5The Maastricht Treaty: Negotiations and Consequences inHistorical Perspective – IntroductionMichael J. GEARY, Carine S. GERMOND, Kiran Klaus PATEL“It is a fault in the execution, not of the architects” declared Jacques Delors, formerPresident of the European Commission (1985 to 1995), to explain the current difficultiesfacing the Euro, the European Union’s single currency, and a product of theMaastricht Treaty. 1 Signed in the picturesque capital of the Dutch province of Limburgon 7 February 1992, the Treaty represented a radical, historical, and perhapsinevitable shift in the European project. Its provisions on economic and monetaryintegration, some of which are so hotly debated today, have had profound political,economic, social and diplomatic implications for the European Union.By historical standards, more accustomed to counting in centuries rather than indecades, twenty years might appear to cover a short time span, but nevertheless allowssufficient distance for historians to take stock of the Maastricht Treaty. Accordingly,this special issue seeks to historicize events. It discusses the negotiations leading tothe Treaty, teases out the bargaining processes between the main actors, weighs upthe role of economic forces and ideational orientations and assesses some of its consequencesin order to refine our understanding of the impact the Treaty has had onthe integration process since 1992.Moreover, this Treaty is a stark reminder that the past is always contingent uponthe present. Ten, or even five years ago, assessment of the Treaty might have beenradically different than it is today. The ongoing sovereign debt crisis, in which anever larger and eminent group of experts warn of the growing possibility of the Euro’scollapse, has not only dramatically increased public awareness of this chapter of theEU’s very recent history, it also challenges some of our main focuses of interest andperhaps also our interpretation of events. During the 1990s, the second of the Treaty’sthree pillars, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), attracted much attention,and sparked a debate about further cooperation in that field, particularly inthe wake of the wars in the Balkans. Moreover, the terrorist attacks in the UnitedStates on 11 September 2001 increased the attention paid to the third pillar of theTreaty – Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) – while the crisis of the ConstitutionalTreaty in 2005 and the negotiations and torturous ratification of the Lisbon Treatybetween 2007 and 2009 shifted attention again to the legal and constitutional aspectsof the Maastricht Treaty. All such concerns are presently overshadowed by the dramaticevents surrounding Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as part of Maastricht’sfirst pillar and the sovereign debt crisis that has engulfed the Eurozone’smember states. These shifts in the public and to some extent also the academic debatereveal the complexity and multifaceted character of the Treaty. Moreover, they give1. The Telegraph, 2 December 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/8932640/Jacques-Delors-interview-Euro-would-still-be-strong-if-it-had-been-built-to-my-plan.html.

6 Michael J. GEARY, Carine S. GERMOND, Kiran Klaus PATELus a sense of humility in defining our own research agendas and in weighing up theirimportance.There are several other reasons why researching such a recent period presentsparticular challenges for historians. Archives for the early 1980s are just now beginningto become accessible, and many of the sources historians, and in particulardiplomatic historians would like to use for their research, are still closed or havelimited access due to the thirty-year rule status. Yet, despite the restricted access tonew sources, historians are now able to revisit existing empirical research by politicalscientists and others, and add their own interpretations to the ongoing debate aboutthe road to Maastricht and its consequences. 2Besides the problem of temporal distance and the unavailability of sources, anotherfactor complicating our research is the ongoing blame-game as to the possiblereasons for the continuing crisis. The contributors to this special issue are not primarilyinterested in addressing the question as to whether the Euro, as a brainchildof the Maastricht Treaty, was a success or a failure when measured against political,economic, or any other criteria. Still, we cannot and should not fully avoid suchquestions either. Historically, crises have always played a key role in furthering and/or transforming European integration. 3 Jean Monnet himself firmly believed that anintegrated Europe would be forged through crises, and would be the outcome of theresponses and solutions to such catalytic moments. 4 The crisis in our times helps usto put some of the earlier ones into perspective, simply because the economic andpolitical stakes are so much higher now, not only for the citizens of the EU, but alsofor the global economy. Also, it invites us to reassess the importance of other episodesof European integration that are linked to it.While many of the factors mentioned so far complicate our agenda, others alsohelp to make it easier. Perhaps most importantly, it would be wrong to think that weare walking on untrodden ground. The following articles, all penned by historians,were first presented and discussed in June 2012 at a workshop at Maastricht University.Not only could we make use of the existing interdisciplinary research on thesubject, paying particular attention to the important contributions already made bypolitical scientists. We also managed to invite some of them as well as several, fellowhistorians to our workshop to act as discussants. We strongly believe that researchon the Maastricht Treaty has much to gain from such an interdisciplinary dialogue.Political scientists have not only done empirical research but they have also developedconcepts such as epistemic communities, which are useful for historians to bettergrasp, both conceptually and empirically, and describe the processes leading to theorigins, development, and long-term consequences of the Treaty.2. See in particular the seminal work by K. DYSON, K. FEATHERSTONE, The road to Maastricht:negotiating economic and monetary union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.3. See R. KIRT (ed.), Die europäische Union und ihre Krisen, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2001; L.KÜHNHARDT (ed.), Crises in European Integration: Challenges and Responses, 1945-2005,Berghahn Books, New York/Oxford, 2009.4. J. MONNET, Mémoires, Fayard, Paris, 1976, p.488.

Introduction 7This special issue highlights two particular dimensions in the history of the MaastrichtTreaty. On the one hand, it analyzes the political bargaining processes betweenthe member states and the European institutions by assessing the origins, dimensions,and consequences of the “Treaty on European Union”, as it is officially called. Partlyfor pragmatic reasons, partly because of their specific significance, Germany, France,and Italy are particularly covered in this part of the analysis. On the other hand, severalcontributions scrutinize the Treaty’s first pillar, paying particular attention to EMU.While including other policy fields for which the Treaty was important, such as CFSPand JHA, would have been a valuable addition, this was not possible in the limitedformat of a special issue. The same holds true for a more systematic involvement ofother actors, such as lobby groups, the media, or non-EU states including a crumblingsuperpower in the East and a triumphant superpower in the West. As such, this collectionof articles does not claim to offer an exhaustive study of the Maastricht Treaty.Our focus on EMU simply reflects a certain concentration on this policy domain inrecent historical research. Moreover, this thematic focus is timely and topical, as themost pressing issues at the moment are those related to monetary and economic integrationwith an eye on the origins and development of EMU and the decisions toallow certain countries to enter into the process during the 1990s. This, however, doesnot mean that the contributions fully ignore the strong links in the negotiations withother policy fields, which more often than not resulted in package deals between, forinstance, Political Union and EMU.* * *The first contribution, by N. Piers Ludlow, assesses some of the origins of theMaastricht Treaty by focusing on the legacy of the 1980s, and especially the obsessionwith treaty reform for which the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 served as animportant milestone. While acknowledging the geo-political earthquake that tookplace between 1989 and 1991, Ludlow argues that certain trends were in progresswithin the integration process in the decade before Maastricht that help to explain thegradual shift towards more ‘Europe’ and further integration by the late 1980s.Antonio Varsori then provides an in-depth analysis of Italy’s role in the MaastrichtTreaty negotiations. His contribution, based on an analysis of the Giulio AndreottiArchive, explores the challenges faced by Italian politicians from the mid-1980s andearly 1990s as they struggled to contain rising inflation, reduce public spending, curbthe power of organized crime and maintain political and economic credibility withinthe European Community on the eve of negotiations on the Treaty. Weaving betweenthe domestic and the European narratives, Varsori presents a rich account of the influencethat Italy exerted over France and Germany on EMU membership criteria.In a similar vein to Varsori, Georges Saunier mainly concentrates on the politicalbargaining processes between member states, and in his contribution, he shiftsattention to the preparation and bargaining position of the Treaty by the French

8 Michael J. GEARY, Carine S. GERMOND, Kiran Klaus PATELgovernment. Saunier assesses this government’s ability to shape the negotiation outcomeat Maastricht according to its own preferences. He demonstrates that Franceoften played an instrumental broker role during the treaty negotiations and was fairlysuccessful in securing key objectives in each of the three pillars (EMU, JHA andCFSP), although it had to water down its original ambitions in several other chapters(e.g. social, industry) of the Treaty.Wilfried Loth’s contribution forms the hinge between the first set of articles, withtheir focus on member states and their roles, and the second set of papers highlightingmonetary policy. More specifically, Loth explores Franco-German negotiations onPolitical and Monetary Union in the run-up to and during the intergovernmental conferenceson these two issues. He argues that the compromises that were struck bilaterallyhelp to explain the form and the shortcomings of the eventual agreement atMaastricht. The French and German leaders were influential in ensuring that Germanunification did not derail or delay the negotiations and their cooperation was crucialto their successful outcome; yet, bilateral concessions, notably on institutional andeconomic governance issues, also limited the ambitions of the Treaty in these twokey areas.Guido Thiemeyer then adds to this picture by highlighting the different argumentsfor and against monetary union in France and Germany. Thiemeyer embeds his analysisof the Maastricht Treaty negotiations in a wider discussion of the divergenteconomic philosophies in the two member states, and he contends that these ideationalorientations had a huge impact on the negotiations, and complicated French-Germanrelations over monetary issues in various ways.Harold James follows this economic thread further in his analysis of central banksin the Maastricht context. He claims that the 1990s saw the emergence of a newphilosophy of central banking, with the independence of central banks from politicalprocesses as a core component of a culture of monetary stability. Commission PresidentJacques Delors’ decision to grant a key role to central bankers in designing thenew monetary policy in the run-up to Maastricht proved pivotal in this context. Beyondits significance for the Treaty and the trajectory of European integration, Jamesargues that this new philosophy, with its roots in a French school of thinking, soonturned into an international movement that also impacted on non-European countries,thus giving it a relevance far beyond the history of European integration alone.Desmond Dinan’s article concludes the collection by returning from the focus onmonetary policy to the more general level of political negotiations. More precisely,Dinan takes stock of the integration process in the post-Maastricht environment. Heassesses the impact that the Treaty has had on the EU’s evolution over the past twodecades by first exploring attempts at (unsatisfactory) treaty reform after 1993, withthe Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, and then by shifting attention to what he callsthe ‘constitutional turn’ during the mid-2000s. Dinan’s paper asks whether a preoccupationwith highly divisive institutional issues had undermined the credibilityand utility of large-scale treaty reform in the post-Maastricht period and he contends

Introduction 9that as a much simpler time in the history of European integration, much now separatesus from the Maastricht Treaty days.Taken together, this collection of essays brings together analyses of the prehistory,the architecture, and the execution of the Maastricht Treaty. It demonstrates some ofthe in-built problems of the Treaty that have led to a fundamental crisis some 20 yearslater, as well as some of the reasons for these deficits. The articles also reveal themany achievements of the Treaty and how longer trends coalesced with kairos, withthe unique moment and the context of the early 1990s at the end of the Cold War thathad given birth to European integration some four decades earlier. Much more researchis needed to deepen our findings and to widen them beyond the specific fieldsand set of actors analyzed here. Maastricht will stay with us, for better or for worse.* * *We would like to thank our contributors for their willingness to explore what are,at least from a historian’s perspective, rather uncharted waters. Special thanks go toEric Bussière (Université de Paris-Sorbonne), Thomas Conzelmann (Maastricht University),Jan van der Harst (University of Groningen), Mathieu Segers (Utrecht University)and Sophie Vanhoonacker (Maastricht University) who acted as discussantsat the Maastricht workshop in 2012, and also to our colleagues in the PCE researchgroup of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASOS) in Maastricht. Finally, wewould like to thank FASOS, the SWOL/Universiteitsfund Limburg, and theGemeente Maastricht for their generous financial support of our work.Maastricht, April 2013

ISBN 978-3-8487-0079-0ISBN 978-3-8487-0221-3Integration vonInfrastrukturen in Europation von Infrastrukturen in Europa im 19. Jahrhundert mitg. Es werden spezifische Typen von Infrastrukturintegrationerschreitender Infrastrukturnetze aus der Perspektive wirtheorienanalysiert.ius, geb. 1949, studierte Wirtschafts- und Politikwissenschaft,habilitierte sich an der Freien Universität in Berlin und istSozialgeschichte an der Universität Siegen.75, studierte Geschichte, Sozialwissenschaften und Mathe-), 2001 1. Staatsexamen, 2005 Promotion an der Universität001 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Universität Siegen.Ambrosius | Henrich-FrankeInstitut für Europäische Regionalforschungen Inhalt: Die Post ist seit Jahrhunderten | 17 Überbringer guter wie schlechter Nachrichten für Menschenauf der ganzen Welt. Doch hinter dem Versand eines Briefes steht ein enormer technischer undorganisatorischer Apparat, insbesondere dann, wenn Staatsgrenzen überschritten werden. InternationalerPostverkehr setzt daher ein Mindestmaß an Integration von nationalen Netzen undDiensten voraus, wozu die Schaffung von Standards eine Grundvoraussetzung ist.In diesem Band werden erstmals Standardisierungen des internationalen Bahn- und Luftpostverkehrsaus historischer Perspektive eingehend untersucht. Der Vergleich struktureller, prozessualerund inhaltlicher Aspekte zeigt neben signifikanten Unterschieden auch eine Reihe überraschenderParallelen zwischen infrastruktureller Integration Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts und jener nach demZweiten Weltkrieg.Der Band wendet sich gleichermaßen an Wirtschafts-, Verkehrs- und Politikhistoriker mit einembesonderen Interesse an Internationalen Beziehungen.Der Autor: Dr. Andreas Benz, geb. 1980, studierte Politische Wissenschaft und Wirtschafts- undSozialgeschichte an der Universität Mannheim. 2006 Magister Artium, 2012 Promotion an derUniversität Siegen. 2006–2008 Tätigkeit in der freien Wirtschaft. Seit 2008 wissenschaftlicherMitarbeiter am Institut für Europäische Regionalforschungen (IFER) in Siegen.Andreas BenzInstitut für Europäische Regionalforschungen | 18Gerold Ambrosius | Christian Henrich-FrankeAndreas BenzIntegration von Infrastrukturenin Europa im historischen VergleichIntegration von Infrastrukturenin Europa im historischen VergleichBand 1: SynopseIntegration von Infrastrukturen in Europaim historischen VergleichIntegration von Infrastrukturen inEuropa im historischen VergleichBand 3: Post1718NomosNomosIntegration von Infrastrukturen inEuropa im historischen VergleichBand 1: SynopseVon Gerold Ambrosius undChristian Henrich-Franke2013, 238 S., brosch., 39,– €ISBN 978-3-8487-0079-0(Institut für EuropäischeRegionalforschungen – Institutefor European Regional Research, Bd. 17)www.nomos-shop.de/20158Der Band vergleicht die Integration von Infrastrukturenin Europa im 19. Jahrhundert mitderjenigen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Eswerden spezifische Typen von Infrastrukturintegrationentworfen und Entwicklungengrenzüberschreitender Infrastrukturnetze ausder Perspektive wirtschafts- und politikwissenschaftlicherTheorien analysiert.Integration von Infrastrukturen inEuropa im historischen VergleichBand 3: PostVon Andreas Benz2013, 426 S., brosch., 79,– €ISBN 978-3-8487-0221-3(Institut für EuropäischeRegionalforschungen – Institutefor European Regional Research, Bd. 18)www.nomos-shop.de/20577Die Post – eine der ältesten Infrastrukturenund Vorreiter grenzüberschreitender Zusammenarbeit.In diesem Band werdenerstmals für den internationalen Bahn- undLuftpostverkehr elementare technische,betriebliche, tarifäre und rechtliche Standardisierungenin ihrer Entstehung undhistorischen Entwicklung analysiert.Bestellen Sie jetzt telefonisch unter 07221/2104-37Portofreie Buch-Bestellungen unter www.nomos-shop.de

12 N. Piers LUDLOWIn order to demonstrate the importance of the legacy of the 1980s, this article willfocus on four different ‘trends’ that had emerged during the decade each of whichfed through into the Maastricht debates. These trends are first the importance of treatychange as opposed to less formalised advance, second the desire to ‘tidy up’ thoseaspects of the integration process that had initially begun outside of the formal Communitycontext, third the ever greater faith in institutional change as a means copewith the EC’s constantly expanding range of tasks and challenges, and fourth a tendencytowards policy spill-over. Each of these will be looked at in turn, before aconcluding section which will return to the issue of how important these longer termpressures and trends would turn out to be.The irresistible rise of belief in Treaty changeOver the last twenty five years or so the history of European integration has beenpunctuated by repeated instances of treaty change. Indeed an author contemplating ahistorical overview of the process might well be tempted – unwisely perhaps – toorganise his or her findings in a series of chapter titles that reflect these institutionalmilestones: so a section on ‘From the Single European Act to Maastricht’ would befollowed by one covering ‘From Maastricht to Amsterdam’, the next would take thestory from Amsterdam to Nice, and so on all the way through to the 2007 Treaty ofLisbon or perhaps even the recent fiscal pact. Treaty change has, in other words,become a regular occurrence and one seen by many as an essential feature of anysignificant alteration in the way that ‘Europe’ functions. 2This has not always been the case, however. For the first two decades of theCommunity’s evolution most of the major changes in the way in which the systemoperated took place without formal treaty modification and its accompanying featuresof intergovernmental conferences, formal signing ceremonies and (lately at least)fraught ratification processes. There were, it is true, a number of treaty changes duringthe 1960s and 1970s. These included the 1965 Merger Treaty, the 1970 LuxembourgTreaty modifying the Community’s financial base, and the 1975 Brussels Treatywhich constituted another attempt to do the same. 3 Each enlargement of the Community’smembership moreover was accompanied by the signature and ratificationof a treaty of accession. 4 But none of these treaty changes covered the really importantmodifications in the way that the Community was actually run. Instead, the gradual2. T. CHRISTIANSEN, G. FALKNER, K.E. JØRGENSEN, Theorizing EU Treaty Reform: BeyondDiplomacy and Bargaining, in: Journal of European Public Policy, 1(2002), pp.12-32.3. See R. MAUGUIS, R. PELLOUX, J.-P. LASSALE, Le Traité de Bruxelles du 8 avril 1965 relatif àla fusion des institutions des Communautés Européennes, Éd. de l’AGEL, Lyon, 1968; B. LAFFAN,The finances of the European Union, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p.7.4. J.-P. PUISSOCHET, L’élargissement des Communautés européennes; présentation et commentairedu traité et des actes relatifs à l’adhésion du Royaume-Uni, du Danemark et de l’Irlande, Éditionstechniques et économiques, Paris, 1974.

European Integration in the 1980s: on the Way to Maastricht? 15Community system, although it did little to specify either the extent of its powers orthe centrality to the integration process that it had already acquired. 14 Title III of thetreaty meanwhile placed the EPC process on a more official Community footing,bringing inside the formal institutional system a series of intergovernmental mechanismsthat had inhabited a strange legal penumbra ever since their creation in the early1970s. In the process, the Commission’s role within the EPC mechanisms for foreignpolicy coordination was legally affirmed – the culmination of a lengthy pitched battlebetween France and most of its partners on this issue. 15 In neither case was the treatyin any real sense altering the status quo. Rather it was retrospectively ratifying a seriesof arrangements that had emerged informally over the previous decade and a half.This same basic pattern was at its most evident in the Justice and Home Affairselement of the Maastricht Treaty – the eventual pillar three. Here the informal realitiesthat Maastricht would begin to acknowledge were the development of police cooperationacross Europe underway since the mid-1970s in the so-called Trevi Processand the push to eliminate border and passport controls within Europe that had startedwith the signature of the Schengen Treaty between France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourgand the Netherlands in June 1985. Neither of these were originally Communitypolicies, as the highly restricted initial membership of the Schengen groupunderlined. The signatories of this last had not believed that their ambitions of eliminatingborder controls completely stood much chance of realisation within thewider EC. Nor, by the late 1980s, had the process of implementation yet gone veryfar. Indeed the Schengen Convention, setting out the manner in which the originalagreement would be translated into actual practice, was only signed in 1990 this timeby seven states (Spain and Portugal having joined the original five signatories), withimplementation only picking up speed in the mid-1990s. 16 Similarly, the Trevi processwas carried on outside of the Community framework, involving structures thatechoed those of the EC Council of Ministers, but with no equivalents of the Commission,the European Parliament or the European Court of Justice. 17 But the veryexistence of these extra-Community instances of integration provided an incentivefor the Community itself to begin discussing these issues more formally and to assessthe extent to which these policy initiatives could be brought ‘in-house’. Trevi andSchengen would thus provide one of two important stimuli to the debate that was toemerge in the run up to Maastricht about how to bring within the EC framework aseries of policy areas – border control, police cooperation, immigration – that hadtraditionally been little affected by the integration process.14. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/singleuropeanact.pdf (lastaccessed 23.08.2012).15. A. ROMANO, From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the HelsinkiCSCE, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2009, pp.160 f.16. V. HREBLAY, Les accords de Schengen: origine, fonctionnement, avenir, Bruylant, Brussels, 1998.17. F.R. MONACO, Europol: The Culmination of the European Union’s International Police CooperationEfforts, in: Fordham International Law Journal,19(1995), pp.268-269.

16 N. Piers LUDLOWThe need for institutional innovationA third major ‘lesson’ of the 1980s was the perceived necessity of pushing aheadwith the institutional innovations introduced by the SEA. Crucial to the latter’s successhad been the introduction of majority voting for all internal market related legislation.This change had been widely – if inaccurately – credited with breaking thedeadlock which was meant to have beset the Community ever since the LuxembourgCompromise of 1966. 18 And it had certainly transformed the behavioural patterns ofMinisters and other national representatives discussing policy change in Brussels,creating the expectation amongst them that meetings were likely to produce a legislativeoutcome rather than impasse, and thereby providing a major incentive for constructivepolicy proposals instead of stonewalling. The speed of decision making wasincreased as a result. 19 It therefore followed – from the point of view of Europeanenthusiasts at least – that any new round of treaty change had to extend this successfulinnovation to other policy fields also. The Commission had already flirted with controversyat several points in the late 1980s by trying to push through legislation thatwas only tangentially related to the internal market using the new, post-SEA legalbase. 20 An extension of majority voting to a range of further policy areas wouldremove the need for such procedural legerdemain. This was all more necessary giventhe likelihood, discussed below, that the policy domain of the Community wouldsubstantially increase. More policy areas would mean more legislation, and morelegislation would only be possible were the productivity of the institutional systemincreased across the board rather than solely on issues concerning the Single Market.Similarly, there was extensive support for a further increase in the powers of theEuropean Parliament in any new treaty. The cooperation procedure introduced forSingle Market legislation by the SEA had been well received, both by Europeanparliamentarians themselves, and by the many partisans of a stronger EP within nationalgovernments and elsewhere. But this increase in parliamentarians’ influencehad only whet the appetite of MEPs and their numerous backers for further movementin the same direction. After all the more active Europe of the late 1980s only aggravatedthe concern surrounding the ‘democratic deficit’ – the more Europe did, themore worrying was the lack of a strong democratic component within the Communitysystem – and increased the need for an increase in the EP’s role that went beyond the18. For a debunking of the causal link between the 1966 deal and later deadlock, by one of the keynegotiators at the original Luxembourg meeting, see R. LAHR, Die Legende vom “LuxemburgerKompromiß”, in: Europa Archiv, 38(1983), pp.223-232.19. A detailed debate has erupted between political scientists as to whether decision making was actuallyfaster: see J. GOLUB, In the Shadow of the Vote? Decision Making in the European Community,in: International Organization, 4(1999), pp.733-764; H. SCHULZ, T. KÖNIG, Institutional Reformand Decision-making. Efficiency in the European Union, in: American Journal of PoliticalScience, 4(2000), pp.653-665. Few participants at the time, however, doubted that the process hadbecome more efficient.20. UK May Challenge EC Powers, in: Financial Times, 17.05.1989.

18 N. Piers LUDLOWcelebrated 1966 article; by the late 1980s, it seemed to have re-emerged from itsgrave. 23 And this revival would have major implications for the subsequent contentsof the Maastricht Treaty.The most straightforward instance of previous policy advances creating strongpressure for further policy change occurred in the field of monetary integration. Formost of the 1980s the majority of European Community member states had grownaccustomed to membership of the European Monetary System (EMS). This was generallycredited with both avoiding the violent intra-European exchange rate fluctuationsof the 1970s and bringing inflation under control across the continent. 24 Butthe success of the EMS was grounded in part on the existence of capital controls ina number of the weaker currency countries, which allowed governments to limit theoutflow of money, thereby making it much easier for their currencies to remain withinthe exchange rate fluctuation bands prescribed by the monetary regime. These capitalcontrols, however, were a clear violation of the free movement of capital, one of thefour freedoms at the heart of the Single Market Programme. In the course of the late1980s, therefore France, Italy and several other countries were obliged to abolish theirlaws on capital exports, bringing closer the realisation of the 1992 target for a fullyoperational internal market, but also seriously endangering their capacity to remainwithin the EMS. Advance in one area, posed a direct threat to integration in anotherequally crucial aspect of integration.European policy makers were most clearly alerted to this potential problem by thepublication of Efficiency, Stability and Equity, a Commission-sponsored report producedby a committee chaired by the eminent Italian economist Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa in 1987. 25 This made use of the Mundell-Fleming ‘impossible trinity’ modelto argue that Europe could not aspire to have free movement of capital, fixed exchangedrates, and national macro-economic freedom all at the same time. Up until thelate 1980s, the EMS had sought to balance the last two while forsaking the first. Butwith the abolition of capital controls either fixed rates or macro-economic freedomwould have to be abandoned instead. Translated into policy terms this meant thatEurope faced an imminent policy dilemma. Either it could step off the path towardsmonetary integration it had successfully followed since 1979, or it could push aheadtowards tighter integration, at the expense of national macro-economic freedom. Thissecond option would not necessarily require a single currency – the Padoa-Schioppareport remained non-committal on this issue – but it was already clear that with currencycontrols slated for removal, the current monetary status quo was unsustainable.23. S. HOFFMANN, Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of WesternEurope, in: Daedalus, 01.07.1966, pp.862-915; J. TRANHOLM-MIKKELSEN, Neo-Functionalism:Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC, in:Millennium – Journal of International Studies, 03.01.1991, pp.1-22.24. D. GROS, N. THYGESEN, European monetary integration from the European monetary systemto economic and monetary union, Longman, London, 1998.25. T. PADOA-SCHIOPPA, COMMISSION of the EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Efficiency, stability,and equity: a strategy for the evolution of the economic system of the European community: areport, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, 1987.

European Integration in the 1980s: on the Way to Maastricht? 19And given the widespread sense that monetary integration so far had been beneficialand that a return to the volatility of the 1970s was highly undesirable, the most likelycourse out of the dilemma would be a move towards greater monetary integration.The intellectual case for the EMU component of the Maastricht Treaty had thereforebeen set out even before the convening of the Delors Committee on economic andmonetary union in 1988. 26The other equally clear-cut instance of policy advance in one area creating strongpressures for further integration elsewhere concerns what would become the Justiceand Home Affairs portion of the Maastricht Treaty. Here too the trigger factor wasthe planned Single Market. Establishing a truly unified European market, most memberstates felt, would involve a substantial scaling down of, if not the total abolitionof most border controls and checks. This would facilitate commerce and also offer avisible sign of integration to the wider population. In the new Europe, crossing frontiers,whether for tourists or for those doing business, would no longer involve longqueues for border checks. 27 But the removal of barriers to cross border travel wouldalso have knock-on effects on immigration control, visa policy, the fight againstcrime, and the limitation of movement of drugs and other illegal products, since inall of these cases national border controls were a central element in existing policy.Shorn of their national border controls, European states would have no option but tocooperate much more closely, establish joint or at least coordinated approaches onall of these issues, encourage interaction and cooperation between customs services,police forces and immigration officials, and pool resources so as to reinforce thestrength of the Community’s outer borders since these would now constitute the lastbarrier between the outside world and Europe’s border control-free interior. 28 Theplanned Single Market thus combined with the pre-existing pressures connected withthe Schengen Treaty and the Trevi process discussed above, to help create momentumtowards what would become in due course the Justice and Home Affairs pillar of theMaastricht Treaty.The final example of spill-over is less direct, but too important nonetheless toexclude, since it contributed to the emergence of the second pillar of the eventualtreaty, dealing with a common foreign and security policy or CFSP. The basic desireto see Community Europe better able to ‘speak with one voice’ on foreign policyissues was of course nothing new. Attempts in this direction could be traced back tothe Fouchet Plan of 1961 if not earlier. 29 Nor was dissatisfaction with the inadequaciesof the EPC process, in existence since the early 1970s. Despite some low-key successes,this last had not brought about the degree of coordination between the external26. For a detailed account of the work of the Delors’s committee, see H. JAMES, Making the EuropeanMonetary Union, Belknap Press, Cambridge Mass., 2012, pp.210-264.27. It is revealing that the over-zealous removal of border controls was one of the many facets of integrationattacked by Margaret Thatcher in her 1988 Bruges speech. For the text of the speech, seehttp://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332 (last accessed August 28, 2012).28. J. MONAR, The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, Driving Factors andCosts’, in: JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 4(2001), p.754.29. G.-H. SOUTOU, Le général de Gaulle, le plan Fouchet et l’Europe, in: Commentaire, 1(1990).

20 N. Piers LUDLOWrelations of European powers that many had initially hoped for. 30 The Genscher-Colombo plan of 1981 referred to above had been one of several unsuccessfulattempts to remedy its failings. But this underlying level of discontent had been massivelyaccentuated by the general surge forward of the integration process in the late1980s. If all other aspects of integration were advancing – as seemed to be the casein the latter stages of the decade – the halting progress of EPC was especially frustrating.And the contrast was made even starker by the huge amount of external commercialleverage that the Community in general and the Commission in particularhad been able to exercise in the context of the major world trade talks of the period,namely the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).Within the context of the global trade forum, the newly revitalised European Communityhad been very much at the centre of attention, with the Commissioners involved,Willy de Clerq and then Frans Andriessen for external affairs, Andriessenand then Ray MacSharry for agriculture, able to exercise an influence and clout rivalledonly by the US Trade Representative. 31 This appeared to demonstrate that whenEurope was able to act collectively on a world stage it could exercise the type ofpower and influence that no single Western European country had been able to deploysince the end of the Second World War. The incentive to try and create mechanismsand structures that would give the Community comparable influence in foreign policymatters that stretched beyond trade and agriculture grew significantly as a result. Thepolicy successes of the late 1980s thus added fuel to a pre-existing policy debate, andhelped create the conditions out of which pillar two of the Maastricht Treaty wouldeventually be born.A foreseeable agenda; an unforeseeable outcomeNone of the trends and pressures outlined above predetermined the exact features ofthe Maastricht Treaty. Apart from anything else, the depth and sophistication of thediscussions about different aspects of what would become the Maastricht agendavaried widely. The debate about EMU, for instance, could not only draw upon a backcatalogue of academic and policy-related debate stretching back to the 1970s if notearlier, but had also been pushed forward by a succession of official study groups,most recently those chaired by Delors and bringing together multiple central bankgovernors and economists. 32 Discussions about the precise implications of lowering30. D. MÖCKLI, European Foreign Policy During the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and theDream of Political Unity, I.B. Tauris, London, 2009.31. S. MEUNIER, Trading voices: the European Union in international commercial negotiations, N.J.Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005, pp.102-124.32. For a sense of monetary debates within the 1970s, see E. MOURLON-DRUOL, A Europe made ofmoney: the emergence of the European Monetary System, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y.,2012; on the Delors committee, see K.H.F DYSON, K. FEATHERSTONE, The Road to Maastricht:negotiating Economic and Monetary Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, 1999, pp.691-745; H. JAMES, op.cit.

22 N. Piers LUDLOWmade little sense in a post-Cold War world, and then, in the rather longer term, to thenewly liberated countries of the former Soviet Bloc, highlighted still further the needto streamline the European decision-making processes and increase the efficiency ofthe institutions. As so often in Community history, the prospect of widening membershipprovided a significant incentive for the existing members to deepen integrationbefore the newcomers arrived. The birth of the European Union is thereforeinseparable from the transformed Europe that was emerging around it.The basic agenda of what would become the Maastricht Treaty had, however,already been defined before these transformations came about. A Centre for EuropeanPolicy Studies publication, finalised in January 1989 but therefore largely written in1988, already listed the completion of the Single Market, EMU and progresstowards ‘a European External Identity’ as the three priorities for the years ahead, andspoke of ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘multiple strategies’ (i.e. varying institutional formulaedepending on policy area) as crucial characteristics of likely European advance. 36This clearly foreshadowed two of the three pillars of the eventual treaty, as well astwo of the key underlying concepts. The subjects to which European leaders wouldhave to address themselves, if not yet the outcomes of their deliberations, were thuslargely determined by the pattern of Community development in the 1980s ratherthan by the geo-political earthquake from 1989 onwards.36. P. LUDLOW, Beyond 1992. Europe and Its Western Partners, Centre for European Policy Studies,Brussels, 1989, esp. pp.61-84.

23The Andreotti Governments and the Maastricht Treaty:Between European Hopes and Domestic ConstraintsAntonio VARSORIItaly's road to MaastrichtDuring the 1980s, after the gloomy and difficult decade of the 1970s, Italy appearedto recover a significant role in the international system. 1 A political leadership, formedby statesmen such as Giovanni Spadolini, Bettino Craxi, Giulio Andreotti, ruled thenation; although some cabinet was still short-lived, the whole period was characterisedby the same political formula, the pentapartito, a five-party, moderate centreleftcoalition, which was formed by all the parties of the Italian political scene withthe exception of the two extremes, that is the neo-fascist party of the “MovimentoSociale Italiano – Destra Nazionale” to the right and the Italian Communist Party tothe left. 2By the early 1980s the terrorist threat, which had plighted the country during the1970s had been defeated. Last but not least by the mid-1980s the Italian economyappeared to experience a strong recovery with an average increase of the GNP ofabout 3 to 4% per year and there was a strong decrease in the inflation rate, whichfrom more than 20% per year went down to some 5 to 6%. In the same period, however,the country was burdened with a growing state deficit, which was the consequenceof several factors: bureaucratic inefficiency, widespread corruption, the creationof an inflated welfare state, governmental decisions which aimed at creating awide consensus on the part of numerous lobbies. Between 1980 and 1986, the rate ofthe public debt increased from 60% of the GNP to 85%. Those negative aspects wereconcealed by the economic growth and by a partial modernization of the industrialand financial systems which appeared to profit from the international positive economictrend of the second half of the 1980s. Moreover there was a growing belief in1. For a more detailed overview of Italy’s international position between the fall of the Berlin Wall andthe crisis of the so-called “First Republic” see the recent volume A. VARSORI, L’Italia e la fine dellaGuerra fredda. La politica estera dei governi Andreotti 1989-1992, il Mulino, Bologna, 2013. Thepresent article is mainly based on the records from the Giulio Andreotti Archives, kept at the “LuigiSturzo” Institute in Rome. In this connection I would like to thank Senator Giulio Andreotti for thepermission to consult his archives, as well as Mrs Flavia Nardelli, secretary general of the “LuigiSturzo” Institute and Dr Luciana Devoti, chief archivist at the Institute, for their precious help andcooperation.2. On the 1980s see S. COLARIZI, P. CRAVERI, S. PONS, G. QUAGLIARIELLO (eds), Gli anniOttanta come storia, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2004; M. GERVASONI, Storia d’Italia neglianni Ottanta. Quando eravamo moderni, Marsilio, Venice, 2011. Although the PCI was in the opposition,the Italian Communists still exerted a strong influence on the Italian society, from the pressto university, from local authorities to the state television.

24 Antonio VARSORIthe advantages and progress of the capitalist system and in the neo-liberal theorieswhich were defeating both the planned economy and Keynesian policies all over theworld. Such an attitude was strengthened by the positive image that the internationalmedia gave of the new Italian economic “miracle” of the mid-1980s whose mostobvious evidence was the apparent brilliant record of the Italian condottieri (CarloDe Benedetti, Raul Gardini, Giovanni Agnelli, Silvio Berlusconi, etc.), not to speakof the glamorous image of Milan as the new capital of international fashion. 3As far as foreign policy was concerned, Italy’s international position benefittedfrom the “second Cold War”, as, mainly owing to its steady alignment to the NATOdecision about the instalment of the euro missiles, Italy was able to strengthen itsalready positive relations with the United States. Italy’s commitment to the positioningin Sicily of the US medium range missiles, in spite of a strong Communistopposition and of a powerful pacifist movement, won Washington’s gratitude andthe Reagan administration regarded Italy as a faithful and precious ally. Moreover,although the Italian leaders confirmed their sympathetic attitude towards the claimsof the Arab world and recognised the PLO as a reliable actor, a position which oftencontrasted with the policies pursued by the American administration, the US authoritiesthought that Italy’s Mediterranean role was of some relevance and usefulness:besides Israel, Italy was the only significant and reliable ally the Americans had inthe Mediterranean, an area which during the 1980s experienced a growing US involvement,from the Lebanese Civil War to the military confrontation with Libya, tothe Palestinian-Israeli conflict. During this same period Italian leaders showed agrowing confidence in their country’s ability to play a relevant role in internationalaffairs. 4European integration had always been a major issue of Rome’s foreign policy,but, during the early 1980s, with the exception of the Colombo-Genscher declaration,the Italian authorities appeared to focus their attention mainly on the Cold War andthe Mediterranean questions. In 1984, however, the Prime Minister Bettino Craxi andhis Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, especially since the Fontainebleau Council,3. In 1990 a special issue of the French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur dealt with the Italian situation.The title was Les miracles italiens and most articles dealt with the success of the Italian economy.This issue has not been dealt with in detail by history scholars, nevertheless see R. PETRI, L’immaginedell’economia italiana nella stampa economica tedesca, in: S. WOOLF (ed.), L’Italia repubblicanavista da fuori (1945-2000), il Mulino, Bologna, 2007. On Italy’s economy in general, see S. ROSSI,La politica economica italiana dal 1968 al 1998, Laterza, Rome-Bari, 1998; M. SALVATI, Dalmiracolo economico alla moneta unica europea, in: G. SABBATUCCI, V. VIDOTTO (eds), Storiad’Italia, vol.6, L’Italia contemporanea, Laterza, Rome-Bari, 1999; D. YERGIN, J. STANISLAW,Commanding Heights: the battle between government and marketplace that is remaking the modernworld, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1998.4. On Italy and the euro-missiles see L. NUTI, La sfida nucleare. La politica estera italiana e le armiatomiche 1945-1991, il Mulino, Bologna, 2007; on the relationship between the US and Italy duringthe 1980s see L. DUCCI, S. LUCONI, M. PRETELLI, Le relazioni tra Italia e Stati Uniti. DalRisorgimento alle conseguenze dell’11 settembre, Carocci, Rome, 2012, pp.155-178. On Italy’s foreignpolicy in the 1980s see E. DI NOLFO (ed.), La politica estera italiana negli anni Ottanta, Lacaita,Manduria, 2003.

The Andreotti Governments and the Maastricht Treaty 25realised that something was changing in the relationship between West Germany andFrance and they thought that a renewed French-German couple would lead to someimportant initiatives in the European field. Moreover the Italian government couldnot ignore the revival of the Federalist movement among influential sectors of thecountry’s public opinion and the important initiatives which had been launched byAltiero Spinelli in the context of the European Parliament. 5 During the first half of1985, the Italian government, also in order to achieve an outstanding diplomatic successon the occasion of Rome’s presidency of the European Community, did a determinedeffort in order to achieve two important goals: on the one hand the completionof the negotiations which would lead to Spain’s and Portugal’s joining theEC, on the other hand the re-launching of the political integration process throughthe reform of the Rome Treaties.Although Italy was unable to win the full confidence of the French-German coupleand, even if both François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl had different views and plansabout the re-launching of the EC, on the occasion of the Milan European Councilheld in June 1985 both Mitterrand and Kohl thought it useful to support the Italiandelegation’s effort in order to have some significant result. The outcome was theItalian decision to have a vote on the issue of convening an intergovernmental conferenceand the defeat of Margaret Thatcher’s opposition to the perspective of a reformof the Rome Treaties. Actually, during the Luxembourg negotiations which ledto the draft of the Single European Act (SEA), the Italian delegation was very criticalof the new treaty, which the Italian authorities regarded as a poor result, with no realprogress in the field of political integration, especially as far as the powers of theEuropean Parliament were concerned. Italy’s interest in strengthening political integrationwas not only the consequence of the country’s federalist tradition and a sortof “post mortem” recognition of Spinelli’s political and intellectual heritage. Actually,the Italian authorities had always thought that political integration would weakenany French-German ambition to create a “European directorate” and would offerItaly, that perceived itself as a weaker but nonetheless “big” nation the opportunityto play a leading role in Community affairs. So, the Italian government made a negativeevaluation of the SEA and Italy was the last member state to ratify the treaty.The Italian authorities did not realise that the Single European Act was a sort ofrevolution in the EC decision making process, especially as it offered the EuropeanCommission the opportunity to exert a stronger influence on the Community’s policies:in fact, the Commission would be able to implement some of the goals whichhad been singled out in the Delors “White Book”. 6 The creation of a single, fullyunified European market was the economic instrument through which the Commis-5. On Altiero Spinelli’s activities in this period see A. SPINELLI, Diario europeo, vol. 3, 1976-1986,il Mulino, Bologna, 1992; P. GRAGLIA, Altiero Spinelli, il Mulino, Bologna, 2008.6. In general on Italy’s European choice see A. VARSORI, La Cenerentola d’Europa? L’Italia e l’integrazioneeuropea dal 1947 a oggi, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2010. As far as the 1980s areconcerned see M. NERI GUALDESI, L’Italia e l’Europa negli anni Ottanta: tra ambizione e marginalità,in: P. CRAVERI, A. VARSORI (eds), L’Italia nella costruzione europea: un bilancio storico(1957-2007), Franco Angeli, Milan, 2009.

26 Antonio VARSORIsion, with the support of both France and West Germany, tried on the one hand toachieve some relevant political goals, which would have involved a more determinedintegration. On the other hand, the Community and its nations could thus be offeredthe opportunity to adapt themselves to a rapidly changing international political andeconomic context: a new more determined détente was filling the gap which for fortyyears had separated Western Europe from East-central Europe; moreover a globalisedeconomy was imposing itself, so pushing the EC to accept a tougher competition withnew emerging economic actors.In that same period, the Italian political system met growing internal rivalries inthe five-party coalition; between 1987 and 1989, Italy experienced the appointmentand fall of three different cabinets, as well as a general election: for some time thegovernmental activity was almost paralysed; in the economic field, although the GNPconstantly increased there was a further significant growth in state spending. 7 Somesectors of the Italian ruling elite were aware of the threat posed to the country’seconomy by the state deficit; in this respect, an important role was played by the Bankof Italy, which, during the past decades, had achieved a growing influence and wasinternationally recognised as an independent and respected actor. In 1988, in his annualreport, the Governor of the Bank of Italy, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, who in the late1970s had been one of the supporters of Italy’s adhesion to the EMS, pointed outItaly’s need to redress the state budget, if the country wished to become part of therelevant economic and financial plans which the EC, especially the Delors Commission,were working out in connection with the implementation of a big unified Europeanmarket, based on the full mobility of all the economic factors (goods, capitals,services, individuals). 8Actually, during the second half of the 1980s, Italy was the European nation whichwas the most often fined by the Commission as a consequence of its inability tocomply with the regulations coming from Brussels. Only in 1989 the Italian Parliamentpassed a law, the so-called “La Pergola law” from the name of the Minister forEuropean policies, Antonio La Pergola, which set up an “ad hoc” parliamentary sessionin order to approve the implementation of the Community’s directives. 9 In May1989, in a report to Andreotti, at that time head of the Farnesina, the Italian ForeignMinistry, the Italian diplomacy analysed the progress of the committee created in1988 under the chairmanship of Jacques Delors, whose aim was the planning of aEuropean Economic and Monetary Union. The Farnesina appeared to support thecommittee project, as the EMU was considered to be closely tied to a political unionon a supranational basis, but the Italian Foreign Ministry perceived the project as too7. On Italy’s domestic situation see P. CRAVERI, La Repubblica dal 1958 al 1992, TEA, Milan, 1996.8. On the position of the Bank of Italy see S. LOMBARDINI, Carli, Baffi, Ciampi: tre governatori eun’economia, UTET, Turin, 2005; J.C. MARTINEZ OLIVA, G. SCHLITZER, Le battaglie dellalira. Moneta, finanza e relazioni internazionali dell’Italia dall’unità all’euro, Le Monnier, Florence,2005; A. GIGLIOBIANCO, Via Nazionale. Banca d’Italia e classe dirigente: cento anni di storia,Donzelli, Rome, 2006.9. On this aspect see L. MECHI, Abilità diplomatica, insuccessi economici, progressi amministrativi.Appunti per una storia dell’Italia e dei fondi strutturali, in: P. CRAVERI, A. VARSORI, op.cit.

The Andreotti Governments and the Maastricht Treaty 27vague, especially as far as the political implications were concerned, in particular therole the European Parliament would have to play. As a matter of fact, the Italiandiplomacy was aware of the difficulties related to the implementation of such anambitious project, in this connection the memorandum specifically pointed out London’sopposition to these grandiose schemes. Nevertheless, in spite of Italy’s usualfavourable attitude towards a stronger integration, the Farnesina did not forget theserious and to a certain extent dangerous implications that the full achievement of theDelors plan could have on Italy’s economic policies, especially as far as the statebudget and the interest rate were concerned. 10The beginning of the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty: Italy’s earlyachievements.In summer 1989, after a long and difficult political crisis, Giulio Andreotti, who since1983 had been Foreign Minister, formed his 6 th Cabinet, once again a five partycoalition, based on an agreement between the moderate sectors of the ChristianDemocracy and the Socialist Party led by Craxi. 11 Gianni De Michelis, a leadingmember of the Socialist Party, became Foreign Minister. The latter was an ambitiousand brilliant politician who aimed at exerting a strong influence on Italy’s foreignpolicy, nevertheless, owing to his long experience at the Farnesina, Andreotti wouldcontinue to play a major role in shaping Italy’s international position. At first DeMichelis, although he did not forget the most obvious pillars of Italy’s foreign policy,i.e. the European Community, NATO and the Mediterranean, appeared to focus hisattention on East-Central Europe. De Michelis thought that the rapidly changing balancein the Communist bloc would offer Italy the opportunity for a revival of itstraditional interest in the Balkan and Danube areas. Between summer and fall 1989he launched two ambitious, although a bit vague, initiatives such as the “Quadrangolare”and the “Adriatic initiative”, which aimed at strengthening Italy’s politicaland economic ties with nations such as Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia. 12The fall of the Berlin Wall came as a shock to the Italian political leadership;especially Andreotti, in an early stage, was worried about the perspective of a quickGerman reunification. The Italian Prime Minister’s political career had been characterisedby the Cold-War; as a cautious politician, who once had stated that in politics10. ASILS [Archivio Storico Istituto Luigi Sturzo], AGA [Archivio Giulio Andreotti], “Francia, DelorsJacques”, box 433, Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Andreotti, 06.05.1989, with annex memorandum“Rapporto Delors”.11. On Giulio Andreotti see the biography by M. FRANCO, Giulio Andreotti. La vita di un uomopolitico, la storia di un’epoca, Mondadori, Milan, 2010. See also M. BARONE, E. DI NOLFO,Giulio Andreotti. L’uomo, il cattolico, lo statista, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2010. On Craxi seeM. PINI, Craxi. Una vita, un’era politica, Mondadori, Milan, 2007.12. See G. DE MICHELIS, La lunga ombra di Yalta. La specificità della politica estera italiana, Venice,Marsilio, 2003.

28 Antonio VARSORIit is better to survive than to perish, he was suspicious of every rapid and dramaticchange of Europe’s political balance. 13 Nevertheless he was also quick to adapt himselfto the new situation; moreover both De Michelis and the most influential diplomatsof the Farnesina realised that the German reunification would be achievedquickly, in spite of Margaret Thatcher’s opposition and Mitterrand’s doubts. At firstItaly tried to be involved in the diplomatic process that would lead to Germany’sunification, but the “two plus four” formula was a stumbling block to Italy’s ambitions;on the occasion of the Atlantic Council held in Ottawa in February 1990 theGerman Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher rudely reminded to De Michelisthat Italy “was not part of the game”. 14Although such a remark was perceived by the Italian press as a diplomatic defeat,the German leaders stated, on the occasion of further meetings between Andreottiand Kohl, as well as between De Michelis and Genscher, that Germany didn’t intendto follow a Sonderweg and Germany’s European partners, Italy in particular, wouldconstantly be kept informed about progress made in the negotiations; moreover theyconfirmed their intention to develop stronger ties between a unified Germany and theEuropean Community. On their part the US Secretary of State James Baker in a secretletter pointed out to De Michelis that Washington still regarded NATO as a pillar ofits European policy and in this context the United States thought that Italy could playa leading role. 15 By February/March 1990 the Italian government thought that Romecould easily comply with a quick German reunification if two conditions were implemented:on one hand the preservation of US involvement in Europe (i.e. NATOand the presence of US troops on European soil), on the other a bold move towardsEurope’s political integration on a supra-national basis. The latter goal was ofparamount importance as the Italian government was convinced that Rome could playa major role in the European context and during the second half of 1990 Italy wouldchair the European Community. 16 So De Michelis thought that Italy could be thepromoter of an intergovernmental conference on the European Union.13. In 1984 on the occasion of a public debate, Andreotti, at that time Foreign Minister in the first Craxigovernment, had stated that there were two “Germanies” and he was against any change in such asituation, moreover he expressed his concern about any pan-German aspiration. Such a statementprovoked a tough diplomatic reaction by the West German government. Actually Andreotti fearedthat any move towards Germany’s reunification could threaten the European balance imposed bythe Cold War and ratified through the Helsinki agreements. On this episode see A. VARSORI,L’Italia e la fine della Guerra fredda …, op.cit., pp.23-26.14. On this episode see M. VAISSE, C. WENKEL (eds), La diplomatie française face à l’unificationallemande, Tallandier, Paris, 2011, p.190.15. ASILS, AGA, “Germania”, box 458, Andreotti to Cossiga, 19.02.1990 and Baker to De Michelis,20.02.1990 as well as De Michelis to Baker, 24.02.1990; “Gran Bretagna, Margaret Thatcher”, box465/466, Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General Political Affairs, “ColloquiAndreotti-De Michelis-Genscher a Palazzo Chigi”, 21.02.1990.16. On Italy and German unification see A. VARSORI, Italy and German Reunification, in: B. AR-CIDIACONO, K. MILZOW, A. MARION, P.E. BOURNEUF (eds), Europe Twenty Years after theEnd of the Cold War, The New Europe, New Europes, PIE/Peter Lang, Bern/Brussels, 2012, pp.47-62.

The Andreotti Governments and the Maastricht Treaty 29Once again the Italian authorities thought that the European Parliament shouldenjoy greater powers. Italy’s interest in the EP’s prerogatives was not only the outcomeof the country’s federalist tradition, but also the belief in the EP as a support toItaly’s national interests. In the Strasbourg Assembly, Italy would rely on a strongparliamentary group equal to the ones of the major member-states, and the EP hadalways been sympathetic to the progressive political and social goals promoted byall Italian governments. Very likely, the Italians also hoped that the EP could becomea counterbalance to any French-German directorate, which would have the EuropeanCouncil as its most obvious instrument. Italy’s position appeared to be strengthenedby the conclusion reached on the occasion of the Dublin European Council, held inlate April 1990, which was characterised by the French-German agreement to favoura closer European union. 17Italy could not forget, however, that in the meantime, also owing to the processof German reunification, there had been some progress in the negotiations for anEconomic and Monetary Union. In this context a leading role was played by theTreasury Minister, Guido Carli, and by the Governor of the Bank of Italy, CarloCiampi. Carli, a distinguished economist, former Governor of the Bank of Italy andformer Chairman of the Confederation of Italian entrepreneurs, Confindustria, waswell-known and highly appreciated in the international economic and financial milieu.18 He had accepted the role of Treasury Minister with the paramount goal to solvethe problem of the state deficit and to modernize the Italian economic system in orderto face progress in the European integration process. Both Carli and Ciampi wereaware that Italy only could join the EMU if the Andreotti government would be ableto launch a policy of severe state spending cuts; some Italian influential finance andbusiness leaders, as well as distinguished economists such as Mario Monti, MarioDraghi, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, understood that the European economic balancewas approaching a dramatic change with new demanding challenges to every Europeanmember state. Especially Padoa Schioppa, who had spent some years in Brusselsat the Commission and was now deputy Director of the Bank of Italy had been amember of the small team of economic advisers, who, in close cooperation withDelors, had developed the project for a single European currency. 19 So there was agroup of influential “technocrats”, who thought that progress in the field of economicand monetary integration would be the best instrument for achieving the modernizationof Italy’s economy and its adaptation to the rapidly changing international economicsystem. That would be a renewal of the experience Italy had made in 1978/79when adhering to the EMS; such a participation had then been perceived as the “vin-17. For a general overview see C. MAZZUCELLI, France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics andNegotiations to Create a European Union, Garland, New York/London, 1997; on France’s positionsee F. BOZO, Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et la réunification allemande, Odile Jacob, Paris,2005.18. On Carli’s role see the recent and important contribution by P. CRAVERI (ed.), Guido Carli Senatoree ministro del Tesoro 1983-1992, Bollati Boringhieri, Milan, 2009; G. CARLI, Cinquant’annidi vita italiana, Laterza, Rome/Bari, 1993.19. See T. PADOA-SCHIOPPA, La lunga via per l’euro, il Mulino, Bologna, 2003.

30 Antonio VARSORIcolo esterno” – the external bond – which would enable a weak political leadershipto impose to both public opinion and political parties unpopular economic choices. 20In 1990 the Italian government, in order to confirm its capability to face the goalsof the EMU, decided that the Italian lira would join the narrow range of the EMS(that is 2.25% instead of the previous 6%) and accept full capitals mobility. That wasa risky decision, but there was no alternative, if they wanted Italy to become part ofthe future EMU; moreover the perspectives of the Italian economy appeared to bestill positive, while it was hoped that the issue of the state deficit could still be dealtwith. 21 The Italian government, was convinced that progress in the field of politicalintegration would facilitate Italy’s task in the economic context and they thereforehoped that the two rounds of negotiations would start at the same time and would becompleted at the same time. Last but not least De Michelis hoped that the ratificationof relevant decisions under the Italian Presidency of the Council would strengthenthe Italian government’s position both domestically and abroad. 22So Italy’s Presidency started with an optimistic outlook. De Michelis has statedin his memoirs that the early project of a European Union was sketched out on theoccasion of a meeting he had in September with Delors at the seaside resort of MonteArgentario, where a document was drafted which aimed at reconciling supra-nationalideals and a practical intergovernmental approach. 23 However, Italy’s internationalposition suddenly faced a serious problem. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait andthe ensuing crisis resulted in a military confrontation. The Italian government immediatelyjoined the Western coalition led by the US, but Andreotti was very worriedabout the negative consequences of a war and he hoped that a diplomatic solutioncould be worked out: during the 1980s Italy had established strong economic ties withIraq and Italy’s investments were now at risk; moreover a strong pacifist movementwas emerging: the opposition to a Western military involvement in the Gulf crisisgave new strength to a weakened Communist Party, which was re-establishing itselfas a new political actor, the PDS; the Holy See and Pope John Paul II had a verycritical view of the Western position and significant sectors of the Catholic worldsympathized with the pacifist movement. Andreotti could no longer rely on the traditionalsupport of the Vatican, and the Christian Democracy began to split on theissue of Italy’s participation in the military operations against Iraq.Last but not least the Gulf crisis had negative consequences on the Italian economy,which suffered a clear slowing down. In summer 1990, Carli’s attempts atpushing the government to pass a series of economic reforms which in his opinionwere destined to redress the situation of public finances were largely frustrated by a20. For an interpretation of the “vincolo esterno” see R. GUALTIERI, L’Europa come vincolo esterno,in: P. CRAVERI, A. VARSORI (eds), op.cit.21. On Italy’s position during the negotiations on the EMU see early analysis offered by K. DYSON,K. FEATHERSTONE, The Road to Maastricht Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union, OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, 1999.22. ASILS, AGA, “Europa – Consiglio europeo straordinario di Dublino”, box 382, Memorandum bythe Italian Foreign Ministry, [April 1990].23. G. DE MICHELIS, op.cit., p.141.

The Andreotti Governments and the Maastricht Treaty 31riotous parliament, which had been used to easy spending and had approved a law onretirement which would increase the state financial burden. In August Carli publiclywarned Andreotti and the political elite that the state deficit was steadily and quicklyincreasing. The Prime Minister was aware of the dangerous situation, especially ofthe link between the country’s economic situation and Italy’s possible strict commitmentsto the Community as a consequence of the setting up of the EMU; on theoccasion of a meeting of the Christian Democracy directorate he pointed out that if,by 1992, the Italian economy would still be in the same situation as in 1990, Italywould cause the failure of the whole European project. 24In October, on the eve of an important extraordinary European Council on whichItaly had pinned its hopes for a breakthrough in the negotiations for the EuropeanUnion, Italy became the target of numerous articles by influential sectors of the internationalpress. The Economist published an article in which the author was highlycritical of Italy’s European policy; moreover the article reported that:“one senior Brussels diplomat says that Italy’s presidency is proving like a bus trip withthe Marx brothers in the drive seat. There are complaints of too many meetings, inadequatelyprepared with over-full agendas”.The article went on criticising De Michelis, who “generated a lot of ideas, but, inview of the many diplomats, is proving unable to channel them constructively” andadded that several member states were “furious” over the convening of an extraordinaryCouncil “for they see no reason to have one”. 25 Other newspapers, such as theWall Street Journal Europe and the Financial Times were slightly less critical, butpointed out the Italian presidency’s shortcomings and The Irish Times wrote of asummit “only Italy seems to want”. 26 Actually, such evaluations appeared partiallymisleading as the Italians tried to pave the way to a successful council also througha series of contacts with the French authorities, who appeared to share with Italy somecommon interests, especially as far as the issues of the seats of the bodies of the futureEuropean Union and the progress schedule of the EMU were concerned.In the weeks prior to the Rome Council there had been a series of bi-lateral as wellas of European meetings, mainly promoted by the Italian government. The lattermeetings had especially involved the Economic Ministers of the Twelve and thecommittee of the Governors of the national central banks. On the occasion of theGeneral Issues Council, the representatives of the member states analysed a reportdrafted by Carli dealing with the project for the creation of the EMU. The documentwas largely appreciated and considered as very relevant. Some definite goals hadbeen singled out, such as for example the creation of a single European currency, the24. See A. VARSORI, L’Italia e la fine della Guerra fredda …, op.cit., pp.47-94 and P. CRAVERI(ed.), op.cit., pp.lxx-lxxiii; ASILS [Archives of the Christian Democracy], “Direzione Nazionale”,box 53, Intervention by Andreotti at the meeting of the National Directorate, 06.09.1990.25. When in Rome, in: The Economist, 20.10.1990. In the Andreotti archives those articles were collectedin a folder, titled “Italy’s image”. It is likely that the Italian Prime Minister thought that all thosearticles were not the outcome of mere coincidence.26. S. FLYNN, The Summit only Italy seems to want, in: The Irish Times, 27.10.1990.

32 Antonio VARSORIsetting-up of a “European central banks system”, the need for the member states’economies to comply with some fundamental rules, which mainly dealt with limitsto state deficit, rate of inflation, interest rates, etc. Carli and his advisers had playeda leading role in the advancement towards the creation of the EMU. In a report to theRome Council Carli stated that there were still differences of opinion, especially overthe characters and timing of the three steps through which the EMU would be implemented.In this connection Italy, France and other countries thought it better to fixa definite date for the implementation of the second step of the EMU, mainly in orderto tie Germany to the creation of a European currency. However, other nations, especiallyGermany, thought that the achievement of the second step should be boundto the implementation of strict criteria, which would demonstrate the effectiveprogress in the member states’ economic performance.Obviously the Germans were not too happy about the end of the “Deutschmark”and they hoped that the future European currency would be based on the values andopinions nurtured by the Bundesbank. Moreover Britain was obviously opposed tothe creation of a European currency. 27 Carli and other Italian officials were aware ofItaly’s internal difficulties in facing the criteria that the creation of the future currencywould impose on EC member states, but they hoped that the EMU could represent afurther vincolo esterno (“external bond”), which on the one hand would help theItalian ruling elite to impose on the parliament, the political parties and the publicopinion a strict policy of “austerity”, and on the other hand to modernize the Italianeconomy mainly through a series of privatizations. Furthermore, if the Italian delegateswould take a “high profile”, such a choice would give them the opportunity tosoften the conditions other European countries would impose on every member statefor the passage from the first step of the EMU to the second and third step. 28If Carli, Ciampi and the Bank of Italy had focused their attention on the economicissues, De Michelis paid more attention to the political integration. As far as thisaspect was concerned, the Italian Foreign Minister, in a long letter to Andreotti,sketched out the characters and goals of the future European Union. Although thesupranational approach was the main pattern of De Michelis’ position, he was awareof the difficulties tied to the achievement of such an ambitious goal. So he tried toreconcile integration and close intergovernmental cooperation. A relevant aspect ofDe Michelis’ position was the central role that the EP would have to play in the futureCommunity structure. Moreover, the Italian Foreign Minister advocated the settingup of a Community that would have a definite role in the new international scenario.Last but not least, he pointed out the need for the broadening of the majority votesystem in the European Council. Italy’s position was further clarified in a letter Andreottisent to Delors on the eve of the Rome Council. Once again, the Italian PrimeMinister pointed out that, in the Italian government’s opinion, the main goals were27. ASILS, AGA, “Francia – Mitterrand François”, box 422/423, Records of the bi-lateral French-Italianmeeting in Paris, 08.10.1990; Memorandum by the Italian Foreign Ministry, 01.10.1990; “Europa– Consiglio Europeo di Roma 27-28 ottobre 1990”, box 383, Italian representative at the EC (Brussels)to Italian Foreign Ministry, 24.10.1990; Report to the European Council by Carli, 27.10.1990.28. See the evaluations in K. DYSON, K. FEATHERSTONE, op.cit., pp.647-650.

The Andreotti Governments and the Maastricht Treaty 33the creation of the EMU and of the EU and he stressed the important role the EuropeanParliament would have to play; moreover he advocated the quick starting of twointergovernmental conferences. 29From the notes of the Council it emerges that, with the exception of Britain, therewas a vague agreement on both the goals of the EMU and the EU, although thecharacters of the Economic and Monetary Union and the European Union were notclear-cut, and for most European leaders it would be up to the intergovernmentalconferences to find the final solutions. Two months later, in December, the Italiangovernment organised a further European Council. It does not seem that further significantprogress had been achieved by the Italian presidency, although the Italianauthorities appeared to be satisfied with the main results that characterised thissemester: the decisions on the convening of two intergovernmental conferences, andthe early discussions about the EMU and the EU. 30The dangerous implications of the vincolo esternoDuring the early months of 1991, the position of the Andreotti government worsenedas a consequence of both external and internal factors. As far as foreign policy wasconcerned, the outbreak of the Iraqi war magnified the contradictions of Italy’s internationalposition, torn between its commitment to the US strategy on one hand,the pacifist mood of large sectors of the public opinion and the political world on theother. Andreotti tried to choose a “low profile” attitude, but such a cautious positiondid not conceal the poor record of the Italian military participation in the operation“Desert Storm” and the growing ambiguity of the Italian attitude. Moreover, inFebruary, Andreotti too easily and too quickly supported the Soviet initiative, whichaimed at avoiding a ground attack by the coalition forces and at finding a compromisesolution. The Bush administration decided to ignore the Soviet peace move and in afew days the coalition forces defeated the Iraqi Army. When in March 1991, after theend of the hostilities in the Middle East, the Italian Prime Minister paid an officialvisit to Washington, the US administration attitude towards Italy was definitely lesswarm than a few months earlier. 31Just after the conclusion of the Gulf War, internal dissensions in the five-partycoalition compelled Andreotti to resign. Although within a few days, the ChristianDemocrat leader was able to form his 7 th cabinet, which was not much different fromthe previous one, his domestic position was definitely weaker and the governmentalcrisis was the symbol of increasing internal difficulties tied also to the worsening ofproblems such as the slowing down of the Italian economy, the challenge posed to29. ASILS, AGA, “Europa – Consiglio Europeo di Roma 27-28 ottobre 1990”, box 383, De Michelisto Andreotti, 23.10.1990; Andreotti to Delors, 24.10.1990.30. Ibid., Handwritten notes and records of the discussions.31. See ASILS, AGA, “Viaggi – USA – viaggio Giulio Andreotti 22-24.03.1991”, box 638.

34 Antonio VARSORIthe state by organised crime, especially the Mafia in Sicily, the disillusionment bylarge strata of voters towards the party system and the civil service, which were perceivedas both corrupt and ineffective. 32 The Community could not wait for the solutionof Italy’s plights and in the negotiations on the EMU, some delegations, especiallythe German and the Dutch ones, aimed at imposing strict conditions for theparticipation in the future European currency. Italy’s easy-going economic policywas the target of harsh criticism from various financial and governmental milieus,especially in Germany and in the Netherlands. Italy’s position was perceived as dangerous,as Carli’s hope at imposing some structural economic reforms (i.e. privatisationof state banks, limits to spending in the retirement system and the social security)had been almost always frustrated by both influential sectors of the governmentalmajority, especially the Socialist Party, and Parliament.Some leading Italian politicians were aware of the growing difficulties Italy wouldhave to face in a near future. On the eve of the appointment of the new cabinet, thePresident of the Republic, the Christian Democrat Francesco Cossiga, wrote an importantletter to Andreotti. The President pointed out the most important problems,which the new government would have to solve. Cossiga singled out in his list thereform of the Armed Forces, the institutional problem, the fight against organizedcriminality, but, significantly, the first issue was the state of public finance. ThePresident of the Republic stated that this problem was seriously threatening the effectivenessof the state structures as well as “our presence in a non subordinate positionand enjoying a real sovereignty both in Europe and in the group of the mostindustrialised nations”. 33In spite of Andreotti’s personal efforts, the position of his new government wasbecoming weaker and weaker. In the domestic context, there were growing contrastsamong the parties, which formed the governmental coalition; moreover the relationshipbetween the President and the Prime Minister quickly and abruptly worsened:in this period, the existence of the “stay-behind” structure was revealed, Cossigadefended this secret structure and as a former Defence and Interior Minister he tookresponsibility for its existence and activities. Andreotti confirmed the leaks aboutItaly’s involvement in the “stay-behind” network in order to show that there wasnothing to be concealed, but such revelations offered the former Communists andsome sectors of the “liberal” press the opportunity to launch a campaign, based onallegations of collusion between “stay-behind” and the so-called “strategy of tension”.The PDS decided also to open a procedure of impeachment against Cossiga,who thought that Andreotti had not defended him. 3432. On the crisis of the so-called “First Republic” see the revealing statements by several members ofthe Socialist Party in: G. ACQUAVIVA, L. COVATTA (eds), Il crollo. Il PSI nella crisi della primaRepubblica, Marsilio, Venice, 2012.33. ASILS, AGA, “Governi – VI governo Andreotti – rimpasto verifica gennaio marzo ‘91”, box 955,Cossiga to Andreotti, 28.03.1991.34. M. FRANCO, op.cit., pp.220-221.

The Andreotti Governments and the Maastricht Treaty 35Concerning the international situation, the new government had to face a suddenwave of mass emigration from Albania with its apex in August, when the images ofthe cargo ship “Vlora”, crowded with Albanian immigrants reaching the harbour ofBari, were broadcasted all over Europe by television networks; such an episode appearedto confirm the inefficiency of the Italian state’s structures. 35 Italy also had toface the dramatic issue of Yugoslavia’s implosion. The Italian government and theFarnesina had always been very worried by Yugoslavia’s instability and they didevery effort in order to maintain some sort of Yugoslav confederation, but Italy’spolicy was doomed to failure, not only because Germany increasingly supportedSlovenia’s and Croatia’s demands for independence, but also because of the growingopposition to the Balkan policy of Andreotti’s government by an unlikely but powerfulalliance of actors, such as the Italian media, the local authorities of the North Eastarea of the country, the Catholic world, the Holy See and the parliamentary majorityitself. The end of the Cold War and the ensuing radical changes in the Europeanbalance were destroying well-rooted ties and alliances, especially in Italy’s Catholicworld and in the Christian Democracy. So the Andreotti government appeared mainlypreoccupied with trying to survive among internal petty jealousies and externalepochal transformations.In the meantime, the negotiations on the EU were progressing. The thorniestquestions were posed by the discussions on the EMU, as it was obvious that somenations, such as Germany, were worried about the possibility that some weaker andunreliable countries, and especially Italy, could destroy the whole structure of thefuture common European currency. Some points in the German strategy were perceivedas dangerous for Italy’s perspectives, especially the creation of the EuropeanCentral Bank only during the third step and the unanimity rule for the participantstates with regard to the passage from the second to the third step. 36 On the contrary,Italy had pinned its hopes on the early creation of a strong and independent Europeancentral bank, as well as on the automatic implementation of the second step of theEMU process. Such an approach would obviously have strengthened the perspectiveof Italy’s involvement in the Monetary Union as it would have favoured the implementationof the vincolo esterno, and a strong and autonomous central bank, on themodel of the Bank of Italy, would become a more favourable counterpart than a stillpowerful German Bundesbank. Actually, the Italian Foreign Ministry clearly recognisedthe weakness of the Italian position, although it still hoped that the EMU couldbe subject to some form of “democratic” control, especially by the Commission andthe European Parliament, an indirect confirmation of Italy’s interest in favouring astronger political integration. But the Italian position on the EMU was further weakenedby the French progressively aligning themselves with Germany with regard tothe characteristics of the European Central Bank. 3735. On Italy’s policy towards the Albanian crisis see A. VARSORI, Italy and the End of Communismin Albania, 1989-1991, in: Cold War History, 4(2012), pp.615-635.36. ASILS, AGA, “Germania – Helmut Kohl”, box 457, Memorandum by the Italian Foreign Ministry,22.03.1991.37. P. CRAVERI (ed.), op.cit., p.cxviii.

36 Antonio VARSORIOn his part, Carli was compelled to fight on two fronts: on one hand he had toreassure his European partners of Italy’s reliability and its capacity to implementdramatic and bold economic reforms; on the other hand, he had to convince themembers of his own cabinet, as well as the political milieu, that Italy had to faceserious sacrifices, if the country wanted to be part of the future EMU. As far as theformer aspect is concerned, Carli and his advisers – in 1991, Mario Draghi was appointedDirector General at the Treasury Ministry – quickly realised that the supranationalinstrument, especially through the role of the early constitution of a powerfulEuropean Central Bank, would not be accepted by Germany. Moreover, it was becomingevident that some European partners would impose stringent convergencecriteria to the future participants in the EMU and such decisions would mainly beintended for Italy. Thus Carli’s attention focused on the convergence criteria and heattempted to convince his partners that such criteria had to be interpreted in a “dynamic”rather than in a “static” perspective. That would imply that the passage of acountry from the first to the following step would be based, not only on the convergenceparameters, but also on the demonstration of a member state’s commitment tothe implementation of such criteria. Carli understood that the Italian authorities neededtime in order to redress the economic situation, and the international economictrend did not facilitate Italy’s already difficult task. But it was not easy to convinceItaly’s partners, especially Germany’s Finance Minister, Theo Waigel, that the Italianauthorities would be able to comply with the future convergence criteria. 38 On hispart, Andreotti tried to lead Kohl to a more forthcoming attitude, which could takeinto consideration wider political considerations.As far as the domestic context was concerned, Carli had a very difficult time, asinfluential members of the governmental majority, the PDS and the trade unions werenot ready to accept the “austerity” measures and the economic reforms, especiallythe privatizations, envisaged by the Treasury Minister, as those proposals, if implemented,would threaten deep-rooted party interests and the role of powerful lobbies.On the contrary, the Confindustria and some influential newspapers, such as la Repubblica,the Corriere della Sera and il Sole 24 ore criticised Carli as too prudent onboth the state budget and the launching of a policy of privatisation of the most importantindustrial and banking sectors owned by the State. In the opinion of someleading industrialists, businessmen and opinion-makers, the creation of the EMUwould offer the opportunity to destroy the strong influence the state – and the politicalparties – exerted on the Italian economy. The position of the Treasury Minister wasfurther weakened by the attitude developed by the Bank of Italy, which, influencedby a rigid Europeanist approach, appeared to believe in the almost miraculous effectsof the vincolo esterno, so it seemed to favour the institution of severe convergenceparameters. In early May 1991, Carli sent a letter of resignation to the Prime Ministeras he was pessimistic about the possibility to implement his economic programme,but Andreotti, who understood the gravity of the situation, was able to convince him38. Telegram sent by Ambassador Cangelosi to the Italian Foreign Ministry in late April 1991, quotedin: P. CRAVERI (ed.), op.cit., p.cxxii.

The Andreotti Governments and the Maastricht Treaty 37to change his mind and a few months later, Parliament passed some economic reformswhich had been advocated by Carli. It is of some significance that the Italian Parliamentappeared to neglect the economic aspect of the intergovernmental negotiations,while it focused its attention on traditional political issues with the usual show offederalist rhetoric about the limits of the future European Union. 39The second semester of 1991 was regarded as the turning point in the negotiatingprocess that would lead to both the EMU and the EU. In matters of Monetary Union,the Dutch Presidency shared Germany’s opinion about the need to impose strict ruleswhich would govern the creation of the EMU, and the Dutch government put forwarda project which was regarded as a threat by the Italians. In September 1991, a meetingof the European Economic Ministers was held at Apeldoorn. In his memoirs Carlistated that on this occasion he was able to redress, at least partially, the situation: theItalian approach for a “dynamic” interpretation of the convergence criteria was accepted,but the European Central Bank would be implemented only at the end of theprocess that would lead to the EMU, while in the meantime a weaker EuropeanMonetary Institute would be created; moreover, the second step would be achievedonly later and not automatically. Carli regarded the conclusions reached at Apeldoornas a viable compromise, though he quickly realised that numerous aspects were stillvague and open to different interpretations, but at least France appeared to share someItalian claims, especially a softer attitude towards the interpretation of the convergencecriteria. 40While Carli was focusing his attention on the EMU, the Farnesina could not neglectthe negotiations on the EU. The European Union treaty project, which wasmainly based on the plan put forward by Luxembourg in the first half of 1991 did notraise enthusiastic reactions in Rome, especially as far as the European Parliament’srole was concerned, but most of its provisions (the three pillars concept, etc.) couldbe accepted, as it was hoped that the treaty would be a starting point and there wouldbe the possibility of an early revision in 1996. 41 Nevertheless, during the final stageof the negotiations, the Italian authorities began to nurture traditional suspicions aboutthe French-German aspiration at creating a “directorate”, which would put Italy in asecond rank position. The Italian Foreign Ministry was especially concerned aboutthe projects for a growing military cooperation between France and Germany, andthey feared that the EU treaty could create, through the strengthening of the WEU,the “core” of a French-German military leadership. Just as on several occasions inthe past, the Italians thought that the best “master” was the more distant and the more39. For an analysis of the parliamentary debates see M. PIERMATTEI, Crisi della Repubblica e sfidaeuropea. I partiti italiani e la moneta unica (1988-1998), CLEUB, Bologna, 2012.40. ASILS, AGA, “Francia – rapporti franco-italiani – atti per la riunione a Viterbo del 17/18 ottobre1991”, box 411, Memorandum by the diplomatic adviser to the President of the Council of Ministers,16.10.1991.41. ASILS, AGA, “Francia – rapporti franco-italiani – atti per la riunione a Viterbo del 17/18 ottobre1991”, box 411, Memorandum by the Italian Foreign Ministry, 17.10.1991.

38 Antonio VARSORIpowerful, that is the United States. 42 In the field of security, NATO was the symbolof both Washington’s power and its continuing involvement in European affairs. IfItaly had always hoped to rely on a “special relationship” with the US, the Italianauthorities knew that somebody else was also interested in avoiding a French-German“directorate” and in maintaining a close bond between Europe and the US. So it isnot surprising that in October 1991 Gianni De Michelis and his British colleague,Douglas Hurd, signed a joint statement in which they confirmed Britain’s and Italy’ssupport of a strengthened WEU, but they also stated that the Western European Unionwould be closely tied to the Atlantic Alliance, which indirectly meant the UnitedStates. It is difficult to think that such a move was very much appreciated in Parisand in Berlin, although the French authorities stated that the two initiatives would goin the same direction and the French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas suggested thatthe Italians could be involved in the French-German brigade. 43In late November the Twelve had reached a general agreement on the variousissues related to both the EU and the EMU; the European Council, which would leadto the signature of the new treaty was due to be held in the Dutch town of Maastrichton the 9 th and the 10 th of December. On the eve of the conference, the Italian ForeignMinistry analysed the outcome of the long and difficult negotiations. As far as theEU was concerned, the new Dutch project was regarded favourably by the Italianauthorities, who however pointed out that a general agreement was still missing. Inthe opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the most controversial points were thecompetences of the EP, the inclusion in the treaty of provisions dealing with theeconomic and social cohesion, and the characteristics of the foreign and securitypolicy. Moreover, the Italian memorandum pointed out, how, on several issues, thestrongest opposition still came from Britain, whereas the attitude of the Italian governmentappeared to be fairly optimistic. Actually, the thorniest issues were the onesrelated to the EMU. The Italian authorities were still worried about the passage to thefollowing steps of the EMU and the nature of the convergence criteria, although thecompromises which had been worked out, mainly owing to Carli’s efforts, appearedto the Italian authorities a positive solution, which would offer the Italian governmentthe time and the means to face the internal economic obstacles to Italy’s inclusion inthe first group of member states which would have created a common Europeancurrency. 44In a further memorandum drafted on the 11 th of December, Ambassador UmbertoVattani, Andreotti’s diplomatic adviser and former head of the Directorate for Eco-42. The joke about the best “master” is attributed to Roberto Ducci, an influential Italian diplomat whowrote this phrase in a memorandum he drafted in the early 1960s.43. On this episode see M. NERI GUALDESI, Il cuore a Bruxelles la mente a Roma. Storia dellapartecipazione italiana alla costruzione dell’unità europea, ETS, Pisa, 2004, pp.154-155. See alsoASILS, AGA, “Francia – rapporti franco-italiani – atti per la riunione a Viterbo del 17/18 ottobre1991”, box 411, Minute of a meeting between Dumas and De Michelis, 16.10.1991.44. ASILS, AGA, “Europa – Consiglio Europeo di Maastricht 9-10 Dicembre 1991”, box 386, Memorandumby the Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the Council of Ministers to Andreotti,07.12.1991.

The Andreotti Governments and the Maastricht Treaty 39nomic Affairs at the Farnesina, summed up the results of the Maastricht conference.This document also was characterised by an optimistic outlook. It stated that theMaastricht treaty would be a turning point in the integration process, as the EU woulddeal with three important issues, which used to shape a nation’s sovereignty: a commoncurrency, foreign and defence policy, domestic security and justice. The Italiansappeared to be satisfied with the results about the EMU, especially with regard to thechoice of a date for the passage from the second to the third stage of the EMU, thequalified majority vote in 1996, the need to rely on at least seven member states thatwould comply with the convergence criteria in order to achieve such a passage. Thememorandum added that Italy had accepted the principle of “multilateral scrutiny”and to that end the Andreotti government would present a “Plan of economic convergence”for the period 1992/94. The Italians were also fairly happy with the resultsabout the political union, especially with the role which would be played by the EP.The “federal inspiration” had disappeared from the text, nevertheless in the Italians’opinion the Treaty would be characterised by a supranational outlook. Rome appearedto approve as well the provisions related to the intergovernmental cooperation and itis significant that the memorandum pointed out that those clauses were not in contrastwith the role played by the Atlantic Alliance. 45It is not surprising that, on their return from Maastricht, the comments of the Italianprotagonists of the negotiations were absolutely favourable. In an article, which waspublished in early 1992 by the semi-official journal Affari Esteri, Andreotti labelledthe Maastricht Treaty as a “great achievement”, which would lay the foundations ofthe new Europe and of the transformation of the European Community into the EuropeanUnion. 46 In an interview to the newspaper la Repubblica, Carli was more cautiousand he pointed out that now Italy had to implement radical economic reforms.47In fact, a few weeks before the beginning of the Maastricht conference, Parliamenthad started the discussion on the general finance law and on the prevision and planningreport for 1992 of the Budget Ministry. The government’s initiative was harshlycriticised by both the supporters of more easygoing financial policy and those, whoadvocated more drastic measures. Some provisions, however, appeared weak andpartially ineffective, and both Antonio Fazio, one of the deputy directors, and Ciampi,the Governor of the Bank of Italy, expressed serious doubts about the government’sdecisions. In October, the unions called a general strike against what was labelled asa policy of “austerity”, whereas, on the contrary, the President of the Republic, whowas now very critical of the ruling political élite, openly criticised the government’seconomic and financial policy as too feeble. 4845. Ibid., Memorandum by the diplomatic adviser to the President of the Council of Ministers,11.12.1991.46. G. ANDREOTTI, Maastricht e le prospettive dell’Unione Europea, in: Affari Esteri, 93(1992), pp.3-8.47. E. POLIDORI, Entrare in Europa? Sarà dura, in: la Repubblica, 12.12.1991.48. P. CRAVERI (ed.), op.cit., pp.cix-cxv.

40 Antonio VARSORIBetween mid-1991 and early 1992, Italy’s economic outlook definitely worsenedand the confidence in both its government and economic system fell dramatically. InJuly, the American rating agency Moody’s decided to downgrade the Italian economy.In November a committee of the IMF paid an official visit to Italy and the finalreport pointed out the serious contradictions in Italy’s economic policy, which, if notimmediately redressed, would pose serious doubts about Rome’s capacity to face thecommitments deriving from its participation in the Maastricht Treaty. 49 A furtherharsh blow to the Italian government’s optimistic approach to the provisions of theMaastricht Treaty came from the European Commission. In late September 1991Delors wrote Andreotti a letter in which he stated:“I do think that Italy’s effort must aim at complying with the goals that had been pointedout in the governmental long term economic and financial project which has been presentedin May. I recognize the relevance of the efforts that have to be implemented but I do thinkthat it is of paramount importance to give a clear-cut indication of Italy’ determination toradically change the country’s budget policy. […] Italy’s convergence efforts must not belimited to the budget but you would agree that the implementation of other goals such asthe fiscal system and the state costs depend on the state’s capacity to redress the statefinances”. 50In mid-October, Andreotti replied to Delors. The Italian Prime Minister pointed outthe provisions which were going to be approved by Parliament, especially the Financeand Budget Law and the Convergence Plan for the period 1992-1994. Andreotti appearedto believe that it would be possible to implement a limit to the increase insalaries and to launch a series of privatisations. He concluded that Italy would complywith the provisions which would enable Rome to adhere to both the second and thethird step of the EMU. 51 However, it is very likely that Delors was not convinced ofAndreotti’s statements. In late January 1992 he sent a further letter to the Prime Ministerin which he criticized the Italian Parliament’s incapability to comply with theCommission’s directives. The Prime Minister immediately rejected Delors’ criticism.The exchange of letters was revealed by the press. 52 On the same day this contrastwas made public, Carli and De Michelis signed the Maastricht Treaty. A few daysearlier the Andreotti government had resigned and the President of the Republic hadcalled for new elections. They were held in an atmosphere of political chaos, increasingeconomic difficulties, political murders by the organised criminality andrevelations about political and financial scandals which involved the whole rulingclass. It was the beginning of the final crisis of the so-called “First Republic”. 5349. ASISL, AGA, “Carli Guido”, box 995, Report by de Fontanay (IMF) to Carli, 20.11.1991.50. ASILS, AGA, “France Delors Jacques”, box 433, Delors to Andreotti [translation], 24.09.1991.51. ASILS, AGA, “France Delors Jacques”, box 433, Andreotti to Delors, 16.10.1991.52. Delors’ letter was published by la Repubblica, which also published Andreotti’s reactions. See M.RICCI, Delors sull’Italia si informi meglio. Andreotti respinge I rimproveri della CEE, in: la Repubblica,07.02.1992.53. See for example S. COLARIZI, M. GERVASONI, La tela di Penelope. Storia della seconda repubblica,Laterza, Rome/Bari, 2012.

The Andreotti Governments and the Maastricht Treaty 41In a confidential report drafted in mid-June 1992 by the civilian branch of theItalian secret services, the SISDE analysed the consequences of the Maastricht treaty.A long section of the report focused on the difficulties which the European constructionwas facing as a consequence of the Danish referendum and of the growing doubtsabout the treaty which were turning up in most EC countries, especially in France,and in Germany as well. With regard to Italy, the memorandum pointed out the seriousfinancial situation, especially the increase in the inflation rate and the growing publicdeficit, two aspects which had been openly denounced by the Governor of the Bankof Italy, Ciampi. Those problems were aggravated by the inefficiency of both theItalian political system and the civil service. The memorandum argued that Ciampi’scritical remarks were going to be exploited by the international press, which regardedItaly’s plight as a further major obstacle to the implementation of the MaastrichtTreaty. Moreover, the dramatic episodes of organised criminality – the obvious referencewas to the murder of judge Giovanni Falcone – were labelled by some leadingEuropean newspapers as an evidence, that Italy was an unstable and unreliable nationwhose situation could jeopardise the whole European project. The SISDE memorandumreminded that on the 11 th of June the European Parliament had invited Italy “tostop the power of the organised criminality”. In its conclusions the memorandumwarned:“There is the risk that Italy’s economic crisis and the issue related to the organised criminalitymay be artificially exploited by those who, in various European countries, alreadythink that the Maastricht Treaty, based on the Europe of the Twelve, is inadequate, especiallyafter Germany’s unification, the dissolution of the Eastern bloc, the revival of national,religious and ethnic identities; in this connection somebody already thinks of acontinental Europe ruled by a directorate of the more powerful nations”.It was added that some sectors of the Italian political world and some entrepreneurialmilieu thought of a “Mediterranean choice” for Italy, which would delay the processof economic reforms imposed by the Maastricht Treaty, especially the convergencecriteria. 54 In a few weeks the “Tangentopoli” scandal and a severe economic crisiswould lead to the collapse of the whole political system, to the devaluation of the liraand to its exit from the EMS.ConclusionsFew Italian historians have dealt with the events which led to the crisis of the socalledFirst Republic and opened a new phase in Italian history. “Tangentopoli” isstill a topic of party polemic and recrimination rather than an object of historicalinvestigation. As far as Italy and the Maastricht Treaty are concerned, the lack ofarchival material favoured some traditional interpretations based on assumptions,54. ASILS, AGA, “Europa – Consiglio Europeo di Maastricht 9-10 dicembre 1991”, box 387, Memorandumby the SISDE, 15.06.1992, confidential.

42 Antonio VARSORIsuch as the one on Italy’s empty federalist rhetoric as the main feature of its Europeanpolicy. A few scholars, especially Lucio Caracciolo and Piero Craveri, have tried tolink the end of the “first Republic” to Maastricht. The signature of the Treaty wouldthus have been a sort of unconscious suicide by the political class unable to understandthe long-term implications of the convergence criteria: the vincolo esterno wouldhave transformed itself into a sort of “noose” which “strangled” the traditional partiesand their leaders. 55Actually, Italy’s role in the negotiations of the Maastricht treaty is a more complexissue. First of all it is possible to single out two different periods in Italy’s policytowards the process that will lead to Maastricht: a first period which spans from late1989 to late 1990; a second period since early 1991 until early 1992. As far as thefirst period is concerned, in spite of some problems, the European policy developedby the Andreotti government was partially effective: Italy’s position aimed at achievinga more stable post-Cold War European framework, mainly through the launchingof an intergovernmental conference and the creation of a European Union characterisedby supranational features and a stronger European parliament; as far as theaspects related to the EMU are concerned, the Italian leaders were still confident thatit was possible to rely on the vincolo esterno strategy, which had been successfulduring most of the 1980s. In spite of critical comments by the international press, theAndreotti government was able to convince his partners to accept a sort of dual trackprocedure that would lead to the implementation of both the EU and the EMU. Withregard to the economic aspects, Italy’s outlook was still fairly bright; moreover, theItalian government could rely on the initiatives taken by Guido Carli and his advisersfrom the Bank of Italy, who enjoyed the confidence of both their European partnersand the influential economic milieu.The Italian position had dramatically and quickly been worsening since early 1991from both the international and the domestic viewpoint. Italy’s contribution to thedrafting of the EU treaty was decidedly a minor one; the Italian authorities wereunable to convince their partners to develop a strong federalist approach to the EuropeanUnion, although it is likely that some progress with regard to the role of theEuropean Parliament can be attributed to Italy’s continuing pressures. But Italy’sEuropeanist commitment was weakened by its traditional fears about a French-Germandirectorate based on military cooperation: the Anglo-Italian declaration of October1991 highlighted NATO’s role, that is US influence on the European defencebalance. In fact, Italy’s commitment towards the EU treaty became weaker mainly,because the implementation of the EMU became the major issue which the Italiangovernment had to cope with. In this connection, Italy’s position suffered as Rome’sEuropean partners became convinced that Italy would be unable to comply with theconditions to be achieved in order to be a member of the future European currency.So Italy’s involvement in the second and third step of the EMU would risk to threatenthe whole construction for the creation of a European common currency. Both a tiny55. L. CARACCIOLO, L’Italia alla ricerca di se stessa, in: G. SABBATUCCI, V. VIDOTTO (eds),op.cit., pp.565-571, See also P. CRAVERI (ed.), op.cit., p.1016.

The Andreotti Governments and the Maastricht Treaty 43technocratic élite, which had the Bank of Italy as its stronghold, and some membersof the political class, such as, for example, Carli, Andreotti and Cossiga, realised thatthe creation of the EMU was becoming the most important aspect of the intergovernmentalnegotiations. But the Italian cabinet and a large part of the political class wereunable to understand that the end of the Cold War had radically changed the internationalscenario and the European balance, leading thus to an acceleration of theinternational dynamics, as well as to the end of some deep-rooted advantageouspositions, such as the fact that Italy – too weak but too important to fail – had alwaysto be supported owing to its role of Western bulwark.This situation was worsened by a crisis of traditional political and societal loyaltiesin the domestic field, as in the opinion of several Italian voters there was no need tocontinue voting for the traditional anti-Communist parties, as the Soviet threat nolonger existed. On the occasion of the signature of the Maastricht Treaty most membersof the political class focused their attention on the most obvious political aspectsof the treaty and they reiterated the usual complaints about the lack of federalistinspiration; a few politicians hoped that the vincolo esterno could solve Italy’s problems,but they thought they had plenty of time to cope with those issues and theyignored the destabilising consequences of the end of the Cold War on the domesticbalance; while the “technocratic” élite believed that “Europe” would solve everyproblem, without realising that “Europe” was not limited to a tiny European “smallworld” of top officials, bankers and scholars, but consisted mainly in the interactionof national interests. So, if the Maastricht Treaty was not the only reason for the fallof the “First Republic”, the international context related to the signature of the treaty,as well as relevant domestic factors closely related to the treaty provisions, such asthe state deficit and the privatisations, favoured the crisis of a public consensus whichhad lasted for half a century and led to the implosion of the traditional Italian partysystem, paving thus the way for a new stage in Italy’s history.In the twenty years after the signature of the Maastricht Treaty Italy has lost mostof its sovereignty, especially in the economic field, to the advantage of the EU, althoughnot in the way the federalists and sectors of the traditional political and technocraticélite had dreamt of. In this period, on the contrary, Italy has experienced theemergence of growing and widespread euro-sceptic feelings, as well as the appointmentof various governments led by representatives of a Europeanist technocraticélite – Giuliano Amato, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Lamberto Dini, Mario Monti -, whosemain goal has been to reassure the European partners and the European Union aboutItaly’s capability to comply with the economic and financial rules, born in Maastricht,implemented by Brussels and advocated by Berlin.

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45La négociation de Maastricht vue de ParisGeorges SAUNIERLe traité de Maastricht, dont les effets, notamment l’instauration d’une monnaie unique,continuent de susciter divers commentaires, est désormais une référence dansl’histoire de l’intégration européenne. En nous intéressant à cette négociation vue ducôté français, à la préparation et au déroulement du Conseil européen qui eut lieu dansla petite ville néerlandaise, nous souhaitons contribuer à son étude.Pour réaliser ce travail, nous nous sommes appuyés sur différentes sources: lesarchives de la Présidence de la République, 1 quelques documents provenant d’archivesprivées, la presse et les média audiovisuels, des témoignages d’acteurs politiquesou administratifs français.Nous rappellerons d’abord différents éléments de contexte qui constituent, à nosyeux, l’atmosphère historique dans laquelle évoluent les différents acteurs français.La «fin de l'Europe dite de Yalta» reste à nos yeux un élément déterminant et explicatifde ce contexte. 2 Que deviendrait l’OTAN dans cet après-guerre froide? Commentorganiser la future sécurité en Europe? Comment mettre en œuvre au niveaueuropéen, c’est-à-dire entre les Douze, une défense autonome des autres grands blocs?Telles étaient les questions auxquelles la diplomatie française était confrontée et quiexpliquent la volonté de créer une Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC)traitant aussi des questions de défense.La fin de la guerre froide impliquait aussi de renforcer l’Europe en tant qu’espacede paix, de coopération économique, culturel et diplomatique. Il s’agissait d’unenécessité, alors que la disparition du glacis soviétique faisait craindre un réveil desnationalismes, comme la tragédie yougoslave naissante pouvait le laisser penser. 3Pour les autorités françaises, la réponse résidait dans l’émergence de nouvelles structurespaneuropéennes au sein desquelles l’Est et l’Ouest de l’Europe se retrouveraient.Ainsi, en sus des démarches au sein de la CSCE, Paris proposa la création d’uneConfédération européenne qui permettrait d’établir un dialogue permanent entre uneCommunauté européenne renforcée, d’une part, et les pays d’Europe centrale etorientale (PECO), d’autre part. Ces derniers, en effet, ne pouvaient dans l’immédiatadhérer à la Communauté européenne, leurs économies n’y étant pas prêtes. Ainsi,au moment où il fut négocié, le projet d’Union européenne (UE) n’avait donc pas1. Notamment les fiches résumant la négociation et destinées au Président de la République et plusieursdocuments préparant la position française.2. IFM [Archives Institut François Mitterrand], Fonds Service de presse, Allocution de MonsieurFrançois Mitterrand, Président de la République, lors de la signature de la “Charte de Paris pour unenouvelle Europe” par les chefs d'États des trois Républiques baltes, …, 06.12.1991.3. AN [Archives nationales], 5AG4/33-1, J. Blot, Réflexions sur la question allemande, 30.10.1989.

46 Georges SAUNIERpour objet d’encadrer plusieurs dizaines de pays supplémentaires mais d’être le noyaudur d’un continent lui-même organisé en confédération. 4Aux marges de cette Europe, que faire de la Russie? Au moment où la négociationde Maastricht s’est nouée, il était clair que l’organisation politique et territoriale del’Union soviétique allait connaître de profonds bouleversements. Or, la Russie restaitune puissance potentiellement menaçante. Il fallait donc veiller à ce que l’intégrationeuropéenne à venir n’inquiétât pas l’ancien géant. Aussi, d’une façon ou d’une autre,les autorités françaises considéraient comme nécessaire d’associer la Russie à la futureconfédération. 5Quant au cœur de cette Europe à construire, organisée autour d’une Communautéeuropéenne renforcée, il devait permettre à la France de vivre en complète solidaritéavec ses principaux voisins et en particulier avec la nouvelle Allemagne unifiée, paysrestant au cœur des préoccupations diplomatiques françaises. 6 Si François Mitterrandne voulait pas d’une unification allemande incontrôlée, réalisée en dehors de toutaccord international, c’est-à-dire à ses yeux potentiellement dangereuse, il en admettaitcependant la légitimité, connaissait son caractère «inéluctable» et a œuvré pourqu’elle intervienne selon certaines conditions. 7 L’une d’elle était que le processusd’unification allemande ne se fasse pas au détriment de l’approfondissement del’intégration européenne. Au contraire, unification allemande et approfondissementdevaient aller de pair. La volonté de progresser vers une Union économique etmonétaire (UEM), puis de renforcer l’Union politique (UP) entre les Douze, s’inscrittrès exactement dans cette logique : renforcer les liens entre la future Allemagne etles autres États membres – entre l’Allemagne et la France – afin de créer une solidaritéirréversible et contraignante entre eux. 8Nécessités «communautaires»Pour les autorités françaises, le projet d’Union européenne se justifie donc par lanécessité de répondre à la nouvelle situation née de la disparition du bloc soviétique.4. Sur ce projet de Confédération européenne, voir : J. MUSITELLI, François Mitterrand, architectede la Grande Europe: le projet de Confédération européenne (1990-1991), in: Revue internationaleet stratégique, 82(2011), pp.18-28; M.-P. REY, Europe is our Common home: a study of Gorbachev'sdiplomatic concept, in: Cold War History, 2(2004), pp.33-66; R. DUMAS, Un projet mort-né: laConfédération européenne, in: Politique étrangère, 3(2001), pp.687-703.5. On verra notamment sur ce point deux des documents récemment publiés par le Centre d’analyse etde prévision du Quai d’Orsay: J.-M. GUEHENNO, Après l’URSS, 27.08.1991; P. BUHLER, MAE,CEP, La désagrégation de l’Union soviétique, jusqu’où, 02.09.1991, consulté le 13.05.2012, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/le-ministere/archives-et-patrimoine/putsch-de-moscou-echantillon-de/.6. Cf. F. BOZO, Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l’unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht,Odile Jacob, Paris, 2005; M. VAÏSSE, C. WENKEL, La diplomatie française face à l'unificationallemande, Tallandier, Paris, 2011.7. AN, CD.177, Hubert Védrine. Réflexions sur la question allemande, 18.10.1989.8. Les entretiens menés auprès des principaux acteurs de cette négociation confirment tous ce point.

La négociation de Maastricht vue de Paris 47Néanmoins, ce projet n’est pas ex nihilo. Il s’inscrit dans une histoire communautaireplus ancienne, ayant ses propres logiques. C’est ainsi que l’UEM ou les nouvellescompétences accordées à l’Union s’inscrivent dans une réflexion politique des autoritésfrançaises à l’égard des grands bouleversements que connaissent l’hexagone etson économie depuis les années 1970 et surtout 1980. 9 À cet égard, la Communautéeuropéenne apparaît ici sous un double aspect, à la fois accélérateur et régulateur.Accélérateur, puisque l’Acte unique a confirmé et amplifié l’internationalisation – ouplus exactement l’européanisation – de l’économie française. Rappelons que le traitéde Maastricht fut négocié parallèlement à l’achèvement du grand marché uniqueprévu pour 1993; régulateur, car en édifiant un cadre politique, diplomatique, juridiqueet monétaire à l’échelle du marché économique européen, l’idée française étaitbien de maîtriser les nouveaux processus économiques à l’œuvre, y compris à l’échellemondiale. 10 Là encore, il faut rappeler que la négociation du traité de Maastrichtest concomitante avec la négociation de l’Uruguay Round. 11Comment exercer cette régulation économique? La délégation française jugeaittrois dossiers prioritaires pour y parvenir: mettre en œuvre une UEM, poser les basesd’un espace social européen, permettre une politique industrielle commune. D’autresdéveloppements étaient possibles – santé, environnement, recherche, grands réseaux– et même souhaitables, à condition toutefois qu’ils restent secondaires. Enfin,divers volets à négocier devaient permettre à la future union de ne pas être qu’unsimple espace économique. 12 La création d’une citoyenneté européenne, d’une politiqueculturelle commune, répondaient à cette exigence, y compris la mise en œuvred’une Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC). 13Comment et qui contrôlerait cette Union? Les perspectives d’une UEM et d’unePESC d’une part, la transformation de la Communauté en Union d’autre part, firent9. Cf. O. GALLAND, Y. LEMEL (dir.), La nouvelle société française. Trente années de mutation,Armand Colin, Paris, 1998; H. MENDRAS, L. DUBOYS FRESNAY, Français, comme vous avezchangé. Histoire des Français depuis 1945, Tallandier, Paris, 2004; L. DIRN, La société françaiseen tendances, 1975-1995. Deux décennies de changement, PUF, Paris, 1998.10. Voir G. SAUNIER, Le gouvernement français et les enjeux économiques européens à l’heure de larigueur 1981-1984, et É. BUSSIERE, Le ministère des Finances et les enjeux économiqueseuropéens à l’époque de la cohabitation 1986-1988, in: É. BUSSIERE, M. DUMOULIN, S.SCHIRMANN (dir.), Milieux économiques et intégration européenne au XX e siècle. La relance desannées quatre-vingt (1979-1992), CHEFF, Paris,2007, pp.109-145 et pp.147-165.11. Les négociateurs français veillèrent à isoler les problèmes du GATT de ceux de la négociation dutraité de Maastricht afin que la première ne vienne pas gêner la seconde. Voir: AN, PHB.8-4, Bastelica;Lafont. Négociations d'Uruguay. Sommet de Maastricht, 06.12.1991; Lafont. L'état desnégociations d'Uruguay, 06.12.1991. Les conclusions du Conseil européen de Maastricht y fontpourtant référence, prudemment et en rappelant la nécessaire compatibilité des négociationsavec «les objectifs de la Communauté». Les références au texte du Traité d’Union européenne(TUE), incluant protocoles et déclarations, ou aux conclusions du Conseil européen de Maastricht(CCE) proviennent respectivement du Journal officiel de la Communauté et du Bulletin mensuelcorrespondant.12. AN, PHB.8-4, Bastelica. Nouvelles compétences, s.d.; voir aussi par exemple IFM, Conférence depresse du Président de la République. Politique étrangère de la France, 18.05.1989.13. Sur ces points, cf. infra.

48 Georges SAUNIERde cette question dite de «l’architecture» un enjeu spécifique de la négociation deMaastricht. À Paris, la réflexion sur ce thème existe dès le printemps 1990. 14 Sesrésultats sont perceptibles dans certains propos de François Mitterrand. 15 Avant d’enétudier les effets lors de la négociation, il convient d’en rappeler les fondements. Ilstiennent en deux mots: légitimité, finalité.Mitterrand considérant que la cohérence politique européenne ne pourrait êtreobtenue qu’avec «beaucoup de patience», il est clair que lors de la négociation deMaastricht, les autorités françaises considéraient toujours l’espace national commele seul espace politique de référence. 16 La seule légitimité possible dans le processusde décision communautaire ne pouvait donc être que celle des États. D’où la volontéfrançaise, lors de la négociation de Maastricht, de privilégier l’architecture dite duTemple plutôt que celle de l’Arbre. 17 Le Temple où le Conseil européen, c’est-à-direla réunion des chefs d'État et de gouvernements, directement responsables devantleurs peuples, reste maître d’œuvre. Quant à la finalité ultime de l’Union, il faut làencore se reporter aux déclarations et actes de Mitterrand. 18 Celui-ci ne ménage passon soutien à de grands projets européens tels que l’UEM ou la PESC. Il n’hésite pasà parler de citoyenneté européenne et se déclare favorable à «un système à finalitéfédérale». Pour autant, il ne faut pas se tromper sur le sens de ces termes. À ses yeux,l’intégration européenne ne peut qu’être respectueuse des intérêts et différences desÉtats membres, de leurs institutions. Il se refuse à les voir se fondre «dans la grisaille».En d’autres termes, la dualité du système de décision communautaire, à la fois supranationalet intergouvernemental, reste à ses yeux la bonne formule et explique sonsoutien à des propositions permettant de mieux articuler les niveaux nationaux etcommunautaires, tels que la subsidiarité, le congrès des Parlements, ou les arbitragesquant aux procédures de votes à l’unanimité ou à la majorité.Quoi qu’il en soit de ces considérations, les autorités françaises se concentrèrentprioritairement lors des négociations du traité de Maastricht sur deux grands dossiers:la PESC et l’UEM. Le projet de PESC, nous l’avons indiqué, répond au nouveaucontexte international et apparait comme le prolongement des premiers efforts decoordination des diplomaties des États membres, nés dans les années soixante-dix,codifiés et intensifiés depuis. Avec la PESC, il s’agissait dans l’esprit des autorités14. Voir Archives privées, Elisabeth Guigou (EG). Quel pourrait être le contenu d’une initiative surl’Union politique de l’Europe, 20.03.1990.15. Le débat sur les institutions européennes en France est toutefois plus large et plus complexe. VoirB. DENNI, Du référendum du 20 septembre 1992 sur l’Union européenne aux élections législativesde mars 1993, in: P. HABERT, P. PERRINEAU, C. YSMAL (dir.), Le vote sanction. Les électionslégislatives des 21 et 28 mars 1993, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris,1993, pp.91-109.16. IFM, Conférence de presse de Monsieur le Président de la République à l'issue du Conseil européen,Dublin, 26.06.1990.17. AN, PHB.8-4, Caroline de Margerie (CDM). La structure du traité, 06.12.1991.18. Les déclarations de ce dernier à ce sujet sont rares.

La négociation de Maastricht vue de Paris 49françaises de franchir une étape supplémentaire et de jeter les bases d’une diplomatieet d’une défense européenne autonome, notamment à l’égard des États-Unis. 19L’autre grand projet – sans doute le principal – était celui d’UEM. 20 La Franceest de longue date attachée à ce projet, comme l’atteste le rôle joué par Paris lors dela mise en place du Système monétaire européen (SME). Lorsque les Socialistesfrançais arrivèrent au gouvernement en 1981, ils cherchèrent d’ailleurs à en renforcerles mécanismes. 21 Les dévaluations de 1981, 1982 et 1983, les exigences de la politiquedu franc fort, les mouvements financiers erratiques américains, leur permirentde mesurer la faiblesse du franc, l’influence monétaire de l’Allemagne et la puissancedu dollar. 22 Autant d’éléments qui militaient en faveur de l’UEM, grâce à laquelle onespérait desserrer l’étau du «mark» et lutter contre la suprématie du dollar, sans oublierles gains possibles pour les entreprises françaises bénéficiant d’une monnaieunique dans un marché unique. Les concessions faites aux autorités allemandes en1989/1990 – sur la libéralisation des capitaux ou l’indépendance de la Banque centraleeuropéenne (BCE) – s’expliquent par cet impératif: constituer un système de solidaritémonétaire européen et y faire entrer le deutschemark. 23Équilibres et déséquilibres intérieursLes décideurs politiques français ont dû tenir compte du jeu politique national quileur donnait plus ou moins de latitude lors des négociations. Sur cette période1988-1991, les Socialistes ne sont pas majoritaires à eux seuls à l’Assemblée et doiventtour à tour composer avec le Parti communiste, les députés non-inscrits ou centristes.24 Deux gouvernements se succèderont: ceux de Michel Rocard (1988-1991)et d’Édith Cresson (1991-1992). Au moment du référendum, Pierre Bérégovoy – ministrede l’Économie et des Finances depuis 1984, artisan du franc fort et négociateurde l’UEM – deviendra Premier ministre.19. Cf. E. REMACLE, Les dispositions du Traité de Maastricht: politique étrangère et sécurité communede l'Union européenne, in: Études internationales, 2(1992), pp.377-394; D. DESCHAUX-BEAUME, De l’Eurocorps à une armée européenne? Pour une sociologie historique de la politiqueeuropéenne de sécurité et de défense (1991-2007), IEP Grenoble, Doctorat [inédit], 2008.20. Voir K. DYSON, K. FEATHERSTONE, The Road to Maastricht. Negotiating Economic And MonetaryUnion, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000; M.-T. BITSCH, Histoire de la constructioneuropéenne de 1945 à nos jours, Éd. Complexe, Bruxelles, 2004.21. AN, 2233, Delors. Le Conseil européen du 26.11 et le volet relance, 10.11.1981; Ministère del'Économie et des Finances, compte-rendu des conversations franco-allemandes, 04.11.1981.22. Interviews de l’auteur avec Elisabeth Guigou, Hubert Védrine, Jean-Louis Bianco, Philippe Jurgensen.23. Sur la négociation UEM, voir AN 5AG4-EG.22-4, 22-10, 88, 89, 90-1, 91-1.24. Voir P. FAVIER, M. MARTIN-ROLAND, La Décennie Mitterrand, t.3 et 4, Seuil, Paris,1998-1999; J.-J. BECKER, P. ORY, Nouvelle histoire de la France contemporaine, t.19, Seuil,Paris, 2002.

50 Georges SAUNIERCommencées dans la confiance, les négociations de Maastricht se terminent dansl’hostilité de l’opinion publique. La cote de popularité du Président, entre 50 et 60%d’opinions favorables en mai 1991, tombe à 30-40% à l’été 1992. 25 Or, l’engagementeuropéen de Mitterrand, le cœur de sa campagne présidentielle en 1988 où il n’hésitaitpas à déclarer que «le principal est que l’Europe avance», constituait l’un des ressortsde son action politique. 26 Mais c’est un ressort de plus en plus contesté à l’extrêmegauche – Parti communiste – comme à l’extrême droite – le Front national –, le toutdans un contexte politique de plus en plus difficile, ce que révélera le difficile débatau moment du référendum sur le traité. Cette évolution eut pour conséquences deréduire les marges de manœuvre du gouvernement lors des négociations mais ausside rendre nécessaire un succès sur la scène diplomatique à présenter à l’opinion publique.Nous avons présenté les éléments de contexte précédents de façon séparée. Il estvrai que les comptes rendus de discussion, les notes des conseillers, les discourspublics, les font apparaître séparément. Néanmoins, ces sujets sont traités, in fine, parles mêmes autorités politiques, dans les mêmes temps et lieux. Bref, on gardera àl’esprit leur globalité.Négocié dans une France en mutation, par un gouvernement chahuté sur le planintérieur, dans un contexte international mouvant et fondamentalement marqué parla fin de la Guerre froide, les autorités françaises avaient pour objectif la constructiond’une Union européenne à Douze, très intégrée autour d’une monnaie, d’une diplomatieet d’une défense commune, entourée par une Confédération européenne plusvaste et respectueuse de la diversité des États.1989-1991 – Négocier le Traité d’Union EuropéenneQui furent les négociateurs de ce traité? Une trentaine de personnes si l’on compteles hauts fonctionnaires capables d’avoir une vue d’ensemble, quelques ministresdont les fonctions ou le poids politique les plaçaient en situation de prise de décisionsur les textes négociés, les arbitrages étant rendus in fine par le Président de la République.27Les profils sont divers: Président, Premier ministre, ministres, conseillers, hautsfonctionnairesdes ministères ou diplomates siégeant dans les instances communautaires.Lors du Conseil européen de Maastricht, en décembre 1991, Matignon est auxmains d’une femme, Édith Cresson, ancien ministre délégué aux Affaires européennes.Roland Dumas, ministre des Affaires étrangères et Pierre Bérégovoy, ministrede l’Économie et des Finances, sont directement associés et proches du Président. Leministre délégué aux Affaires européennes, Élisabeth Guigou, joue un grand rôle.25. IFM, Dossier Sondages.26. IFM, Mitterrand. Lettre à tous les Français, avril 1988.27. La liste a été établie à partir de différents comptes rendus de réunions dont AN/54, 61, 62.

La négociation de Maastricht vue de Paris 51Elle était précédemment à l’Élysée, conseillère pour les questions européennes.D’autres ministres sont bien entendu associés du fait de leurs portefeuilles et de leurspoids politiques. Quant aux conseillers et hauts-fonctionnaires, ils proviennent desprincipaux ministères et de la Présidence de la République. 28 Ces hommes – principalement– et femmes maîtrisaient alors parfaitement les rouages communautaires.Ils en avaient une solide expérience, des habitudes de travail et connaissaient leursinterlocuteurs.Quand négocièrent-ils? La question suppose de déterminer une date de départ, cequi est délicat puisque, malgré ses aspects novateurs, le traité de Maastricht s’inscritdans une continuité. D’une certaine façon, l’Acte unique a ouvert à la discussionnombre des débats qui se sont concrétisés à Maastricht. Il est certain, toutefois, qu’autournant des années 1988/89, Paris suit de près les efforts de Jacques Delors en faveurde l’UEM et agit en conséquence. Lors du Conseil européen de Strasbourg, endécembre 1989, Mitterrand obtient du Chancelier Helmut Kohl qu’une date soit fixéepour que débute la CIG sur l’UEM. 29 La révolution de velours et le processus d’unificationallemande agissent dès lors comme un accélérateur. Le projet d’UP devientprogressivement une évidence: de chaque côté du Rhin, on s’accorde pour qu’intervienneune nouvelle phase de l’intégration communautaire. En avril 1990, la premièrelettre Mitterrand-Kohl est envoyée.Quelle fut la tactique française dans cette négociation? 30 D’abord, «surveiller deprès» l’Allemagne et à chaque étape de la négociation s’assurer de disposer d’unaccord solide avec ce pays. 31 L’affaire pouvait être délicate dans la mesure où la RFApouvait prendre des postures contradictoires. 32 D’où, tout au long de la négociation,un dialogue constant entre le Président et le Chancelier, leurs collaborateurs et lesdeux ministres des Affaires étrangères. À partir de là, construire un rapport de forcepour faire face à la Grande Bretagne. Ce pays, en effet, ne voulait pas de cette négociation,n’avait donc aucune marge de manœuvre, ferait tout pour diviser l’Allemagneet la France et tenterait de faire reporter les principales décisions. Il fallait donc l’isoler,ne rien lui concéder d’essentiel, mais sans pour autant l’amener à la rupture, …tout en menaçant de le faire. Telle était la quadrature du cercle.28. Citons notamment Pierre de Boissieu (Affaires étrangères, représentant français à la CIG sur l’UP),Jean-Claude Trichet (Économie, CIG sur l’UEM), Caroline de Margerie, Philippe Bastelica, PierreMorel, Hubert Védrine (Présidence de la République), François Lamoureux (Matignon), BernardKessedjan, Jean-Michel Casa, Alain Dejammet (Affaires étrangères), Pierre Vimont (Affaireseuropéennes), François Villeroy de Galhau (Économie), Jean Vidal (COREPER), Bernard Vial(SGCI) et Renaud Denoix de Saint Marc (SGG).29. Les deux CIG, sur l’UEM et l’UP, débutèrent en décembre 1990.30. Voir notamment: AN, CDM.14-1, Boissieu. Position des délégations, 25.11.1991; PHB.9-1, Boissieu,Conseil européen: union politique, 22.11.1991; PHB.9-1, Casa. Conférence intergouvernementales:Conseil restreint du mercredi 27 novembre, 26.11.1991; CDM.14-1, CDM, Note manuscrite,12h, s.d.; CDM.14-1, CDM, Entretien avec M. Lubbers, 27.11.1991; CDM.14-1, EG. Notemanuscrite, s.d.31. AN, CDM.14-1, P. Boissieu, Position des délégations, 25.11.1991.32. La délégation allemande se déclarait facilement favorable au communautaire mais réclamait l’unanimitésur l’industrie, le social voir même la culture.

52 Georges SAUNIERComment y parvenir? En établissant un accord à onze délégations. Un tel accordrendraient le coût d’une rupture – et donc d’un possible isolement – très coûteux pourla Grande Bretagne. Sur quelle délégation pouvait compter la France pour y parveniren dehors de la RFA? À la veille du sommet, Pierre de Boissieu dresse le portrait desdifférents partenaires tel qu’il a pu le constater pendant la conférence intergouvernementale.Portrait largement partagé et qui témoigne de l’atmosphère au sein de ladélégation française ainsi que des rapprochements envisageables lors des discussions.L’Espagne? «Un grand. Mais intraitable», souvent proche des positions françaises,mais dont certaines demandes ne pouvaient être satisfaites. 33 Le Danemark? Ils sontles véritables «Français de Scandinavie», excellent soutien. Le Luxembourg?«Remarquable». La Belgique? Proche de Paris, le pays traversait toutefoisdes difficultés gouvernementales paralysantes. Heureusement, son négociateurétait «de talent». L’Irlande ne posait pas de problème particulier, il fallait lui trouverune formulation correcte sur la défense. La présidence néerlandaise? Elle s’étaitd’abord opposée à Paris et Bonn mais, depuis octobre 1991 «jou[ait] le jeu». Plusdélicat semblaient le cas de l’Italie, «absente»; du Portugal, dans une oppositionrésolue à Paris; et de la Grèce, uniquement intéressée par les transferts financiers etpar son adhésion à l’Union de l’Europe occidentale (UEO). Maintenir un front uniserait donc délicat. Il faudrait circonscrire les «ayatollahs», «gardiens de la vraiefoi» communautaire, qui en demanderaient toujours plus au risque de faire échouerl’accord; éviter les «zélés» maintenant jusqu’au bout leurs demandes excessives; seméfier des «temporisateurs», toujours prompts à renvoyer les difficultés à plus tardet finalement à vider les textes de leur substance. À l’inverse de ceux là, il fallait allervite et prendre les décisions nécessaires.À cet égard, la France pouvait être victorieuse, mais elle avait un «talon d’Achille».Étant la seule à pourvoir «signer le texte tel qu’il est présenté par la présidence[néerlandaise]» à la veille du Conseil européen de Maastricht, elle devait veiller àmaintenir l’équilibre général du texte qui lui paraissait favorable. Le risque était queles Britanniques et les Allemands ne se livrent à une guerre de tranchée sur l’architecturede l’Union, les pouvoirs du Parlement ou les affaires de justice. Que les Allemandslâchent les Français sur les questions de défense. Que les Espagnols réclamenttrop de compensations budgétaires.Restait le problème de la Commission. Le constat de Paris était sévère: «peut êtrela seule négociation communautaire que la Commission n’ait pas prévue, pas comprise,pas maîtrisée». Surtout, elle s’opposait par la voix de son Président, JacquesDelors, à la structure en Temple et réclamait celle de l’Arbre où la Commission gardaitle contrôle, y compris dans les domaines aussi sensibles que la monnaie, la diplomatieou la défense. Afin de neutraliser l’opposition de la Commission, Mitterrand rencontraà plusieurs reprises Delors. Mais jusqu’à la veille du Conseil européen deMaastricht, la France ne put compter sur le soutien de Bruxelles. 3433. Pour les citations de ce paragraphe, voir AN, CDM.14-1, Boissieu. Position des délégations,25.11.1991.34. AN, PHB.9-1, CDM. Entretien avec M. Jacques Delors, 05.12.1991.

La négociation de Maastricht vue de Paris 53Aller vite, ne pas s’enliser dans de trop longues négociations, tel semblait être leleitmotiv français. Aller vite, c’est-à-dire faire ratifier le traité dans le courant del’année 1992, avant que ne commencent d’autres délicates négociations communautairessur l’agriculture et le budget – le futur «paquet Delors II», qui mettraient lecouple franco-allemand en difficulté. 35 On peut distinguer trois grandes étapes.Premièrement, du mois d’avril à la fin de l’année 1990, la priorité française fut defaire adopter un mandat de négociation pour les deux CIG, proche des propositionsfranco-allemandes. Ce qui conduisit à de nombreux contacts franco-allemands. Lorsdu Conseil européen de Rome, en décembre, la délégation française eut le sentimentd’avoir atteint ce premier objectif. La deuxième phase de la négociation débuta avecla présidence luxembourgeoise, durant le premier semestre 1991. La disparition del’Union soviétique, la crise du Golfe et surtout les débuts de celle de Yougoslavie 36compliquèrent l’agenda de la négociation mais la période permit à la délégationfrançaise d’affiner ses positions et de les défendre au niveau communautaire. 37 Toutefois,à mesure qu’approchait l’échéance du Conseil européen de Luxembourg, les28-29 juin 1991, il devint clair que l’on ne pourrait pas conclure. Paris réussit cependantà faire acter, avec l’aide de l’Allemagne, un certain nombre de points. Latroisième phase des négociations s’ouvrait donc avec le second semestre 1991.Le Conseil européen de MaastrichtPrévu pour les 9-10 décembre 1991, c’est donc à l’occasion du Conseil européen deMaastricht, au terme de la présidence néerlandaise du second semestre 1991, que lesDouze devraient amender puis adopter les conclusions des deux CIG. Ce texte seraitla base du futur traité. Ruud Lubbers, le Premier ministre néerlandais, président enexercice de la Communauté, soulignait par avance l’«importance historique» de larencontre et les «grands espoirs» qu’elle soulevait. 38 Comment la délégation françaisese présentait-elle à cette échéance?Il avait d’abord fallu se battre avec la présidence néerlandaise. Dans le courant dumois d’août, en effet, celle-ci avait mis deux textes en circulation. Ces deux textesbalayaient d’un trait toutes les positions françaises pourtant actées à Luxembourg etremplaçaient en particulier le Temple par l’Arbre. Face à ce que certains à Paris35. AN, PHB.8-4, PHB. La cohésion, 06.12.1991.36. Les divergences entre Paris et Bonn sur ce dossier sont connues. Il fut cependant décidé qu’elles netroubleraient pas la négociation de Maastricht. Un texte fut néanmoins adopté en conclusion duConseil. AN, PHB.8-4, Morel. Situation en Yougoslavie: aide humanitaire et gestes politiques,07.12.1991; Conseil européen de Maastricht (09.-10.12.1991) – Yougoslavie, 06.12.1991.37. Ce fut le cas pour la PESC, l’architecture institutionnelle de l’Union, le contenu concret de l’UEM(monnaie unique et non commune, structures de décision, durée et dates des différentes phases detransition), ainsi que sur différents dossiers tels que la culture, l’industrie et le social.38. AN, PHB.8-4, TD La Haye 1003, 05.12.1991.

54 Georges SAUNIERconsidéraient comme une déclaration de guerre diplomatique, 39 l’Élysée et la Chancellerieimposèrent que l’on reprenne les négociations à partir des conclusions dejuin, les documents néerlandais étant rejetés lors d’un Conseil des ministres, «le 30septembre [1991], par 10 voix contre 2», «sous les sifflets». 40 Puis, à la mi-octobre,une nouvelle lettre Mitterrand-Kohl fut adressée aux Dix précisant ce que devait êtrela future PESC. Mais plusieurs semaines avaient été perdues. Le mois de novembredevrait donc être décisif. Paris chercha dès lors à faire le tri dans les demandes desautres délégations sans renoncer à ses propres priorités: annuler les chapitres surl’énergie (trop libéral), la protection civile et le tourisme; conserver ceux sur la santé,la protection des consommateurs, la recherche, les réseaux transeuropéens et l’environnement.41 Enfin, trancher ce qui devait être ou non décidé à la majorité.À cet effet, les contacts se multiplièrent à tous les niveaux. 42 L’idée étant que laprésidence communique à l’occasion du Conseil européen de Maastricht un textelargement agréé, ne comportant plus que quelques points à régler, afin d’éviter unnouveau report des discussions. Mitterrand rencontra plusieurs de ses homologues.Des conclaves ministériels eurent lieu au niveau communautaire de la mi-novembreau début décembre. À Paris, plusieurs réunions de haut-niveau arrêtèrent les positionsdu gouvernement. 43 Le Conseil européen pouvait dès lors se tenir avec quelqueschances de conclure. Pour Mitterrand, ce Conseil débuta le dimanche 8 au soir parun dîner avec le Président du Conseil italien. Il prit fin vers 2 heures du matin, lemercredi 11 décembre après un marathon exténuant. Quels en étaient les enjeux pourla France?Conformément à l’ordre du jour prévu, la première séance plénière, le 9 décembre1991 dans la matinée, conduisit les Douze à traiter la question de l’Union économiqueet monétaire. 44 Dans ce dossier, la France estimait avoir concédé l’essentiel, notammentsur l’indépendance de la Banque centrale européenne (BCE). Un accord permettantla création d’une monnaie unique semblait donc à portée de main. Encore39. Entretien avec Roland Dumas, 04.08.2000.40. AN, CDM.14-1, Boissieu. Position des délégations, 25.11.1991; AN, CDM.14-1, CDM. Entretienavec M. Lubbers 27.11.1991.41. AN, PHB.8-4, Nouvelles compétences, s.d.; PHB.9-1, Casa. Conférence intergouvernementale:Conseil restreint du mercredi 27.11, 26.11.1991.42. Par exemple AN, CDM.14-1, Entretien avec M. Lubbers, op.cit.; CDM. Dîner avec M. Andreotti àMaastricht, 05.12.1991; PHB.9-1, Entretien avec Delors, op.cit.; CDM.14-1, Morel. Votre déjeuneravec M. Major le 2.12 à Londres, 25.11.1991.43. AN, PHB.9-1, Casa. Conférence intergouvernementales: Conseil restreint du mercredi 27 novembre,26.11.1991; CDM.14-1, Conseil restreint. Préparation du Sommet de Maastricht, 27.11.1991;CDM.14-1, Lamoureux. L'union politique. Dossier pour la réunion ministérielle de préparation duSommet de Maastricht …, 26.11.1991; CDM.14-1, Secrétariat général du gouvernement. Compterendu de la réunion de ministres tenue le 28.11.1991 à l'hôtel Matignon, 02.12.1991; CDM.14-1,Compte rendu de la réunion interministérielle le lundi 25.11.1991, 26.11.1991.44. AN, PHB.8-4, CDM. Conseil européen de Maastricht, 07.12.1991; TD La Haye 1003, 05.12.1991.Il existe deux documents antici, mais incomplets, des discussions du Conseil européen de Maastrichtdans les archives de la Présidence françaises. Nous nous y référons avec la mention antici, AN,CDM.14-1, Notes manuscrites; Présidence de la République, Conseil européen (Maastricht,09.-10.12. 1991).

La négociation de Maastricht vue de Paris 55fallait-il que les textes définissant les modalités de passage à la troisième phase del’UEM – c’est-à-dire l’étape où les pays respectant les critères de convergence économiqueabandonnaient leurs monnaies nationales pour adopter la monnaie unique –soient suffisamment contraignants pour que les décisions prises ne restent pas «lettremorte». 45 Or, malgré d’ultimes tractations menées par Bérégovoy, le mécanismeaboutissant au lancement de cette 3 e phase restait complexe: plusieurs modes dedécision, à l’unanimité ou à la majorité, à des dates plus ou moins éloignées, avecplus ou moins de pays. La procédure restait donc aléatoire. Pour la délégation françaiseet Mitterrand lui-même, la priorité était que le traité rende la création de la monnaieunique «irréversible». 46C’est dans ces conditions qu’eut lieu, la veille du Conseil européen, un discretdîner entre François Mitterrand et Gulio Andreotti. 47 Rapidement, les deux hommesse sont entendus sur une idée simple: en séance plénière, le lendemain, ils proposeraientde fixer, dans le traité, une date butoir à partir de laquelle, quoi qu’il arrive, lesÉtats membres respectant les critères de convergence passeraient à la troisième phase,et ceci indépendamment de toutes autres considérations ou votes. 48 L’idée, qui circulaitdepuis quelques temps et que les Français avaient travaillée, avait ses chancesd’être retenue. 49 Le lendemain, en séance plénière, après d’ultimes discussions surcette question, Mitterrand, soutenu par Andreotti, proposa comme convenu de «fixerune date de manière précise », début 1999. 50 La proposition franco-italienne emportal’adhésion des autres délégations, notamment de l’Allemagne prévenue à l’avance.De fait, le passage à la troisième phase, prévu pour le 1 er janvier 1999, devenait«irréversible», aucun État membre ne pouvant désormais en empêcher la réalisation.Il s’agissait d’une importante victoire pour la délégation française, Mitterrands’en félicitant dans sa conférence de presse au terme du Conseil. 51Restait cependant à surmonter l’opposition britannique. Dès le début de la CIGsur l’UEM, Londres avait proposé des solutions alternatives à la monnaie unique,comme par exemple la création d’un SME renforcé. Mais ces tentatives furent unéchec et, à Maastricht, John Major avait devant lui un front de onze États décidés.45. AN, PHB.8-4, PHB. Union économique et monétaire (passage en troisième phase), s.d; PHB. Unionéconomique et monétaire (passage en troisième phase), s.d.; CDM.14-1, EG, Maastricht. Passage àla phase finale de l'Union économique et monétaire, 18.11.1991.46. AN, CDM.14-1, Secrétariat général du gouvernement. Compte rendu de la réunion de ministrestenue le 28.11.1991, 02.12.1991; CDM.14-1, Compte rendu de la réunion interministérielle le25.11.1991, 26.11.1991.47. AN, CDM.14-1, CDM. Dîner avec M. Andreotti à Maastricht (08.12.1991), 05.12.1991.48. AN, CDM.14-1, CDM. Sujets de Maastricht. Abordés entre le Président de la République et M.Andreotti. Résumé des discussions, 05.12.1991.49. AN, PHB.8-4, PHB. Union économique et monétaire (passage en 3 e phase), s.d.; CDM.14-1, EG,Maastricht. Passage à la phase finale de l'Union économique et monétaire, 18.11.1991; CDM. Pointsimportants des conférences de Maastricht, 29.11.1991; CDM. Conseil restreint du mercredi 27 novembresur les conférences intergouvernementales, 26.11.1991.50. AN, CDM.14-1, CDM. UEM – dernier état des négociations, 09.12.1991.51. IFM, Conférence de presse de M. le Président de la République à l'issue du Conseil européen,10.12.1991.

56 Georges SAUNIEROr, comme le fit remarquer Major, son parlement ne pourrait jamais accepter deratifier un traité l’obligeant à abandonner la livre. Pour contourner ce problème, Parisavait discuté la possibilité d’une clause d’exemption. La Grande-Bretagne signeraitle traité mais déclarerait dans un protocole annexe ne pas s’engager à passer à latroisième phase. La délégation française en acceptait l’idée, à condition que cetteclause ne soit pas extensible à d’autres – ce que demandait la Grande-Bretagne –, cequi aurait remis en cause le caractère irréversible du traité. Bref, la clause devait êtretrès encadrée. Paris comptait sur la RFA et la Commission pour l’appuyer en ce sens.Au final, après d’âpres discussions dans la matinée du 9 décembre, la Grande-Bretagnedut se résigner à une clause spécifiquement britannique même si, pour desraisons constitutionnelles, le Danemark bénéficia d’un protocole annexe identique.Concernant l’UEM, quelques autres détails furent discutés en marge du Conseil,notamment la question du siège de la future BCE. Pour Paris, l’affaire était toutefoisplus large: traditionnellement, la France refusait en effet de se prononcer sur ces sujetstant que le siège du Parlement européen n’aurait pas été définitivement fixé à Strasbourg.Un accord faillit cependant être trouvé sur ces problèmes de sièges, grâcenotamment à l’action de Ruud Lubbers, mais fut finalement repoussé à la fin del’année 1992, les Douze espérant de nouvelles propositions de Jacques Delors. Ceci,selon un souhait français. 52Le résultat obtenu à Maastricht à l’égard de l’UEM mérite d’être souligné. Legouvernement français et le Président de la République le présentèrent comme uneavancée historique conforme aux intérêts français. De fait, le traité fut appliqué et lamonnaie unique entra en vigueur à la date prévue. Pour Paris, il s’agissait d’uneavancée qualifiée «d’historique», les autorités françaises ayant régulièrement réclaméle renforcement de la solidarité monétaire communautaire. 53Le second dossier d’importance discuté à Maastricht est celui de la PESC. Ils’agissait pour Paris d’une «question fondamentale», priorité a priori partagée parl’Allemagne, cœur de la future union politique. 54 La PESC devait permettre dedépasser la coopération politique (CPE) codifiée par l’Acte unique et faire franchirune nouvelle étape à la diplomatie commune. À l’égard de ce second pilier de la futureUnion, placé sous le seul contrôle des États, le projet de traité tel que présenté par laPrésidence paraissait assez ambitieux aux yeux des Français, y compris dans le domainesi sensible de la défense. 55 Il était proposé une articulation nouvelle entre la52. AN, PHB.8-4, CDM. La clause d'exemption ("Opting out"), s.d.; Siège de la banque centrale et del'Institut monétaire européen, s.d.; CDM. Siège des institutions, 06.12.1991; PHB.9-1, CDM et PHB,Conseil européen de Maastricht. Demandes allemandes, 21.11.1991.53. Le gouvernement s’emploie à présenter l’accord de Maastricht et en particulier celui sur l’UEMcomme «l’acte le plus important depuis le traité de Rome de 1957». AN, PHB.9-1, Lettre de Matignon,Centre d’information et de documentation, décembre 1991.54. AN, PHB.8-4, CDM. La politique étrangère et de sécurité (pp.104 sqq. du projet de traité),07.12.1991; CDM. La sécurité et la défense, 07.12.1991.55. AN, CDM.14-1, Union politique SN 252/91, 09.12.1991.

La négociation de Maastricht vue de Paris 57future Union, l’UEO et l’OTAN. 56 Le texte présentait la perspective d’une défensecommune. Enfin, il prévoyait que certaines décisions se prendraient à la majorité etdéfinissait une unité d’action «sans réserve» de l’ensemble des États membres. 57La France et l’Allemagne – soutenues par l’Espagne, le Luxembourg, la Belgiqueet la Grèce – avaient fait connaître leurs positions en octobre. Le Conseil européenet le Conseil définiraient à l’unanimité les grandes lignes, les positions et les actionscommunes de la PESC, mais leurs modalités d’application seraient décidées à lamajorité. Ces actions devaient être compatibles avec les engagements spécifiques dechaque État membre: neutralité ou appartenance à l’Alliance atlantique par exemple.C’est cette perspective d’un vote à la majorité qui nourrissait l’opposition de la Grande-Bretagneà la PESC. La délégation britannique maintenait son désaccord sur troisautres points: l’UEO devait rester sous l’autorité de l’OTAN; Londres s’opposait àdéfinir dans une liste ce qui relèverait du domaine de la PESC; il ne devait pas y avoirde référence à une «défense commune». L’opposition était donc frontale, comme lesdiscussions l’attestent. La délégation française – espérant le soutien sans faille del’Allemagne – étant prête à certaines concessions à condition de ne pas dénaturer letexte : une nouvelle étape devait être franchie dans ce domaine.Au final, un compromis fut trouvé, après que Mitterrand et Kohl se soient personnellementprononcés et consultés, le Chancelier précisant lors d’une ultime rencontreentre les deux qu’il fallait «se battre sur la défense». 58 La procédure de décisionmélangerait effectivement unanimité et majorité, mais la majorité ne s’appliquantqu’à des domaines décidés … à l’unanimité. Le texte précise cependant qu’un paysne devait pas, par ce biais, empêcher le bon fonctionnement de la PESC. Compromis,aussi, sur la défense, le texte final enregistrant la formulation proposée par la présidencenéerlandaise: la PESC traiterait des questions de sécurité, «y compris la définitionà terme d'une politique de défense commune, qui pourrait conduire, le momentvenu, à une défense commune». L’expression «politique de défense commune»agréait plusieurs délégations, car elle faisait référence à des discussions – et nonactions! – dans ce domaine, voire à celles menées dans le cadre de l’OTAN. Toutefois,le texte fait bien référence à une «défense commune», c’est-à-dire aux modalitésconcrètes – et non discussions – d’une défense propre à l’Union. Précisément, le traitéajoutait une déclaration des États membres de l’Union de l'Europe occidentale (UEO),celle-ci devenant partie intégrante de l’Union, ce qui convenait parfaitement auxFrançais qui voulaient faire de cet organisme le bras armé de l’Europe.Certes, le texte final était un compromis, mais une clause de revoyure existait pour1996 et les nouveaux développements de la PESC trouvaient une base légale. Unedéfense existait, certes compatible avec l’Alliance atlantique, mais devant en consti-56. Le Conseil européen de Maastricht intervient à la suite du sommet de l’OTAN des 7-8 novembre1991 où fut acté le terme «identité européenne» de défense, «compatible et complémentaire» del’Alliance atlantique.57. TUE.58. AN, PHB.9-1, CDM. Entretien du Président de la République avec le Chancelier Kohl (Maastricht,mardi 10.12.1991, 16h00), s.d.

58 Georges SAUNIERtuer à terme «le pilier européen». 59 La France avait donc atteint ses objectifs, saufpeut-être sur le vote à la majorité. On peut toutefois s’interroger sur la volontéfrançaise en ce domaine. Cherchait-on véritablement, à Paris, à créer une diplomatieunique? En guise de réponse, on rappellera que, tout au long de la négociation, laFrance veilla n’être liée par aucun «mandat impératif» au sein du Conseil de sécuritéde l’ONU. 60Quoi qu’il en soit, lors de sa conférence de presse, Mitterrand pouvait déclarer:«Ce qui a été fait représente un grand pas en avant. Je l'aurais voulu plus grand encore,c'est à dire laisser un peu de côté l'unanimité, retrouver plus souvent les majorités qualifiéeset même parfois les majorités simples. C'est comme cela que la Communauté trouvera sapleine liberté d'action, mais enfin, je dois reconnaître que l'effort accompli est un effortsérieux et profitable». 61Dernier et nouveau pilier, celui dit «Justice et affaires intérieures» (JAI). La Franceen acceptait le principe. Ce dossier n’était pourtant pas son initiative, mais d’origineallemande. Bonn souhaitait que les États membres accentuent leurs politiques communesà l’égard du contrôle des mouvements migratoires et de la lutte contre le banditisme.Une fois de plus, la Grande Bretagne était réticente, comme elle l’avait étélors de la création de l’espace Schengen. Bonn et Londres s’opposaient notammentsur les modalités de décisions. Les Allemands voulaient communautariser les procéduresau maximum; à l’inverse, les Britanniques voulaient inscrire la totalité de cessujets dans un troisième pilier, strictement intergouvernemental. Le bras de fer,prévisible, inquiétait modérément Paris, la délégation française étant «extrêmement[à] l’aise» sur ce dossier, «n’ayant pas de vraie difficulté» sauf sur les règles du droitd’asile qui nécessitaient une modification du préambule de la Constitution de1958. 62 Bref, il s’agissait d’une bonne occasion de soutenir la RFA. Au final, lestextes adoptés entérinent de réelles avancées mais restent loin de la communautarisationtotale espérée par la RFA.L’architecture de l’Union fut l’objet de nombreux échanges en séance plénièrelors du Conseil. Le dossier était jugé délicat pour Paris qui craignait de voir réapparaitreà cette occasion une irréductible opposition entre Bonn et Londres; oppositionqui pourrait empêcher l’accord final. La position française était connue: le Conseileuropéen devait être l’instance supérieure de l’Union car seuls les États disposaientde la légitimité démocratique nécessaire. Certes la France avait accepté l’indépendancede la BCE, mais Paris avait veillé à ce que ce soit le Conseil qui définisseles «grandes orientations de la politique économique et la nomination des principauxdirigeants de […] la BCE». 63 En d’autres termes, pour la délégation française, il59. TUE.60. AN, CDM.14-1, CDM. L'union politique et le Conseil de sécurité, 25.11.1991; PHB.8-4, CDM. Lapolitique étrangère et de sécurité, 07.12.1991.61. IFM, Conférence de presse de M. le Président de la République à l'issue du Conseil européen,10.12.1991.62. AN, PHB.8-4, PHB. Affaires intérieures et de justice, s.d.63. AN, PHB.8-4, CDM. Questions institutionnelles (pour le cas où cette question viendrait au Conseileuropéen), s.d.

La négociation de Maastricht vue de Paris 59existait un équilibre entre les volets monétaire et économique de l’UEM. La définitionde la politique économique relevant in fine du Conseil européen.Tel que présenté par la présidence néerlandaise, le projet de traité respectait lesorientations françaises, avec l’architecture en «Temple» et ses trois piliers. Plusieursdélégations, dont l’Allemagne, emmenées par la Commission, auraient préféré davantagede communautaire, mais la Grande Bretagne s’y opposait résolument. LaFrance avait une position intermédiaire que plusieurs dossiers discutés à Maastrichtillustrent parfaitement. 64 C’est d’abord le cas avec la subsidiarité qui permet de mieuxrépartir les rôles de chacun – régions, États membres, Union européenne – dans l’exercicede cette souveraineté. La France veillait à ce que les États membres aient à direce qui relevait, ou non, de l’Union, contrairement à la RFA. C’est ensuite le cas avecl’extension des pouvoirs du Parlement européen. Le projet de traité prévoyait en effetune codécision. C’est-à-dire une procédure de décisions, particulièrement complexe,prolongement de la coopération instaurée par l’Acte unique, qui faisait du Parlementeuropéen – instance démocratique –, un co-législateur au même titre que le Conseildes ministres. Au même titre mais nullement supérieur, puisque Strasbourg obtenaitune sorte de droit de veto dans des domaines très précis, mais ne pouvait forcer leConseil à adopter un texte contre son gré. Les autorités françaises acceptaient cetéquilibre.La RFA et d’autres délégations voulaient étendre cette procédure à un maximumde compétences communautaires, voire octroyer au Parlement un droit de passage enforce lors de la conciliation. La Grande-Bretagne ne le voulait pas et Paris, qui nesouhaitait pas apparaître «comme complice de l’obstruction anglaise» attendait simplementque «les Anglais jouer[aient] contre les Allemands». 65 Par ailleurs, ladélégation française espérait voir la codécision – c’est-à-dire la majorité au Conseil –s’appliquer à l’industrie, au social et à la culture. Sur la question de l’avis conformedu Parlement européen, les Français adoptèrent la même prudence. Les députéseuropéens ne pouvaient obtenir un droit permanent d’opposition au Conseil sur detrop nombreux sujets, au risque qu’ils n’abusent de ce droit et entrent dans un chantagebudgétaire permanent. L’Allemagne semblait ne pas le craindre et, finalement, ladélégation française se contentera d’observer la Grande Bretagne, qui «devrait fairele travail pour nous». 66 Codécision ou avis conforme, le texte final est à peu prèsconforme à ce qu’espérait la délégation française. D’une part, l’avis conforme restelimité, d’autre part la procédure de codécision est étendue aux domaines prévus parla France, à l’exception de la culture qui reste du domaine de l’unanimité contrairementaux attentes de Paris. La délégation française, on le verra, échoua aussi à obtenirl’extension de la majorité dans les cas du social et de l’industrie.64. AN, CDM.14-1, Union politique SN 252/91, 09.12.1991; PHB.8-4, CDM. La structure du traité,06.12.1991; CDM. Les institutions de la Communauté dans le futur traité d'union politique. Récapitulatif,25.11.1991.65. AN, PHB.8-4, CDM, Subsidiarité, s.d.; Pouvoir du Parlement. La co-décision, 06.12.1991.66. AN, PHB.8-4, CDM. Pouvoir du Parlement. Avis conforme, 06.12.1991.

60 Georges SAUNIERConformément à la dualité du système communautaire qu’elles envisageaient,Paris était aussi à l’origine d’un projet particulier, discuté à Maastricht et intégré auTraité sous forme de déclaration: le Congrès (ou conférence) parlementaire européen.Il s’agissait de réunir ensemble les parlementaires nationaux et européens afin d’adopterde «grandes orientations de l’Union». Le Parlement européen s’y opposait,estimant que cette nouvelle institution empièterait dangereusement sur l’assembléede Strasbourg, mais la France fut soutenue par plusieurs délégations en ce sens. 67Enfin, à l’égard des institutions, les deux derniers problèmes furent réglés – ouplutôt évacués –lors du Conseil européen de Maastricht. Prévoyant de futurs élargissements,plusieurs délégations s’interrogeaient sur le nombre de Commissaireseuropéens nécessaires. 68 Ne fallait-il pas revoir les règles de répartition afin de limiterle nombre de commissaires? Les grands États ne devaient-ils pas abandonner leursseconds représentants dans cette institution? Les petits États y étaient favorables. LaGrande Bretagne y voyait un moyen d’affaiblir la supranationalité de la Commission.Bien qu’initialement isolée sur ce sujet, la France, soutenue par l’Espagne, réussit àfaire reporter cette décision à plus tard. La même question se posait, mais de façonplus insistante et plus cruciale, à l’égard du nombre de députés européens. 69 Désormaisunifiée, l’Allemagne réclamait en effet une augmentation du nombre de sesreprésentants à Strasbourg, notamment pour les Länder de l’Est. Mais ceci revenaità faire de l’Allemagne le pays ayant le plus de députés et brisait donc l’équilibre entreles grands existant sur ce point. Potentiellement, il s’agissait d’une «énorme concession»à la RFA. La France proposa une alternative: une augmentation égale desdéputés des grands. Mais, après avoir tergiversé, Kohl refusa cette proposition. 70 Letraité de Maastricht se contente de renvoyer le problème à la fin de l’année 1992, enmême temps que le siège de la BCE.Enfin, un dernier point, plus ou moins lié à l’architecture du traité, fut discuté enséance. L’Union aurait-elle, ou non, une «vocation fédérale» comme le texte de laprésidence néerlandaise le prévoyait? Il s’agissait, pour le Royaume-Uni, d’un véritable«chiffon rouge». 71 D’ailleurs, à la veille du Conseil européen, la délégationfrançaise acceptait déjà son retrait, considérant l’expression «à peu près vide de contenu»dans la mesure où seul le fonctionnement des traités pouvait définir ce qu’étaitl’Union. Une formule alternative était déjà prévue et permit à Major une victoire àpeu de frais.67. AN, CDM.14-1, Union politique SN 252/91, 09.12.1991; PHB.8-4, CDM. Le congrès, 06.12.1991;PHB.9-1, Casa. Conférence intergouvernementale: Conseil restreint du mercredi 27 novembre,26.11.1991; TUE.68. AN, PHB.8-4, CDM. Nombre de commissaires, 06.12.1991.69. AN, CDM.14-1, Union politique SN 252/91, 09.12.1991; PHB.9-1, EG, Maastricht, 18.11.1991;CDM et PHB. Conseil européen de Maastricht. Demandes allemandes, 21.11.1991; PHB.8-4, CDM.Nombre de membres du Parlement européen. Députés allemands, 06.12.1991.70. AN, CDM.14-1, Union politique SN 252/91, 09.12.1991; PHB.8-4, CDM. Nombre de membres duParlement européen. Députés allemands, 06.12.1991.71. Antici, op.cit.; AN, 14-1, Union politique SN 252/91, 09.12.1991; PHB.8-4, CDM. La vocationfédérale, 06.12.1991.

La négociation de Maastricht vue de Paris 61Si les questions d’architecture furent discutées, elles n’étaient pourtant pas essentiellespour Paris qui espérait surtout qu’elles n’empêchent pas un accord final.En réalité, en plus des deux sujets majeurs, UEM et PESC, la délégation françaiseavaient deux priorités concernant d’autres politiques communes: le social et l’industrie.72 Question moins vitale, elle comptait aussi batailler sur la culture et savaitqu’elle devrait prendre position sur la cohésion et la citoyenneté.Le social est une antienne française depuis 1981. Devant l’opposition de leursprincipaux partenaires, Paris et Mitterrand lui-même, cherchèrent à atteindre progressivementleur objectif. En décembre 1989, onze pays adoptaient ainsi une Chartecommunautaire des droits sociaux fondamentaux des travailleurs fixant les grandsprincipes du droit du travail dans la CEE. Mais Margaret Thatcher avait refusé sonaccord et le texte était resté en dehors de la juridiction communautaire. Il fallait franchirune nouvelle étape. La France espérait ainsi que le futur traité d’Union comporteraitspécifiquement un titre social et que les décisions y seraient prises à la majorité.Il s’agissait de l’une «des principales demandes françaises». Les discussions furentcomplexes. Plusieurs textes circulèrent et furent discutés en séance plénière. Laprésidence néerlandaise avait fait une première proposition qui, certes, étaitune «énorme édulcoration» des ambitions françaises mais avait le mérite de satisfairel’Espagne. 73 Ce pays, en effet, craignait que l’adoption de directives sociales ne relèvele coût du travail dans son pays, diminuant sa compétitivité au sein de la Communauté.Or, Felipe Gonzales considérait le texte de la présidence comme «un minimum bienéquilibré». Paris se savait en mauvaise posture sur ce dossier. La délégation françaiseestimait «indispensable […] de ramener les Espagnols dans le groupe des 11 paysqui pourr[aient] approuver le texte» et de «vaincre l’intransigeance espagnole». Leprojet néerlandais était le seul atteignable à onze. Affaibli, il comportait toutefois untitre social et surtout un large protocole qui faisait référence à la Charte sociale. 74Restait le problème britannique. La présidence chercha à présenter un nouveautexte, encore moins ambitieux. Major le refusa malgré l’appel à la modérationd’Andreotti. Surtout, d’autres délégations s’y opposèrent, jugeant, comme JacquesSanter, que le premier projet était «un minimum», que la «dimension sociale» étaitindispensable et que «l’opinion publique ne comprendra[it] pas» son absence. Mitterrandfit de même, déclarant que «la note diffusée [par la présidence dans l’]aprèsmidicontredisait le texte [initial]»! L’opposition était totale. Paris savait d’ailleursque, sur cette question, Major se «battrait jusqu’à la mort» et qu’il s’agissait là de «laseule question qu’il [ne lui était] pas possible de négocier». 75 Esquissée dans le courantdu mois de novembre, précisée à Maastricht même, l’accord sur le volet socialdevrait donc se faire sans la Grande Bretagne à qui on proposerait une clause d’optingout et qui se trouverait ainsi isolée comme dans le cas de l’UEM. «Hérétique, dan-72. AN, PHB.9-1, Casa. Conférence intergouvernementales: Conseil restreint du mercredi 27 novembre,26.11.1991.73. AN, PHB.8-4, PHB. Politiques sociales, s.d.; CDM.14-1, Union politique SN 252/91, 09.12.1991.74. Antici, op.cit.; AN, PHB.9-1, Boissieu. Conseil européen: union politique, 22.11.1991; TUE.75. Antici, op.cit.; AN, PHB.9-1, Casa. Conférence intergouvernementale: Conseil restreint du mercredi27 novembre, 26.11.1991; PHB.8-4, PHB. Politique sociales, s.d.

62 Georges SAUNIERgereuse», créant «un précédent» dans le droit communautaire et donnant éventuellementun «avantage de compétitivité» à la Grande-Bretagne, cette solution semblaitla seule possible. La France donna donc son accord, après d’ultimes tractations ycompris le dernier jour, à la rédaction d’un protocole ad hoc, excluant la GrandeBretagne et constatant que «que onze États membres [était] désireux de poursuivredans la voie tracée par la Charte sociale de 1989». 76Éloignée de ses objectifs initiaux, la délégation française obtenait néanmoins satisfactionsur l’inscription d’un titre social. Mitterrand ne pouvait cependant queconstater: «nous avons une Europe idéale en vue, mais nous n'y sommes pas». 77Second dossier prioritaire, celui dit de l’industrie. «L’un des sujets les plus importantspour la France, qui est pratiquement isolée». 78 Tous les partenaires de laFrance s’opposaient en effet à sa tradition interventionniste. Il s’agissait donc pourParis d’obtenir que la future Union puisse prendre les mêmes décisions que précédemmentdans ce domaine – c’est-à-dire d’inscrire un titre « Industrie » dans le traité –et, éventuellement, d’étendre les possibilités d’action à la majorité qualifiée. Le projetde la présidence néerlandaise répondait à ces préoccupations, sous réserve decompléments. Mais l’affaire était loin d’être réglée. L’Allemagne, la Grande Bretagne,les Pays-Bas, l’Irlande et le Luxembourg s’y opposaient. C’est d’ailleurs d’Allemagneque vinrent les coups les plus durs. Au final, le titre figure effectivementdans le Traité. L’Union veillerait à son développement via ses outils traditionnels touten coordonnant l’action des États. Toutefois, de nouvelles mesures spécifiques dansce domaine ne pouvaient intervenir qu’à l’unanimité. 79 Bref, l’accord obtenu était adminima. On notera cependant que le traité octroie de nouvelles compétences à l’Union(santé, environnement, réseaux transeuropéens, protection des consommateurs), soutenuespar la France, qui auraient pu ouvrir la voie à de nouvelles interventions auprèsdes acteurs économiques.Point jugé moins fondamental que les précédents, la culture n’en était pasmoins «une des priorités “sectorielles”». 80 En 1991, la politique culturelle était encorebalbutiante au niveau communautaire, la France étant à l’origine de nombreuses initiatives.Pour Paris, l’objectif était d’inscrire cette dimension en tant que titre à partentière du traité et de permettre des décisions à la majorité. Mais les traditions desautres États dans ce domaine étaient très différentes. Beaucoup craignaient l’actionde la Commission dans un domaine où, par ailleurs, les enjeux économiques étaientde plus en plus importants. Les négociateurs français avaient d’ailleurs veillé à isolerla culture des règles de libre-concurrence au nom de la spécificité de cette activité.Rapidement évoqué lors du Conseil européen, le texte adopté était conforme aux76. AN, PHB.9-1, Boissieu. Conseil européen: union politique, 22.11.1991; PHB.8-4, PHB, Politiquesociales, s.d.; CDM.14-1, CDM. Note manuscrite, s.d.; PHB.9-1, CDM, Entretien du Président dela République avec le Chancelier Kohl (Maastricht, mardi 10.12.1991, 16h00), s.d.; TUE.77. IFM, Conférence de presse …, op.cit.78. AN, PHB.8-4, PHB. Industrie, s.d.79. AN, CDM.14-1, Union politique SN 252/91, 09.12.1991; CDM.14-1, CDM. Note manuscrite, s.d.80. AN, PHB.8-4, CDM. Culture, 06.12.1991.

La négociation de Maastricht vue de Paris 63attentes françaises sauf sur un point important: les décisions se prendraient à l’unanimité.Quant au dossier cohésion, il recouvre en fait une demande espagnole, soutenuepar les États membres dits «moins prospères». 81 Grâce à l’inscription de nouvellespolitiques communes et d’un titre ad hoc dans le traité, il s’agissait de modifier lesrègles de financement et de dépense de la Communauté afin d’accentuer les transfertsbudgétaires des pays riches vers les moins prospères. Madrid affirmait ne pouvoirsigner le futur traité sans avoir gain de cause sur ce sujet, arguant qu’il faudrait denouvelles aides structurelles pour que certains pays parviennent à remplir les critèressur l’UEM. La Grande Bretagne mais aussi la RFA refusaient ces demandes, jugéestrop coûteuses. Cherchant le compromis, le texte de la présidence néerlandaise comportaitun titre intitulé «Cohésion économique et sociale» qui permettait d’aider desrégions «moins favorisées» – et non des États – et proposait des politiques nouvellesaccentuant les transferts. Madrid estimait cependant le texte insuffisant alors queBonn et Londres trouvaient qu’on allait trop loin. L’affaire fut largement évoquée enséance plénière. Quant à la délégation française, elle espérait trouver une positionmédiane. Satisfaire l’Espagne – afin de faire front à onze face à la Grande Bretagne –sans créer de dépenses qui alourdiraient considérablement sa propre contribution.L’idée était de convaincre Madrid que l’inscription d’un titre suffisait et que la questiondes transferts serait de nouveau discutée lors de la négociation du Paquet DelorsII en 1992. C’est, au final, l’accord qui fut trouvé, le traité de Maastricht actant néanmoinsla création de plusieurs politiques jugées redistributives – environnement,réseaux transeuropéens – dont Paris se satisfaisait par ailleurs.Dernier point, la création d’une «citoyenneté» européenne. 82 L'idée espagnoleétait immédiatement soutenue par Paris. La délégation française y tenait. Son contenurestait limité – libre circulation, droit de séjour, droit de vote, protection consulairecommune – mais symboliquement, l’UE ne serait plus un simple marché économique.L’affaire n’était pourtant pas simple. Comme dans le cas du pilier de la Justice et desaffaires intérieures (JAI), il touchait à des éléments de la souveraineté nationale. Rapidementabordé en séance plénière du Conseil, le texte final maintint à cet égard levote à l’unanimité, alors que l’Espagne voulait la majorité, soutenue par la délégationfrançaise.Conclusion – la campagne référendaire«En avril 1990, le Chancelier Kohl et moi même, avions proposé à nos partenairesde constituer une union politique. Aujourd'hui, nous avons à Douze, décidé de luidonner vie». 83 Cette phrase de Mitterrand, par laquelle il entame sa conférence de81. AN, PHB.8-4, PHB. La cohésion, 06.12.1991.82. AN, PHB.8-4, CDM. Citoyenneté (articles A à F, pp.15-18), s.d.83. Conférence de presse …, op.cit.

64 Georges SAUNIERpresse le 11 décembre 1991, à 2 heures du matin, résume à elle seule la négociationet les résultats du Conseil européen de Maastricht.Rien n’aurait été possible sans l’accord franco-allemand. Dans les semaines et lesjours qui précédèrent ce Conseil et dans son déroulement, les autorités des deux paysse consultèrent plusieurs fois. Le Président français demanda par exemple à rencontrerle Chancelier pour forcer la négociation vers 16 heures, le 10 décembre, estimantque la présidence néerlandaise était trop complaisante avec la Grande Bretagne. 84Ceci fut d’ailleurs vrai à tous les niveaux, jusqu’aux conseillers. Ce travail de couloir,poursuivant les discussions plénières, fut certainement déterminant, même si les archivesécrites n’en rendent pas ou peu compte. 85Au terme de cette négociation, on peut dire que les autorités françaises jouèrentun rôle central dans l’élaboration de l’accord final, pour au moins deux raisons. Enpremier lieu, la délégation française avait fait ses priorités des deux principaux voletsdu futur traité – l’UEM et la PESC. Son poids politique, allié à celui de l’Allemagne,permit d’aboutir à un texte substantiel, faisant de Maastricht un acte de grande portée,peut-être le «plus important depuis le traité de Rome de 1957». 86 En second lieu,parce ce que sa position était souvent pivot entre celles de l’Allemagne et de la Grande-Bretagne,la délégation française put se présenter comme recours dans nombred’arbitrages.L’UE était donc née. Il fallait cependant la faire grandir puisque Maastricht restaitun compromis. Sur l’UEM, la France avait obtenu ce qu’elle voulait. Sur d’autressujets, Paris avait dû faire des concessions. Minimes sur la PESC, mais la perspectived’une défense commune existait ainsi qu’un début de vote à la majorité. Minimes surle social, puisque l’acquis était préservé et que la Charte faisait une entrée timide dansle droit communautaire. Plus importantes sur l’industrie. Sur d’autres thèmes plussecondaires, l’accord lui était favorable. Du reste, et il faut le rappeler, il s’agissaitbien à Maastricht de faire enregistrer des avancées à confirmer par la suite. L’Europeà la française restait à inventer …, ce qui rendit la ratification du traité d’autant plusdifficile et alimenta nombre de critiques.La presse, française et étrangère, ne s’y était pas trompée. Beaucoup de commentateurssaluèrent l’effort, mais tous insistèrent sur les concessions réalisées et lesinterrogations à venir. Les réactions étrangères, et d’abord allemandes, furent d’ailleursscrutées à Paris, tout comme l’avancée des différents processus de ratification.En France, le mercredi 3 juin 1992, au lendemain du référendum danois négatifsur Maastricht, Mitterrand annonça en Conseil des ministres que les Français seraienteux-mêmes appelés à se prononcer directement sur ce sujet. Il le faisait contre l’avisde ses proches ministres, de plusieurs de ses collaborateurs, y compris ses communicants.Ce fut sa dernière bataille politique. Il la gagna de justesse, à la suite d’un84. AN, PHB.9-1, CDM. Entretien du Président de la République avec le Chancelier Kohl, op.cit.85. Cf. entretiens de Caroline Margerie et de Pierre Morel; AN, CDM.14-1, CDM. Article D sur ladéfense, 09.12.1991.86. AN, PHB.9-1, Lettre de Matignon.

La négociation de Maastricht vue de Paris 65débat de très grande qualité, qui mobilisa l’attention des Français, notamment lorsd’une grande émission télévisée de plusieurs heures, le 3 septembre, où le ChancelierKohl intervenait personnellement.Au-delà des considérations politiciennes qu’on ne négligera pas, il nous sembleque Mitterrand avait parfaitement mesuré la portée de ce texte, son équilibre, lescompromis réalisés et ce qu’il engageait pour son pays. Raison pour laquelle il décidade consulter le peuple français. Le dimanche 20 septembre 1992, le oui l’emporta par51,04% des suffrages exprimés. Au même moment, l’Europe se trouvait secouée parune terrible crise monétaire.

The European Community1973–1983 approximatePublications of the | 14European Union Liaison Committee of HistoriansJohnny LaursenThe Institutions and Dynamicsof the European Community,1973-83NomosThe Institutions and Dynamicsof the European Community,1973–83By Johnny Laursen2013, approx. 370 pp., pb., approx. € 69.00ISBN 978-3-8329-6963-9(Veröffentlichungen der Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommissionder EG, vol. 14)Approximate publication in August 2013In this volume a group of internationalhistorians take a fresh look at this periodof European integration. Based on recentarchival research and interviews the volumeoffers a new look on the history of thisdistinct époque of European integration.Overall, the contributions take up a reinterpretationof the period as a period ofcrisis and stagnation and offer a discussionof the importance of the developments inthe period for the resurgence of the integrationprocess in the subsequent époqueof Commission president Jacques Delors.The book is organised in two main parts:First, four chapters discuss the interpretationof the main dynamics of the integrationprocess with a particular focus on therole of the European institutions. The secondpart provides new interpretations of theemergence of monetary co-operation andof the emergence of new policy areas andinternational challenges in Europeanco-operation.To order please visit www.nomos-shop.de/14061, fax (+49) 7221/2104-43 or contact your local bookstore.

67Negotiating the Maastricht TreatyWilfried LOTH“Maastricht” means the end of a major struggle on the monetary union which hadstarted at the Hague summit in December 1969 and which had been intensified since1984 by French pressure against German reluctance. The French had several reasonsto urge that such a union should be achieved: first, they saw it as a necessary elementof a policy of economic growth on the European level; second, they strove for independencefrom the erratic movements of the dollar and the US policy of interest; thirdthey aimed at destroying the hegemonic position of the German Bundesbank. Germanresistance resulted from the long-term fear of an “inflation union” and the institutionalself-interest of the Bundesbank whose directors saw no reason to abandon their comfortableposition. At the same time, Maastricht was the provisional end of an evenmuch longer debate on a Political Union, the question of a Common Foreign andSecurity Policy and the institutional design of a united Europe. This debate had startedwith Charles de Gaulle’s proposal for a Political Union in September 1960 and hadled to many crises, sharp confrontations and tough struggles.It is a commonplace to state that agreement on these crucial issues was reacheddue to the unexpected and sudden re-unification of Germany in 1990. Confrontedwith the danger of the end of the European Community, Helmut Kohl and FrançoisMitterrand were able to find compromises on all the long-standing open questions;and these compromises set the basis for the institutional reforms of the MaastrichtTreaty, the establishment of the monetary union, and the development of a CommonForeign and Security Policy. However, it is not very well known how these compromiseswere reached in detail and why the Maastricht Treaty obtained that specificcomplicated form which was disputed later on. By answering these questions, thisarticle may contribute to a more qualified assessment of the Treaty, its merits and itsshortcomings. 1Agreement on a Monetary Union ConferenceThe monetary union as the core element of the Maastricht Treaty had been on theEuropean policy agenda since April 1989 when the so-called “Delors Committee”delivered its report. As agreed upon at the European Council meeting in Hannoveron 27 and 28 June 1988, this body, consisting of all twelve central bank presidents1. A wealth of information on the negotiation process can be found in K. DYSON, K. FEATHER-STONE, The Road to Maastricht. Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union, Oxford UniversityPress, Oxford, 1999. This article is furthermore based on evidence from the French Presidentialarchives, the German Federal Chancellor Office, and contemporary public sources.

68 Wilfried LOTHof the European Community along with some further experts and acting under thechairmanship of Commission President Jacques Delors, had developed a roadmapfor the achievement of a monetary union. It adhered to the German input by describingthe goal of an independent European Central Bank system, led by the directorate ofthe European Central Bank as well as the presidents of the national banks and committedto the goal of price stability. In this, Mitterrand had given the French Committeemember Jacques de Larosière his blessing, because he knew that the monetaryunion could not be achieved in any other way. In order to demonstrate the irrevocabilityof the setting of the exchange rates, it was necessary to introduce also a nominalCommunity currency. In contrast, when it came to the parallel development of acommon economic and fiscal policy, which Delors regarded as indispensable if themonetary union were to function over the long term, there was only vague talk of“macro-economic coordination, including binding rules in the budgetary field”.Delors struck the explicit mention of “transfer of decision power” to the Europeanlevel contained in an early draft, because he considered it as impossible to reach aconsensus on this.Regarding the roadmap, Delors succeeded in gaining approval for a three-stageplan as well as for the recommendation that right at the beginning of this process therebe “a clear political commitment to the final stage”. With regard to a timeframe itwas only recommended that the first stage should begin no later than the startingpointof the free movement of capital on 1 July 1990. Besides, there was no clearstatement as to which conditions needed to be fulfilled in order to move from the firstto the second stage or from the second to the third, nor were any kind of time pointsspecified for these transitions. During the first stage, convergence was to be furtherpromoted by economic development and economic policy; and all member stateswere to join the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System (EMS).Additionally, a treaty on economic and monetary union was to be worked out. Afterthe ratification of this treaty, the second stage could be entered upon, during whichthe European Central Bank system was to organize the transition towards full monetaryunion for the third stage.As to the organization of the transition towards the second stage, the report of theDelors Commission remained just as vague. German Bundesbank president Karl-OttoPöhl successfully fended off Larosière’s demand to establish a European MonetaryFund for this transition phase, just as the idea to create a parallel European currencythat was to be legal tender alongside the national currencies. The report only retainedthe provision that the European Central Bank was to have the possibility of accumulating“a certain amount of reserves” and using them for intervening in the foreignexchangemarkets. The ranges of fluctuation among the national currencies were tobe narrowed as far as circumstances and progress toward convergence allowed. Additionally,agreements on precise rules determining the size and financing of budgetdeficits were to be reached; these were not yet to be binding, however. “Guidelines”for macro-economic development were to be passed by majority vote; at the same

Negotiating the Maastricht Treaty 69time, the “ultimate responsibility” for political decisions in this phase was still lyingwith the member states. 2It is true that the Bundesbank thereby retained the fundamental essentials regardingthe shape of the future monetary union and that the pace of its realization remainedunclear. Nevertheless, the recommendation for an immediate launch altogether witha simultaneous commitment to the final goal gave a strong impetus for a furtherdevelopment of the monetary system into a monetary union. This posed a seriousdilemma for Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl: on the one hand, he shared the analysisof the advocates of the monetary union like Delors and German Foreign MinisterHans-Dietrich Genscher; on the other hand, he had to act with particular cautionprecisely at the same time with regard to domestic politics. The criticism of his leadershiphad escalated, and his own general secretary, Heiner Geissler, was about tohave him removed. Kohl therefore simply could not afford to deceive Finance MinisterTheo Waigel, who had succeeded Franz-Josef Strauss as chairman of theBavarian CSU and who was supporting the Chancellor against criticism within theparty. In cabinet discussions, Genscher succeeded in winning approval for having thegovernment support the Delors Report as well as for the start of the first stage on 1July 1990. However, Waigel and his Secretary of State Hans Tietmeyer – whoseexpertise was greatly valued by the new Finance Minister – argued that before fixinga time for the beginning of the government conference, a whole series of “technicalissues” had to be resolved. Kohl did not dare to contradict them. 3In Madrid, where the heads of state and of government gathered on 26 and 27June, it was thus not possible to take further decisions. Kohl took advantage of MargaretThatcher’s opposition to negotiate a new treaty and presented himself as a mediator,trying so to play for time: : The report of the Delors Commission was hailedas an indispensable basis for preparing the monetary union, the first stage beingscheduled to start on 1 July 1990. The government conference should only meet oncethe responsible bodies – that is the General Council, the Council of Finance Ministers,the Commission, the Committee of the Central Bank Governors and the MonetaryCommittee – had completed the necessary preparations. Under no circumstanceshould the government conference meet before the beginning of the first stage. Additionally,the Council explicitly approved the West German proposal to set unambiguousconvergence criteria and also rejected the French plan for a European ReserveFund. 42. Bericht zur Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion der EG, in: Europa-Archiv, 44(1989), pp.D 283-304;H. KRÄGENAU, W. WETTER, Europäische Währungsunion. Vom Werner-Plan zum Vertrag vonMaastricht. Analysen und Dokumentation, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1993, pp.33-40. On the negotiationsin the Delors Committee, see K. DYSON, K. FEATHERSTONE, op.cit., pp.342-350 and713-720; additional material in J. DELORS, Erinnerungen eines Europäers, Parthas, Berlin, 2004,pp.385-389.3. K. DYSON, K. FEATHERSTONE, op.cit., pp.350-354. On Kohl’s domestic problems see also H.-P. SCHWARZ, Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Munich, 2012,pp.520-527.4. Europa-Archiv, 44(1989), pp.D 406 ff.

70 Wilfried LOTHMitterrand then sought to make use of his European Council presidency to givedecisive impetus to the preparations for a government conference on monetary unionand to wring a binding date for this meeting from the Germans. It should thus beginno later than before the end of 1990. The necessary decisions should be taken at thenext Council meeting in December in Strasbourg; these were to be prepared by aworking group composed of representatives of the Ministries of Finance and ofForeign Affairs under the leadership of Mitterrand’s European advisor, ElisabethGuigou. As Mitterrand told Thatcher during a lightning visit on 4 September, hisintention was “to set the train on the rails”; and it should not be impeded by “one ortwo states”. 5 In other words, France was prepared to make a move on the monetaryunion even if Britain would not immediately join in.Kohl agreed with Mitterrand’s timeframe “in principle”. However, his consent toMitterrand’s initiatives, as usually, was subjected to some conditions. Consideringthe upheavals in Hungary and Poland as well as the visible collapse of the SED regimein East Germany, the Chancellor was convinced that along with the economic andmonetary integration, also the political unification of Europe had to be accelerated.This seemed necessary to him, firstly, in order to create a strong framework for theprocess of German reunification; secondly, he also saw new tasks emerging for theCommunity in order to overcome the legacies of Communism in Eastern Europe. On24 October, Kohl went to Paris for a meeting with Mitterrand on this topic. AsMitterrand’s adviser Jacques Attali noted during a dinner shared by the two leaders,“it would be necessary to tackle after the economic also a political European project”.The chancellor also made it clear that in his view, such an initiative was urgent: “Thesummit in Strasbourg must send a clear message to the East”.Mitterrand didn’t fail to notice that his guest reacted evasively to his questionabout fixing a date for the beginning of the government conference: “One can’t decideanything before seeing what happens in Strasbourg”. This made the French presidentmistrustful. Attali concluded his notes on this “head-spinning” meeting with the observationthat “I feel for the first time that the Chancellor does not disclose everythinghe knows and he wants”. 6 This mistrust developed into great anxiety when Kohlspecified his ideas in a letter to Mitterrand on 27 November: in Strasbourg, the FinanceMinisters and central bank presidents should be commissioned to prepare thegovernment conference; and the conference should not only deal with the economicand monetary union but also, in a second phase, from the end of 1991 onward, with5. AN [Archives nationales], 5AG4, 88 EG d.1, quoted in: J.-M. PALAYRET, La voie française versl’Union économique et monétaire durant la négociation du traité de Maastricht (1988-1992), in: M.LIBERA, B. WASSENBERG (eds), L’Europe au cœur. Études pour Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, PeterLang, Brussels, 2009, pp.197-221, here p.209.6. J. ATTALI, Verbatim, tome 3: Chronique des années 1988-1991, Robert Laffont, Paris, 1995, pp.325-327. On this and the following, also H.J. KÜSTERS, La controverse entre le Chancelier HelmutKohl et le Président François Mitterrand à propos de la réforme institutionnelle de la Communautéeuropéenne (1989/1990), in: M.-T. BITSCH (ed.), Le couple France-Allemagne et les institutionseuropéennes, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2001, pp.487-516, here pp.491-496; K. DYSON, K. FEATHER-STONE, op.cit., pp.363-366.

Negotiating the Maastricht Treaty 71other institutional reforms, especially with the strengthening of the position of theEuropean Parliament. The “political decision on implementing a government conferenceon the economic and monetary union” should only be made in the middle ofDecember 1990, and the negotiations should begin in early 1991. Both parts of thenegotiations should be wrapped up over the course of 1992, “in December at thelatest”. As was emphasized in the conclusion of the document, the ratification couldthen take place promptly before the next elections to the European Parliament in Mayand June of 1994. 7This announcement to postpone the political decision on the monetary union foranother year, along with its incorporation into a more comprehensive reform projectcontaining many pitfalls, was perceived in Paris as a covert rejection. “If that reallyis the position of the Chancellor”, Attali commented, “then it means that he’s beenswayed by the British arguments. And that everything is buried. German problemswill sweep across the European construction”. 8 It was not only the project of themonetary union that threatened to fail at exactly the moment when it was, in theFrench view, especially urgent but also the incorporation of Germany altogether –which was after all an essential motive not only for the French European policy.The President then did his utmost to convince the Chancellor to offer bindingapproval for the summoning of a government conference on the monetary union atthe upcoming Strasbourg Council meeting. An understanding on negotiations for aPolitical Union would surely be desirable in principle, but it should be deferred so asnot to endanger the breakthrough on the monetary issue. During a phone call withChancellor Kohl in the afternoon of 28 November, Mitterrand threatened that Franceonly would approve Kohl’s reunification plan if Bonn made three distinct commitmentsbeforehand: the beginning of negotiations on the monetary union, the definitiverecognition of Germany’s border with Poland, and confirmation of the Federal Republic’srenunciation of nuclear weapons. Mitterrand spoke still more darkly to Genscher,who had sought him out on 30 November in order to smooth the waves thatKohl’s solo initiative had generated:“If German unity is achieved before European unity, you’ll have the Triple Alliance(France, Great Britain and the USSR) against you, exactly as in 1913 and 1939. […] You’llbe encircled, and that’ll end in a war in which once again all Europeans will ally againstthe Germans. Is that what you want? Conversely, if German unity is achieved after there’sbeen progress on the unity of Europe, then we’ll help you”. 9No later than Kohl was reported this conversation, the Chancellor must have realizedthat his engagement for a Political Union was not sufficient to win France’s supportfor the reunification process. This meant that he after all had to take a larger domesticpolicy risk if he wanted to retain the necessary room for manoeuvre as to the shaping7. Kohl to Mitterrand, 27.11.1989, in: Deutsche Einheit. Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes1989/90, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1998, pp.565-567.8. J. ATTALI, op.cit., pp.349.9. Ibid., pp.320-323. On Genscher’s visit, see also J. ATTALI, op.cit., pp.353 ff; H.-D. GENSCHER,Erinnerungen, Siedler, Berlin, 1995, pp.390 and 677-680.

72 Wilfried LOTHof the reunification process without at the same time endangering the European construct.Nor could he rule out the possible danger of losing the initiative to Genscherin the one question as well as the other, if the monetary union continued to be blocked.All this led him to give in on the issue of the monetary union. Shortly before theopening of the Council meeting on 8 December, the Chancellor’s office let the Elyséeknow that Kohl was finally willing to fix a date for the opening of the governmentconference in December 1990. 10The Strasbourg Council meeting then began in a relatively relaxed atmosphere.As early as at the opening luncheon, Kohl declared that a clear roadmap was necessary“in order to demonstrate our will to achieve progress”. As Council President,Mitterrand was able to confirm“that the necessary majority exists for the summoning of a government conference inaccordance with Article 236 of the Treaty. The government conference will meet beforethe end of 1990 at the invitation of the Italian government”.No decisions were made regarding the Political Union; it was only determined “thatthe economic and monetary union [was to] take fully into account the democraticrequirement”. The “Community Charter on Social Rights of Workers” was adoptedagainst the vote of Margaret Thatcher, a move for which Mitterrand and Delors hadlong been fighting. Lastly, the Twelve also approved the establishment of the “EuropeanBank for Reconstruction and Development”. Mitterrand only had to concede toThatcher that “the other OECD member states” – that is especially the US – wouldalso be invited to participate. 11Establishing a Political Union ConferenceJacques Delors had been the first to articulate the need to hasten the European integrationprocess in order to accelerate as well German unification, saying so internallyand more or less clearly in public as well. Only three days after the fall of the BerlinWall, he had declared on German television that according to the provisions of theTreaties of Rome, the way stood open for the citizens of the GDR to enter the EuropeanCommunity. In his inaugural address to the European Parliament at the beginningof his second term, he had argued “that the Community can only retain its attractivenessif it accelerates its integration”. In his view, this included the idea “that10. F. BOZO, Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l’unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht,Odile Jacob, Paris, 2005, p.152. On the following, ibid., pp.152-156; T. SCHABERT, Wie Weltgeschichtegemacht wird. Frankreich und die deutsche Einheit, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 2002, pp.425-428; U. LAPPENKÜPER, Mitterrand und Deutschland. Die enträtselte Sphinx, Oldenbourg,Munich, 2011, pp.269-271.11. Schlussfolgerung des Vorsitzes der Straßburger Ratstagung, 08./09.12.1989, in: Jahrbuch der EuropäischenIntegration 1989/90, pp.421-438.

Negotiating the Maastricht Treaty 73comprehensive executive authority be transferred to the Commission” and as a consequence,there must be an “expansion of the powers of Parliament”. 12Mitterrand’s advisor on European issues Guigou, a one-time staffer of Delorsduring his time as Finance Minister, embraced the essentials of this argument in amemorandum to the President on 6 February of 1990. As she wrote, the Communityneeded to take an interest in “very quickly inventing an institutional armature thattrivializes and restrains the German fact so that Germany determines its orientationswithin a Community framework and not autonomously”. She therefore proposed totake up Kohl’s initiative for the creation of a Political Union, a “European Union”overarching the existing institutions. Justifying the urgency of her proposal, she wrotethat it would be better “to negotiate a European Union with a Germany that is for thetime being still divided into two states and that needs the Community rather than witha reunited German that no longer needs anyone”. 13 In the run-up to the dinner on 15February to which Mitterrand had invited Kohl, Guigou established contact with herWest German counterpart Joachim Bitterlich and was able to reinforce her proposalwith information on the Chancellor’s willingness to undertake a joint initiative forthe Political Union.Mitterrand however hesitated to agree to the proposal about launching the PoliticalUnion. He still feared that differing views on the institutional configuration of thefinal political form of the Community could delay the implementation of the monetaryunion. On 15 February, his only concrete suggestion to Kohl was to bring forwardthe beginning of the government conference on monetary union, which was swiftlyrejected by the Chancellor. Mitterrand gave his support to a joint Franco-Germaninitiative for a Political Union only in late March as a result of a German proposal onthis matter and after Kohl had pressurized Council President Charles Haughey intodeciding on a government conference on Political Union at the upcoming specialmeeting of the heads of state and of government scheduled for 28 April. Meanwhile,the Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens had brought more pressure to bear onMitterrand by means of a memorandum – inspired by Delors – addressed to the partnergovernments – and calling for a government conference on institutional reforms.The Franco-German initiative in the form of a joint letter from Mitterrand andKohl to Council President Haughey on 18 April did not consider to take already adecision yet on the introduction of a further government conference at the upcomingCouncil meeting. Because Mitterrand feared a hasty commitment to Bonn’s institutionalconceptions, it was only possible for the time being to propose that the ForeignMinisters make preparations for a government conference on the Political Union.Only on the basis of their report a decision was to be made at the next regular Councilmeeting in late June. Regarding the timeframe for the government conference onPolitical Union, the joint letter suggested that it should occur parallel to the governmentconference on the monetary union so that “the totality of the relations among12. Europa-Archiv, 45(1990), pp.D 269-282; J. DELORS, op.cit., pp.327-329.13. AN, 5AG4, AH 35, Memorandum by Guigou, 06.02.1990, quoted in: F. BOZO, op.cit., pp.198 f.On the following, ibid., pp.196-202 and 244-249.

74 Wilfried LOTHthe member states can be transformed into a European Union by 1 January 1993”. Interms of content, the proposal was relatively vague: the Political Union was to“strengthen the democratic legitimization of the Union” and “flesh out more efficiently”its institutions, but also provide for the “unity and coherence” of its activities“in the areas of economy, currency, and politics” as well as “defining and implementinga common foreign and defence policy”. 14In Dublin, where the heads of state and of government met on 28 April, the Franco-German initiative, as expected, met with opposition by Thatcher. In the view of theBritish Prime Minister, German unification provided no argument for the deepeningof the European Community – on the contrary, there was reason to block such adeepening: “The European construct will not bind Germany; it’s rather the case thatGermany will dominate the European construct”, as she put it at a dinner at the Frenchembassy in London in mid-March. 15 As a consequence, it could only be decided inDublin that before the next Council meeting on 25-26 June, the Foreign Ministerswere to review the necessity of possible treaty amendments for strengthening democraticlegitimacy and for effectively responding to the “challenges of the new situation”.It was left open as to whether the summoning of a second parallel governmentconference would then actually be decided on. The European Council only stipulatedthat the treaty amendments necessary for the transition towards the second stage ofthe monetary union had to be in force by 1 January 1993. 16 For Kohl, this did notrepresent the strong signal for progress on political unification that he regarded asnecessary in order to secure the monetary union with the German electorate.The Foreign Ministers of the Twelve nevertheless succeeded in agreeing on numerousprinciples in favour of the Political Union during a meeting on 19 and 20May. Kohl and Genscher had reduced their conceptions of an institutional strengtheningof the Community to a realistic level, so that unity could be more or lessachieved on the idea that the European Council would continue to constitute thecentral institution of the Union; above this, the Community area and the area of politicalcooperation were to be more strongly interlinked. On the other hand, RolandDumas, the French Minister, accommodated the reservations of various partners regardinga common foreign and defence policy to the effect that these were initiallyto be developed incrementally. On this basis, at the regular Council meeting also heldin Dublin on 25 and 26 June, it was possible to reach the agreement that, parallel tothe government conference on the monetary union, also a government conference onthe Political Union was to be held. More specifically: the monetary conference wasto begin on 13 December 1990 and the “political” one on 14 December. Both conferenceswere to complete their work so that the resulting treaties or treaty amendmentscould be ratified before the end of 1992. 1714. Europa-Archiv, 45(1990), p.D 283.15. Embassy report, 13.03.1990, quoted in: F. BOZO, op.cit., p. 242.16. Europa-Archiv, 45(1990), pp.D 284-288.17. Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1990/91, pp.417-420.

Negotiating the Maastricht Treaty 75Negotiations on Political UnionWhile preparing the second government conference, Kohl and Mitterrand continuedto work closely together, to a certain extent for different motives: for Kohl and theWest German government, it was primarily a matter of reducing the democraticdeficit of the Community that had emerged after the development of Communityactivities in many new policy areas through the Single European Act; addressing thatissue would secure the European orientation of German policy over the long term.The German public’s fatigue regarding Europe, evident in several respects includingthe lower turnout elections to the European Parliament in June 1989, was definitelyperceived in Bonn as an alarm signal. For their part, Mitterrand and his advisors wereprimarily aiming at strengthening the common foreign and defence policy. They fullyexpected that after the end of the Cold War, the American presence in Europe woulddiminish sooner or later; the French wanted to make use of this opportunity to achievesubstantial progress in promoting European autonomy in world politics.Both governments however agreed that the completion of the monetary union hadto be accompanied by a strengthening of the political structures of the Community ifthe integration of the now sovereign Germans was to succeed over the long term. Onthe day after German unification had come into effect, Kohl sent a letter to the FrenchPresident in which he expressed gratitude for Mitterrand’s support and pledged hisefforts to accelerate European unification. In a conversation with Attali, Mitterrandappeared propitiated and was at the same time resolved to seize the opportunity tostrengthen the European Union, something which together with Kohl seemed feasibleto him:“The chancellor is sincere. And he will do all that if he has the time. That’s a man of verygreat worth. But after him? One must integrate Germany into the Political Union, dissolveit in it, before Kohl leaves. If not, German arrogance – this time Bavarian rather thanPrussian – will once again threaten peace in Europe”. 18Both statesmen were at pains to demonstrate publicly that their divergences on thequestion of German unification policy – which had not passed completely unnoticedby the public – had by no means diminished their resolution to bring forward Europeanunification.Taking up a suggestion that Roland Dumas had made to his German counterpartHans-Dietrich Genscher at the Franco-German summit of 17 and 18 September 1990in Munich, both sides worked on another joint declaration that was to be presentedby Kohl and Mitterrand in the run-up to the opening of both government conferences.In a joint letter of 6 December to the Council President (now Giulio Andreotti), Kohlcommitted himself more explicitly to the goal of a “common defence” than in thesummer of 1987 when a joint Franco-German defence concept had to be developed.For this purpose, a “clear organic tie” between the Political Union and the WEU wasto be created; in the long term, the WEU was to become a component of the Political18. Note, 04.10.1990, in: J. ATTALI, op.cit., p.606.

76 Wilfried LOTHUnion and consequently was also to include those Union members that did not yetbelong to it up to that moment. The document listed as areas in which a “genuinecommon foreign policy” could develop, relations with the former Eastern Bloc countriesand the states bordering the Mediterranean, disarmament talks, as well as developmentpolicy. Decisions would be made “fundamentally unanimously”, but itwould also be possible to allow for majority decision-making, especially involvingmodalities of policy implementation.Paris acceded to Bonn’s demands regarding the incorporation of immigrationpolicy and the battle against international crime into the Community. It was in theseareas that after the fall of the “Iron Curtain” and the re-emergence of ethnic conflictsin the former Eastern Bloc countries, Bonn was confronted with problems that it didnot want to face and could not tackle alone. Therefore, the joint letter also urged thecreation of a Justice and Home Affairs Council. Regarding the strengthening of theorgans of the Community, Paris and Bonn agreed on giving the European Parliamenta power of “co-decision” for legislative acts “in the narrower sense”, which ultimatelyopened up the possibility of a veto right; also the President of the Commission andthe Commission as a whole had to be approved by a majority of Parliament membersand majority voting was introduced as a rule in the Council of Ministers. Additionally,in order to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Community, a “genuine Europeancitizenship” should be created. 19Delors, however, considered this as insufficient to actually secure the Community’slegitimacy and ability to act. At the intergovernmental conference in February1991, making use of elaborations by his deputy cabinet chief, François Lamoureux,he presented a series of draft texts that went in the direction of more supra-nationality.According to these, actions in the foreign-policy realm were always to be submittedfor approval if required by the Council President, the Commission, or a group of morethan six member states. The decision to become active in a certain field was still tobe taken unanimously by the European Council. Regarding the nature of the measuresto be taken, the Council of Ministers should have to decide by qualified majority;their execution should primarily lie in the hands of the Commission. 20 In general, theCommission was to receive greater freedom of action in issuing provisions for implementation.The Commission was also to assume the representation of the Communityin international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund. Last-19. Europa-Archiv, 46(1991), pp.D 25-27. On the course of the government conference on the PoliticalUnion, J. CLOOS, G. REINSCH, D. VIGNES, J. WEYLAND, Le traité de Maastricht. Genèse,analyse, commentaires, Bruylant, Brussels, 1994, pp.73-93; K. ENDO, The Presidency of the EuropeanCommission under Jacques Delors. The Politics of Shared Leadership, MacMillan, Houndsmills/NewYork, 1999, pp.170-190; D. ROMETSCH, Die Rolle und Funktionsweise der EuropäischenKommission in der Ära Delors, Peter Lang, Frankfurt/Main, 1999, pp.181-195; H.STARK, Kohl, l’Allemagne et l’Europe. La politique d‘intégration européenne de la Républiquefédérale 1982-1998, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2004, pp.179-213; F. BOZO, op.cit., pp.303-325. In theview of a participant, J. DELORS, op.cit., pp.403-411.20. Commission Proposals on Common External Policy, in: Agence Europe, Documents,Nr. 1697/1698, 07.03.1991.

Negotiating the Maastricht Treaty 77ly, the Commission proposed that the Community be given the right to impose taxesof its own.This went well beyond any consensus that could possibly be reached among thetwelve governments; it also ran counter to Mitterrand’s antipathy towards an increasein the Commission’s power that he had repeatedly expressed. Government representativesat the working level showed little inclination to adopt the Commission’s proposal.“We simply set aside the Commission’s drafts and proceeded with others”, asone member of the Council Secretariat remembered. 21 In the middle of April, theLuxemburg Council presidency submitted a first draft treaty. This document took upthe principle of different “pillars” of the future Union. This had been brought up fordiscussion by the French representative Pierre de Boissieu in order to counter theCommission’s claims to power. In accordance with this concept, foreign and defencepolicy as well as justice and home policy would each constitute a distinct pillar of theUnion, within which proceedings were to be strictly intergovernmental. In the Communityarea, the right of initiative of the Commission was to lose some of its significancebecause it was also to be conferred to the European Parliament. The Councilshould be able to alter Commission proposals by simple majority. In case of a differenceof opinion between Council and Parliament, the Commission was no longerto have authority to make amendment proposals or simply withdraw the bill. 22Delors attacked, to a certain extent successfully, this draft as an attempt to reducethe Commission to a kind of secretariat that would be subordinate to the other institutionsof the Community: at an informal Council of Ministers gathering hosted byGenscher in Dresden on 2 and 3 June 1991, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van denBroek and his Belgian colleague Mark Eyskens severely criticized the proposed pillarstructure. Genscher and the Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis, along withtheir counterparts from Spain, Ireland, and even Greece also voiced criticism. Thisconvinced the Luxembourg Council presidency of the need to revise the draft treaty.In the version presented at the Luxembourg Council meeting on 28 and 29 June, thehomogeneity of the institutional framework of the Union was more strongly emphasized.23Nevertheless, the pillar structure was retained in the draft, and the Commissionwould thereby be prevented from having access to the fields of foreign policy anddomestic security. The Dutch Council presidency of the second half of 1991 soughtto change this once again by advocating its own draft treaty, which bound the threepillars together under Community law and further strengthened the rights of Parliament.Given that the Dutch draft also downplayed the role of the common foreignand defence policy, it failed to find support among many who advocated a strengtheningof the Community organs. 24 In late September, Bonn decided – heeding pres-21. Interview with K. ENDO, op.cit., p.178.22. Non-Paper of the Luxembourg Presidency, 15.04.1991, in: Agence Europe, Documents,Nr. 1709/1710, 03.05.1991.23. Draft treaty, 18.06.1991, ibid., Nr. 1722/1723, 05.07.1991.24. Draft treaty, 23.09.1991, ibid., Nr. 1733/1734, 03.10.1991.

78 Wilfried LOTHsure from Paris – to support the retention of the Luxembourg draft. The decision wastaken at the session of the Council of Ministers of 30 September, the so-called “BlackMonday” of the Dutch presidency.The only thing Delors achieved was to have withdrawn the limitations of authorityof the Commission contained in the Luxembourg draft. During a conclave of governmentrepresentatives at Noordwijk in the Netherlands on 12 and 13 November, itwas decided that legislative initiatives of Parliament were first to be presented to theCommission. This meant that the Commission’s monopoly on initiatives was preserved,at least in the sense of having a veto right. Also, the Commission was still tobe in a position to withdraw bills if did not agree with the changes made by otherorgans. The strengthening of the position of Parliament was essentially limited to theintroduction of a co-decision-making process in individual areas and the expansionof oversight rights; also, the Commission would henceforth need to be confirmed bya parliamentary majority. For the Council of Ministers, majority voting was introducedas a rule, but there was to be a group of exceptions, such as when definingresearch framework programs and industrial policy.Bonn’s decision against the Dutch treaty draft represented at the same time astatement in favour of an autonomous European defence system, which had beenopposed not only by the Dutch government, but also by the British, Danish and Portuguesegovernments. They argued that the already-threatened cohesion of NATOought not to be further endangered by emphasizing a European defence identity. Theformulation of the Franco-German programme, which Dumas and Genscher had presentedon 4 February, 25 did therefore not find a common consent. At the LuxembourgCouncil Meeting, the only agreement reached was to postpone the decision on thisprogramme until the closing phase of the government conference. In Paris, doubtsbegan to arise as to whether Bonn was actually willing to involve itself in an independentdefence; in the main question of the day concerning common foreign policy– the position toward the Serbian intervention against the declarations of independenceby Slovenia and Croatia in late June – the two partners took opposing sides.Mitterrand was once again worried about the stability of borders in Europe, whereasthe German government was under pressure from South German sympathizers of theformer Habsburg territories.In order to banish the risk that the Franco-German initiative for a common foreignand defence policy would fail, Kohl, at a meeting in Lille on 25 June suggested toMitterrand that there be another joint foray. This resulted, by the beginning of October,in a new joint letter addressed to the Council chairman, for the time being DutchPrime Minister Ruud Lubbers. The document specified the goal of foreign and defencepolicy in three points. Firstly, a draft text of treaty terms on these matters wasoffered, naming the WEU as the organ charged with carrying out common foreignpolicy but at the same time declaring that the “specifics of the defence policy ofindividual member states” were “unaffected”. A review of these terms was announced25. Der Bundesminister des Auswärtigen informiert. Mitteilung für die Presse (German Foreign MinisterPress Release), 06.02.1991.

Negotiating the Maastricht Treaty 79for no later than 1996. Secondly, Bonn and Paris presented a draft declaration of WEUmember states, which was to be appended to the Union treaty; this emphasized the“incremental expansion of the WEU into the defence component of the Union” aswell as the goal of “creating a European pillar” of the Atlantic alliance. Thirdly, theChancellor and the President announced not only an expansion of Franco-Germanmilitary units, but also declared that these could “constitute the nucleus of a Europeancorps” in which “forces of other members of the WEU” participated. 26Thatcher’s successor John Major declared to Mitterrand that a subordination ofthe WEU to the guidelines of the Union would be absolutely out of the question.However, in a declaration of the NATO Council on 8 November, the US governmenthad accepted the “development of a defence identity for Europe”. Thus, at the Councilmeeting of 9 and 10 December in Maastricht, at the conclusion of treaty negotiations,the British Prime Minister had to content himself with demanding to tone down theformulations of the Franco-German draft. The treaty text now contained only thestatement that the common defence policy “could in due course lead to a commondefence”; for practical measures following from Council decisions on defence policy,there was an assumption of “accord” between the Council and the organs of the WEU.Additionally, absolutely no majority decision-making was permitted on “questionstouching the field of defence-policy”. 27 Through close cooperation, Mitterrand andKohl were able to prevent any further watering down of the defence perspectivesduring the Council meeting in Maastricht. 28Negotiations on Monetary UnionAs to the timeframe fixed for the monetary union, Mitterrand and Delors voted inagreement for precise political determinations. The second stage of the monetaryunion was to begin as soon as possible, that is, upon the entry into force of the treatieson 1 January 1993. Conveniently, this was also the date on which the internal marketwas to be completed. Theo Waigel and new State Secretary Horst Köhler now at thehead of the German Finance Ministry, were averse to fixing a date and instead wantedthe achievement of objective criteria such as price stability and budgetary discipline.Finally, at a Council meeting in Rome on 28 and 29 October 1990, Kohl was readyfor a compromise: the second stage was to begin on 1 January 1994, at least if“sufficient” progress in real-economic and monetary convergence had been achievedby then – a vague formulation that no longer left much manoeuvring room for the26. Letter of 14.10.1991, Europa-Archiv, 46(1991), pp.D 571-574.27. EU Treaty, Art.J.4.28. On the course of the meeting, P. FAVIER, M. MARTIN-ROLLAND, La décennie Mitterrand, vol.4, Les déchirements, 1991-1995, Eds du Seuil, Paris, 1999, pp.227 f.

80 Wilfried LOTHGerman neo-liberals to delay the actual beginning of the monetary union any further.29Kohl however did not yet give in to pressure from Mitterrand to fix a date for thetransition towards the third stage, the introduction of the Community currency. Onlywhen in March 1991 Genscher publicly pleaded for 1 January 1997 as the transitiondate did Kohl acknowledge the need for a clear timeline. Yet, in order to avoidcriticism from those who had a sentimental attachment to the German mark, he stilldid not want to name a precise concrete date. It was Andreotti at the MaastrichtCouncil meeting who first brought 1 January 1999 into play as the latest date for thebeginning of the currency union, and this was accepted. If before the end of 1996 theCouncil was to determine by qualified majority that a majority of member states hadfulfilled the criteria for joining, the monetary union could then begin on 1 January1997. Otherwise, a decision was to be taken before 1 July 1998 on which states couldparticipate.Pressure was thus put on the economically-weaker countries to make serious effortsto meet the entry criteria: New debt not over three percent, total debt not oversixty percent of GNP, an inflation rate not over 1.5 percent of the average of the ratesin the three most stable states, long-term interest rates not over two percent more thanin those states, and no devaluation within the EMS over the previous two years. Atthe same time, however, there developed a certain amount of manoeuvring room fora generous interpretation of these criteria, in case that in 1998 a country such as Francestill would clearly diverge from the level of the Federal Republic. Waigel and Köhlerwho were completely surprised by Kohl’s decision to agree on a fixed date 30 had toaccept that the Chancellor preferred the irreversibility of the decision to a completeguarantee of stability.Great Britain was granted the possibility, even with a positive assessment of itseconomic performance, of foregoing participation in the third stage. This was theprice that had to be paid in order to avoid having British Prime Minister John Majoruse his veto to block the necessary treaty amendments. At the same time, this settlementstill kept open a path for British participation. Such a decision – fundamentallydesired by all partners – could not in fact be excluded from the realm of possibilityafter the up-coming 1992 parliamentary elections. Earlier, while serving as Chancellorof the Exchequer, Major, along with Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, hadforced through Britain’s entry into the EMS on 5 October 1990; then, widespreadcriticism of Thatcher’s aggressively anti-Europe rhetoric had six weeks later even ledto the Prime Minister’s fall. There was not necessarily an underlying intention toparticipate in the Community currency, but Thatcher’s opponents hoped that theproblems of the British economy, such as rising inflation and a massive balance oftrade deficit, could be better brought under control if the country participated in theEuropean Monetary System. They were also convinced that, as a member, they could29. K. DYSON, K. FEATHERSTONE, op.cit., pp.395-399; on the following, ibid., pp.202-255, 370-45,and 726-740.30. See the witness of Hans Tietmeyer in: H.-P. SCHWARZ, op.cit., p.701.

Negotiating the Maastricht Treaty 81more easily bring their influence to bear on its construction than by remaining on thesidelines. Britain should take its place “at the very heart of Europe”, as the new PrimeMinister John Major proclaimed during his first public appearance in Bonn. 31The Dutch government proposed that all member states have the option of quittingthe monetary union after the point when the Council decided on the transition towardsthe third stage; this proposition however was rejected at an informal meeting of theFinance Ministers on 1 December 1991 in Scheveningen in the Netherlands. Then,the Danish government demanded a special right to withdraw, advancing the provisionsof the country’s constitution: the Danish government asserted that entry intothe monetary union might well require approval by a national referendum and for thatreason it could not commit itself definitively in a treaty at that juncture. The partnersdid agree to this demand by providing an additional protocol, knowing that much lesswas at stake here than in the British case, considering the weight of the Communitycurrency in the world currency structure and the cohesion of the internal market.This compromise character of the monetary union agreements revealed itself stillmore clearly at the moment, when the decisions on the second stage were to be taken.Köhler, who carried on the negotiations for the German side with backing fromWaigel and Kohl, had to accept that the preparations for the third stage were notsimply left to the Committee of National Bank Governors but would be taken up bya “European Monetary Institute” under the leadership of an external president chosenby the European Council. This monetary institute would however not take over thecoordination of national monetary policies at that time, as France – represented byTreasury Director Jean-Claude Trichet – and the Commission were demanding for aEuropean Central Bank that would be created at the beginning of the second stage.Likewise, this institute was not to take on responsibility for currency reserves at thattime. National central banks could transfer currency reserves to the institute, whichwould then act only under their mandate.Regarding the already-accepted independence of the European Central Bank systemand the commitment to the goal of currency stability, the German side had toaccept that the independence of the national central banks would be realized beforethe beginning of the third rather than the second stage. On the other hand, FrenchEconomy Minister Pierre Bérégovoy’s hopes that a comprehensive “economicgovernment” of the Community would necessarily go together with the creation ofthe Community currency waned as, instead of binding “guidelines”, the Councilwould only be able to issue a “recommendation”; whereas financial support formember states in difficulties would depend on the unanimous vote of the Council.As the Bundesbank had demanded, there was an explicit ban on holding the Communityliable for the debts of individual member states; states with an “excessivegovernment deficit” risked “fines of an appropriate size”. At the closing ministerial31. Speech, 11.03.1991, quoted in: H. YOUNG, This Blessed Plot. Britain and Europe from Churchillto Blair, Macmillan, London, 1998, p.374. Cf. ibid., pp.362-374; K. DYSON, K. FEATHER-STONE, op.cit., pp.644-682; and A. FOSTER, Britain and the Maastricht negotiations, St. Martin’sPress, New York, 1999.

82 Wilfried LOTHmeeting in Brussels on 2 and 3 December, Waigel and Köhler obtained, that a decisionwas made to the effect that, regarding the exchange-rate policy, the Council, insteadof guidelines, could only provide “general orientations”. Additionally, it was determinedthat these orientations “shall be without prejudice to the primary objective ofthe ESCB to maintain price stability”. 32Waigel and Köhler were also successful in fending off the Spanish demand toestablish a “convergence fund” in order to assist weaker member states. Commitmentto social and economic cohesion was inserted in a protocol attached to the EU Treaty.The latter announced the creation of a “Cohesion Fund” with which weaker memberstates could be supported on “projects in the areas of environment and trans-Europeannetworks”. There was thus a narrow restriction on redistribution needed as part of thepromotion of convergence. Likewise, determinations on the authority of the Communityin the realm of social policy – securing minimal standards in promoting employment,working conditions, equality between the sexes and worker participationin management – were relegated to a separate agreement, which Great Britain did notsign. In Maastricht, Kohl was able to push through a decision that a further governmentconference in 1996 would review the practicability of the agreed-upon stipulations.This preserved the opportunity for all participants to make improvements inline with their views.Saving with ShortcomingsThe agreement in Maastricht can therefore be considered from two different pointsof view. On the one hand, Kohl and Mitterrand had succeeded – by means of significanteffort – in preventing the European unification process from being compromisedby German reunification and in addition had even made it advance further. Acommon currency brought about a degree of integration and European state-likestructures that made it become irreversible. On the other hand, progress in areas especiallyimportant to either the German Chancellor or the French President didn’tmeet the requirements for achieving lasting success. Contributions to reduce thedeficit of democracy by strengthening the rights of Parliament and expanding majority-votingin the Council of Ministers had to a great extent been offset by theproliferation of procedures. The commitment to the goal of common decision-makingstructures in the field of defence was relativized by mandating unanimity on the wayto their realization.These shortcomings, which prompted Delors to speak of an “organizedschizophrenia”, 33 were to an extent due to the fact that, since the turn of the year32. Articles 103, 104, and 109 (2) of the EC Treaty. For an overview of the decisions on the monetaryunion, see H. UNGER, A concise history of European monetary integration: From EPU to EMU,Quorum books, Westport/Connecticut, 1997, pp.229-242.33. Speech to the European Parliament, 20.11.1991.

Negotiating the Maastricht Treaty 831989-90, cooperation between Delors and Mitterrand had given way to prickly tension.Due to an obviously exaggerated self-regard, Delors had neglected to reach anagreement with Mitterrand on the institutional questions. For his part, the FrenchPresident had given little thought to how the “economic government” and the commonforeign and defence policy were to function. A coherent negotiating strategy forthe expansion of the Community could not develop under such circumstances. Thenetwork build by Delors, Genscher and Dumas (with Guigou as decisive contact toMitterrand) could not plainly work. Since the beginning of 1991 Delors had largelyacted in isolation and could be glad in the end to have preserved the status quo forthe Commission.The deficits of an “economic governance” largely complained during the presentday“Euro-crisis” are mainly the result of the influence of the German Bundesbankinsisting on the independence of a European Central Bank. Thus, attempts to stabilizethe monetary union in the long run were – ironically enough – defeated by the Germandefenders of monetary stability themselves, by fear of involvement of such a governmentin monetary policies. It is hard to see how this influence of the Bundesbankcould have been minimized. German reunification helped to find compromises andthus to speed up the establishment of the European monetary union, but the politicalconsiderations in the context of the reunification process could not push away allresistance against the ambitious monetary union project. Without German reunification,it is highly probable that the monetary union project would nevertheless havesucceeded later on, but in a similar form.Several weeks went by before the treaty on the founding of the European Community,which built on the revised EEC Treaty, as well as the Treaty on the EuropeanUnion with all the protocols and declarations could be edited and translated into allofficial languages. On 7 February 1992, the Foreign and Finance Ministers of theTwelve assembled once again in Maastricht in order to sign the treaties. Three-anda-halfmonths later, at the conclusion of the Franco-German summit in La Rochelleon 22 May 1992, the two governments announced the formation of the Franco-Germancorps, which would number approximately 35,000 men. At the Council meetingin Edinburgh on 11 and 12 December 1992, it was finally possible to make decisionsabout the seats of important Community organs: the official seat of the Commission,which in the meantime was employing more than seventeen thousand civil servants,was assigned to Brussels — shortly after the Berlaymont Building had to be vacateddue to asbestos contamination. Parliament was to meet once per month in Strasbourg,while further plenary sessions and committee meetings as well as sessions of theCouncil of Ministers were to take place in Brussels. Thus, multiplicity of the arrangementsmade in Maastricht was also reflected in the inconsistency of its geographiclocation.

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Economic Models in France and Germany and the Debates onthe Maastricht Treaty85Guido THIEMEYERThe Maastricht Treaty was without any doubt an important turning point in the historyof European Integration. It not only profoundly changed the institutional structure ofthe European Community that was reorganized and developed into the EuropeanUnion based on a three-pillar temple construction, but also marked the beginning ofthe monetary union. The introduction of a common European currency implied theend of all national currencies in those member states that would join the monetaryunion and therefore led to intense national debates. “Maastricht” was therefore notonly a turning point concerning the institutional development of the Community. Theearly 1990s marked also a turning point in public debate on European integration inthe member states. European integration policy up to that point had been based onwhat was called “permissive consensus”, i.e. a general acceptance for the transfer ofnational sovereignty from national governments to supranational institutions in mostmember states. However, euro-scepticism had grown remarkably in the 1990s. Thereis until now no unanimity among scholars concerning the origins of this turning point:whereas some see the beginnings of euro-scepticism in the 1960s and 1970s triggeredby debates on the inefficiency of the Common Agricultural Policy, others hint at theSingle European Act that opened up European markets for services, labour and capitaland therefore put internal markets under permanent reform pressure. 1 But withoutany doubt also the Maastricht Treaty and the project of monetary union triggeredpublic debate and scepticism on European integration in general. 2 The Danish referendumrejecting the treaty and monetary union in particular, the British opt-outand also the debate in France that took place before the referendum (even though thetreaty was accepted by a short majority) reflected the growing scepticism among thepopulation. This scepticism, however, remained diffuse. Even though many peoplewere wary of the growing influence of supranational institutions on their respectivecountry, they could not precisely explain why.This article will examine arguments of euro-scepticism in France and Germanyconcerning the Maastricht Treaty in the middle of the 1990s. It will focus on thedebates on monetary union and analyze the arguments against the EMU in France1. L.M. McLAREN, Identity, Interests and the Attitude to European Integration, Palgrave Macmillan,Basingstoke, 2006, p.8; A. LAUMEN, A. MAURER, Jenseits des “Permissive Consensus”. Bevölkerungsorientierungengegenüber Europäischer Integration im Wandel?, Stiftung Wissenschaft undPolitik, Berlin, 2006, p.5. On euro-scepticism in general: B. WASSENBERG, F. CLAVERT, P.HAMMAN (éds), Contre l’Europe? Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans laconstruction européenne de 1945 à nos jours: les concepts, vol.1, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart2010.2. K. REIF, Ein Ende des „Permissive Consensus“? Zum Wandel europapolitischer Einstellungen inder öffentlichen Meinung der EG-Mitgliedstaaten, in: R. HRBEK (ed.), Der Vertrag von Maastrichtin der wissenschaftlichen Kontroverse, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1993, p.25.

86 Guido THIEMEYERand Germany. By this it will try to illuminate the background of euro-scepticism inthis particular debate.The article will mainly focus on economic arguments against monetary union inFrance and Germany. Since the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Communitythere has been in both countries a traditional scepticism among leadingeconomists and public intellectuals against European economic integration, the EuropeanEconomic Community and later against the EMU. Even though, for politicalreasons, both governments supported and even pushed for European supranationalintegration, European supranationalism in both countries was considered a menacefor the respective economic philosophy. Whereas important German economists regardedthe European Monetary Union as an attack on the German system of “SozialeMarktwirtschaft”, the French opposition was convinced that this was a threat to thesystem of “planification”. But what was the object of criticism in particular? Whydid they reject the EMU and what were their arguments? Who were these critics?In our answer we will argue that the Maastricht Treaty and the Monetary Unionin particular were considered as harmful for the economic philosophies of France andGermany. A first chapter will explain the emergence and significance of economicphilosophies for the economic organization and the cultural identity of a country. Itwill show how these philosophies had developed in the 1950s and how they becameimportant elements of national identity in France and Germany. A second chapterwill analyze in detail the arguments used by French and German critics against theMaastricht Treaty and the European Monetary Union in particular. Finally the articlewill show why the early 1990s, i.e. the “Maastricht period” must be considered as aturning point for the public perception of European Integration from a permissiveconsensus to a more critical view on European supranationalism.Economic philosophies and their relevance to national identity in France andGermanyEconomic philosophies play a threefold role in public life: firstly, from a scientificpoint of view they provide an instrument of analysis and explanation. Models likeKeynesianism or Neoliberalism are ethically and philosophically rooted sometimesnormative approaches to economic life in general. From an empirical point of view,economic philosophies are theoretical constructs representing economic processes.Secondly, they have a political meaning. Seen from this angle, economic philosophiesprovide an intellectual framework for economic or political decisions in a givenpolity. They help political actors to find a solution for specific problems by giving ageneral orientation.This article, however, will deal with a third function of economic philosophiesthat is their cultural significance. An economic philosophy in this context is part of

Economic Models in France and Germany and the Debates on the Maastricht Treaty 87the political culture in which politicians, officials and intellectuals have been socializedand in which they operate.“The political culture of a society consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressivesymbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place. Itprovides the subjective orientation to politics”. 3Thus defined, political cultures vary in different ways: they are different across classes,generations and nations and therefore explain to a certain extent why there aredifferences in people’s behaviour. 4 But they not only vary across social groups butalso in time. It is therefore important to see that there is a constant change in theeconomic models, they are developping permanently. Economic philosophies are aparticular form of political culture. The analysis of political cultures permits to uncoverthe deeper motives lying behind political decisions.The method applied here to define the impact of economic philosophies is thereforea particular form of discourse analysis. For the economic sector this means thatwe try to highlight the deeper motives and the overall context of economic debates.We will particularly pay attention to some key-words, symbols and values in thedebates and try to show their deeper meaning. This again permits a deeper insightinto the significance of the debates on monetary union in France and Germany in the1990s. Furthermore, we have to take a closer look at the vehicles for the creation andtransmission of economic philosophies in France and Germany. Here the role ofpublic intellectuals, the media and their relation to political decision will be focused.Using this theoretical approach we are, however, well aware of the limits of culturalanalysis. It is obvious that, compared to economic and political history, culturalanalysis is often too sweeping to pinpoint and conceptually describe an economicsystem. Even though cultural patterns undoubtedly play a major role in economicsystems and human behaviour within these systems, these patterns however are difficultto describe. In order to avoid these problems it is important to develop a clearmodel of analysis, a precise definition of what is meant by a cultural basis of economy.For our purpose it makes sense to revert to the model of “Wirtschaftsstile” that hasbeen developed by German economists of the so-called “Historische Schule” in the19 th century, 5 which rely on the cultural basis of economic policy. Werner Sombartdescribed an economic mentality in which “alle Wertvorstellungen, Zwecksetzungen,3. G.A. ALMOND, Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations,Little, Brown & Co, Boston, 1965, p.513.4. P.A. HALL, Governing the Economy. The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, 1986, p.8.5. A. MÜLLER-ARMACK, Stil und Ordnung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, in: A. MÜLLER-ARM-ACK (ed.), Wirtschaftsordnung und Wirtschaftspolitik. Studien und Konzepte zur Sozialen Marktwirtschaftund zur Europäischen Integration, Rombach, Freiburg 1966, pp.231-242; W. STREECK,Re-forming capitalism. Institutional Change in the German Political Economy, Oxford UniversityPress, Oxford, 2009.

88 Guido THIEMEYERMaximen, die in den die Wirtschaft gestaltenden Personen lebendig werden”. 6 AlfredMüller-Armack spoke of a “Wirtschaftsstil […] wo die Erscheinungsformen im Bereichdes Sozialen und Wirtschaftlichen den Ausdruck einheitlichen Gepräges aufweisen”.7 Günther Ammon developed an approach based on a cultural and an anthropologicalbasis and defined the Wirtschaftsstil as “ein Gefüge von Symbolen, dasals Ganzes auf das gesellschaftsspezifische Sinnverständnis verweist”. 8 From thispoint of view, a Wirtschaftsstil is a texture of key words and symbols developingnational economic systems that play a decisive role in the creation of national identity.Seen from the perspective of a Wirtschaftsstil, economic instruments (as for instancea national currency) and economic institutions (e.g. Central Banks) are not only partof an economic system, but symbols of national identity. They are instruments thatgrant a deeper sense to economic policy in general. On the basis of these approachesthe article uses a definition of economic culture which depends on three elements.First, the economic and political history of a country, the economic experience ofthe population and the political and economic elite. Economic policy is strongly influencedby this collective experience in a negative or positive way. The Germanexperience of inflation in the 1920s had without any doubt a strong influence on thepolicy of deflation of the governments in the late Weimar Republic. The same appliesin a positive way to the experience of exceptional economic growth in the 1950s, aperiod which since the 1970s was transfigured as an economic miracle(“Wirtschaftswunder”). Historical experience and its collective interpretation from apresent day perspective is an important element of economic culture.A second important element is provided by the institutions of an economic systemin a wider sense. This aspect refers to the educational system, government and economyinstitutions, social partners, the role of markets and Central Banks. It refers alsoto the role of state actors in the economic system, the role of private enterprises andthe media system. In a wider sense the values and objectives of economic policy alsoplay a role. These institutions are strongly interrelated with specific terms as for instance“Colbertisme” in France and Soziale Marktwirtschaft in Germany.A third aspect of economic culture is the tradition of economic theory. Even ifeconomic research is more and more internationally organized (with a strong dominanceof Anglo-American approaches) there is still a national tradition of economicthinking in France and in Germany. These German and French traditions of economicthinking are also related to national identity of both countries and played a major rolein the national discussions on the Maastricht Treaty and Monetary Union in the 1990s.6. W. SOMBART, Der moderne Kapitalismus. Historisch-systematische Darstellung des gesamteuropäischenWirtschaftslebens von seinem Anfang bis zur Gegenwart, vol.1, Duncker und Humblot,München, 1986 (first published in 1902), p.16.7. A. MÜLLER-ARMACK, Religion und Wirtschaft. Geistesgeschichtliche Hintergründe unserer europäischenLebensform, W.Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1959, p.57.8. G. AMMON, Der französische Wirtschaftsstil, Eberhard, München, 1989, p.24.

Economic Models in France and Germany and the Debates on the Maastricht Treaty 89The French Wirtschaftsstil and the Debates on the Maastricht Treaty in the 1990sThe principal elements characterizing the French Wirtschaftsstil of the 1990semerged in the immediate after war period between 1944 and 1950. It was a periodof reconstruction not only in the economic sense but also from a political point ofview. The traumatic breakdown of the Third Republic in spring of 1940 and the virtualcivil war between 1941 and 1944 necessitated the foundation of a new state. Theinstitutional and ideological centrepiece of economic reconstruction became the“Commissariat Général du Plan” under the presidency of Jean Monnet. 9 Even thoughMonnet was not committed to a particular economic ideology, “planification” quicklybecame the “French” system of economic organization. From a technical point ofview the Commissariat Général du Plan was meant as an institution to solve theproblem of imperfect information in market economies by giving guidance and providingspecific information for the actors on the markets. The theory of “planification”had already been developed during the great depression in France in the 1930sin order to find an answer to the serious economic problems of the country. 10 As amember of the France Libre government led by Charles de Gaulle during World WarII, Monnet developed the idea of a Commissariat Général du Plan, a public institutiongiving guidelines to the actors in a market economy. The Commissariat Général duPlan was founded immediately after the liberation of the country in 1944.From the viewpoint of an historian this was nothing unusual in Western Europeafter the war. Just like France, Great Britain, Western Germany, as well as the Scandinaviancountries and Italy also adopted mixed economies after the war. They allproved to be quite successful. The origins of the economic boom of the 1950s and1960s in Western Europe are manifold, but in the public perception they were firstof all based on the particular national economic system. This was one reason why“planification” became part of the French national identity.But even though the institution (Commissariat Général du Plan) and the notionof “planification” were new, key actors stressed the continuity of the French economictradition. As Pierre Rosanvallon has shown, there was a Keynesian revolution inFrench economic policy. 11 Even though it underwent some important changes, theprinciples continued to apply until the 1990s. But why did many public intellectualsand politicians stress the elements of continuity? According to the German scholarGünther Ammon their arguments were based on the following elements: in contrastto liberal economic and political thinking, in France there was no separation between9. E. ROUSSEL, Jean Monnet 1888-1979, Fayard, Paris, 1996, p.436; C. GRUSON, Origine et espoirsde la planification française, Dunod, Paris, 1968; É. QUINET, La planification française, PUF,Paris, 1990; F. SAMMETH, Der Wiederaufbau und die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Westdeutschlands(BRD) und Frankreichs im Vergleich 1944/45 bis 1963, Verlag Dr. Kovacs, Hamburg, 2005.10. P. MIOCHE, The Origins of the Monnet Plan, EUI Working Paper N°79, Florence, 1984; E.ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.432-433.11. P. ROSANVALLON, Der Staat in Frankreich. Von 1789 bis heute, Westfälisches Dampfboot Verlag,Münster, 2000, pp.174-175 (first published in Paris 1992).

90 Guido THIEMEYERthe economic and political sector of public life. 12 Economic questions are politicalquestions and therefore have to be treated within the political system. This is a resultof the French tradition of republicanism. It is also the reason why the state has to playan important role in economy. Whereas liberal theorists argue that the state shouldrefrain from intervention in the economic system, republicans stress the guiding roleof a democratically controlled public administration for the markets. But the Frenchsystem is by no means an authoritarian socialist system comparable to the communistdictatorships in Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1990. Public administrations actas driving forces for the private economy, they give incentives for private action andguidelines for the overall development of the economy. French economic planninginvolved first of all the creation of norms rather than the delineation of choices. 13 Theeconomic elite had therefore to be trained by the state and the École Nationale d’Administrationin particular. These “énarques” play an important role in the public administrationand the management of huge enterprises that are also at least partlyowned by the state. Even though details of the system are discussed among scholars,there is no doubt that these are the intellectual pillars of the French economic systemsince 1944. It is, however, important to see that these principles did not enforce a realeconomic policy. It allowed a policy of austerity in the 1970s under the presidencyof Valéry Giscard d’Estaing as well as the socialist redistributive Keynesianism inthe early Mitterrand years of the 1980s. 14For the subject in question it is however important to see that “planification” andthe state centred economy, irrespective of their role for economic decision making,became also part of the national French identity. From the middle of the 1950s onwardEuropean integration within the framework of the EEC became therefore a menaceto the French Wirtschaftsstil. An early example for this was given by the socialistMinister for Economy Paul Ramadier who commented on the first drafts of the EuropeanEconomic Community treaty by the so called Spaak Committee in the middleof the 1950s:“L’Ouverture d’un véritable marché commun conforme aux règles prévues par le rapportde Bruxelles condamne de la manière la plus sévère les pratiques protectionnistes grâceauxquelles la reconstitution industrielle de la France a été possible et qui sont manifestementindispensables à notre agriculture. C’est la position traditionnelle de la France. Oncompterait aisément les années qui depuis le XVII e siècle se sont écoulées sous un régimede libre-échange. L’expérience tentée sous Louis XVI, renouvelée sous Napoléon III atoujours donné de médiocres résultats. On peut affirmer que sans le protectionnisme intensifdes années qui ont suivi la Libération, le relèvement français n’eut pas été possible”.1512. G. AMMON, op.cit., pp.115-225.13. P.A. HALL, op.cit., p.161.14. R. LASSERRE, Union monétaire – Währungsunion, in: J. LEENHARDT, R. PICHT (eds), AuJardin des Malentendus. Le Commerce franco-allemand des idées, Actes Sud, Paris, 1997, pp.419-426.15. Archives Départementales d’Aveyron, Fonds Ramadier, 52J114, Note sur le Marché Commun,24.05.1956.

Economic Models in France and Germany and the Debates on the Maastricht Treaty 91The arguments of Ramadier reveal important elements of the French Wirtschaftsstilthat developed after World War II. The first important element is the reference tohistory. Political intervention of the state is interpreted as part of the French tradition,of what has been called “exceptionnalité française”. To justify his opposition againstthe proposals of the Spaak Committee, Ramadier argues that there has been a traditionalFrench economic model from the age of absolutism in the 17 th century up tothe 1950s. According to this interpretation the reconstruction policy after 1944 andstate intervention in particular have been fully in line with this tradition. The adoptionof the liberal Spaak proposals would have meant a blow against French tradition andtherefore against an important part of French national identity. 16“Ce principe [i.e. liberalism] est directement contraire au développement de l’économiecollective, qui suppose une organisation systématique de l’économie d’un ou plusieurspays, sous une direction démocratique”. 17Ramadier recalled the times when French economic policy had been extremely successful,the time of Louis XIV in the 17 th century and the time of reconstruction afterWorld War II. This is exactly what Eric Hobsbawm once called an “invention oftradition”. 18 Protectionism became thus a part of French economic identity, the liberalapproach of the Common Market being therefore considered as an attack on Frenchidentity. Two important elements of the French Wirtschaftsstil can be found in thisdocument: the reference to national history and the justification of existing institutions.The French Wirtschaftsstil roughly described above also set the framework forthe intensive discussions on the Maastricht Treaty and the monetary union in the1990s. The public debate on the Maastricht Treaty started in France on 3 June 1992,when President François Mitterrand announced a referendum on the treaty. The earlydebate, however, was very much dominated by internal French policy with only littlereference to the treaty itself. The referendum therefore quickly turned into voting foror against Mitterrand and his general policy. On 20 September 1992 the French electorateaccepted the treaty with a short majority of 51.05 per cent. But the referendumdid not end the public debate that instead continued and reached its climax in themiddle of the 1990s on the occasion of the so called Stability and Growth Pact adoptedas an amendment to the Maastricht Treaty in 1997. The states adopting the Euro wouldhave to meet four convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact was meantto ensure that the member states observed them afterwards. In contrast to the firstFrench debate in 1992, the second debate in the middle of the 1990s dealt preciselywith questions about the monetary and economic consequences of the Maastricht16. See for details G. THIEMEYER, Europa zwischen Smith und Colbert. Wirtschaftsordnungen inDeutschland und Frankreich als politische Mythen und ihre Folgen für die europäische Integration,in: J. RÜSEN (ed.), Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut. Jahrbuch 1997/98, KulturwissenschaftlichesInstitut im Wissenschaftszentrum Nordrhein-Westfalen, Essen, 1998, pp.161-174.17. Note sur le Marché Commun, 24.05.1956, op.cit.18. E. HOBSBAWM, T. RANGER, The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1992.

92 Guido THIEMEYERTreaty. They focused therefore on two main subjects, monetary policy on the onehand and budgetary (fiscal) policy on the other.The French debate on the Maastricht Treaty must be seen as part of a generaldiscussion on French national identity in the 1990s. 19 As most European nations,France also was deeply shocked by the fundamental political and economic changesfollowing the end of the Cold War, German unification and the new wave of globalizationin the early 1990s. Not only the French Wirtschaftsstil, but the whole politicalphilosophy of the country was put into question in an intensive debate. Globalizationand the so called neo-libéralisme were considered as a threat to the Frenchmodel of republicanism. As a consequence, a neo-republican debate started in theearly 1990s. In this context, the Maastricht Treaty and the monetary union were consideredto be part of a general change in Western Europe and the world as a whole.This was not only an intellectual debate but a whole process which included long andintensive strikes and protests against the economic and monetary policy of the Juppégovernment. 20 Public intellectuals blamed the government for putting the countryunder a “pensée unique”, that became a metaphor for the rules set up by the MaastrichtTreaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. 21All in all, the French debate was characterized by four major positions: 22 a firstgroup was called “Anti-Maastrichtiens” (Jean-Pierre Chévènement, Philippe Séguinand others) assembling those who principally rejected the treaty. On the monetarysector they argued that a stable currency according to the Bundesbank model wouldentail important disadvantages for French enterprises on the international markets.The rigid budgetary policy as demanded by the Stability and Growth Pact was consideredas harmful for the French economic system. The public deficit could only bereduced under the conditions of an economic growth above 3% of the GDP. A secondgroup was called “Sociaux-sensibles” (Laurent Fabius, Jacques Attali and others).They agreed in principle with the rigid convergence criteria but on a long-term perspective.States like Italy or Spain would not be able to cope with the rigid monetaryand budgetary policy but for political reasons it would be impossible to exclude themfrom the start of the monetary union. Apart from that, it would be necessary to maintainthe social standards of the European states. A third group, called the “Maastrichtiensconservateurs” (President François Mitterrand and others) supported themonetary union mainly for political reasons. The economic consequences – monetarystability and budgetary rigidity -, were considered as difficult but favourable for theFrench economy. A last group, the “Libéraux” (e.g. Alain Madelin), a minority in19. F. BEILECKE, Diskursive Rehabilitierung des republikanischen Modells und Neoliberalismus-Kritik in der französischen Presse seit 1990, in: Frankreich Jahrbuch 1998, Leske und Budrich,Opladen, 1998, pp.97-112.20. R. HÖHNE, Aufstand der Privilegierten oder Verteidigung des Sozialstaats? Der Sozialkonflikt vomNovember/Dezember 1995, in: Lendemains, 81(1996), pp.107-122.21. R. HÖHNE, Neorepublikanischer Diskurs und nationale Identität. Eine aktuelle Kontroverse, in:Frankreich Jahrbuch 1998, op.cit., pp.113-120.22. Dossier Questions et Familles, in: Le Monde, 17.12.1996.

Economic Models in France and Germany and the Debates on the Maastricht Treaty 93France, supported the Maastricht convergence criteria as well as the Stability andGrowth Pact for economic reasons.The French Maastricht debate in the middle of the 1990s was very much influencedby the German question. 23 The Maastricht Treaty and the monetary union inparticular were interpreted by the “Anti-Maastrichtiens” as an instrument that wouldassert German superiority in Europe and France. Laurent Fabius, a Socialist and formerPrime Minister, therefore argued that it would be necessary to renegotiate theconvergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty in cooperation with Germany. It wouldbe necessary to enter into “an open debate” with Germany about monetary policybeing used as an instrument to support economic growth. 24 He was supported by theGaullist president of the Assemblée Nationale, Philippe Séguin, who also argued thatthe monetary and budgetary rigidity stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty was a menacenot only to France but to the whole European Union. 25 For the editorial journalistLucas Delattre, a Germany expert and former correspondent in Berlin for Le Monde,Maastricht was a milestone on the German way to leadership in Europe.“La construction européenne ne signifierait plus seulement, pour l’Allemagne, la possibilitéde reprendre l’initiative et de maîtriser à nouveau son destin; l’Europe représenteraitégalement le levier de la puissance allemande, qui se sentirait, une fois de plus, trop àl’étroit dans ses frontières. Autrement dit, après plus d’un siècle de conflits meurtriers enEurope, il est possible de penser que l’Allemagne parvient grâce à Maastricht à réaliserson objectif de toujours – la stabilité de l’Europe au service des exportations allemandeset la paix – par des moyens non militaires”. 26Maastricht from this perspective was nothing less than the continuation of the Germanhegemonic policy that had begun in 1914, but this time within a different framework.The principal aim, according to Delattre, was political and economic (monetary) stabilityin order to secure export markets for German industry. Even though Delattrewas fully aware of the fact that in 1990 the political system of the Federal Republicof Germany had nothing to do with the German Reich and Nazi Germany, there wasin his eyes nevertheless a structural continuity. Whereas Nazi Germany aimed atEuropean leadership on a racist basis, the Federal Republic gained European hegemonyon an economic basis. A key role in this concept was provided by the economicsystem of Federal Germany:“L’Allemagne continue à faire confiance aux recettes qu’elle a adoptées depuis 1945,résumées en une seule doctrine: «l’économie sociale de marché». Cette doctrine d’État[…] assure la prédominance de la «raison économique» dans le pays. Une idéologie résuméepar Hans Barbier, le très influent chef du service économique de la FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung, qui explique que «ce qui n’est pas exact sur le plan économique nepeut pas l’être politiquement non plus”.23. U. GUÉNOT, Deutschland, Frankreich und die Währungsunion. Einige sorgenvolle Anmerkungenzum Stand der Diskussion, in: Dokumente, 52(1996), pp.448-455.24. L. FABIUS, Une dernière chance de sauver l’Europe, in: Le Monde, 07.09.1996.25. P. SÉGUIN, Europe: Voici pourquoi Laurent Fabius a raison, in: Le Monde, 19.09.1996 and Larépublique et l’exception française, in: Philosophie politique, 4(1993), pp.45-62.26. L. DELATTRE, La logique allemande, in: Esprit, Mai(1996), pp.10-23, here: p.15.

94 Guido THIEMEYERHere we find one of the key elements of French preoccupation concerning the MaastrichtTreaty. The Monetary union and in particular the convergence criteria wereinterpreted as instruments to implement the German economic model on a Europeanlevel. But according to Delattre this model was not compatible with the French Wirtschaftsstil:“Les élites [allemandes], elles, rêvent bien entendu des États-Unis, mais aussi plus récemment,de Singapour. Dans le premier cas, c’est la prééminence du droit qu’on apprécie,dans le second, les performances économiques mais aussi la discipline morale. On observepeu de fascination, en tout cas, pour un modèle politique volontariste à la française”. 27From this point of view the German model of Social Market Economy is just theopposite of the French economic system. Whereas the German model was based onthe primacy of the economic sector over the political domain, the French system wasright on the contrary constructed according to the principle of political dominanceover economy. 28This was also one of the principle arguments of Jean-Pierre Chevènement, one ofthe most important opponents of the Maastricht Treaty in France. As a left wingrepublican, he argued that Maastricht provided the proof that the French system wasin a crisis. In his eyes the planned monetary union would be a dead end for Franceand European integration, 29 as in his eyes it was fundamentally opposed to the Frenchtradition of economic and political thinking.“L’actuelle majorité a abandonné la politique monétaire et la fixation des taux à uneBanque de France dite indépendante, démission majeure dont tous les tenants de Maastrichtportent la responsabilité solidaire. Ainsi a été anéantie une des œuvres maîtresses du Frontpopulaire et de la Libération”.As in 1956, in the paper by Paul Ramadier, we find again the reference to the Frenchhistory, now connected with the Front Populaire of the 1930s and once more with theliberation of 1944. Both events mark important points of reference for the identity ofthe fifth French Republic and for left wing republicans in particular. From this pointof view, the Maastricht Treaty, the monetary union and the convergence criteria werenot only harmful to the French economic system, but they were considered as anattack on French national identity.“Le passage à la monnaie unique n’est qu’en apparence une affaire technique. La monnaieest en réalité au cœur de la souveraineté. Une monnaie unique commune à deux nationsne peut durer que si elle asservit la plus faible. Elle crée, en effet, un engrenage. Elleimplique l’harmonisation des politiques budgétaires, et, à partir de là, de toutes autrespolitiques. […] Dès lors, c’est la légitimité même de l’État qui se trouve progressivementmise en cause”. 3027. Ibid., p.23.28. P. THIBAUT, L’Europe allemande… Définitivement?, in: Esprit, 221(1996), pp.53-64.29. J.P. CHEVÈNEMENT, France Allemagne. Parlons Franc, Plon, Paris, 1996, p.162.30. Ibid., pp.165 and 170.

Economic Models in France and Germany and the Debates on the Maastricht Treaty 95The transfer of monetary sovereignty from the nation state to the European CentralBank was therefore perceived as a menace to France and its political identity. Fromthis standpoint, the entire French nation was put into question. These arguments wereprincipally shared by Gaullist politicians as for instance Philippe Séguin. 31 LikeChevènement on the left side of the political spectrum, he considered the transfer ofmonetary sovereignty a fundamental attack on French identity. In March 1993 heeven asked himself whether France would still exist in the year 2000. 32Not only politicians, but also French economists fought against the MaastrichtTreaty. One important example was Maurice Allais who won the Nobel memorialprize in economic sciences in 1988. In several articles published between 1992 and1994 mainly in Le Figaro, he criticized the treaty for several reasons: firstly, in hiseyes it was not democratically legitimized.“L’application du Traité de Rome s’est accompagnée d’une dérive technocratique, dirigiste,centralisatrice, unitaire et jacobine de la Communauté Européenne. Des décisionsmajeures ont été prises sans qu’aucun débat démocratique réel ait pu prendre place. Cettedérive et ces perversions ne peuvent qu’être accentuées par l’application du Traité deMaastricht”. 33Secondly, the objectives named by the treaty were irreconcilable. On the one handthe treaty pleaded for monetary stability, on the other hand for general support of theeconomic policy by the member countries. This would inevitably lead to contradictionsand difficulties. Thirdly, Allais saw the Maastricht Treaty as an element of thegeneral tendency toward free trade liberalism in the world economy. This, accordingto him, would lead to economic instability and unemployment. The argumentsbrought forward against the Maastricht Treaty by Allais are good examples for theFrench Wirtschaftsstil of the 1990s. Again we find the reference to history, in particularthe French Revolution (reference to Jacobinism) and the major idea of democraticcontrol of international (monetary) markets.All in all, the French opposition against the Maastricht Treaty and the monetaryunion was characterized by three elements:Firstly, there was a certain interpretation of the French history since the Revolution.Jean Pierre Chevènement, Paul Ramadier and also Maurice Allais saw themselvesas being part of a long tradition that could not be given up without renouncingthe identity of the French state itself. The traditions of the Colbertisme (Ramadier)the Front Populaire and liberation (Chevènement) served as key elements of a nationaleconomic tradition. The French Wirtschaftsstil therefore was based on a certain interpretationof national history.31. C. BANERJEE, Will Paris wirklich die gemeinsame Währung? Zweifel und Alternativvorstellungenbei den Gaullisten, in: Dokumente, 51(1995), pp.411-416.32. RPR, La France que nous voulons avec le RPR, mars 1993, p.12.33. M. ALLAIS, Quatre Raisons Majeures et Impératives de ne pas ratifier le Traité de Maastricht, in:Le Figaro, 06.09.1992. See also: M. ALLAIS, Combats pour l’Europe 1992-1994, Clément Juglar,Paris, 1994, p.41.

96 Guido THIEMEYERSecondly, one could observea certain perception of Germany and its political andeconomic system. The liberal Common Market in the 1950s and the Monetary Unionin the 1990s were interpreted as being influenced by the German economic model ofthe “Social Market Economy” and as such a German attack on the French model of“planification” and the French economic tradition in general. For Chevènement,Séguin and many others, Maastricht had become a symbol of German intellectual andinstitutional hegemony in the European Union. The monetarist theory, i.e. the primacyof monetary stability among the objectives of economic policy was considered as amenace to the French Wirtschaftsstil.Thirdly, the argument of a missing democratic control of the economy and theEuropean Central Bank in particular played also a major role.The German Wirtschaftsstil and the debates on monetary union in the middle ofthe 1990s.Even though there was no referendum held in Germany on the Maastricht Treaty, anintensive debate on European integration and the monetary union in particular tooknevertheless place. As in France, the years of 1995 and 1996 marked the culminatingpoint of the debates. And just like in France, the German debate was framed by aparticular German “Wirtschaftsstil that was part of the national identity of the country.This German “Wirtschaftsstil originated in the 1950s. The total defeat in 1945 ofNazi Germany and the division of the country in the year 1949 necessitated the foundationof a totally new political and economic system. Under the influence of theUnited States government and the first Minister of Economy, Ludwig Erhard, theFederal Republic of Germany adopted an economic system that soon became knownas Soziale Marktwirtschaft. 34 Soziale Marktwirtschaft originally is a notion createdby the German economist Alfred Müller-Armack in order to describe an economicsystem in which the freedom of markets and the laisser-faire liberalism are combinedwith social protection. 35 Originally, the theory rested on two pillars: first, ordoliberalism,a theory developed in the 1930s by a group of German and Austrian34. G. AMBROSIUS, Die Durchsetzung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft in Westdeutschland1945-1949, DVA, Stuttgart, 1979; W. ABELSHAUSER, Des Kaisers neue Kleider? Wandlungender Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, Roman-Herzog-Inst., Munich, 2007; H. LAMPERT, Die WirtschaftsundSozialordnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Olzog, Landsberg, 1990, p.88.35. A. MÜLLER-ARMACK, Soziale Marktwirtschaft, in: E. von BECKERATH, C. BRINKMANN,H. BENTE, Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften, vol.9, G. Fischer Verlag, Stuttgart, 1956,pp.390-392.

Economic Models in France and Germany and the Debates on the Maastricht Treaty 97economists as a response to the crisis of liberalism since the end of the 1920s. 36 Thesecond pillar is the Catholic Social Teaching developed since 1891 and providingsocial security. 37This concept was picked up by Erhard and the Ministry of Economy in the WesternGerman election campaign of 1953 to describe the economic system of the FederalRepublic and the CDU. 38 In this context it became the economic program of theconservative party, the German Christian democrats, and later on also of the liberalparty FDP. This proved to be highly successful. The Soziale Marktwirtschaft becamea symbol of economic success, the so-called “Economic Miracle” (“Wirtschaftswunder”).39 In 1959 therefore also the Social Democrats SPD adopted the expression ofSoziale Marktwirtschaft to describe their respective economic concept even thoughit differed significantly from the Christian Democrat concept. In the 1990s, that is theperiod of intensive debate on the Maastricht Treaty in Germany, all German politicalparties from the extreme left (PDS, successor of the East-German Communist partySED) to the liberal FDP advocated Soziale Marktwirtschaft as their economic pointof reference. It is clear that there were considerable differences concerning therespective parties’ concept of economic policy, but all of them referred to the SozialeMarktwirtschaft.This shows that the Soziale Marktwirtschaft, apart from the theoretical conceptdeveloped by Müller Armack and others, had become a formula to describe the extremelysuccessful German economic system. The expression became central duringthe CDU election campaigns of 1953 and 1957 and was presented as the origin of thestupendous economic recovery of Western Germany at the time. 40 As a matter of fact,there was no coherent economic system in Western Germany. 41 Economic historyhas therefore made the difference between a phase of ordoliberal dominance in WesternGerman economic policy from 1949 to 1966, a phase of Keynesianism from 1967to 1983, and a second phase of ordoliberalism from 1983 to 1990. The Treaty on36. G. AMBROSIUS, Der Neoliberalismus und die europäische Fundamentalkrise zwischen 1914und 1945, in: H. SCHOLTEN (ed.), Die Wahrnehmung von Krisenphänomenen. Fallbeispiele vonder Antike bis in die Neuzeit, Köln, 2007, pp.251-266; M. WEGMANN, Früher Neoliberalismusund Europäische Integration. Interdependenzen der nationalen, supranationalen und internationalenOrdnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1932-1965), Nomos, Baden-Baden 2002.37. C.E. CURRAN, Catholic Social Teaching, 1891 to the present, Georgetown University Press,Washington, 2002.38. V. HENTSCHEL, Ludwig Erhard. Ein Politikerleben, Olzog, Landsberg, 1996, p.197; P. COM-MUN, La conversion de Ludwig Erhard à l’ordolibéralisme, in: P. COMMUN (ed.), L’ordolibéralismeallemand. Aux Sources de l’économie sociale de marché, CIRAC/CICC, Cergy-Pontoise,2003, pp.175-199.39. L. LINDLAR, Das missverstandene Wirtschaftswunder. Westdeutschland und die westeuropäischeNachkriegsprosperität, Mohr-Siebeck, Tübingen, 1997.40. For an example see: Erhards Soziale Marktwirtschaft. Advertisment during the election campaignof 1953, in: Rhein Neckar Zeitung, 05.09.1953.41. H.G. HOCKERTS, Der deutsche Sozialstaat. Entfaltung und Gefährdung seit 1945, Vandenhoeck& Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2011, p.11; L. LEISERING, Der deutsche Nachkriegssozialstaat – Entfaltungund Krise eines zentristischen Sozialmodells, in: H.-P. Schwarz (ed.), Die BundesrepublikDeutschland: eine Bilanz nach 60 Jahren, Böhlau, Köln/Wien, 2008, p.428.

98 Guido THIEMEYERMonetary, Economic and Social Union between the two German states (Unification)from 18 May 1990 defined Soziale Marktwirtschaft as an economic order characterizedby private property, free competition, free pricing and freedom for capital,labour, goods and services. 42 All in all, Soziale Marktwirtschaft like the French“planification” never entailed a concrete economic policy but remained flexible. Eventhough free market competition prevailed, there were from the beginning importanteconomic sectors that were organized by state intervention, as for instance agriculture,transport policy and social security.However, monetary stability was one element of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft thatwas particularly important and widely shared by the political and economic elite. 43According to ordoliberalism, only a Central Bank that was institutionally independentfrom the federal and regional governments could guarantee the stability of prices.Public deficit financing through Central Bank credits was therefore precluded by theBundesbankgesetz. The Deutsche Mark became one of the most stable currencies inthe world and from the 1960s onwards the key currency of Western Europe. Eventhough in the early 1970s Western Germany was confronted with inflation rates ofabout seven per cent and the independence of the Bundesbank was violated in 1990by the Kohl government in the context of German unification, Central Bank independenceand monetary stability were considered to be the key elements of the Germaneconomic system. Like the Soziale Marktwirtschaft, the Deutsche Mark becameone of the symbols of German economic recovery and a symbol of national identity.Both elements were decisive for the emergence of the German Wirtschaftsstil inthe 1950s. Ludwig Erhard was not only the symbol of economic success, he becameone of the most important creators of the German Wirtschaftsstil. In 1958, on theoccasion of the tenth anniversary of the monetary reform and the introduction of theDeutsche Mark, he said in a radio speech:“Es gehörten schon gute Nerven, starke Herzen und ein unbeirrtes Wollen dazu, die deutscheWirtschaft und die deutsche Währung durch alle Fährnisse, alle bequemen Verlockungenund feindliche Bedrohung glücklich hindurchzusteuern. […] An Warnungen, antrüben Prophezeiungen und an Drohungen hat es durch alle diese Jahre wahrlich nichtgefehlt, und wenn auch die Besserwisser, die Kritiker und Pessimisten aller Sorten mitihren falschen Prophezeiungen und dadurch bewirkten Verwirrung des deutschen Volkesdurch das Leben immer wieder ad absurdum geführt wurden, so hat es doch lange gewährt,bis sich die Idee und das Prinzip der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft auf breiter Grundlagedurchgesetzt und in der Bevölkerung Resonanz gefunden haben. […] Ich möchte in dieserStunde der Besinnung darauf verzichten, das Äußere und das Atmosphärische dieses Geschehensnoch einmal auszubreiten. Obwohl ich es bewusst nacherlebe, wie vor zehn Jah-42. Vertrag über die Schaffung einer Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion zwischen der BundesrepublikDeutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Staatsvertrag) vom 18. Mai1990, Kapitel 1, Artikel 1, Absatz 3.43. DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (ed.), Fünfzig Jahre Deutsche Mark, Beck, Munich 1988; H. RO-EPER, Die D-Mark. Eine deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Societäts-Verlag, Frankfurt, 1996; M.POHL, Das Symbol für Freiheit und Stabilität. Die D-Mark 1948-2001, in: M. POHL, H. JAMES,C.L. HOLTFRERICH, Requiem auf eine Währung. Die Mark 1873-2001, DTV, Stuttgart 2001, pp.7-59.

Economic Models in France and Germany and the Debates on the Maastricht Treaty 99ren das deutsche Volk in innerem Zwiespalt zugleich hoffte und bangte, als das Unfassbare,die Aufhebung der Bewirtschaftung, der Rationierung, das Bezugsscheinwesen, der PreisundLohnbildung sowie der sklavischen Unterjochung jeder menschlichen freien Regung,lebendige und beglückende Wirklichkeit werden sollte [sic!]”. 44This speech by Erhard is a good example for how and why a Wirtschaftsstil develops.The most important element is again the reference to history. Even though only tenyears have gone by since the monetary reform and the introduction of the DeutscheMark, Erhard refers to this event as if it were at the origin of the extraordinary economicgrowth in Germany. In this as in many other speeches the introduction of theDeutsche Mark is referred to as a mystic act of creation. The Deutsche Mark and thesystem of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft are at the origin of the “Wirtschaftswunder”,a glorifying expression for the economic success of the 1950s. Even though historicalresearch has shown that monetary reform and the Deutsche Mark were only tworeasons of minor importance for German economic growth, both remained in collectivememory.All in all, the German Wirtschaftsstil consisted of three elements:Firstly, the expression “Soziale Marktwirtschaft”, an economic concept that hadturned into a symbol for German economic success in the 1950s and 1960s; secondly,the Deutsche Mark, a symbol for monetary and economic stability and thirdly theconcept of the independence of the Central Bank as a precondition for monetarystability.The German public debate on the Maastricht Treaty and the monetary unionstarted in January 1994. 45 In its general structure it differed from the French debate:if the majority of the population was sceptical about giving up the Deutsche Mark,the political and economic elite (with the important exception of the Deutsche Bundesbank)was in favour of the monetary union. The opponents of monetary integrationwere economists, experts in public law and some journalists, in particular the economicdepartment of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.One of the vocal opponents was the economist Joachim Starbatty, a professor atthe University of Tübingen. Together with other liberal economists he severely rejectedthe European monetary union and the abandonment of the Deutsche Mark. Inhis eyes, the main arguments that spoke in favour of the monetary union were noteconomic reasons but political interests of France and other European countries. AsErhard before, he evoked the history of the introduction of the Deutsche Mark:“Wie war die Situation vor der Währungsreform von 1948? Bündel labbriger Geldscheine,Lebensmittelkarten, leere Warenregale, schwarze Märkte. Wie war sie nach dem Stichtag?44. L. ERHARD, Zehn Jahre Währungs- und Wirtschaftsreform (Rundfunkansprache am 19. Juni1958), in: L. ERHARD, Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik. Der Weg der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, Econ,Düsseldorf, 1992. (first published in 1962), pp.388-389.45. G. THIEMEYER, „Maastricht“ in der öffentlichen Debatte. Eine deutsche und eine französischeoder eine deutsch-französische Diskussion?, in: D. HÜSER, J.-F. ECK (eds), Medien-Debatten-Öffentlichkeiten in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Franz Steiner Verlag,Stuttgart, 2011, pp.307-320.

100 Guido THIEMEYERNeues Geld, Preisreform, volle Warenregale, keine Lebensmittelkarten und keine schwarzenMärkte mehr. Die D-Mark wurde ein Erfolg: Vom Kellerkind zum Weltstar (HansRoeper). Nun wird sie gegen den Euro eingetauscht, von dem ein Teil der politischenKlasse behauptet, er werde so stabil wie die DM”. 46The Maastricht Treaty and the monetary union therefore represented a threat to Germanyand its economic system: “Ziel der gemeinsamen Währung [ist] eigentlich dieAbschaffung der D-Mark und der Deutschen Bundesbank; von ihr fühlten sich dieMitgliedstaaten der EU bevormundet”. 47 Seen from this perspective, the monetaryunion was an instrument to discriminate against Germany and its leading role in theEuropean political and economic system.Starbatty was not the only one to polemicize against the monetary union. Togetherwith two other economists and a professor in public law, Karl AlbrechtSchachtschneider, he brought the decision of the Bundestag in favour of the MaastrichtTreaty before the German constitutional court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht.48 The court, however, decided that the integration of Germany into the monetaryunion was in accordance with the German constitution.Another example of a publicity-oriented argumentation in the Maastricht debatein the 1990s is an appeal published in February 1998 by a group of ordoliberal Germaneconomists on the initiative of Wim Kösters, Manfred Neumann, Renate Ohr andRoland Vaubel. 49 They argued that in spite of the Stability and Growth Pact therewas no guarantee for the sustainability of monetary stability in the monetary union.They referred exclusively to economic arguments and were primarily preoccupied bythe internal and external stability of the Euro. There was, however, an answer byanother group of German economists “against euro-scepticism” initiated by PeterBofinger. They saw good chances that Europe could develop a “culture of stability”:“Es gibt keinen Grund, den Ländern in der EU den ernsthaften Willen zu hoher Preisstabilitätabzusprechen. In den 70er Jahren wurden in Europa sicher stabilitätspolitische Fehlergemacht, doch die Lernprozesse sind evident”. 50Even though the first manifest argued against monetary union and the second was infavour of European monetary integration they both advocated monetary stability asthe most important aim of economic policy. This again shows the dominance of ordoliberalismamong German economic scholars in the 1990s. Both positions were46. J. STARBATTY, Schicksalhafte Entscheidung und politische Argumentation – Bundestag undBundesrat zum Euro, in: W. NÖLLING, K.A. SCHACHTSCHNEIDER, J. STARBATTY (eds),Währungsunion und Weltwirtschaft, Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart, 1999, pp.201-223.47. Ibid., p.202.48. W. HANKEL, W. NÖLLING, K.A. SCHACHTSCHNEIDER, J. STARBATTY, Die Euro-Klage.Warum die Währungsunion scheitern muß, Rororo, Reinbek 1998.49. Der Euro kommt zu früh. Professoren der Wirtschaftswissenschaften nehmen Stellung zum geplantenStart der Europäischen Währungsunion. Still available under: http://blog.d-perspektive.de/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/155-Profs-Der-Euro-kommt-zu-frueh_980209_KoBog.pdf(09.08.2012).50. 10 Punkte wider die Euro-Skepsis. Wort laut des 10-Punkte Appells „Pro Euro“ verfasst von 58Wirtschaftsprofessoren. http://www.economics.uni-wuerzburg.de/fileadmin/12010100/sonstiges/Euro_Manifest.pdf (09.08.2012).

Economic Models in France and Germany and the Debates on the Maastricht Treaty 101shared within the German economic media. Whereas the economic department of theFrankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung supported euro-sceptics, the weekly journal DieZeit advocated monetary union but also under the condition of a priority for monetarystability.These examples show the significance of the German Wirtschaftsstil for the debateon the Maastricht Treaty and the monetary union in the 1990s. All three elements ofa Wirtschaftsstil proved to be relevant in this context: firstly the reference to history,i.e. the monetary reform and the introduction of the Deutsche Mark in 1947 and the“Wirtschaftswunder” of the 1950s by Erhard in 1956 and again by Starbatty in 1996.Secondly, from an institutional point of view, the important position and independenceof the Deutsche Bundesbank. Both, supporters and critics of the monetary unionin Germany were convinced of the importance of the independent status of the CentralBank. Thirdly, in Germany, there is in the 1990s still a predominating ordoliberaltradition of economic thinking among the majority of economic scholars and in thepublic administration. It is also important to see that the critics of European (monetary)integration saw Maastricht as an attack on the German Wirtschaftsstil and thereforeon German national identity.The significance of Economic styles Wirtschaftsstil in France and in Germanyin the 1990sSeen from the perspective of their respective economic style Wirtschaftsstil, Franceand Germany seem to be in opposition to one another: on the one hand the SozialeMarktwirtschaft emphasizing free market operation and monetary stability eventhough with a state guaranteed social protection, on the other a Republican stateeconomy with democratic control of the Central Bank and the monetary policy. Fromthis point of view, France and Germany seem to have fundamentally different economicsystems and this was in both countries an important argument of the respectiveopponents against monetary union.It is therefore astonishing to compare some central economic figures of botheconomies. To start with the most important indicator for monetary policy, inflationrates:1961-73 1974-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996 1997France 4,8% 10,5% 2,9% 2,3% 1,9% 1,1%Federal Germany 3,5% 4,3% 1,5% 3,5% 1,9% 1,9%Even though monetary stability seemed to be the most important aim of economicpolicy in Germany, whereas in the French system its significance was of secondaryimportance, the long-term figures show no important difference between both countries.Since the middle of the 1980s, in particular, there seems to be a convergence of

102 Guido THIEMEYERmonetary policy between France and Germany. One reason for that can undoubtedlybe found in the foundation of the European Monetary System in 1979 that obligedboth Central Banks to close cooperation in monetary policy. The same result can befound concerning public deficit (in per cent of GDP): 511961-73 1974-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996 1997France 0,7% -1,7% -1,8% -4,5% -4,1% -3,0%Federal Germany 0,2% -2,8% -1,5% -3,1% -3,4% -2,7%Even though the French Wirtschaftsstil demands public investments and an importantrole of the state in the national economy whereas the German ordoliberalismstresses the importance of budgetary discipline, there can’t be found, in a long-termperspective, any significant difference between both countries concerning their statefinances. The reason for this convergence is twofold: firstly, in spite of contradictingWirtschaftsstilen, both countries followed a pragmatic economic policy. Both, Franceand Germany, knew times where they rather turned to a Keynesian-oriented policy,as well as phases of austerity. Secondly, European integration in particular within theframework of the EMS, required close cooperation of governments and Central Banksconcerning monetary and budgetary policy.What, then, was the role of the Wirtschaftsstil in both countries? Why did leadingpoliticians, economists and public intellectuals stress the role of economic philosophiesand traditions of their country? The discussions on the Maastricht Treaty andthe monetary union in France and Germany during the 1990s showed that the Wirtschaftsstilein both countries were of a certain relevance for economic policy. Butthey were even more significant in the debates on identity. During the 1990s NeoRepublicanism in France claimed for a return to the Republican ideals of the countrysince the Great revolution. Globalization, monetary union, neo liberalism and “penséeunique” were considered as harmful for democracy and national solidarity. TheFrench Wirtschaftsstil of the 1990s was defined to a large extent in a negative way:through the rejection of monetary and budgetary stability, austerity and free marketeconomy. These economic values, however, were assigned to Germany and thereforethe neo-republican discourse in France of the 1990s had an anti-German aspect. TheFrench Wirtschaftsstil of the 1990s was therefore essentially negative, French identitywas constructed against an imaginary threat, the ultra-rapid and fundamental socioeconomictransformation of the country under the influence of what has been calledglobalization. 52 From this point of view, Germany was the main actor and the MaastrichtTreaty its instrument to threaten France.A similar situation can be found in Germany: the end of the Cold War, Germanunification and the economic and social challenges the country was facing during the1990s inevitably led to a discussion on German national identity. The Maastricht51. Frankreich Jahrbuch 1998, op.cit., p.256.52. E. HOBSBAWM, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1992, pp.164-165.

Economic Models in France and Germany and the Debates on the Maastricht Treaty 103debate and the question of monetary integration seemed to be threatening the GermanWirtschaftsstil, the system of Soziale Marktwirtschaft, monetary and budgetary stabilityand also the institutional system of the country. The debate on the MaastrichtTreaty was therefore part of a general discussion on German identity. And as inFrance, also the German Wirtschaftsstil was constructed ex negativo: it was the rejectionof the French model of “planification” that, from the perspective of ordoliberalism,was a synonym for high inflation rates and budgetary laxness.Why did France and Germany define at that time these Wirtschaftsstile reciprocallyin a mainly negative way? It was because the nations (not only France andGermany) were visibly loosing important parts of their old functions, namely that ofconstituting a territorially bounded “national economy” within a larger world economy.53 Some of the contemporaries were aware of this context: the journalist JacquesBarraux explained the French debate on Maastricht in the journal L’Express on 22January 1996:“Il vient peut-être de l’attachement profond aux symboles qui ont fondé l’unité du paysdepuis un demi-siècle. Il y a des mots qui font peur, des vérités que l’on n’ose pas étaler.Les Français ironisent sur les énarques et s’indignent des désordres du secteur public. Mais,s’ils critiquent les acteurs, ils souhaitent que la pièce reste à l’affiche. Ils demeurent fidèlesà une certaine idée de l’État, du service public ou de la Sécurité sociale. Ils ont peur duvide qui succéderait à une remise en cause trop brutale du système”. 5453. Ibid., p.175.54. J. BARRAUX, L’État boîte noire, in: L’Express, 22.01.1996, http://lexpansion.lexpress.fr/economie/l-etat-boite-noire_4631.html (01.06.2012).

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105Designing a Central Bank in the Run-Up to MaastrichtHarold JAMESThe 1990s saw the emergence of a new philosophy of central banking, in whichindependence of central banks from the political process became a core componentof the culture of monetary stability. Europe played a pivotal role in the formulationof the new philosophy, largely because designing a new central bank outside theframework of the nation-state raised new conceptual issues. 1 In every country, therewas a continual and natural tension between governments’ wish to control and manipulatemonetary policy for the sake of short-term growth and short-term politicaladvantage, and the logical prerequisites for long-term monetary stability. If stablemoney were to be an international rather than a merely national good, that conflictwould take on an additional level of complexity. That was especially the case in theEuropean context, where there were contrasting philosophies of monetary management,with on one side an entrenched German view of the importance of central bankautonomy, and on the other side a French emphasis on traditions of economic managementand the primacy of politics. 2Unlike the late 1970s, when the principal push for a new European monetarysolution came from high politics, and in particular from an initiative of ChancellorHelmut Schmidt and President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, when the push for monetaryunion was renewed in the late 1980s, EC Commission President Jacques Delors waskeen to ensure that central bankers played a critical part in designing the new institutionsand laying out the blueprint for transition. Central bankers composed thedominant majority of the Delors Committee that in 1988-89 sketched out the road tomonetary union; and central bankers also played a crucial part in designing the institutionalrealization – one that not surprisingly (given who was in charge of designingit) accorded a high priority to the realization of central bank independence.The Delors Report envisaged monetary union as the establishment of “a currencyarea in which policies are managed jointly with a view to attaining commonmacroeconomic objectives”. It would be achieved in stages: in the first, anticipatinga treaty changing the character of the European Communities, the European centralbank governors would establish sub-committee dealing with monetary policy, withexchange rate policy and banking supervision. In the second stage, the new EuropeanSystem of Central Banks (henceforth ECSB) would absorb the already existing Committeeof Governors of the Member Countries of the European Communities, andwould manage the transition from the combination of monetary policies of nationalcentral banks to a common monetary policy. In the third stage, exchange rates would1. This paper draws heavily from H. JAMES, Making the European Monetary Union: The Role of theCommittee of Central Bank Governors and the Origins of the European Central Bank, Harvard UniversityPress, Harvard, 2012.2. See N. JABKO, The Hidden Face of the Euro, in: Journal of European Public Policy, 3(2010), pp.318–334.

106 Harold JAMESbe locked finally and irrevocably. The ESCB would then pool reserves and manageinterventions with regard to third currencies.The Committee of Governors of the Member Countries of the European Communities(henceforth CoG) occupied a central role in this debate. It had originallybeen created in 1964, in response to a feeling that European monetary matters hadbeen subject to too much discussion and intervention at a global level (in particularwith US involvement). It offered a sanctum where central bankers could communein an environment largely free of immediate political pressure. In the early 1990s, theCoG was chiefly responsible for drawing up the details of a new monetary constitution,and thus for leaving its intellectual imprint on Europe’s future monetary institutions.In the aftermath of the Delors Report, the CoG began to transform itself froma committee or forum for the exchange of ideas and information into the skeletonapparatus of a central bank. The translation of the Delors Report into a potential basisfor a new central bank depended on the extension of the existing, rather informal,group structure of the CoG. The governors, in their personal capacity, had constitutedthe core of the Delors Committee. The report provided the big vision, as it were thepoetry of monetary reform. The governors now hoped that they would be able to writethe “prose version” of the treaty provisions that would govern any new institutionaladvance. There was an explicit acknowledgment that, far from being marginalized asthe governors had feared at the outset of the negotiations about the new monetaryorder, the CoG was the “prefiguration” of new institutions. 3A political science distinction is helpful in considering the function of the centralbankers in developing notions from the Delors Report into an institutional reality.The Delors Committee has sometimes been described as an “epistemic community”in that its success depended on its ability to project a shared vision. What distinguishesan epistemic community from a merely bureaucratic body is that whereas the bureaucracies“operate largely to preserve their missions and budgets”, the epistemiccommunity applies “consensual knowledge to a policy enterprise subject to theirnormative objectives”. 4 Bureaucratic structures are much more limited, and cannoteasily work in a transformative way, because they are protecting interests rather thanpromoting ideas. By contrast, the process described in this paper is less one of bureaucraticcapture than of the promotion of an idea or a vision.The development of central banking corresponds with a broader internationalmovement to produce a framework for managing globalization through the introductionof new rules but also by unburdening the political process by delegating respon-3. Interviews. See also HADB [Historisches Archiv der Deutschen Bundesbank, Frankfurt],B330/18436, Betr. Tagung des Gouveneursausschusss am 11. Juli 1989, 05.07.1989; BdF [Archivesof the Banque de France], 1489200205/11, A l’intention de M. Lagayette: Commentaires sur la lettrede M. Van Wijk à Gunter Baer, n.d. [1992].4. A. VERDUN, The Role of the Delors Committee in the Creation of EMU: An Epistemic Community?,in: Journal of European Public Policy, 6(1999), pp.308–328; P.M. HAAS, Introduction: EpistemicCommunities and International Policy Coordination, in: International Organization, 1(Winter1992), p.19.

Designing a Central Bank in the Run-Up to Maastricht 107sibilities to transnational experts. 5 The visionaries associated with this process at boththe international and the European level were largely French, and came from a Frenchschool of thinking of how experts might manage policy: the crucial roles were playednot only by Jacques Delors but also by Jacques de Larosière, Governor of the Banquede France in the early 1990s, but a former prominent international civil servant asManaging Director of the International Monetary Fund. Jean-Claude Trichet, directorof the French Treasury, and Pascal Lamy, Delors’ chef de cabinet, figures who laterbecame central to the business of managing globalization, already played a prominentpart in the debates of the early 1990s.Drawing Up a StatuteThe framing of the new European monetary order occurred in several different contexts:the tensions following from German monetary policy, which created problemsfor French policymakers (and also for US policymakers); the political suspicionsfollowing from the sudden German unification process in 1990; but also a longertermdebate about the desirability of central bank independence. A fundamental conflictbroke out over the choice of the forum that should realize the proposals of theDelors Committee. The French and German Finance Ministers, Pierre Bérégovoy andTheo Waigel, met on August 24–25, 1989, at Rottach-Egern on the South GermanTegernsee, a meeting that proved to be the beginning of a period of very close German-Frenchrapport on monetary arrangements. Both Ministers agreed to push forthe Monetary Committee and the CoG to be the central arenas for discussion. Thecentral bank governors, Jacques de Larosière and Karl Otto Pöhl, as well as Jean-Claude Trichet, director of the French treasury, were also prominent participants inthe Tegernsee meeting. The financial experts faced some competition: a study groupunder President François Mitterrand’s policy adviser Elisabeth Guigou believed thatit was Foreign Ministers who should be responsible for a proposal that would lead toa new EC treaty, and wanted to exclude the technocrats. But the Guigou paper waslargely ignored, and the central bankers continued to play the central role in preparingfor monetary union. The EC Monetary Committee then prepared a paper that waspresented to an informal ECOFIN and CoG meeting in Ashford Castle (March 31–April 1, 1990) in Ireland, which in practice left the elaborations of the detailed draftto the CoG. 6When central bankers design a new central bank, they obviously draw lessonsfrom their own experiences. In the 1960s the members of the CoG had emphaticallyasserted their independence from Community institutions, from the Commission and5. R. ABDELAL, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance, Harvard University Press, CambridgeMass., 2007.6. See C. MAZZUCELLI, France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create theEuropean Union, Garland, New York, 1997, pp.65–66.

108 Harold JAMESthe Council; but in reality the majority were highly dependent on governments andFinance Ministers. The debate of the early years had thus focused heavily on therelations of national governments with European institutions. The general issue ofcentral bank autonomy or independence, which had been a prominent concern in the1920s, in the era of the fiercely proud Bank of England Governor Montagu Norman,was not very widely discussed in the golden years of post-1945 economic growth. Inpart, monetary policy was not seen as a centrally important part of general economicpolicy-making; in part, the international fixed-exchange-rate system provided a simplemonetary rule.In the 1970s high levels of inflation and the end of the par value system ensuredthat there was more discussion not only of monetary policy (including at the CoG),but also of the circumstances in which an optimal monetary policy could begin to beimplemented.Two large issues emerged as crucial, the first concerning the status of a centralbank, the second relating to the policy guidelines to be adopted. The two were clearlyclosely related in that a wrong institutional framework for central banking might beexpected to lead to bad policy decisions. In both cases, there was a wide variety ofpractices among the national European central banks. Achieving some sort of reconciliationbetween the different modes of operating appeared to be an intractableissue, but during the 1990s both questions were resolved. The first was resolved bythe treaty process. The issue of monetary policy formulation could not be dealt within this way, and in fact it was eventually handled in the European Monetary Institutethrough the development of a new institutional mechanism.Realizing Central Bank IndependenceCentral bank independence was at the core of the discussions of the Delors Committeeand of the recommendations of the Delors Report, as well as of the controversies thatit provoked at the political level, especially in Paris. Without inclusion of this principle,the text would have been unacceptable to Germany. The result was reflectedin the draft statute evolved by the alternates in 1990, whose first article seemed toecho the terms of the 1957 Bundesbank Law. But the key to independence was actuallynot to be found in the specific text of an article of the statute, but rather in themechanism for putting the statute into force.Three aspects of the new institutional arrangements were vital to German willingnessto move to sacrifice the Bundesbank’s role in monetary policy. First, a nationallaw, even one such as the Bundesbank law that seems to command a deepnational political consensus, could always be altered by legislative process. On theother hand, altering an international treaty that created the European Union wouldrequire the unanimity of the signatories. Consequently, Bundesbankers who reflectedon why their 1980s scepticism about economic and monetary union (EMU) had turned

Designing a Central Bank in the Run-Up to Maastricht 109into later support for the process always gave the answer that what mattered wascentral bank independence; and that while the Bundesbank was protected by a law,the ECB was backed by an international treaty. This operation seemed to echo oneof the most successful operations in German monetary and economic history: thecurrency reform of 1948 and the new monetary institutions (the Bank DeutscherLänder, the forerunner of the Bundesbank) were not the creation of German law, butoriginated from an Allied military government. Many Germans quickly realized thatin the long run this setting of monetary institutions outside a democratic frameworkmade them better off, as it removed the institution from political controversy andfrom the temptation to politicians to make legal and institutional changes. The secondvital aspect of the new arrangements lay in a mechanism for excluding the EuropeanParliament from any influence on monetary policy-making. The Frankfurt centralbankers saw the risk that transferring the business of central banking to a Europeanlevel would involve a new array of political actors, including the EC Commissionand the European Parliament. 7 Third, there was an awareness that law and practicedo not always conform. The Bundesbank negotiators were particularly emphatic intheir insistence that independence had to be a “lived reality”. 8The EC Monetary Committee found two aspects of the institutional architectureproblematic. What would happen in Stage Two? Germany, supported by a broadgrouping of Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands, saw noreal need for Stage Two institutions at all, besides offering the kind of technicalfunctions that the CoG in fact already provided. A separate stage was therefore redundant,and would only be an unnecessary and unwelcome invitation to increasedpoliticization of central banking. By contrast, France and Italy, while recognizing thatultimate responsibility would remain with national authorities until Stage Three,thought that there would be a need for a “factory” to be established during Stage Twoin order to create the basis for immediate policy effectiveness in the next stage. 9A further issue was raised by the prospect of the availability of new financialresources. Who should control them, and on the basis of what conditionality? Thehistory of EC conditionality was a saga of softness and failure, and interestingly therewas no distance between France and Germany on this issue. Discussing the deterioratingsituation in Greece in late 1989, the French treasury director Jean-ClaudeTrichet wondered whether a new conditionality mechanism should be applied to anew loan, but went on to comment that “the IMF was the better vehicle for conditionality”.Hans Tietmeyer, then State Secretary in the German Finance Ministry,agreed, on the grounds that EC discussions tended to be politicized and affected byinterest linkage. As he put it, “Country conditionality would be watered down bypolitics, including by interventions by the Commission and the Foreign Affairs7. CoG [Committee of Governors archive, European Central Bank Frankfurt], Alternates discussion,08.01.1990.8. Interview with Helmut Schlesinger.9. BoE [Bank of England Archive, London], 8A/225/2, Monetary Committee meeting, 24.04.1990.

110 Harold JAMESCouncil”. 10 The whole history of European integration was one of sharp limits onattempts to impose conditionality on member countries.In seeking to avoid politically influenced monetary decisions, the Monetary Committeewas writing itself out of the future of the European design and making centralbankers the decisive part of the process. At the May 1990 meeting of the MC, therewas a consensus to recommend guarantees of the institutional, operational, personal,and financial autonomy of the national central banks operating in the new system. Inline with the German views, the Monetary Committee report of July 1990 emphasizedthat the passage to Stage Two and Stage Three might not necessarily be made simultaneouslyby all member countries, and that measures should be taken to reinforcemarket discipline over budget deficits. The Monetary Committee’s “orientations” forthe intergovernmental conference (IGC), needed to prepare an amendment to theTreaty of Rome, provided for a procedure for monitoring and avoiding excessivedeficits. It recognized that member states needed to remain “masters of the mainaspects of budgetary policy”, but at the same time stated that “a stability-orientedmonetary policy can in the long run only be successful if supported by sound budgetarypolicy”. That meant a prohibition on the monetary and compulsory financingof public deficits, and a no-bailout rule: “It must be clear that the member states donot stand behind each other’s debts”. In the MC’s view, the consequence of such arule would be that financial markets would exert discipline by imposing differentialinterest rates and “ultimately by refusing to lend”. A majority of the committee wantedto establish a mechanism for enforcing legally binding positions, perhaps through theEuropean Court of Justice. 11The CoG made a similar point. As its chairman Karl Otto Pöhl presented thegovernors’ conclusions to an informal ECOFIN meeting in March 1990, he “stressedthe importance of budgetary discipline and its key role in the Economic Union, whichmust be realized in parallel with the Monetary Union. Sound budgetary policies areindispensable and complementary to stability-oriented monetary policies”. Pöhl emphasizedthat“it is essential to avoid in the future the repetition of developments often observed bothwithin and outside the Community, namely that budgetary laxness has been tolerated onthe basis that monetary policy would compensate for any shortfall”. 12The emphasis on central bank autonomy raised questions about the future role of theEC Monetary Committee (henceforth MC). A strengthening of the central bank sideof cooperation might logically imply that central banks should no longer be representedin the MC: such a stance was taken by the German government. Many FinanceMinisters saw a strengthening of the Monetary Committee as a necessary counterweightto the central banks, and some suggested that as the national central bankgovernors and then the ECB acquired greater authority and autonomy in the monetary10. BoE, 8A/225/1, Monetary Committee bureau, 21.10.1989.11. CoG, Monetary Committee: Economic and Monetary Union beyond Stage 1: Orientations for thepreparation of the intergovernmental conference, 26.03.1990.12. CoG, 31/1–7, Report by Chairman to Informal ECOFIN, 26.03.1990.

Designing a Central Bank in the Run-Up to Maastricht 111policy sphere there should be a clearer separation of powers with regard to monetaryand fiscal policy. 13Meanwhile the CoG began to run with the ball on institutional design of the newcentral banking system. In April 1990 Pöhl made a proposal at the CoG for draftstatutes on the objectives, organization, functions, instruments, and voting system ofa new bank. 14 In May Delors distributed a note from the Commission about the institutionalcharacter of EMU. In particular, the Commission was concerned aboutthree issues: voting within the ECB, democratic control, and external monetarypolicy. The Commission proposed a weighted voting system as in the EC, with theaddition that the ECB board should be required to cast its vote as a bloc to avoiddivisions. The “reconciling of Eurofed independence with democratic control” wasquite problematical. The term preferred by the Commission to describe the futureinstitution, Eurofed, captured some sense of the desirability of political control in itsallusion to the American model; the CoG’s favourite term, the European System ofCentral Banks, did not. But both versions saw some attraction in the US example. 15The governors were resistant to any hint of political supervision, and believed thatany measure of political control would in practice mean pressure to inflate. They alsowanted to escape from any obligation to accept quantitative inflation targets – a viewthat was gaining acceptance among policy-oriented academic economists. 16Pöhl believed that “responsibility for monetary policy was indivisible – he hadalready said so at a conference in Paris – but some might not take that view and mightpropose other solutions”. The preparation of the statute thus set off an intense politicalclash. The governor of the Bank of England began to worry about a “two-speed Europe”dominated by a “German bloc” with locked exchange rates, but with a looserperiphery where exchange rates continued to move. 17At its meeting on June 26–27, 1990, the European Council asked the CoG toundertake preparatory work for the forthcoming intergovernmental conference onmonetary union, which would run in parallel with an IGC on political union. TheCoG took as its guideline two principles: price stability as the primary objective ofthe central bank; and the indivisibility and centralization of monetary policy. Thiswould not be “in contradiction with the principles of federalism and subsidiarity”. 18The model of the Bundesbank looked powerfully attractive as a guide for centralbanking practice, and many participants felt that the new institution was in fact de-13. BoE, 8A/225/3, J.A.A. Arrowsmith, Future Role and Composition of Monetary Committee,06.02.1991.14. See also C.A. VAN DEN BERG, The Making of the Statute of the European System of CentralBanks: An Application of Checks and Balances, Dutch University Press, Amsterdam, 2004, p.6.15. CoG Meeting 245, Basel, 15.05.1990.16. B.S. BERNANKE et al, Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience, PrincetonUniversity Press, Princeton, 1999.17. BoE, 4A39/11 EEC, Note, 18.06.1990.18. CoG, Introductory Report to the Draft Statute of the European System of Central Banks, 18.09.1990.Subsidiarity is the principle that decisions should be made at the lowest level of authority practicable:national rather than European, and provincial/state rather than national.

112 Harold JAMESsigned to replicate the structure and philosophy of the Bundesbank. In the draft statuteprepared by the CoG, there was a direct echo of the relationship of the German centralbank to the government in Article 2, specifying the “objectives” of the system, andstating that the System of Central Banks would “support the general economic policyof the Community”. Yet at this point the Community had no mechanism for defininga single economic policy to go alongside the single monetary policy of the new centralbank, and the phrase was consequently altered by the government negotiators intothe much less intellectually satisfactory obligation to “support the general economicpolicies in the Community”.As a result of the dialogue between the European Council and the CoG, the alternateswere assigned the responsibility of producing a draft statute on the basis ofthe principles that had been at the core of the governors’ discussion in May 1990.The initial debates focused upon the name: should the new institution be called theEuropean Central Bank, or should it have a “lower-profile” name, such as Authorityor Agency? Should it be given the task “to support the stability of the financial system”?This phrase was placed in square brackets to indicate that it was controversial.What should the legal status of the institution be in the Community? 19A report to the CoG alternates’ committee by a group of legal experts in August1990 set out the quadripartite institutional structure of the EC (Parliament, Council,Commission, Court of Justice) and pointed out that the European Investment Bankand the Centre for Vocational Training were “Community organs”. But a central bankwas not analogous to these institutions, and the report recommended very stronglythat the European System of Central Banks should not be classified as an EC institution.20At the same time, the insistence on the independence of the central bank explicitlyechoed the much older debate about the relationship of the Commission to nationalgovernments. The wording chosen in Article 7 on autonomy deliberately recalled thelanguage of 1967 describing the role and position of the European Commission:“in the performance of their duties, they [Commissioners] shall neither seek nor take instructionsfrom any Government or from any other body.[…] Each Member State undertakesto respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the Commissionin the performance of their tasks”. 21In July the CoG agreed on the “one man one vote” principle for the ECB ExecutiveBoard, which in case of a conflict would apparently mean that the effective power ofthe Bundesbank would be greatly reduced. There would be no rotation of votingequivalent to the arrangement that prevails in the Open Market Committee of theFederal Reserve Banks, in which only the New York bank (perhaps to be consideredthe American equivalent of Frankfurt as the site of the financial powerhouse) has a19. CoG, Committee of Alternates, July 24, 1990, Draft Statute.20. CoG, Meetings of Legal Experts on certain aspects relating to the draft Statute of the “System”,31.08.1990.21. C.A. VAN DEN BERG, op.cit., p.104.

Designing a Central Bank in the Run-Up to Maastricht 113permanent vote. 22 The central bankers thus rejected the original plan of the EC Commission,which would have made the system much more political. The shift laterattracted a great deal of criticism in Germany, which looked to be the loser if theinstitution was viewed in terms of a balance of power, with influence shifting to thenumerous softer-currency and Southern countries. But in fact the decision reflectedthe experience of successful consensus forming in the CoG, and indicated the extentto which the Bundesbank was now prepared to trust the stability-oriented monetaryphilosophies now emerging in other central banks. In the end the exercise of consensusformation, combined with the avoidance of the formal votes that characterizedthe Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee, generally would give German interestsa greater rather than a lesser voice in the ECB Council. But this design elementwas also probably predicated on the assumption that the accession criteria to the EMUwould be set sufficiently strictly to stop the inclusion of very soft countries; the designwould indeed eventually prove to be problematical with the expansion of membershipin EMU.By September 1990 there was substantial agreement on the major design features,including independence and the unitary monetary policy, but some disagreement remainedabout the division of responsibilities between the Council and the ExecutiveBoard of the ECB, and how operations might be decentralized without impairing theimplementation of a unitary monetary policy and coherent exchange rate policies andoperations. The options ranged from including all national central banks within thesystem to maintaining central banks with their own balance sheets, with specifiedcontributions to a central institution. 23The Bundesbank’s response to the remaining uncertainties was to press for allmonetary policy-making to be concentrated in the ECB Executive Board. 24 Such anarrangement would be less political, less subject to a confrontation of divergent nationalinterests on monetary policy, and would prevent national central banks fromsmaller or softer countries from playing an excessive role. But this solution, in whichdecisions were left to the small board, attracted some opposition, as a board that wasnot directly linked to the national central banks might develop into a new and dangeroussort of supranational monetary government.The alternates’ discussion occurred at the same time as positions at the politicallevel had become harshly polarized. A dispute had flared up in the aftermath of theOctober 27 and 28, 1990, meeting of the European Council in Rome. At Rome, thediscussions had been carefully channelled by Italian civil servants, notably by TommasoPadoa-Schioppa. Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti had managed to pushthrough an agreement to start Stage Two on January 1, 1994, largely by securing inadvance the agreement of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In its meeting, the EuropeanCouncil wanted to call the monetary institution created in Stage Two the EuropeanCentral Bank, but the Dutch government quickly responded with a statement that also22. CoG, Meeting 247, Basel, 10.07.1990.23. CoG, Secretariat Note: Draft Statute, 05.09.1990.24. CoG, Stellungnahme zum Draft Statute, 09.09.1990.

114 Harold JAMESreflected the position of the Bundesbank. According to The Hague, the new institutionwas something different from an ECB. The main German and Dutch fear was that ifthere were to be a gradual institutional evolution of the ECB, the door would open toincreasing political pressure on policy, as well as in regard to the potential membershipof a monetary union.The EC Rome meeting laid out plans for a market-based EMU, which wouldpromote both price stability and growth. The Monetary Union involved a new independentmonetary institution, responsible for single monetary policy based on a singlecurrency, and with a primary goal of maintaining price stability. Stage Two was tobegin on January 1, 1994, and, in advance of that date, EC member countries wouldbe under an obligation to participate in the EMS exchange rate mechanism (ERM).In that stage, the monetary institution would reinforce the coordination of monetarypolicy, prepare a single monetary policy, and supervise the development of EMU.There was a “process” that would “ensure the independence of the new monetaryinstitution at the latest when monetary powers have been transferred”. 25The UK government fiercely objected to the outcome of Rome, because of theroad map it laid down for monetary union, but London was isolated in its stance.Other governments accepted but noted the lack of clarity about whether Stage Twowas conditional on fiscal improvement, and whether the monetary institution was thesame as in Stage Three, namely the European Central Bank. 26 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa and the Banca d’Italia believed that the institution created in 1994 wouldbe the ECB. This was implied in the agreement reached at the Council, though notexplicitly stated. The October 1990 Rome communiqué had stated: “At the start ofthe second phase, the new Community institution will be established”.There were thus two parallel fault lines: one in which Britain looked isolated fromall the other member countries, and a second running between France and Germany.In November 1990 the EC Monetary Committee was the scene of a bitter clash involvingTrichet and the British, when Trichet ridiculed the British proposal for a hardECU (which in some ways looked similar to de Larosière’s proposals in the DelorsCommittee, and to older French ideas of a parallel currency). Trichet saw this newproposal emanating from London as little more than a delaying tactic.When the CoG discussed the draft statute in November 1990, the controversiesfocused on three major elements, and in each case the Bundesbank representativeswere insistent on a solution that translated German answers onto the Europeanlevel. 271. Exchange Rate Intervention. Exchange rates are obviously political, and attemptsto fix global exchange rates had been negotiated not by central banks but by25. European Council in Rome, October 27-28, 1990, Conclusions of the Presidency, available as: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/rome1/default_en.htm, accessed 01.12.2011.26. A. ITALIENER, Mastering Maastricht: EMU issues and How They Were Settled, in: K.GRETSCHMANN (ed.), Economic and Monetary Union: Implications for National Policy-makers,M. Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993, p.64.27. CoG, Meeting 249, Basel, 13.11.1990.

Designing a Central Bank in the Run-Up to Maastricht 115governments, either through the IMF or later increasingly in the framework of G-7Finance Ministers’ meetings. Even in Germany, the Bundesbank was not responsiblefor foreign exchange policy according to the 1957 Bundesbank Law; and one of themost long-standing struggles of the Bundesbank involved the argument that thegovernment should recognize that foreign exchange policy had consequences formonetary policy. In particular, the Bundesbank shied away from the possibility ofintervention commitments that would require the use of Deutsche Marks with potentiallyinflationary consequences in Germany. From the French point of view,however, a great deal of the attraction of new institutional arrangements lay in theimproved management of exchange rates. This was particularly a topic for discussionat the Monetary Committee meetings, where the French treasury pressed especiallyvigorously for the view that government should determine and define the externalvalue of the currency. The Bundesbank’s Hans Tietmeyer tried to counter that exchangerate policy was properly the business of the central bank (although, in realityas well as in German law, that responsibility fell to the government). In the CoGdiscussions, Pöhl was sceptical about the desirability of including references to exchangerate intervention. 28The Bundesbank and De Nederlandsche Bank suggested adding to Article 4 therequirement that the Community’s exchange rate policy be subject to the consent ofthe ECB. 29 The result, which appeared as a formulation in the Maastricht Treaty, wasseen by the Bundesbank as a European equivalent of the famous Emminger letter, aget-out clause that protected the central bank from really extreme consequences offoreign exchange commitments by governments.At the March 12, 1991, intergovernmental conference personal representatives(the negotiators immediately below the ministerial level) and the March 18 ministerial-levelmeeting, German State Secretary Horst Köhler insisted that the principle ofunanimity applied to Council decisions on the exchange rate system, so that Germanywould in practice hold a veto. Finally, at the IGC ministerial level of December 2–3,1991, German Finance Minister Theo Waigel achieved what was thought to be aGerman victory with the formula that “general orientations” rather than “guidelines”would be given by EC governments on exchange rate policy. Article 109.2 of theMaastricht Treaty eventually stipulated: “These general orientations shall be withoutprejudice to the primary objective of the ESCB [European System of Central Banks]to maintain price stability”.2. Lender of Last Resort Functions. It would be reasonable to assume that thecentral bank issuing a new currency would take over the functions normally associatedwith existing national central banks. But assumptions about central banks’operations – and their willingness to state clearly what the objectives were – variedsignificantly from country to country. In particular, the Germans worried about themoral hazard implications of central bank regulation of the financial sector. Beforethe First World War, the German Reichsbank had been widely viewed as providing28. CoG, Meeting 249, Basel, 13.11.1990.29. CoG, Draft Statute Commentary, 21.11.1990.

116 Harold JAMESthe ultimate support of the financial sector. Its origins lay in a response to the severefinancial crisis of 1873, and the big German banks saw the central bank as a backstop.But the experience of hyperinflation in the 1920s led to a new approach, and a feelingthat unlimited support for the financial system contained a danger to monetary stability;and in consequence, the idea of a central bank as a lender of last resort hadmuch less support in late-twentieth-century Germany than in the Anglo-Saxon world,where Walter Bagehot’s treatise of 1867, Lombard Street, was still widely regardedas the basic text for modern central bank behaviour.There was thus considerable uncertainty about the wording of the statute on financialsector regulation. In the draft produced by the governors’ alternates (whoplayed a vital role in the drafting process), the “tasks” of the ECB included “to supportthe stability of the financial system”; and Article 25 on “Prudential Supervision”included quite extensive tasks for the ECB, which were placed in square brackets toindicate that they were not yet consensual. The Bundesbank wanted to avoid referencesto an explicit role for the ECB in supervising banks, as “these two Articlescould be misinterpreted as a lender of last-resort function”. 30 As a consequence, theitems in square brackets were in the end excised from the CoG draft.3. Supervisory Board. The Delors Report had recommended the appointment ofa supervisory board for a new European central bank. Such a provision would necessarilyhave provided a higher element of political involvement and control. Thegovernors now abandoned any such proposition. Again, this step was in line with thepreferences of the Bundesbank, which was confident that it provided a good institutionaltemplate for a future European monetary order, and that the directorate or bankcouncil should bear sole responsibility for setting monetary policy.Further NegotiationsWhen the European Council started the two parallel IGCs, one on political and theother on monetary union, a new round of controversy broke out, along the lines ofthe old divisions between a German view, which was now termed “fundamental”about the need for gradual policy convergence (that had in the 1970s been called the“economist” perspective), and the Italian and French position, formerly known as“monetarist” but which was now given the sobriquet “telescopic”. In the latter view,a quick transition would bring a shock therapy to harness market forces so that nominalconvergence in goods markets as well as in financial markets would be accelerated.The German enthusiasm for monetary union seemed to have cooled. 3130. CoG, Meeting 249, Basel, 13.11.1990.31. Rome Summit, in: Financial Times, 17.12.1990. See also D. GROS, N. THYGESEN, EuropeanMonetary Integration: From the European Monetary System to Economic and Monteary Union,Longman, Harlow, 1998, pp.407-409.

Designing a Central Bank in the Run-Up to Maastricht 117Italy tried to refocus the discussion on the need for a quick establishment of theECB. In December 1990 the Banca d’Italia circulated a memorandum in the CoG,“The Functions of the European Central Bank in the Second Phase of Economic andMonetary Union”. It tried to distinguish between “qualitative” policy (the structuralcharacteristics of policy instruments), which would be made by the new institution,and “quantitative” policy (interest rates and liquidity), which would remain with thecentral banks. At the end of the second phase, with a common approach to open marketoperations and minimum reserves, the ECB would also take over monetary policy.But already in the second phase there would be foreign exchange interventions conductedthrough the ECB. In addition, the ECU would be strengthened through aspecification of conditions for foreign exchange interventions in private ECUs. 32The Italian initiative looked as if it corresponded quite precisely to a draft treatypresented on December 10, 1990, by the EC Commission, which referred to a “Eurofed”already instituted in Stage Two, a stage that would not be conditional on anypolicy convergence.The discussion prompted by these initiatives polarized the CoG in the subsequentmeeting (January 8, 1991). De Larosière echoed the Rome communiqué when he saidthat he wanted to set up “at the beginning of Stage Two an ECB and an ESCB asdefined in the draft Statute”. Stage Two would be of only limited duration and simplybe concerned with the preparation of Stage Three. By contrast, Pöhl tried to downplaythe consequences of the language used at Rome. The communiqué “should not beseen as a legal document but as a statement of political intent”. Henning Christopherson,the EC Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, thought that thesecond stage would include “an embryonic form of the ECB and ECSB”. 33The clash of the Italian and French approach with that of the Germans and theDutch was sidestepped as another front opened up in the conflict over institutionaldesign. It concerned the way in which a new money should be established. Threegovernments (the United Kingdom, Spain, and France) put forward alternative visionsto that of the CoG draft, in which the single currency was an evolution of theERM’s basket currency: the United Kingdom, wanting to signal its distance from theproject, proposed a radically incompatible alternative based on the idea of a hardECU. 34 There should be no basket currency, and no reliance on one national currency,but rather a link to the most stable currency at the time. In case of realignments, thehard ECU would thus never be devalued against any participating currency. Spainidentified in substance with major elements of the British proposal, and urged a hardbasket, in which there would be a change in the basket composition of the ECU ateach realignment, to ensure that the ECU would not be devalued against the strongest32. BdF, 1489200205/90, Banca d’Italia. The Functions of the European Central Bank in the SecondPhase of Economic and Monetary Union, 24.12.1990; see also K. DYSON, K. FEATHERSTONE,The Road to Maastricht. Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union, Oxford University Press,Oxford, 1999, p.520.33. CoG, Meeting 251, Basel, 08.01.1991.34. United Kingdom Treasury, Economic and Monetary Union beyond Stage One: Possible TreatyProvisions and a Statute for a European Monetary Fund, 08.01.1991.

118 Harold JAMESEMS currency, in other words the same feature as the British proposal for a stableEuropean currency. But elsewhere there was a suspicion that the “hard ECU” was awedge that was being deliberately and skilfully inserted by British negotiators in orderto drive France and Germany apart. 35The most critical alternative proposal came from the French government, whichsaw in the CoG version too much of the hand of the Bundesbank, and pushed for agreater role for the ECU, as well as more political control of the ECB and a strongerrole for the European Council. France also, like Italy, saw the EMS as part of the newtreaty and consequently deduced a need for all member states to participate. Frenchministers advocated an idea of “economic governance” that should function at a politicallevel in parallel to the new monetary institutions; and for a brief time FinanceMinister Bérégovoy also took up the “hard ECU” plan. But then, in a dramatic meetingin the Elysée on January 26, 1991, President Mitterrand instructed him to desist;there should be “no reversal of alliances. The ally is Germany! The Brits are alignedwith the United States”! 36Germany’s draft treaty proposals looked very different from the French or Britishschemes. Germany emphasized “ground rules” that were designed to ensure a genuinelycompetitive market and rapid price adjustment: a commitment to priceliberalization, freedom of wage contracts, and a stipulation that price indexationwould require the consent of the new central bank. Fiscal policy would be limited bya “golden rule” permitting deficits only to finance investment and not current expenditure.In Stage Two, there would be only a Council of Governors of the memberstates and no ECSB.In the first part of 1991, under the Luxembourg presidency of the EC, the controversiesin the preparation of the draft statute and a draft treaty focused on financialissues concerned with the operation of the ECB, and on the mechanisms for movingthrough Stages Two and Three. The Bundesbank worried that the central bank governors’documents were not treated as the basis for negotiations by the IGC of personalrepresentatives, but were merely viewed as one option among many. 37 Thepersonal representatives drew up a nonpaper that gave a decisive role to the politicalauthorities in any decisions by the ECB to increase capital, as well as in the allocationsof profits from the ECB operations to a reserve fund. 38 The Luxembourg proposalsalso provided for sanctions in regard to excessive deficits, and wanted to leave thedecision on the start of Stage Three to the European Council.According to the Luxembourg proposals, the ECB Board of Governors, essentiallyan enlarged version of the CoG, would take the place of the European Monetary35. See R.H. HASSE, T. KOCH, The Hard ECU—A Substitute for the D-Mark or a Trojan Horse?, in:Intereconomics, 4(July/August 1991), pp.159–166.36. K. DYSON, K. FEATHERSTONE, op.cit., pp.35, 227–228 and 678; J. QUATREMER, T. KLAU,Ces hommes qui ont fait l’Euro: Querelles et ambitions européennes, Plon, Paris, 1999, pp.202–203.37. HADB, ZBR meeting 817, 28.02.1991.38. CoG, Meeting 256, Basel. Report of Gunter Baer, 10.06.1991.

Designing a Central Bank in the Run-Up to Maastricht 119Cooperation Fund and assume the functions and powers of the CoG as early as StageOne, and its functions would then be transferred to the ESCB in 1996. Thus in effectStage One would be subdivided into two substages. The ECSB would then take overresponsibility for the operation of the clearing system. 39 That timetable was strenuouslyopposed by the EC Commission, and on June 10 at an ECOFIN meeting BelgianFinance Minister Philippe Maystadt proposed that a new institution, the EuropeanMonetary Institute, should be established in January 1994, right at the beginning ofStage Two. In response to the Luxembourg nonpaper, the CoG alternates worked onreconciling the original draft of the statute with amendments proposed by the IGC.Both the Banking Supervisory Subcommittee and the alternates wanted to retain thedraft statute’s provision on banking regulation. All except one of the alternates wantedto keep the ECB Statute’s Article 21.1 on avoiding monetary financing of the publicsector.At this stage, although there was a substantial consensus among the governorsabout the no-bailout formulation of Article 21.1, prohibiting central bank purchasesof government securities on the primary but not on the secondary market (wheredealings in government securities constituted an essential tool of monetary policy),the CoG’s staff was sceptical about the impact of such a restriction on future nationalfiscal policies in the monetary union. 40The CoG sent a revised statute to the EC presidency on April 26, 1991, with amechanism for allocating income based on relatively simple population and GDPcriteria, adjusted every five years, with the same key being used to determine subscriptionsto the new institution, the transfer of foreign reserve assets, and the determinationof voting on financial matters. The issue of amending the system’s operationwas handled by a simplified amendment procedure.MaastrichtIn September 1991 the Dutch central banker André Szász wrote an unusually candidnote on what had been achieved in the lead-up to the Maastricht negotiation. Heargued that the “tasks which are now vested in this committee [CoG] pursuant to aCouncil decision of 12 March 1990 but which have thus far remained in large measurea dead letter” should now be taken up once again: the coordination of monetary policy,the formulation of views on “the overall orientation of monetary and exchange ratepolicy”, and finally, the responsibility of expressing39. CoG, UEM 41/91, 43/91, Drafting of Articles 109d and 109e; The Presidency’s Proposals for StageTwo of EMU, 03.05.1991.40. CoG, 3.4/1–7, Economic Unit. Monetary Financing of Budget Deficits in Stage Three, 19.06.1991.

120 Harold JAMES“opinions to individual governments and the Council of Ministers on policies that mightaffect the internal and external monetary situation in the Community and, in particular, thefunctioning of the European Monetary System”. 41The functioning of the EMS had in fact become a very substantial threat to the negotiationson further European monetary integration.The meeting of the European Council on December 9–10, 1991 in Maastricht,finalized the draft of a treaty that had substantially been prepared in advance. Inparticular, the statutes of the European Monetary Institute and the European CentralBank deviated from the governors’ draft legislation only with regard to banking supervisionand some of the claims for central bank independence. The most controversialaspects that were settled only at a late stage were the discussion of the entrycriteria for EMU (with the German and Dutch preference for tough criteria) and thequestion of a British opt-out, which was the subject of frantic last-moment directnegotiation with the British Prime Minister, John Major. Article 109(e) specifiedunder the transitional arrangements:“4. In the second stage, Member States shall endeavour to avoid excessive governmentdeficits.5. During the second stage, each Member State shall, as appropriate, start the processleading to the independence of its central bank, in accordance with Article 108”.Article 109(f)3 laid down the way in which the EMI would prepare the transition: Atthe latest by 31 December 1996, the EMI shall specify the regulatory, organisationaland logistical framework necessary for the ESCB to perform its tasks in the thirdstage. This framework shall be submitted for decision to the ECB at the date of itsestablishment. Finally, the crucial Article 109(j) set out the convergence criteria of– the achievement of a high degree of price stability;– the sustainability of the government financial position;– the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchangerate mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two years, withoutdevaluing against the currency of any other member state;– the durability of convergence achieved by the member state and of its participationin the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System as reflected inthe long-term interest rate levels.Article 109(j)4 set the timing of the transition to the third stage:“If by the end of 1997 the date for the beginning of the third stage has not been set, thethird stage shall start on 1 January 1999. Before 1 July 1998, the Council, meeting in thecomposition of Heads of State or of Government, after a repetition of the procedure providedfor in paragraphs 1 and 2, with the exception of the second indent of paragraph 2,taking into account the reports referred to in paragraph 1 and the opinion of the EuropeanParliament, shall, acting by a qualified majority and on the basis of the recommendations41. CoG, Szász note, The position of the central banks during stage two, 20.09.1991.

Designing a Central Bank in the Run-Up to Maastricht 121of the Council referred to in paragraph 2, confirm which Member States fulfil the necessaryconditions for the adoption of a single currency”.The treaty was signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992, though its subsequent ratificationwas surprisingly rocky and threatened to destroy the EMS. The problem wasa political one in that the debate about monetary union became embroiled in a generaldiscussion of the single market and of the competence of national governments in aperiod of quite severe recession. But there was also a technical problem in that theEMS and its operation was built into the treaty by the convergence provisions ofArticle 109(j). Any major upset in the EMS would thus destroy the prescribed pathto monetary union. An omen of the future difficulty came when the Bundesbank onDecember 19, 1991, just a few days after the conclusion of the Maastricht EuropeanCouncil meeting, voted to raise its interest rates.ConclusionThe ECB statute represents the high-water mark of the idea of an independent centralbank committed to the unique goal of price stability. The outcome of Maastricht waspossible only because of the widespread consensus about central bank independence,which made it seem as if the astonishing act of European monetary integration couldoccur without any substantial transfer of sovereignty. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa sawthis emphasis on the independence of the central bank as part of a more generalacceptance of “minimum government” that made a new stage of European integrationpossible. 42 As he implied, the discussion of central banking was part of a broadertrend that prepared the way for what was later dismissively referred to as “marketfundamentalism”. But the consensus inevitably shone a new kind of spotlight on thecentral banks.Had central bankers taken on too much of the burden of responsibility for providinga stable economic and social order? Had they insisted too much on the separationof central banking from politics? As an aftermath of the Maastricht discussion,European politics braced for a blame game in which central bankers played againstpoliticians. A Euro-sceptic Briton wrote about this phase:“Many central bankers are intelligent, courteous and affable: your typical central bankeris quite a high class of person, much nicer, one imagines, than your average politician. Butpoliticians have at some point to confront the consequences of their mistakes; their unaccountablecentral bankers do not”.By contrast, a Europhobic American economist made the exactly opposite claim:“Central bankers are a tough, mean lot, but in the end the kind-hearted politicians will42. T. PADOA-SCHIOPPA, The Road to Monetary Union in Europe: The Emperor, the Kings, and theGenies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p.186.

122 Harold JAMEStell them what to do”. 43 Had politicians abdicated too much? That was the questionthat was tested in 1992 and 1993, in the immediate aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty.An astonishing series of violent financial crises destroyed the credibility of governmentsthat had wagered their reputations on the ability to maintain fixed exchangerates. Markets then blew up governments. The outcome left central bankers morepowerful and more prestigious than ever before.43. B. CONNOLLY, The Rotten Heart of Europe: The Dirty War for Europe’s Money, Faber and Faber,London, 1995, p.277; Martin Feldstein quoted in From Bundesbank, a Clue to EC’s Future Approach,in: New York Times, 16.09.1992.

From Treaty Revision to Treaty Revision: The Legacy ofMaastricht123Desmond DINANBy one measure, albeit simplistic, the Maastricht Treaty was merely the second in aseries of major changes to the founding treaties of the European Community (EC)that took place over a period of nearly twenty-five years, beginning with the SingleEuropean Act (SEA), negotiated in 1985, and ending with the Lisbon Treaty, implementedin 2009. Before the mid-1980s, treaty change in the EC was not unknown,but had limited scope and political significance. 1 By contrast, the SEA and MaastrichtTreaty altered the EC fundamentally, not least by realizing the long-standing goal ofa single market and launching the European Union, which incorporated a variety ofambitious undertakings such as Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the CommonForeign and Security Policy (CFSP), and cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs(JHA). The SEA and the Maastricht Treaty are directly linked in origin and importance;they stand out as closely-related developments, almost as a single “foundationaltreaty change”. Subsequent treaty changes proved far less consequential butmuch more controversial.Treaty change is a complicated and potentially contentious process, requiring intenseintergovernmental negotiations and unanimity among national governments. 2Informal political agreements among national governments can have the same effectas formal treaty changes, but lack legal protection and can also be difficult to reach.The infamous Luxembourg Compromise of 1966, which thwarted the widespread useof qualified majority voting (QMV) as an instrument of legislative decision making,is a striking example of a political agreement that had the effect of a treaty change. 3As an alternative to what became the SEA, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcherproposed simply that the voting provisions of the original treaty be fully honoured,thereby facilitating decision-making by means of QMV on a range of single marketissues. 4 The call by the European Council in June 1985 to proceed with formal treatychange, and the weightiness of the ensuing SEA and Maastricht Treaty, tipped thebalance firmly in favour of such an approach to deepening European integration. 51. F. LAURSEN, Introduction: On the Study of EU Treaties and Treaty Reforms, in: F. LAURSEN(ed.), Designing the European Union: From Paris to Lisbon, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012,pp.1-16.2. D. BEACH, C. MAZZUCELLI, Introduction, in: D. BEACH, C. MAZZUCELLI (eds), Leadershipin the Big Bangs of European Integration, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp.1-21.3. J.M PALAYRET, H. WALLACE, P. WINAND, Visions, Votes and Vetoes: The Empty Chair Crisisand the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2006.4. “Europe: The Future”, paper presented by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to the FontainebleauEuropean Council, 25-26.06.1984, reproduced in: Journal of Common Market Studies, 23(1984),pp.73-81.5. Milan European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Bulletin EC, 6(1985).

124 Desmond DINANWhat accounts for formal treaty change in the post-Maastricht period? Why hasit been so pervasive and divisive? Why have the twenty-five years since the SEA beendominated by major treaty change, in marked contrast to the preceding twenty-fiveyears? One explanation for the persistence of treaty change hinges on the need tocomplete unfinished business. Despite the enormous effort put into the Maastrichtnegotiations, inevitably some policy and institutional issues remained incomplete andwould need to be revisited in due course. Similarly, the impact of the SEA and Maastrichtwould likely cause a degree of spill-over by raising institutional and policyissues, either anticipated or unexpected, that would have to be tackled in anotherintergovernmental conference (IGC), a prerequisite for treaty change. A reviewclause in the Maastricht Treaty, calling for an IGC within five years of the treaty’simplementation, specifically mentioned unfinished business, notably in relation tothe CFSP. Additionally or alternatively, a feeling that major treaty change, in the formof the SEA and Maastricht, had contributed decisively to the acceleration of Europeanintegration may have led EU leaders to look benignly at the prospect of further treatyreform, seeing it as a means of achieving “ever closer union”.Even without tackling spill-over or tidying up loose ends, the possibility of post-Maastricht treaty reform would likely have arisen in any case because of two sets ofcircumstances that were already apparent in the early 1990s but became pressingthereafter: the challenge of democratic legitimacy and the unprecedented nature ofCentral and Eastern European enlargement. Yet these developments shaped the agenda,negotiation, and outcome of the post-Maastricht IGCs in ways that severely limitedthe utility of treaty reform as a method of deepening European integration. Farfrom allaying public concern and strengthening the EU’s legitimacy, treaty reform inthe post-Maastricht period seemed to exacerbate the much-maligned “democraticdeficit”. At the same time, anxiety among national governments over the implicationsof enlargement for influence in decision-making institutions intensified rivalry betweenthe big and small member states, which dominated the conduct of IGCs at thehighest level – the heads of state and government – and ensured sub-optimal results.This article explores the legacy of the Maastricht Treaty in terms of further treatychange, which can be divided into two distinct stages. First, in the ten-years followingthe Maastricht Treaty, national governments negotiated the Amsterdam and Nicetreaties. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 contained a useful but unspectacular set ofamendments, especially with regard to the functioning of cooperation in the area ofJHA, but failed conspicuously to resolve urgent institutional problems. Even at thetime, the Nice Treaty of 2000 seemed highly unsatisfactory, specifically because ofthe negotiators’ inability to achieve their stated goal of far-reaching institutional reform.General dissatisfaction with Nice triggered the second stage of post-Maastrichtreform, which began even before implementation of the Nice Treaty itself. Hopingto restore confidence in the efficacy of treaty reform and reanimate European integration,EU leaders took an explicitly constitutional turn in the Laeken Declarationof December 2001, which sparked the Constitutional Convention and led to the ConstitutionalTreaty of 2004. Yet the factors that had derailed effective treaty reform in

From Treaty Revision to Treaty Revision: The Legacy of Maastricht 125the 1990s persisted into the next decade, souring the IGCs that preceded the Constitutionaland Lisbon treaties and contributing to the negative referendum results.Treaty change will continue in the EU, but large-scale reform along the lines ofMaastricht, Amsterdam, or Lisbon is unlikely to be attempted again, notwithstandingthe fallout from the eurozone crisis. To some extent the EU has returned to the past,tinkering with the founding treaties by making relatively narrow – though not insignificant– changes, especially in response to the eurozone crisis. As it happens, theeurozone crisis highlights the need for far-reaching treaty change that wouldstrengthen the fundamentals of EMU, but such a development may be politicallyimpracticable thanks to the legacy of major treaty reform in the post-Maastricht period.Ironically, major EMU-related treaty reform in the post-Lisbon era – were itever to happen – would constitute unfinished Maastricht business.The SEA and Maastricht: Foundational Treaty ChangeThe SEA and Maastricht anchor the series of treaty changes that took place betweenthe mid-1980s and late 2000s. 6 The impetus for the main components of the SEA andMaastricht – the single market program and monetary union, respectively – was economic:pervasive concern about Western Europe’s relative weakness at a time ofaccelerating globalization. Whereas all national governments, as well as the governmentsof some non-member states, such as Sweden, supported greater market integration,encapsulated in the SEA, as a necessary response to global economic interdependence,the same was not the case with monetary union. While the Commissionand some national governments saw EMU as a desirable and inevitable spill-overfrom the single market program, other governments, such as Britain’s, disputed bothits economic necessity and political wisdom. Geo-political changes may well haveaffected the timing and the political dynamics of the inter-governmental conferencethat resulted in the Maastricht Treaty, but EMU was well on track by the time thatthe Berlin Wall came down.By contrast, geo-political changes account squarely for two other components ofthe SEA and the Maastricht Treaty: provisions for European Political Cooperation(EPC) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, respectively. Ironically, thechanges in question were radically different preceding the SEA and the MaastrichtTreaty. In the case of the SEA, it was the intensification of Cold War hostility in theearly 1980s that impelled national governments to explore ways of strengthening the6. On the SEA and Maastricht, see M.J. BAUN, An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and theNew Politics of European Integration, Westview Press, Boulder, 1992; D. DINAN, The Single EuropeanAct: Revitalizing European Integration, in: F. LAURSEN, Designing the European Union…, op.cit; C. ENGEL, W. WESSELS, From Luxembourg to Maastricht: Institutional change in theEuropean Community after the Single European Act, Europa Union Verlag, Bonn, 1992; C. MAZ-ZUCELLI, The Treaty of Maastricht, in: F. LAURSEN, Designing the European Union …, op.cit.,pp.244-286.

126 Desmond DINANdecade-old mechanism of EPC in order to boost Western Europe’s standing vis-à-visWashington and Moscow. In the case of Maastricht, it was the winding down of theCold War, and then its sudden end, that impelled national governments to replaceEPC with a more robust and overtly security-related CFSP in order to ensure a voicefor the nascent EU in the emerging, post-Cold War strategic environment. Even so,different tendencies among national governments – neutralist, Atlanticist, and Europeanist– bedevilled negotiations on the EPC and CFSP components of both treatychanges.The geo-political and the economic drivers and components of the SEA andMaastricht highlight another close link between the two treaty changes: the pillarstructure of the post-SEA European Community and the post-Maastricht EuropeanUnion. By bringing EPC formally under the umbrella of the EC, as happened in theSEA, national governments implicitly established a second, intergovernmental pillaralongside the original socio-economic pillar, with the single market at its core. Theexistence of the pillar structure became explicit in the Maastricht Treaty. Alongsidethe supranational pillar, which now included EMU, governments established separateintergovernmental pillars for the CFSP and for cooperation on JHA.Institutionally, strengthening the legislative authority of the European Parliament(EP) and extending the scope of QMV to additional policy fields tie the SEA and theMaastricht Treaty together. The rationale for the former was democratic legitimizationof the EC and later the EU; the rationale for the latter was to improve the efficiencyof the legislative process. The SEA introduced the cooperation procedure, thefirst step on the road to giving the EP real legislative power; the Maastricht Treatywent far beyond that by introducing codecision between the EP and the Council ofMinisters in legislative decision-making, though not yet in a way that put both institutionson an equal footing. Within the Council itself, the policy scope of QMV,extended in the SEA to most single-market measures, was further extended in theMaastricht Treaty.Several officials and politicians from across the EC had participated in negotiationsfor both the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty. For many of them, Maastricht wasan opportunity not only to go beyond the relatively limited confines of the SEA butalso to correct some of the institutional shortcomings of the SEA itself. Moreover,the geo-political context in which the Maastricht negotiations took place, and themore ambitious scope of the new treaty, gave the occasion greater historical significance.For national leaders and the European Commission President, who participatedin the final negotiating session in Maastricht in December 1991, the sense of historymakingwas palpable, much more so than in the concluding session of the pre-SEAintergovernmental conference, in Luxembourg, in December 1985. Never mind thatthe negotiations themselves became mired in seemingly petty disputes over institutionalarrangements and Britain’s rejection of the draft treaty’s social policy provisions.Basking after the Maastricht summit in the glow of media attention, most ofthe principal negotiators emphasized the momentous nature of the event, notably thedecision to recast the doughty old EC as the shining new EU.

From Treaty Revision to Treaty Revision: The Legacy of Maastricht 127The Maastricht Treaty was the second major treaty change within five years, andwas closely-related to the first. For nearly three decades before the SEA, the RomeTreaty had been revised in only relatively minor ways. Nevertheless the nature of theEC had changed appreciably, notably as a result of intergovernmental agreements,ranging from the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966, to the decision to hold the firstdirect elections for the EP in 1979, to successive rounds of enlargement, which increasedthe number of member states from six to twelve. It would have been naiveof the SEA and Maastricht negotiators to think that the new EU settlement wouldendure without change for the foreseeable future. Although none could have predictedthe sequence of treaty changes during the next two decades, all must have appreciatedthat the EU would indeed evolve not only informally but also formally through furtherintergovernmental agreements. Two factors, in particular, suggested that additionalchange was highly likely. One was a provision in the Maastricht Treaty calling foranother IGC within five years to revise, if necessary, the functioning of the CFSP.The other was future enlargement to include, first, those members of the EuropeanFree Trade Association (EFTA) drawn to the EC by the single market program andunconstrained, following the end of the Cold War, by concerns about neutrality; and,second, the newly-independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It was theseemingly inevitable accession of the second set of prospective member states thatcaused EU leaders, by the mid-1990s, to realize that the post-Maastricht constitutionalsettlement would not endure for long without major treaty changes.Additionally, the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty had let the genie of public opinionout of the bottle. 7 Hitherto, the EC was largely unimpeded by public opinion,which paid relatively little attention to what took place in “Brussels”, at the Europeanlevel of governance. The excitement of the single market program and the promiseof a border-free Community attracted public attention, initially in the form ofwidespread support. Despite the obvious convenience of being able to use the samecurrency across national borders, however, public opinion was not as enthusiasticabout EMU, which cut much closer to the core of national sovereignty and threatenedto constrain national fiscal policies in unpopular ways. At the same time, resentmentof the EC’s post-SEA regulatory zeal, epitomized by the inherently unpopular Commission,stoked incipient Euroscepticism. Rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in thefirst Danish referendum brought matters to a head. 8 Having ridden an unexpectedwave of popular support at the height of the single market euphoria, the new EU wassuddenly thrown on the defensive. Already sensitive to claims that the EC sufferedfrom weak democratic legitimacy, EU leaders in the post-Maastricht period graspedthe importance of strengthening – or being seen to try to strengthen – the EU’s democraticcredentials in order to boost the organization’s legitimacy and halt the rise of7. R. DALTON, R. EICHENBERG, Citizen Support for Policy Integration, in: W. SANDHOLTZ,A. STONE SWEET (eds), European Integration and Supranational Governance, Oxford UniversityPress, Oxford, 1998, pp.250–282; M. GABEL, Public Support for European Integration: An EmpiricalTest of Five Theories, in: Journal of Politics, 60(1998), pp.333–354.8. F. Laursen, S. Vanhoonacker (eds), The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: Issues, Debates, andFuture Implications, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1994.

128 Desmond DINANEuroscepticism. Further treaty changes, or other intergovernmental and inter-institutionalagreements, would give the EU an opportunity to do so.Grappling With EnlargementThe new EU’s architectural design seemed inherently unbalanced, or at least inelegant.The first, supranational pillar was vastly stronger than the two intergovernmentalpillars. By including these pillars in the Maastricht Treaty, governments acknowledgedthe importance of cooperating more closely within the EU on foreignand security policy, and on asylum, immigration and internal security. Yet the relativeweakness of the intergovernmental pillars reflected governments’ unwillingness toextend supranational decision-making to the highly-sensitive areas of CFSP and JHA.Developments on both fronts in the immediate post-Maastricht period highlightedthe inadequacy of the existing institutional arrangements and policy instruments. Inparticular, the EU’s inability to broker or impose a ceasefire in the Balkans, whichhad erupted in conflict just as the Maastricht Treaty was being concluded, demonstratedthe need for a more muscular EU foreign policy. Though less dramatic, developmentsrelating to asylum, immigration, and cross-border crime stoked publicsupport and political pressure for more effective EU action in the area of JHA. Thepost-Maastricht IGC, due to take place within five years of the treaty’s implementation,provided an ideal opportunity to revise not only CFSP – as originally planned– but also JHA procedures.Arguably the most pressing EU policy issue in the post-Maastricht period, however,was not CFSP but a different aspect of external relations: enlargement. In 1995,Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU. The so-called EFTA enlargement wasrelatively easy for the EU to manage. 9 The three acceding countries were highlydeveloped administratively, economically, and politically. Even so, their impendingaccession set off a row between existing member states over the threshold for ablocking minority in the reweighted system of QMV. The outcome was a politicalagreement – the Ioannina Compromise – whereby, following enlargement, the Councilwould strive to make legislative decisions on the basis of the pre-enlargementthreshold for a blocking minority. Though it never had much of an effect and quicklyfaded into oblivion, the Ioannina Compromise was a timely reminder that institutionaldisputes, notably concerning the composition of a qualified majority, were likely toarise during future rounds of enlargement unless resolved beforehand as part of acomprehensive reform package.Enlargement – not the imminent accession of the EFTA four (originally Norwayalso planned to join) but the possible accession, however distant, of the newly–inde-9. F. GRANELL, The European Union’s Enlargement Negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway andSweden, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, 1(1995), pp.117-142.

From Treaty Revision to Treaty Revision: The Legacy of Maastricht 129pendent Central and Eastern European countries – had been the elephant in the roomas the Maastricht IGC came to a close. While negotiating the Maastricht Treaty,however, most national leaders and the Commission President were eager to consolidatethe existing EU rather than address the likely impact on EU policies andprocedures of the end of the Cold War. Ironically, an unintended consequence of theMaastricht Treaty was to raise the bar for future members, by increasing the acquiscommunautaire and intensifying the administrative and regulatory burdens of membership.Thus, the Maastricht Treaty made EU accession more onerous for the newlyindependentcountries of Central and Eastern Europe, which were struggling to developeffective post-Communist institutions and adequate administrative capacity.Previous enlargements had the beneficial effect of prompting the EC to think aboutits fundamental nature. This was particularly true of the 1981 and 1986 enlargements,which had brought newly-democratic Greece, Portugal and Spain into the fold. 10Twenty years earlier, an application for an association agreement by Spain’s thenauthoritarian government had triggered a discussion within the EC about the democraticprinciples underpinning European integration. 11 The accession of Greece, Portugaland Spain cast the spotlight firmly on the EC’s democratic foundations, as didthe impending applications in the early 1990s of the Central and Eastern Europeancountries. This coincided with growing concern among EU citizens over the qualityof democracy at the European level of governance. Just as it would provide an opportunityto address institutional arrangements as well as the functioning of CFSPand JHA, the post-Maastricht IGC would allow the EU to elaborate further its democraticnature and tackle the democratic deficit.Even before the follow-on IGC, the European Council took an important constitutionalstep in June 1993 when it developed the “Copenhagen Criteria” – the basicrequirements for EU membership. Prospective members would be judged for accessionbased on the stability of their institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law,human rights, and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning marketeconomy; and the ability to take on the obligations of membership in a wide rangeof policy areas. 12 Although largely a statement of the obvious, the timing of theEuropean Council’s declaration, and the inclusion in it of an explicit political criterion,reflected growing pressure within the EU to address Central and Eastern Europeanenlargement in the immediate aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty.Accordingly, whereas a review and possible restructuring of CFSP had been theoriginal reason for convening the IGC that opened in March 1996, institutional reformin anticipation of Central and Eastern European enlargement instead became its mainrationale. Indeed, the institutional implications of enlargement dominated the extensivepreparations for the IGC. In the event, although another IGC may indeed have10. A. COSTA PINTO, N.S. TEIXEIRA, Southern Europe and the Making of the European Union,1945-1980s, Columbia University Press, New York, 2002.11. D.C. THOMAS, Constitutionalization through Enlargement: The Contested Origins of the EU'sDemocratic Identity, in: Journal of European Public Policy, 8(2006), pp.1190-1210.12. Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Bulletin EC, 6(1993), point 1.4.

130 Desmond DINANbeen necessary at some point, arguably 1996-1997, less than five years after theMaastricht Treaty, was too soon to hold one. Moreover, a subsequent IGC was boundto pale by comparison with the negotiations that had resulted in the SEA and Maastricht,each of which was dominated by a compelling “big idea” (the single marketand EMU). Institutional reform, improvement in the operation of CFSP and JHA, andthe strengthening of the EU’s democratic principles and processes were worthy, indeednecessary, changes. Yet they lacked the drama and popular appeal of more farreachingand consequential policy developments and, especially in the aftermath ofthe Maastricht ratification crisis, were unlikely to provide a big boost for Europeanintegration.Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the 1996-1997 IGC, and subsequent IGCs,was that the debate about institutional reform had become so narrow and overwrought.In the negotiations leading to the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, the issueof institutional change mostly concerned the legislative role of the EP and the scopeof QMV. As already noted, the Ioannina Compromise of 1994 had introduced a newdimension to the discussion about QMV, thanks to enlargement. During the1996-1997 IGC, most actors – national governments, the Commission, and the EP –wanted to extend QMV to additional policy areas, but the issue now became wrappedup with the much more politically-sensitive question of the reweighting of Councilvotes. The reason for this was growing apprehension among the big member statesover the decline in their relative voting power following successive rounds of enlargement,which had increased the number of small member states in the EU. Notunreasonably, the big member states wanted an increase in the number of their votes.Alternatively, they favoured the introduction of a double majority, combining thetraditional requirement of a qualified majority with a new demographic criterion.Otherwise, they argued, a qualified majority could be formed following Central andEastern European enlargement by a group of countries that together did not representa majority of the EU’s population – most of the Central and Eastern European candidatecountries being future small member states.By opening the latent division between big and small member states, negotiationsabout the future of QMV inevitably became linked to another controversial question:the size and composition of the Commission. As long ago as 1979, the SpierenburgReport on institutional reform had urged a diminution in the size of the Commission,which consisted of two Commissioners per big member state and one Commissionerper small member state. 13 Jacques Delors, who became Commission President in1985, complained that the Commission, which increased in size to seventeen Commissionersfollowing Portuguese and Spanish accession to the EC in 1986, was toolarge and unwieldy, though it soon became the most successful Commission in EUhistory. 14 By 1995, when the EU acquired three new member states and the Com-13. European Commission, Proposals for reform of the Commission of the European Communities andits services; report made at the request of the Commission by an Independent Review Body underthe chairmanship of Mr. Dirk Spierenburg, Brussels, 24.09.1979.14. K. ENDO, The Presidency of the European Commission under Jacques Delors: The Politics ofStructured Leadership, St. Martin’s, New York, 1999.

From Treaty Revision to Treaty Revision: The Legacy of Maastricht 131mission increased to twenty members, the intellectual argument in favour of changingthe basis for appointment to the Commission, thereby reducing its size, became compelling.The prospect of Central and Eastern European enlargement added to the urgencyof the issue, though most small member states were loath to accept a solutionthat denied them representation in the Commission, despite the fact that Commissionerswere supposed to be independent of the governments that nominated them.For their part, most big member states seemed willing to give up the right to appointa second Commissioner only in return for additional votes in the Council or an overhaulof the system of QMV in ways that would increase their voting power.Notwithstanding extensive preparatory work, negotiators failed to overhaul QMVand the Commission appointment system in the 1996-1997 IGC. 15 EU leaders cameclose to a solution at the concluding summit, in Amsterdam in June 1997, but wereunable to finalize a package deal. The reason may have been that Central and EasternEuropean enlargement, the catalyst for large-scale institutional reform, still seemedtoo distant to force EU leaders to act. Taking the easy way out, they decided to postponeinstitutional reform until another IGC, to take place at least one year before theEU enlarged to more than twenty member states.Although it did not include institutional reform, the Amsterdam Treaty was by nomeans inconsequential for the EU. Aware of the special character of Central andEastern European enlargement and sensitive to growing public concern about theEU’s weak legitimacy, national leaders affirmed in the treaty that “the EU is foundedon the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamentalfreedoms, and the rule of law”. Whereas the EU and the Communities that precededit were political constructions, national governments had not explicitly imbued themwith core political values. In the Amsterdam Treaty, by contrast, governments clearlystated what those values were and included a provision to sanction any member statethat deviated from them. Drafted with the Central and Eastern European applicantsin mind, this was one of the few provisions in the Amsterdam Treaty that owed itsexistence to impending enlargement.The shadow of enlargement had nevertheless influenced the debate in the run-upto the Amsterdam Treaty on the possibility of institutionalizing differentiated integration.With the EU likely to include many more member states of varying sizes,interests, and capabilities, the idea of flexibly, whereby like-minded member statescould integrate more quickly and closely than others, gained ground. Although somecountries remained wary, a consensus emerged during the IGC that, in principle,flexibility should be included in the treaty so long as it was limited, in practice, toprecisely defined conditions and would not endanger the acquis communautaire. The15. On the 1996-1997 IGC and the Amsterdam Treaty, see G. FALKNER, M. NENTWICH, The AmsterdamTreaty: The Blueprint for the Future Institutional Balance?, in: K. NEUNREITHER,A. WIENER (eds), European Integration after Amsterdam: Institutional Dynamics and Prospectsfor Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000; F. LAURSEN (ed.), The Amsterdam Treaty:National Preference Formation, Interstate Bargaining and Outcome, Odense University Press,Odense, 2002.

132 Desmond DINANincorporation of both general “enabling” clauses for countries wishing to cooperatemore closely and particular provisions governing the use of flexibility in certainpolicy areas was one of the most striking features of the Amsterdam Treaty. 16The treaty’s innovations with regard to CFSP and JHA were significant, thoughnot as far-reaching as proponents of deeper integration in these policy fields hadhoped. The impetus for CFSP and JHA reform, despite developments in the Balkansand elsewhere, was not sufficient to overcome entrenched opposition among manynational governments to sharing sovereignty in key aspects of foreign and securitypolicy, and in police and judicial cooperation. The Maastricht Treaty had managedto bring CFSP and JHA formally and fully onto the EU agenda, but the follow-onreview happened too soon to bring about extensive changes.The Stability and Growth Pact, which national leaders adopted at the Amsterdamsummit, before concluding the IGC, amounted to an important change in the EU’sconstitution. The pact originated in German doubts about the sustainability of EMUthrough budgetary discipline following the eventual launch of the euro. Accordingly,governments agreed that eurozone members whose budgets exceeded 3 percent ofgross domestic product would be subject to financial penalties. While not part of theAmsterdam Treaty, the Stability and Growth Pact was tantamount to an informaltreaty change, one that would have an enormous impact on EU developments andpolicies in the years ahead. 17Large-scale institutional reform was the obvious unfinished business of the AmsterdamTreaty. The EU finally tackled the so-called Amsterdam leftovers three yearslater in an IGC that resulted in the Nice Treaty. 18 Central and Eastern European enlargementwas still several years away, but seemed sufficiently imminent to ensurethat EU leaders would agree on the necessary institutional reforms. The pre-Nice IGCalso addressed institutional representation for the candidate countries, an issue thatordinarily would have been included in the accession negotiations and spelled-out inthe ensuing accession treaties. The narrowness of the IGC agenda, which focusedalmost exclusively on voting weights and institutional representation, distinguishedthe new round of treaty reform from the SEA, Maastricht, and Amsterdam negotiations.The pre-Nice IGC did indeed tackle the related issues of voting weights in theCouncil and national representation in the Commission, but in a highly unsatisfactorymanner. Perhaps the very narrowness of the agenda precluded the kinds of linkagesand side deals that facilitated success in previous IGCs, notably those resulting in the16. A. STUBB, The Amsterdam Treaty and Flexible Integration, in: ECSA Review, 2(1998), pp.1-2.17. P.M CROWLEY, The Stability and Growth Pact: Review, Alternatives and Legal Aspects, in:Current Politics and Economics of Europe, 3(2002), pp.225–244.18. E. BEST, M. GRAY, A. STUBB (eds), Rethinking the European Union: IGC 2000 and Beyond,European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 2002; M. GRAY, A. STUBB, The Treatyof Nice: Negotiating a Poisoned Chalice?, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(2001), pp.5-23; F. LAURSEN (ed.), The Treaty of Nice: Actor Preferences, Bargaining and InstitutionalChoice, Nijhoff/Brill, Leiden, 2006.

From Treaty Revision to Treaty Revision: The Legacy of Maastricht 133SEA and the Maastricht Treaty. The big member states managed to get more votesin the Council, in return for a commitment to reduce the number of Commissionersto one only per member state until the EU expanded to twenty-seven members, atwhich time the EU would introduce a system, still to be worked out, to reduce thesize of the Commission to fewer than the number of member states. In the meantime,big and small member states fought doggedly among each other, as well as betweenthemselves, for as many Council votes as possible. Despite having a smaller populationthan Germany, France insisted for pragmatic and symbolic reasons on maintainingparity with its Eastern neighbour: each got the same number of additionalvotes. By contrast, the Netherlands secured more votes than Belgium, with whichhistorically it was equal in the Council, much to the chagrin of its Benelux partner.Because the allocation of votes did not fairly reflect each country’s population, theNice agreement on QMV included a demographic criterion for the calculation of aqualified majority. Thus a legislative proposal would pass if it received a qualifiedmajority (about 72 percent) of votes cast, representing an absolute majority of memberstates and, subject to a request by a national government, a qualified majority (62percent) of the EU’s population.The Nice Treaty of 2001 had finally tackled the institutional implications of enlargement,but without introducing radical reform. The conduct of the IGC, duringwhich national governments fought tenaciously over voting weights and Commissionrepresentation, tarnished the eventual agreement and brought the EU into disrepute.The final session of the negotiations, conducted by national leaders and the CommissionPresident in Nice in December 2000, was especially inglorious. Without thecover of substantive policy issues, the IGC’s almost exclusive focus on institutionalaffairs exposed the seeming pettiness of national positions and the glaring gap betweenrhetoric and reality in the conduct of EU affairs. Within ten years, treaty reformhad deteriorated from the meatiness of Maastricht to the narrowness of Nice, bringingthe credibility and utility of IGCs into question.The Constitutional TurnIn 1999, eleven member states launched the third stage of EMU, irrevocably fixingtheir exchange rates and launching the single currency. Enlargement was the otherbig item on the EU’s agenda. Yet the EU’s response to impending enlargement haddominated two rounds of IGCs without producing radical institutional reform. Despitethe magnitude of EMU and enlargement, the EU at the beginning of the newdecade seemed stuck in acrimonious debates about arcane institutional issues thatdeepened public discontent with the broader European project. Aware of the need tolift the EU out of what had become a rut of treaty reform, EU leaders took a constitutionalturn, intending to make a decisive break with the first ten years of the post-Maastricht period of treaty change.

134 Desmond DINANThe constitutional turn emerged from a post-Nice debate about the future of theEU that began even before the conclusion of the Nice Treaty. Key contributions includedthat of German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who called in a speech inMay 2000 for a Constitutional Treaty to establish a European Federation based onthe principle of subsidiarity. 19 Continuing the debate after the Nice Treaty was signed,Commission President Romano Prodi issued a White Paper on governance, followingmore than a year of consultations with politicians, officials and representatives ofcivil society. 20The debate culminated in the Laeken Declaration, issued by the European Councilin December 2001. “Within the Union”, the Declaration proclaimed,“the European institutions must be brought closer to its citizens [who] undoubtedly supportthe Union’s broad aims, but […] want the European institutions to be less unwieldy andrigid and, above all, more efficient and open. […] In short, citizens are calling for a clear,open, effective, democratically controlled Community approach”.The EU was in a dilemma: treaty reform required an IGC, which involved bargainingamong national governments that tended to produce lowest-common-denominator orotherwise sub-optimal solutions. Accordingly, the European Council decided to pavethe way for the next IGC “as broadly and openly as possible”, by convening a convention“composed of the main parties involved in the debate on the future of the Union […]. toconsider the key issues arising for the Union’s future development and try to identify thevarious possible responses”. 21The Laeken Declaration generated hope, if not confidence, that the EU was capableof breaking out of its narrow constitutional confines and embracing instead a broader,richer constitutional framework to address institutional constraints and citizen concerns.Inevitably, perhaps, the Constitutional Convention, which opened in Brussels inFebruary 2002, failed to live up to expectations. 22 The Convention was intellectuallyinteresting, with participants, representing national governments and national parliamentsfrom the existing and candidate member states, as well as Commissionersand members of the EP, discussing a range of potential policy innovations and institutionalreforms. Delegates drafted hundreds of proposals and treaty amendments.Yet national governments made most of the running, especially as the deadline of19. Joschka Fischer, From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration,speech at Humbolt University of Berlin, 12.05.2000.20. COM(2001) 428 final, European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper, 25.07.2001.21. European Council (2001), Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, http://europeanconvention.eu.int/pdf/lknen.pdf.22. P. NORMAN, Accidental Constitution: The Making of Europe’s Constitutional Treaty, 2 nd revisededition, Eurocomment, 2005; C. CLOSA, The Convention Method and the Transformation of EUConstitutional Politics, in: E. ODDVAR ERIKSEN, J.E. FOSSUM, A. JOSE MENDEZ, Developinga Constitution for Europe, Taylor and Francis, London, 2006, pp.184-207.

From Treaty Revision to Treaty Revision: The Legacy of Maastricht 135June 2003 approached for the Convention to produce the Draft ConstitutionalTreaty. 23Contrary to the ethos of the Convention, the big-small country cleavage over institutionaldesign soon resurfaced, with many of the small member states mountinga fierce rearguard action to maintain the right always to appoint a Commissioner. Thebig member states nevertheless managed to push through a provision for a college ofonly fifteen Commissioners. The debate over the modalities of QMV also followedfamiliar lines. Acutely aware of the limits of the Nice arrangement and their continuingloss of power as a result of enlargement, France and Germany pressed for anew voting system whereby half the number of member states representing at least60 percent of the EU’s population would constitute a qualified majority. Thanks inpart to the support of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Chairman of the Convention, the twocountries succeeded in having the new voting formula included in the Draft ConstitutionalTreaty.The Constitutional Convention had taken place in part because of dissatisfactionwith the traditional method of treaty reform, especially in the aftermath of the IGCsthat preceded the Amsterdam and Nice treaties. Yet under the terms of the existingtreaties, governments would have to hold an IGC in order to change the treaties.Whereas governments had worked behind the scenes to shape the outcome of theConstitutional Convention, they openly pushed for their preferences in the ensuingIGC. Once again, institutional issues predominated, with the small member states –including those just about to join the EU – attempting to regain the right to representationin the Commission and two big countries – Poland and Spain – fighting topreserve the Nice arrangements for QMV, which were highly advantageous to them.Under the circumstance, the post-Convention IGC immediately reverted to form.Threats by France and Germany to link the outcome to the upcoming budget negotiations(by implication cutting funds to Poland and Spain) and to forge ahead witha core group of member states (by implication excluding Poland and Spain) set adivisive tone for the negotiations. Changes of government in Poland and Spain, forreasons unrelated to the IGC, improved the chances for success. Hoping to signal amore accommodating approach to EU affairs, the two countries’ new governmentswere willing to reach a compromise on a revised voting procedure. At the same time,the small member states eventually agreed to a Commission reduced in size, beginningin 2014. These reforms covered only a small part of the far-reaching ConstitutionalTreaty. Yet their negotiation dominated the IGC in a way that dramaticallydemonstrated the persistence and intensity of national rivalry over institutionalarrangements in the EU.It is questionable whether the Convention provided more legitimacy for the treatyreform process. 24 Certainly, the Constitutional Treaty – the outcome of the Conventionand the IGC – failed to generate public enthusiasm or support. Far from rallying23. B. CRUM, Politics and Power in the European Convention, in: Politics, 1(2004), pp.1-11.24. T. RISSE, M. KLEINE, Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU's Treaty Revision Methods, in: Journalof Common Market Studies, 1(2007), pp.69-80.

136 Desmond DINANpublic opinion to the EU, the Constitutional Treaty seemed to have generated additionalcause for concern. The use of the word “constitutional” in the name of thetreaty, and of titles such as “Foreign Minister” in the text, fuelled public unease withthe state-like attributes of the emerging EU. Given the rise of Euroscepticism and, atbest, widespread public indifference toward the EU, the fate of the ConstitutionalTreaty was highly uncertain. The decisions of the French President and the Dutchgovernment to ratify the treaty by means of referendums gave a huge hostage tofortune. In both countries, most of the opposition had less to do with the treaty itselfthan with unrelated factors, such as fear of economic uncertainty (especially inFrance) and the government’s unpopularity (especially in the Netherlands). It washard to make a compelling case for the Constitutional Treaty, whose institutionalinnovations seemed arcane and lacked popular appeal. Not surprisingly, sizable majoritiesin both countries rejected the Treaty. 25The experience of previous treaty rejections suggested that governments wouldpersist in pushing through the Constitutional Treaty. The difference this time was theimpossibility of changing the treaty in ways that would be acceptable to all memberstates and would likely produce positive results in second referendums in France andthe Netherlands, let alone in a referendum in the UK. Nevertheless governments weredetermined to salvage as much as possible of the Constitutional Treaty, having investedconsiderable time and political capital in it. Their best hope was to repackagethe treaty in order to avoid holding new referendums, which they seemed bound tolose. For a start, they would need to call the Constitutional Treaty something else.The European Council agreed in June 2006 to adopt a “twin track” approach: first,using existing opportunities to deliver a “Europe of results”; second, exploring thepossibility of rescuing the treaty with a minimum of change to it. 26The irony, once again, was the need to hold an IGC in order to revise the discreditedConstitutional Treaty in ways that would make it more palatable politically. Patiencewith IGCs, even among national governments, had by then worn exceedinglythin. Germany, in the Council presidency in the first half of 2007, resolved to preparea mandate for the IGC, which was scheduled to take place during the following PortuguesePresidency. In effect, Germany conducted the bulk of the negotiations duringits presidency, bequeathing to the incoming Portuguese a revised treaty that governmentscould rubber-stamp in the IGC proper. Most of the changes made to the ConstitutionalTreaty were indeed cosmetic, which allowed governments to argue thatthe proposed “Reform Treaty” merely amended the existing treaties, not replace themwith a new treaty, thereby obviating the need for referendums.25. D. BEACH, The Constitutional Treaty: The Failed Formal Constitutionalization, in: F. LAURSEN,Designing the European Union …, op.cit; pp.350-392; S. BARONCELLI, C. SPAGNOLO, L. SI-MONA TALANI, Back to Maastricht: Obstacles to Constitutional Reform within the EU Treaty(1991-2007), Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Cambridge, 2008; F. LAURSEN (ed.), The Rise andFall of the Constitutional Treaty, Nijhoff/Brill, Leiden, 2008.26. European Council, Brussels European Council, June 15-16, Presidency Conclusions, 10633/1/06,REV 1, Brussels, 17.07.2006.

From Treaty Revision to Treaty Revision: The Legacy of Maastricht 137Nevertheless the truncated IGC could not avoid reopening the contentious questionof QMV. At issue this time was Poland’s insistence on revisiting the doublemajority formula contained in the Constitutional Treaty. Understandably, Polandwanted to retain the Nice arrangement whereby its share of the total number of Councilvotes was almost equal to Germany’s. The June 2007 summit, where EU leadersconcluded the IGC, was suitably testy. Having resolved a variety of other issues, theEuropean Council turned to the outstanding question of QMV. Under intense pressurefrom almost every other national delegation and the Commission President, the Polishdelegation formally dropped its opposition to the double majority system in returnfor an arrangement to delay its entry into force until 2014. 27National leaders signed the new treaty at a ceremony in Lisbon in December 2007.Other than in Ireland, whose constitution mandates a referendum on EU treatychanges, there would not be any ratification referendums. Yet the result of the Irishreferendum, held in June 2008, was 54 percent against. Once more, the fate of theConstitutional Treaty, this time in the form of its successor, the Lisbon Treaty, wasin jeopardy. In contrast to the situation following the French and Dutch referendums,however, EU leaders could revert to their old tactic of offering the Irish governmentminor concessions with a view to holding a second referendum and appeasing a sufficientnumber of voters in order to secure a successful outcome. One Irish demand,however, was to prove highly significant. In the run-up to the referendum, the antitreatyside had exploited concern that Ireland’s influence in Brussels would diminishfollowing the reduction, in 2014, in the Commission’s size. Never mind that thischange was mandated long ago in the Nice Treaty. Given public sensitivity on thematter, the Irish government expressed confidence that it could hold and win a secondreferendum on the Lisbon Treaty if the European Council would agree to modify theNice Treaty in order to retain one Commissioner per member state. 28What followed was a series of carefully choreographed steps. The EuropeanCouncil announced in December 2008 that it would decide in due course, as long asthe Lisbon Treaty entered into force, to keep the Commission’s size at one Commissionerfrom each member state. Six months later, the European Council agreed on aspecial protocol for Ireland, a largely meaningless form of words addressing some ofIreland’s other concerns, to facilitate holding a second referendum and to help ensurea successful outcome. Soon afterwards, the Irish government announced that the referendumwould take place in October 2009. Influenced less by the promised protocolthan by the global financial crisis, which hit Ireland especially hard, Irish voters turnedout in larger numbers and ratified the Lisbon Treaty in the second referendum. Onceratified by every other member state – the Czech Republic being the last holdout –the Lisbon Treaty finally came into effect in December 2009.27. European Policy Center, A Midsummer Night's Treaty, June 2007, http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=416&cat_id=5.28. J. O’BRENNAN, Ireland and the Lisbon Treaty: Quo Vadis?, CEPS Policy Brief No.176, October2008.

138 Desmond DINANThe import of the Lisbon Treaty went well beyond the institutional changes includedin it, though institutional issues had dominated the preceding IGC. 29 One ofthe key objectives of the Constitutional Treaty and subsequent Lisbon Treaty, asstated in the Laeken Declaration of 2001, was to simplify the EU’s constitutionalstructure and decision-making procedures. One means of simplification was to doaway with the Maastricht Treaty’s three-pillar system, substituting for it a unitaryEU. Whereas the Lisbon Treaty seemed to have achieved this objective, by retaininga separate, largely intergovernmental decision-making procedure for the CFSP, Lisbonreplicated the SEA with respect to European Political Cooperation: it establisheda unitary treaty structure with an implicit intergovernmental pillar for foreign policy,security, and defence.ConclusionThe Maastricht Treaty harks back to an apparently simpler time in the history ofEuropean integration. With only twelve member states, the EC was far more manageablethan today’s EU. Yet the possible accession of many newly-independentCentral and Eastern European countries was already on the horizon. Maastricht representedthe completion of an agenda that emerged in the late 1970s, in response topersistent economic setbacks and changing geo-political circumstances. It built onthe evolution of European Political Cooperation, tentative steps in the area of justiceand home affairs, and implementation of the single market program to deepen integrationamong existing member states before the EU would have to embark on anunprecedented round of enlargement. EMU, an ambitious objective with far-reachingpolitical implications, seemed a fitting undertaking for an entity that enjoyed broadpublic support thanks to the presumed benefits of deeper market integration.Though representing the end of a distinct phase in the history of European integration,Maastricht contained the seeds of future treaty reform, not least because ofa clause calling for an IGC to review CFSP within five years. Yet the post-Maastrichtagenda of institutional change, in light of impending Central and Eastern Europeanenlargement, dominated the 1996-1997 and subsequent IGCs. An effort to alter theterms of the debate and legitimize the treaty reform process by convening the ConstitutionalConvention in 2003 failed to generate public support and wean the EUaway from a preoccupation with seemingly narrow institutional interests. Rejectionby French and Dutch voters of the Constitutional Treaty, then by Irish voters of theLisbon Treaty, gave national governments a chance to focus the ensuing IGC squarelyon institutional affairs. Whether preceded by a convention or consisting exclusivelyof an IGC, ambitious treaty reform had run out of public support and political steam29. P. CRAIG, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, revised edition, Oxford UniversityPress, Oxford, 2013; J. ZILLER, The Treaty of Lisbon: Constitutional Treaty, Episode II, in:F. LAURSEN, Designing the European Union …, op.cit.

From Treaty Revision to Treaty Revision: The Legacy of Maastricht 139by the time that the Lisbon Treaty eventually came into effect. In its place, the EUfaced a debate about results more than reform, with a corresponding shift of emphasisfrom input to output legitimacy.Paradoxically, the main seeds of major treaty reform lay in Maastricht’s majorshortcoming: the weak foundations of EMU. The onset of the eurozone crisis exposedthe fragility of monetary union without strong economic governance and effectivepolitical direction at the European level. Efforts to resolve the crisis have led to technicaltreaty changes in order to establish a permanent bailout fund and a fiscal pactprimarily among eurozone members, though Britain’s rejection of the latter resultedin the pact being concluded outside the EU treaty structure. The weakness of Maastricht’sprovisions for EMU was evident at the time of the original treaty negotiations,but wishful thinking masked its potential seriousness. Now that the extent of theproblem is fully apparent, it may not be possible to seek the answer through widerangingtreaty reform, thanks to public discontent and political dissatisfaction withthe experience of treaty change – from Amsterdam to Lisbon – in the post-Maastrichtperiod.

Politische Union ohneeuropäischen Demos?Michael KelpanidesPolitische Unionohne europäischen Demos?Die fehlende Gemeinschaft der Europäer als Hindernisder politischen IntegrationNomosPolitische Union ohneeuropäischen Demos?Die fehlende Gemeinschaft der Europäerals Hindernis der politischen IntegrationVon Michael Kelpanides2013, ca. 460 S., brosch., ca. 69,– €ISBN 978-3-8487-0309-8Erscheint ca. Juli 2013Die Gründung der europäischen Währungsunionhatte kontraproduktive Folgen: Sie hatnicht zur Konvergenz, sondern zu divergierendenökonomischen Entwicklungen in denEuro-Ländern und zu übermäßiger Verschuldungder Südländer geführt, wodurch diegrößte Krise seit dem Zweiten Weltkriegausgelöst wurde.Dieses Buch untersucht die tiefer liegendenökonomischen, gesellschaftlichen, politischenund kulturellen Disparitäten zwischenden Mitgliedsgesellschaften, die der Entstehungeiner solidarischen Gemeinschafteuropäischer Bürger – eines europäischenDemos – massiv entgegenwirken. Die historischerfolgreichen Fälle der Nationalstaatsbildungzeigen allerdings, dass starke Bürgerbewegungenfür die Gründung derNationalstaaten auf der Basis von kulturellenund gesellschaftlichen Affinitäten entstanden.Diese gibt es heute zwischen den GesellschaftenNordwest- und Südosteuropasnicht. In dem Vergleich dieser stark miteinanderkontrastierenden Ländergruppen wirdGriechenland, das „schwächste Glied derEuro-Kette“ besonders berücksichtigt.Bestellen Sie jetzt telefonisch unter 07221/2104-37. Portofreie Buch-Bestellungen unter www.nomos-shop.de/20602

141Book reviews – Comptes rendus – BuchbesprechungenSylvain SCHIRMANN, Sarah MOHAMED-GAILLARD, Georges Pompidou etl’Allemagne, Collection Georges Pompidou – Archives, no.6,: P.I.E. Peter Lang,Bruxelles, 2012, 408 S. – ISBN 978-90-5201-058-8 – 41,90 €.Die Präsidentschaft von Georges Pompidou und die Kanzlerschaft von Willy Brandthaben sich bis auf wenige Monate zeitlich genau überschnitten. Diese Parallelität istnatürlich nur ein Grund, Pompidous Einstellung und Politik gegenüber der Bundesrepublikim Lichte der Quellen zu betrachten. Es handelt sich bei dieser Dokumentationum die Wiedergabe von Texten zu den für die deutsch-französischen Beziehungenrelevanten Bereichen, angefangen mit der Politik über die wirtschaftlicheZusammenarbeit bis hin zur westeuropäischen Integration und den Ost-West-Beziehungen.Die aus den in den Archives nationales liegenden Pompidou-Papieren stammendenTexte geben Auskunft über das persönliche Verhältnis von Pompidou undBrandt, das sich durch Sachlichkeit und Informationsbereitschaft, aber kaum durchpersönliche Nähe auszeichnete, vor allem aber über die großen politischen und wirtschaftlichenThemen, denen vier Abschnitte gewidmet sind: Die bilateralen Beziehungenmit den Schwerpunkten Kultur und Wirtschaft, die Europapolitik, die Ostpolitikund die Vier-Mächte-Verhandlungen über Berlin sowie schließlich Fragen derinternationalen Politik (KSZE, gleichgewichtige Truppenreduzierung, transatlantischeBeziehungen, Nahostkonflikt).Die abgedruckten Texte stellen überwiegend Auszüge aus umfassenderen Dokumentendar. Das hat den Vorteil, dass damit kürzere themenbezogene Passagen zurHand sind, aber natürlich den Nachteil, dass der Kontext im Rahmen des jeweiligenDokuments nicht ersichtlich ist. Merkwürdig ist, dass sich Sylvain Schirmann undSarah Mohamed-Gaillard, obwohl zahlreiche Briefe von Brandt und Protokolle überBegegnungen zwischen Pompidou und Brandt abgedruckt sind, nicht um die deutscheÜberlieferung gekümmert haben. Wenigstens Bd. 6 der Berliner Ausgabe der WerkeBrandts und natürlich die einschlägigen Bände der „Akten zur Auswärtigen Politikder Bundesrepublik Deutschland“ hätten sie heranziehen können.In seiner fast ausschließlich französischsprachige Literatur heranziehenden Einleitunganalysiert Schirmann Pompidous Sicht auf die Bundesrepublik, die diesereinerseits fest im Westen verankert, andererseits aber in Gefahr sah, ihre Westbindungim Zuge einer nun aktiveren Ostpolitik zu lockern. Der französische Staatspräsidentunterstützte die Ostpolitik schon deswegen, weil das Frankreich de Gaulles als Pionierder europäischen Entspannungspolitik hervorgetreten war. Aber er erkannte auch sofort,dass die sozial-liberale Ostpolitik den Status quo respektierte, um ihn längerfristigzu verändern. Brandts Ostpolitik rollte die deutsche Frage in einer für Frankreichirritierenden Weise neu auf. Pompidous nie nachlassende Sorge erreichte 1973in dem von Henri Kissinger ausgerufenen „Jahr Europas“ einen Höhepunkt, als Pompidouauf deutscher Seite lauter Halbheiten und Grautöne entdeckte. Die Bundesre-

142 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungenpublik pendelte in seinen Augen zwischen Neutralismus, europapolitischem Engagementund transatlantischer Orientierung. Aus alldem folgte, dass die Pflege derAchse Paris-Bonn ein verbindliches Leitmotiv war, weil dadurch die Kooperation imbilateralen Verhältnis und bei der „construction européenne“ auf der einen und dieBändigung der als übermächtige Konkurrenz empfundenen westdeutschen Dynamikauf der anderen Seite ineinander griffen.Der Wert dieser Dokumentation liegt weniger in neuen grundstürzenden Einsichtenals darin, dass Textpassagen zu verschiedensten Aspekten der französisch-westdeutschenBeziehungsgeschichte bequem zugänglich werden. Im bilateralen Bereichgehören dazu der deutsch-französische Jugendaustausch oder der von Pompidou angemahnteFranzösischunterricht an deutschen Schulen, vor allem aber die vielfältigenKooperationen zwischen den beiden Staaten (u.a. Industriewirtschaft, Agrarpolitik,Energiewirtschaft, zivile und militärische Luftfahrt, Nukleartechnologie). Auf westeuropäischerEbene sind es in erster Linie währungspolitische Fragen, die eingehenddokumentiert werden. Zur Auseinandersetzung Pompidous mit der Ostpolitik sindnicht nur die Treffen mit dem Bundeskanzler, sondern auch mit Vertretern der Oppositionaufschlussreich. Helmut Kohl, als Nachfolger Rainer Barzels neuer Vorsitzenderder CDU, konnte es im Oktober 1973 nicht lassen, sich von den angeblichen„tendances de M. Bahr“ zu distanzieren. Was er damit meinte, wurde sofort deutlich,wenn er die Treue der CDU zum Westen herausstellte. Für Pompidou war es eineGelegenheit, wieder einmal das MBFR-Konzept der Bundesregierung zurückzuweisen:„La détente ne va pas sans vigilance“ (S. 293 f.).Gottfried NiedhartUniversität MannheimEmmanuel MOURLON-DRUOL, A Europe made of money: the emergence of theEuropean Monetary System by (2012), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2012,368 p. – ISBN 978-0-8014-5083-9 – 51,90 €.This book examines the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS), taking along term perspective, starting from post war monetary cooperation in Europe,through the Werner plan (1974-75), and the start of the EMS (1979). It grounds theresearch on a variety of primary sources, first and foremost the consultation ofarchival material in several countries.The creation of the EMS was a turning point in European monetary history. Itreintroduced a semifixed exchange rate regime in Europe, after the end of the BrettonWoods system. It subsequently acted as an external constraint on the economicpolicies of the participating countries. No less importantly, it was a crucial step onthe road to Economic and Monetary Union in Europe. The author rejects a ‘deus exmachina’ (p.3) explanation that focuses exclusively on the creation of the EMS in1978-79 and sets out to investigate the deeper forces that underpinned it.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 143The main argument put forward in the book is that the establishment of the EMScannot be understood without considering the supranational, transnational and intergovernmentalforces at play. Hence, the book stresses the supranational role played bythe Commission, the activity of the transnational community of monetary experts and theintergovernmental leadership provided by some political figures. The book pays attentionto shifting economic ideas and the Bundesbank-led transnational learning processthat unfolded amongst monetary elites. It argues that European monetary cooperation inthe 1970s was a response to the international economic and monetary crisis (p.10).The book is well researched and clearly written. It relies on an impressive amountof archival material. The author does an excellent job in explaining with Cartesianclarity, who did what, when, how and most importantly why. It situates the actionsof the various actors in the broader economic and political context in which theyinteracted. It explains the underlying economic and political dynamics – or structuralforces – that partly influenced the behaviour of actors. At the same time it also explainshow actors shaped the context in which they were embedded.Despite all its merits, the book suffers from two interrelated shortcomings. Tobegin with, it uses a rather limited amount of secondary sources, and includes only ahandful of works written by non-historians. By now the literature on the EMS andmore generally European monetary integration is vast, not only in the discipline ofhistory but also in political science. Hence, one could have expected more stocktakingfrom the existing literature, for example, just to cite one, the prize-winning work ofKenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht (OUP, 1999). Tosome extent this disciplinary focus is understandable, and indeed all academics tendto speak primarily to works of colleagues in their discipline – in this case, history.Moreover, historians prefer to rely on primary material rather than citing secondarysources and to be fair the author makes a skilful use of primary sources.Yet, given the fact that the literature on European monetary integration is extensive,some of the arguments put forward by the book, though well documented, arenot very original, at least for political scientists. The importance of economic ideasand economic elites, the role played by transnational networks of monetary experts,the political impetus provided by political leaders gathered in the European councilare all topics that have been extensively discussed – though sometimes not adequatelysubstantiated – by the literature on the politics of European monetary integration. Inthis respect, this book can be seen as complementary to the existing literature, ratherthan providing novel insight.Despite its historical take (or perhaps because of it), the book is very topical becauseit helps the reader to gather a better understanding of the current crisis in the euro area.The need for monetary union to be complemented by an economic (especially fiscal)union, as well as by a political union, have been long standing issue in the policy debateson European monetary integration, as documented by Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol’sbook. The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area has brought these issues at the forefront.Lucia QuagliaUniversity of York

144 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – BuchbesprechungenAurélie Élisa GFELLER, Building a European Identity. France, the United Statesand the Oil Shock, 1973-1974, Berghahn Books, New York/Oxford, 2012, 232 S. –ISBN 978-0-85745-225-2 – Hb 75.00$Aurélie Élisa Gfeller hat in den letzten Jahren eine Reihe von Artikeln zur Integrationsgeschichtein namhaften Geschichtszeitschriften veröffentlicht. Die in Lausanne,Stanford und Princeton ausgebildete Zeithistorikerin zählt zum immer größer werdendenKreis von Wissenschaftlern, die die 70er Jahre nicht als Phase der Stagnationim Bemühen um die Einigung Europas verstehen sondern als ein Zeitraum vollerIntegrationsinitiativen und Schritte zur Einheit des alten Kontinents begreifen. Davonzeugt auch ihre erste Monographie, die sich mit dem Selbstverständnis Europas beschäftigt.Nach ihren auf ihrer Dissertation 1 beruhenden Forschungsergebnissen konstruiertendie führenden politischen Eliten Frankreichs eine europäische Identität nebendem eigenen französischen Selbstverständnis, die der Regierung Georges Pompidouals Grundlage diente, die Europäische Gemeinschaften, EG, als europäischeEinheit zu begreifen und sie als eigenständige weltpolitische Kraft und Akteurin gegenüberden Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und in der arabischen Welt zu sehen(S. 2 und 85-105). Die europäische Identität stehe nicht im Widerspruch zum französischenNationalstaat, so die Historikerin, die allerdings nicht von sich ergänzendenTeilidentitäten spricht. Das Konzept sah nach ihrer Meinung vor, Souveränitätsrechtezwischen Nationalstaat und europäischen Gemeinwesen aufzuteilen, so dass die EuropäischeGemeinschaft als Weltmacht anstelle und im Interesse Frankreichs handelnkönne. Damit habe Frankreich die Tür zur supranationalen politischen EntwicklungEuropas aufgestoßen (S. 10). Die Ölkrise bildete die Bewährungsprobe für das neuefranzösische Konzept. Pompidou und sein Nachfolger Valéry Giscard d’Estaing förderteninstitutionelle Reformen der EG mit der Absicht, die Europäische Gemeinschaftzu einem einflussreichen internationalen Akteur aufzubauen (S. 11).Gfeller forschte in den Nationalarchiven in Frankreich und den Vereinigten Staatensowie den Archiven des französischen Auswärtigen Amts, der EuropäischenUnion in Florenz und der Stiftung Jean Monnet in Lausanne. Zudem wertete sie diefranzösische Presse in ihrem Untersuchungszeitraum von April 1973 bis Dezember1974 aus, deren Ergebnisse auffällig unvermittelt neben dem von ihr minutiös aufgezeigtendiplomatischen Verhandlungsprozess stehen. Sie nutzte auch die Gelegenheit,Zeitzeugen – darunter Giscard d’Estaing – zu befragen und ihre Arbeit mit zahlreicheninternational anerkannten Kennern der Materie zu diskutieren (S.VI f.). DieVerfasserin will das europäische Selbstverständnis der französischen Eliten analysieren(S. 11 f.), was die Schwerpunktsetzung auf französische Archivalien erklärtund ebenso begründet, weshalb sie auf Archivreisen nach London, Berlin undKoblenz verzichtete, stattdessen die entsprechenden Akteneditionen der AuswärtigenÄmter benutzte und offenbar keinen Kontakt zu Zeitzeugen aus Deutschland undGroßbritannien suchte.1. A.E. GFELLER, Re-envisioning Europe: France, America and the Arab World, 1973-1974, Princeton,2008.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 145Anders verhält es sich mit den USA. Gfeller bemüht sich, die Hintergründe fürdie amerikanische Initiative zum „Jahr Europas“ aufzuklären. Dabei konzentriert siesich zu Recht auf den Sicherheitsberater von US-Präsident Richard Nixon. HenryKissinger war die treibende Kraft hinter der Initiative, die die amerikanischen Wirtschafts-und Sicherheitsinteressen gegenüber den Europäern stärker durchsetzen sollte(S. 3 und 19). Die Verfasserin hatte offenbar nicht die Möglichkeit, den ehemaligenSicherheitsberater und späteren amerikanischen Außenminister zu sprechen und sein– zumindest in Teilen – in der Library of Congress aufbewahrten Nachlass einzusehen.Nur an wenigen Stellen ihrer Arbeit geht sie auf die Haltung des US-Außenministeriumsein. Gfeller konzentriert sich auf das Wesentliche. Foggy Bottom waroffenbar nicht nur unzureichend in die Initiative eingebunden sondern auch von ihremSinn nicht überzeugt. 2Die amerikanische Europainitiative im Jahr 1973 sollte der Nordatlantischen Allianzneuen Auftrieb geben, sich abzeichnende wirtschaftliche Gegensätze unter denVerbündeten versöhnen und vor allen Dingen die amerikanischen Finanz-, Wirtschafts-Sicherheitsinteressen gegenüber den Europäern stärker durchsetzen(S. 19-26 und 196). Gfeller schildert ausführlich und mit vielen neuen Details dieHintergründe des amerikanischen Ansinnens und die Vorbereitung der Initiative. DieUS-Verantwortlichen mussten nach ihren internen Analysen und zahlreichen Gesprächenmit Kennern der europäischen Politik sowie offiziellen Vertretern der Verbündetendavon ausgehen, dass ihr Versuch – die amerikanische Führerschaft inWesteuropa vor dem Hintergrund der Entspannungspolitik unter den Supermächtenzu erneuern – auf französischen Widerstand treffen würde. Mit der Rolle einer Regionalmacht,wie sie Kissinger den Europäern in seiner Rede vom 23. April 1973zugewiesen hatte, wollte sich weder die Presse noch die Regierung in Frankreichzufrieden geben. Sie verweigerten sich dem amerikanischen Ansinnen, unter verändertengeopolitischen Verhältnissen in der Welt die US-Führerschaft im Westen wiederzu behaupten. Sie befürchteten, dass die von Washington geforderte Stärkung dertransatlantischen Beziehung dazu führen würde, die Europäische Gemeinschaft einenalles beherrschenden amerikanischen Einfluss auszusetzen (S. 30-34). Die französischeRegierung lehnte die von den Amerikanern gewünschte gemeinsame Grundsatzerklärungmit ihren europäischen Verbündeten ab.Die ablehnende französische Haltung nahmen die EG Partner nicht hin. Allenvoran bemühten sich, Großbritannien und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland zwischenParis und Washington zu vermitteln und eine gemeinsame Erklärung zu den transatlantischenBeziehungen abzugeben. Gfeller beschreibt minutiös, wie es den Franzosengelang, den amerikanischen Plan zu konterkarieren und die ursprünglich angestrebtemachtvolle Demonstration atlantischer Einheit in eine Integrationsinitiativeumzuwandeln (S. 58-76). Am 14. Dezember 1973 veröffentlichten die Außenminis-2. Siehe M.J. HILLENBRAND, Die USA und die EG: Spannungen und Möglichkeiten, in: K. KAISER,H.-P. SCHWARZ (Hrsg.), Amerika und Westeuropa. Gegenwarts- und Zukunftsprobleme, BelserVerlag, Stuttgart/Zürich, 1977, S. 290; M.J. HILLENBRAND, Fragments of our time. Memoirs of adiplomat, University of Georgia Press, Athens (Georgia), 1998, S. 330 f.

146 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungenter der Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften eine Erklärung über dieeuropäische Identität.In dem Dokument beschrieben die Außenminister die Gemeinsamkeiten Europas,in dem sie die kulturell-wertebezogene und die politische Identität miteinander verbanden.Die Werte (repräsentative Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, soziale Gerechtigkeitund Menschenrechte), die europäischen Institutionen und der GemeinsameMarkt führten hiernach zu einer eigenen unverwechselbaren Identität. Damit stelltendie europäischen Außenminister die Identitätsfrage in einen Zusammenhang mit denpolitischen Institutionen der Gemeinschaften und sahen in diesen Handlungseinheitenden Ausdruck eines politischen Selbstverständnisses in der EG. Gfeller entziehtsich einer ausführlichen Interpretation der Quelle. Vielmehr legt sie großen Wert aufden Umstand, dass der bis dato für den Nationalstaat besetzte Begriff „Identität“nunmehr in Frankreich auf Europa Anwendung fand (S. 12 und 75). Der Hinweis aufdie politische Sprache bleibt ein Exkurs in einer Arbeit, die methodisch einer klassischenDiplomatiegeschichte entspricht. Die Historikerin beschreibt wie sich die EGihre Identität auf französisches Drängen hin aus sich selber, nicht in Beziehung zuden Vereinigten Staaten und als eigenständige weltpolitische Kraft definierte (S. 58,63, 72, 74 und 197 f.). Dabei gelang der französischen Diplomatie ein ungewöhnlicherSpagat. Sie beharrte ganz im Sinne des außenpolitischen Vermächtnisses Charles deGaulle’s auf ihre uneingeschränkte Souveränität und öffnete gleichzeitig die Tür füreine gemeinsame europäische Außenpolitik, die nur auf der Basis von Kooperationund gemeinsamen Absprachen denkbar war (S. 68 und 75).Ausführlich zeigt Gfeller diesen „Europäisierungsprozess“ am Beispiel der gemeinsamenNahostpolitik der EG Staaten. Den drohenden Verlust dieser traditionellfranzösischen Einflusssphäre konnte Paris durch Zusammenarbeit auf europäischerEbene wirksam entgegenwirken und auf diese Weise eigene Interessen weiter verfolgen(S. 85-105).Die eigentliche Bewährungsprobe für eine gemeinsame – mehr auf Unabhängigkeitvon den USA bedachte – Politik der EG-Staaten stand freilich noch aus. In derÖlkrise verfolgten die europäischen Staaten eigene nationale Interessen, die eine gemeinsameund abgestimmte Politik unter den EG Staaten unmöglich machten und –bis auf Frankreich – ihre Beziehung zu den Vereinigten Staaten und damit die AtlantischeGemeinschaft aufwerteten. Die Europäer konnten nur mit und nicht ohneund schon gar nicht gegen die Amerikaner die Krisenzeit bewältigen. Während derÖlkrise beeinflussten finanz- und wirtschaftspolitische Entwicklungen die Außenpolitikund verdeutlichten die führende Rolle der Vereinigten Staaten in der westlichenWelt. Gfeller beschreibt detailliert die französische Politik, sich der amerikanischenKrisenstrategie zu entziehen und damit einen stärkeren US-Einfluss auf Europazu verhindern. Zu keinem Zeitpunkt konnte die Pariser Regierung für diesesVorhaben die Unterstützung ihrer Partner gewinnen, was Gfeller nicht als Zeicheneiner zerstritten Gemeinschaft wertet (S. 114-134). Die Historikerin deutet den Fehlschlagder französischen Politik nicht als Niederlage mit einer nachhaltigen Wirkungfür die politische Kooperation unter den EG-Staaten, wohl aber musste Paris in der

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 147Folgezeit atlantischen Konsultationsverfahren zustimmen, die mehr US-Wünschenentsprachen und Washington Einflussmöglichkeiten auf die europäische Politik dauerhafteröffneten (S. 143-157 und 161 f). Damit stärkte die EG die atlantischen Beziehungenauf Kosten der von Frankreich so gewünschten europäischen Identität.Der europäisch-arabische Dialog konnte erst nach der Einigung zwischen EG undUSA über das gemeinsame Konsultationsverfahren fortgeführt werden, die zu einerEuropäisierung der französischen Nahostpolitik führte (S. 115, 133, 154, 178 f.und 198 f.). Es war allerdings undenkbar geworden, eine gemeinsame europäischePolitik gegen amerikanische Interessen zu führen (S. 162), was auch nicht mehr imInteresse des neu gewählten französischen Präsidenten lag. Gfeller argumentiertüberzeugend, wie sich Giscard d’Estaing von der intergourvernmentalen Europapolitikseiner Vorgänger, de Gaulle und Pompidou, entfernte und beide Entwicklungsrichtungender EG – supranational und intergouvernmental – stärkte, um den Integrationsprozessdurch den Aufbau des Europäischen Rats und die Wahlen zum Europaparlamentzu vertiefen (S. 180). Die Historikerin führt in die Forschungsdiskussionneue Quellenfunde ein, die das Zusammenspiel von Jean Monnet, AußenministerJean Sauvagnargues und den persönlichen Überzeugungen des sich der europäischenEinigung verbunden fühlenden Präsidenten aufzeigen und den neuen Kurs in derfranzösischen Europapolitik erklären (S. 180-187 und 198 f.). Die durch die Zustimmungzu Wahlen zum Europaparlament zum Ausdruck gebrachte Stärkung einer supranationalenInstitution markierte nach Gfeller einen bedeutenden Wandel in derfranzösischen Europapolitik. Die Regierung in Paris hatte die Konsequenzen aus ihrenwirtschaftlichen, sicherheits-, finanz- und machtpolitischen Abhängigkeiten gezogen.Frankreich wollte zukünftig weltpolitischen Einfluss mit und durch die EuropäischeGemeinschaft ausüben. Zu diesem Zweck bedurfte diese internationaleOrganisation eine europäische Identität als weltpolitischer Akteur, um in Augenhöhemit den USA und der UdSSR handeln zu können.Es ist das Verdienst von Gfeller, diesen Transformationsprozess des französischenSelbstverständnisses aufzuzeigen. Ihre Perspektive, jeden auch noch so kleinen gemeinsamenNenner der EG Staaten als Erfolg zu deuten, und ihre Neigung, Sachverhaltethesenartig zuzuspitzen, laden zu kontroversen Diskussionen genauso einwie ihre Wertungen, die sich oft an den Aussagen und Urteilen französischer Zeitgenossenorientieren (119 f. und 149-153). Das gut lesbare Buch gehört deshalb aufdie Literaturliste für ein Seminar im Masterstudium zur Integrationsgeschichte.Christian BremenRWTH Aachen UniversityHans-Peter SCHWARZ, Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie, DeutscheVerlags-Anstalt, München, 2012, 1052 S. – ISBN 978-3-421-04458-7 – 36,75 €.This biography written by the eminent German historian specialized in recent contemporaryaffairs is as massive as its object – the German Chancellor Kohl, physically

148 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungenas much as politically a “giant” in the eyes of the author. Large portions of this bookare devoted to Kohl’s origins and his career within the Christian Democratic Party(CDU) of his native city of Ludwigshafen in the Palatinate (Pfalz), a German regionbordering France in the West that had been, at times, a battleground between Germanyand France. Schwarz singles out two factors that have marked the Kriegskind (warchild) Kohl: One was World War Two, which “owing to the blessing of his late birth”he experienced as a young teenager and not yet as a soldier, but nonetheless as amember of the Nazi youth organization that had to fight the fires resulting from theallied air raids on his home town, one of the most frequently bombed German cities.This experience made him loathe war for the rest of his life. The other factor leavinga lasting imprint on him was the influence of a somewhat leftist political Catholicismto which he was exposed in and out of school during the immediate post-war period.It was an influence, which along with his father’s example induced him to supportthe local Christian Democratic Party (CDU), when he still went to school.Schwarz goes to considerable lengths to describe Kohl’s early political career:His beginnings as a history student at the University of Heidelberg, that he concludedwith a PhD degree for a thesis that analysed the French supported separatist movementin the Palatinate after 1945. Schwarz then details Kohl’s ascent from the rank and fileof the local CDU to the leadership of his party in the State of Rhineland-Palatinateand, following his electoral victories, his appointment as Minister-President of hisState (1969) and as chairman of the West German CDU in 1973. After some setbackshis moment arrived in the fall of 1982, when the governing Social-Liberal coalitionwas replaced by a Liberal-Christian-Democrat majority in the West German parliamentwhich voted him into the Chancellor’s office. His earliest major achievement,as Schwarz underlines, was to overcome a formidable public opposition to the deploymentof modernized American missiles on German ground.For the purposes of this journal this reviewer will refrain from dwelling any furtheron the sixteen years of Kohl’s general role in domestic politics and in foreign affairs.Instead he will focus on the Chancellor’s commitment to the project of a united Europeand the contributions he made in the interest of that objective. Like many othersof his generation Kohl was already during his school days ardently pro-European. AsSchwarz repeatedly stresses, Kohl was from the beginning a disciple of Konrad Adenauer’spro-French orientation and adhered to the latter’s European policies includingthe ill-fated project of a European Defence Community (EDC). In Kohl’s eyes thethree pillars on which German national interest rested were to remain a faithful memberof the Western alliance, to support European integration and to uphold Germany’sclaim for reunification. Under the influence of Walter Hallstein, the first President ofthe European Commission, and in line with a clear majority of German public opinionhe aspired to a politically and at the same time federally united Europe. This was thestance to which he committed the CDU in 1976, i.e. at a moment when he still headedthe opposition in the German Bundestag.As Schwarz does not fail to add, Kohl, for all his pro-European enthusiasm, didnot give up the aim of an ultimate German reunification, to be sure to be achieved

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 149within some European frame, and quite early during his tenure of office he coinedthe phrase, often to be repeated, that Bonn’s German and European policies, or, forthat matter, German unification and European integration, were the “two sides of thesame medal” (p.596). Schwarz leaves no doubt that Kohl’s pro-European pronouncementsrepresented a programme to be put into practice, whenever possible, in a closealliance with France. By a fortunate coincidence, the French President FrançoisMitterrand had also recently adopted a pro-European-integrationist programme, atthe time, when Kohl took over as Chancellor. No wonder that when taking office hefirst went to Paris in order to arrive at a Franco-German agreement regarding thefuture evolution of the European communities (pp.352 f.). Mitterrand in turn backedKohl in his advocating the just mentioned modernization of NATO’s missile defenceand expressed his interest in closer economic cooperation within the European Communities.Significantly, this included financial and monetary matters. Kohl’s goodfaith in this respect was tested a few months after taking office: Costly social reformsMitterrand had enacted had led to increased market pressure against the Franc. Kohlhelped France to remain in the “currency snake” by revaluing the DM – an act ofsupport which he would repeat again in the early nineties. Kohl also endorsed thecandidacy for the EC-presidency of Jacques Delors, since the negotiations of theSingle European Act a key actor regarding the efforts undertaken to strengthen theEuropean Communities.In this context the discussion was launched on devising a monetary union forunited Europe. It pays to take a closer look at the sections of Schwarz’s accountdealing with this presently so controversial issue. As popular lore wants it, a Franco-German bargain was struck, when Kohl some time in 1989-90 agreed to the Euro inexchange of Mitterrand’s acceptance of German unification. Even Kohl himself inhis memoirs subscribed to a certain extent to this version of the record. 3 Schwarz,however, largely discards this legend. Actually, he demonstrates that Kohl’s commitmentto the creation of a European currency union preceded the big sea change of1989. Instead, Schwarz suggests another linkage – the linkage between French pressureto create a European currency union and Kohl’s interest in closer Franco-Germancooperation in questions of common defence. Both had their reasons. Mitterrand resentedthe dominance of the strong DM over the French Franc and other soft Europeancurrencies – at one point he went so far as to refer to the DM as the Federal Republic’s“atom bomb” serving as the backbone of its power (p.431). 4 Kohl, on the other hand,in view of the breakthrough of East-Western détente had grown somewhat doubtfulas to the validity of America’s nuclear guarantee for the security of Western Europeand sought to upgrade France’s commitment to the defence of West Germany.In the end there was a French agreement establishing a Franco-German brigade(pp.428 f.) and, from 1987 and in the face of strong British reservations, a growing3. See K. SCHWABE’s review of Kohl’s Memoirs, in: Journal of European Integration History,1(2010), p.120.4. Schwarz's translation is perhaps a trifle too liberal. The original runs as follows: Mitterrand said “Or,sa puissance, c'est l'économie, et le Deutsche Mark en est la force atomique”. See J. ATTALI,Verbatim. Chronique des années 1981-1991, vol.3, 1988-1991, Fayard, Paris, 1995, p.74.

150 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – BuchbesprechungenGerman inclination to accept the creation of a European currency. A Franco-Germancouncil for defence and another one for financial/economic matters were set up inlate 1987. Kohl also began to share Delors’ conviction that a European reserve currencyplus a European Central Bank would make European integration “irreversible”(pp.433, 435 and 463). In March 1988 Kohl in a speech pledged support for a Europeaneconomic and currency union considering them important steps – and this isimportant for his original position – on the way to the final goal of a political union.This implied that in Kohl’s eyes the founding of a European Central Bank and theintroduction of a European currency would occur at the end of the process of constructinga European federal union. In June 1988 the Hannover summit of the EuropeanCouncil had agreed to the appointment of a so–called Delors committee of financialexperts, which in April 1989 submitted its concept consisting of three stagesin the preparation process for the future Euro-currency.“Today, in the second decade of the 21 st century”, Schwarz sums up his findings,“it is possible to ascertain: However the project [of the Euro] would have evolved,this major objective shared by Mitterrand and Delors would have been carried out,be it with Kohl’s or with another Federal Chancellor’s assistance. Had the upheavalof the years of 1989-1990 not occurred, the convergence would have been even moreeasily attainable […]. Looking more closely [one can only conclude] that the NewEurope that took shape after the great upheaval of 1989 had already been launchedduring the short eighties” (pp.484 f.). Schwarz does salvage a trace of the legend ofa Franco-German “unification-integration deal” in pointing out to the relation thatexisted between Mitterrand’s consent to German unification and the agreement on aprecise date for a governments’ conference, which was to work out the terms of atreaty providing for the monetary union. The author depicts the increased pressurethat Mitterrand put on Kohl in late 1989 to commit himself to such a date as a prerequisitefor a French agreement on further progress in the German re-unificationprocess. On December 6, 1989, on the eve of the EC summit convened in Strasburg,Kohl yielded and proposed late 1990 as a time frame for the governments’ conference.Still, Schwarz insists, Kohl’s concession was more a matter of form than of substance.In fact, he repeats, Kohl had already “resigned” himself (p.560) to sacrificing the DMon the altar of a European currency. If this was still necessary, some quite hostileinternational reactions to the prospect of Germany’s reunification in late 1989 hadconfirmed him in his conviction that for a unified Germany a European frame wasindispensable, in order to make it palatable to the rest of Europe, and that the monetaryunion the French government was pressing for had to be an integral part of suchEuropean frame. Following Schwarz, one may add, that even after Kohl’s concessionMitterrand’s resentment of his German “friend’s” seemingly unilateral reunificationpolicies remained unabated, that for the French President European integration hadto be given priority over Germany’s reunification and that it took until the summerof 1990 before Franco-German tensions finally eased off. In accordance withSchwarz’ analysis it is then safe to conclude that an immediate link between Kohl’sagreeing to a fixed timetable for implementing the EURO and the French government’sacceptance of German reunification in reality did not exist.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 151There was, however, yet another linkage in Kohl’s European concept that Schwarzbrings up and that deserves some scrutiny – the linkage between the two goals of afederally structured political union for the EC on the one hand, and the introductionof a European currency on the other. Throughout his life, the Chancellor’s top priorityhad been a European federation, by Kohl often referred to as the “United States ofEurope”. By that he meant a shared foreign policy and a long term European – or atleast a Franco-German – coordination in the field of military security. Institutionally,this would have meant a strengthening of the EC’s existing structures, i.e. an introductionof the majority rule in their proceedings, and an extension of the Europeanparliament’s responsibilities. In Mitterrand’s eyes agreeing to a political union of thatsort amounted to an important concession vis-à-vis his German partner. As he explicitlystated in June 1989, such concession demanded Kohl’s prior assent to a Europeancurrency. After the collapse of the Soviet rule over East Germany and EasternEurope, Mitterrand preferred a loose all-European confederation outside the EuropeanCommunities. As Delors took Kohl’s side, Mitterrand finally yielded to thelatter’s plea for a common initiative aiming at a political union. Due to French andBritish misgivings and much to Kohl’s and Delors’ disappointment, in the monthspreceding the Maastricht Conference the deliberations concerning a political unionstarkly fell behind the negotiations for a common European currency. As a consequence,the Maastricht Treaty remained largely vague regarding a politically integratedEurope. Schwarz concedes, that this was a clear defeat for Kohl’s aspirations.The chancellor consoled himself with the prospect that the dynamism unleashed bythe other provisions of the Maastricht Treaty would sooner or later provide an impulsefor continued discussions about a political union and “federal elements” in it.As it turned out, he was wrong. French reservations were upheld. Schwarz explainswhy. One major reason for Mitterrand’s increasingly lukewarm attitude regardinga political union was the unilateral position the Federal Republic resorted toin recognizing the Yugoslav break-off republics of Slovenia and Croatia. In the wakeof Yugoslavia’s disruption there was no such thing as a common European policy.Furthermore, the inclusion into the European Union of Poland, the Czech Republicand Hungary, which Kohl strongly advocated despite distinct misgivings on the partof the EC’s Southern members, was bound to complicate still further the decisionmaking process within the EC. Also the French concept of a European security organizationwould entail a clear distance to NATO – an implication that would contradictKohl’s pro-NATO orientation.Evidently, these divergences reinforced Mitterrand’s own reservations regardinga European political union. In early 1997 the French government did come out withthe proposal of a “gouvernement économique”, apparently consisting of delegates ofthe member states and working similarly as the European Council. Fearing to beoutvoted by economically weaker members and dreading state interventionism theGerman government declined to consider this suggestion. Thus the former linkagebetween the future EURO and a political union for Europe had faded away. Lookingfrom the perspective of the present day crisis of the EURO, Schwarz notes that neitherthe French nor the German governments envisaged the possibility of a political union

152 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungenfor Europe that would both enjoy democratic legitimacy and would coordinate as wellas supervise the fiscal policies of the member states of the future “EURO-land”.Schwarz, therefore, makes both France and Germany responsible for the fact thattoday’s monetary union comes close to an isolated torso within the structure of theEuropean institutions (p.807). In accordance with the German Supreme Court’s definitionof the European Union as something like a confederation (Staaten-Verbund),Kohl in February 1994 revised his opinion further by fully parting with his longcherished concept of a European federation, to him by then a “utopia” (pp.709 and816). At the same time and somewhat inconsistently, he continued to remind hisentourage that a monetary union without any kind of a political union “would notmake sense” (p.807).All the more dogged and determined and not unaware of the German voters’ scantenthusiasm vis-à-vis the prospect of losing the DM, Kohl pushed the project of aEuropean currency, considering it the only remaining step towards European unity,a step, that would be immediately palpable as well as irreversible. Germany’s partnershad agreed to make a number of concessions to the German ideas of a stable Europeancurrency in an open European market: Already before the beginning of the negotiationsfree capital movement was conceded within the EC; the absolute independenceof the future European Central Bank with the sole purpose of assuring the stabilityof the EURO was accepted as well as the well-known criteria for financial convergencebetween the members of the monetary union plus a “stability pact”. At an extraEuropean summit held in Brussels on 2-3 May 1998 the eleven original members ofthe European monetary union gave the final green light for the opening of the thirdand definite phase of the introduction of the EURO. At the end of the same year theEuropean Council conferred the title of an “honorary citizen of Europe” to Kohl – atitle only Jean Monnet had received before. Kohl was praised as the real founder ofthe new European currency. Schwarz agrees with this, summing up: With all theauthority Kohl had gained, whenever possible acting as the “universal harmoniser”among contradictory interests, with a particular eye on the wishes of the smallermembers, the German Chancellor was indeed the only political authority of his daysto assure the introduction of the EURO in a foreseeable future.Curiously, as Schwarz has to admit, at the very end of his chancellorship Kohlonce more modified his European concept. After a nasty clash with the new Frenchpresident Jacques Chirac, an even more outspoken anti-federalist than his predecessor,about the personality to be appointed first Governor of the Central EuropeanBank, Kohl turned to the new British Prime Minister Tony Blair as the future leaderin the process of European integration. Forgetting the harsh controversies he hadfought out with former British governments, above all with Margaret Thatcher, hesuddenly began to criticise the centralism of the Brussels institutions and the demandsof the European Parliament for an extension of its influence pleading at the same timefor subsidiarity among a “Europe of nations”. As Kohl had to resign soon thereafter,on 27 October 1998, as the result of a lost election, Schwarz cannot prove whetheror not this represented more than a temporary change of emphasis. Although a partyfunding scandal, Kohl had been involved in as Chancellor, over-shadowed his years

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 153as an elder statesman, he did not refrain from criticising some of his successors’ policydecisions like the admission to the “EURO-club” of Greece or plans to extend theEU to Russia, the Ukraine or Turkey.In his final assessment of Kohl’s standing in Germany’s recent past, the author isunstinting in his praise. Schwarz calls him no less than the “architect” of the Europeof today(p.930). It was largely due to Kohl’s achievements, he asserts, that Europecame out of the upheaval of 1989 and its repercussions as a relatively stable continent.Schwarz takes Kohl’s fervent commitment to the European idea at face value, deeplyconvinced as this statesman was that this was the only way to prevent future wars onthe old continent. Turning to the creation of the EURO, Schwarz characterizes Kohlas “seduced” by the prospect of a (federal, one should add) European Union as theconsequence of the creation of a European monetary union. In this process, Schwarzasserts, Kohl’s partners like “Gaullist” Mitterrand and the latter’s “national-selfish”colleagues from soft currency countries came to act as “fateful figures”. “To thedamage of all concerned”, Schwarz writes, “they persuaded Helmut Kohl, an essentiallyidealistic European, to submit the monetary system – for all institutions! – to apremature mega-experiment, which in the long run could only turn out to be highlyrisky”. Seen that way Kohl, in the view of the author, embodies “tragic greatness”(pp.935 f.).Schwarz’s ultimate verdict is bound to instigate critical discussions. Critics mightask whether in confronting the “essentially European” German Chancellor with hisessentially nationalist non-German opposite numbers Schwarz does these politiciansand not least President Mitterrand, really justice. Was the French President merelythe instrument of France’s political goal of stopping the predominance of theDeutsche Mark? Is it really unlikely that genuine economic and financial considerationsmay also have motivated Mitterrand’s demand to set up the EURO? Was notthe French striving for some balance among the bigger members of an integratedEurope understandable as such balance promised long-term stability within the newEurope? On the other hand, did not Kohl personally regard himself as a nationalpatriot pursuing national interests? Admittedly, he defined these basically in Europeanterms, but did this exclude more mundane considerations on which Kohl’sEuropean policies may have rested as well?Such critical remarks should not detract from Schwarz’s admirable achievementto have transformed the record of the most recent past into history, delivering anadmittedly long, but nonetheless highly readable and captivating, if not outright fascinating,account. No scholar dealing with European integration in the last half-centurycan afford not to make full use of this rich presentation, which again and againdiscloses a host of hitherto unpublished documents. One can only urgently recommendan early translation into English.Klaus SchwabeRWTH-Aachen, Germany

154 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – BuchbesprechungenSebastian REYN, Atlantis Lost: The American Experience with De Gaulle,1958-1969, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2010, 547 p. – ISBN978-90-8964-214-1 – $US 79.00.Sebastian Reyn has written an extensive and important book on transatlantic relationsduring the Cold War. He set out to examine American perceptions of Charles deGaulle from 1958 to 1969, but has done both more and less than this. He has donemore by narrating, in detail, the myriad crises and complex decisions faced by leadersof the Western Alliance in a particularly complicated period of international history.Reyn’s full and detailed catalagoue of events is a useful reference for students ofAmerican foreign policy, European-American relations, and the Cold War in Europe.Reyn puts a finer grain on the events previously described in excellent earlier accountsby scholars such as Marc Trachtenberg, Jeffrey Giauque and Thomas Schwartz. 5 IfReyn has done less than he set out to do, it is because he does not establish a frameworkfor analyzing American perceptions and the connection between perceptions andpolicy. Nonetheless, he reveals a number of paths where future historians, interestedin a more analytic treatment of this period, will tread fruitfully.Reyn builds his narrative on thorough research in numerous archives, includingfour Presidential Libraries. He demonstrates how de Gaulle was both hero and villainin the eyes of United States officials: a staunch ally at times, especially during theCuban Missile Crisis, but also an enemy whose policies threatened to undermine thestructures of European integration and Atlantic defence built up since 1945. For themost part, however, de Gaulle was more villain than hero. Ultimately, Reyn arguesthat de Gaulle’s challenges to American policy defined the limits of American powerin Europe and bankrupted hopes for an Atlantic Community.Reyn succeeds in relating a complicated tale of international relations that involvesmany actors. While the United States and France are his primary subjects, heincorporates the United Kingdom and other allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) into his narrative. He begins with a study of Dwight D. Eisenhowerand John F. Kennedy’s responses to de Gaulle’s proposals for a tripartite –that is French, British, and American – directorate atop NATO. While the memorandumitself is well known, Reyn describes the less familiar aftermath. Eisenhowerand Kennedy both sought to placate de Gaulle without granting his wishes. Thisinvolved a lengthy triangular correspondence and unfruitful meetings of officialsfrom all three countries. In the end, the United States rejected the tripartite proposals,citing a threat to the broader Atlantic alliance system. Nonetheless, Reyn claims thatboth “Eisenhower and Kennedy ended up extending the ‘special relationship’ withGreat Britain to France” (p.76). Students of transatlantic relations will be puzzled by5. M. TRACHTENBERG, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963,Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1999; J.G. GIAUQUE, Grand Designs and Visions ofUnity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955-1963, University ofNorth Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 2002; T.A. SCHWARTZ, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: Inthe Shadow of Vietnam, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 155Reyn’s claim: Anglo-American co-operation on nuclear matters, intelligence sharing,and informal consultation between diplomats and planning sections of the State Departmentand Foreign Office was always far more intimate and special than any suchrelationship with France.American disagreements with France, particularly over economic issues, becamemore pronounced in the early 1960s. Reyn’s second chapter examines Kennedy’sreactions to de Gaulle’s plans for a “European” Europe. Reyn calls this period a “tugof-war”over the future of European integration. He points out the inherent paradoxin American hopes for the continuation of European integration in the style of JeanMonnet: American officials supported such a policy to limit de Gaulle’s ability to actindependently, but its success would have required de Gaulle’s full-throated support.This was not to be.Where chapter one considered American attempts to placate de Gaulle, and chaptertwo stressed the ambiguity of the larger Atlantic relationship, chapter three focuseson the clash between France and the United States after 1963 that had been buildingup for five years. Reyn details the Anglo-American Nassau conference and Charlesde Gaulle’s press conference that effectively ended the first British application to jointhe Common Market. He argues American policy became much less ambiguous afterthe veto, and Washington sought “to isolate France within Europe by simply forgingahead with American policies as if there were no de Gaulle” (p.182) Reyn’s interpretationof this period dutifully represents the views of the contemporary State Department.This is not, however, the whole story. As Marc Trachtenberg has argued,1963 saw the Kennedy administration rethink its European policy and reach out toFrance. 6 Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defence, led a project intended toshare nuclear technology with France; it lost steam after Kennedy’s assassinationbecause of Lyndon Johnson’s concern with Asia, rather than any specific effort toisolate France. 7Reyn’s fourth chapter is a study of the various efforts to establish a jointly ownedand operated Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF). Reyn makes a novel case that it wasFrench opposition to the MLF that led both the Federal Republic and Johnson toabandon the policy. Reyn records all of the threats and ominous grumblings from theÉlysée over the MLF, with their implicit threats to the future of the Common Marketand NATO. Certainly, Johnson’s National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy knewthat pushing the MLF would require a fight with de Gaulle, and this was one of manygood reasons to abandon the MLF. Reyn’s emphasis on the role of French thinkingis a good corrective to what is otherwise a well-documented period of transatlanticdisagreement.Chapter five considers the American response to the most significant Frenchchallenge to American leadership in Europe: de Gaulle’s request for NATO forces toleave France, and his withdrawal of French forces from NATO’s integrated military6. M. TRACHTENBERG, op.cit., p.357.7. TRANSCRIPT, Roswell Gilpatric Oral History Interview I, 11/2/82, by Ted Gittinger, Internet Copy,Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

156 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungencommand in 1966. Reyn acknowledges that de Gaulle’s request was tied up withseveral other elements of American policy in NATO, including the establishment ofa nuclear consultative committee, Anglo-American-German negotiations over trooppayments, and the major study of NATO’s future known as the Harmel Report. Hedoes a fine job of showing the connections between these thorny problems.A puzzle remains, however, in linking American perceptions of de Gaulle andAmerican policy in 1966. Reyn notes that the “Atlanticists” in the State Department– proponents of deepening and broadening connections between Western Europe andNorth America – were livid at de Gaulle’s actions. Yet Johnson, and other officialswho Reyn calls the “pragmatists”, refused to be provoked by de Gaulle and avoidedany tit-for-tat policies. How and why was there such different thinking in Washington?State officials, Reyn explains, were overwhelmingly influenced by Monnet andhis integrationist ideas, and viewed de Gaulle as a threat to the construction of Europe.But what about the pragmatists? Surely in a study of American perceptions of deGaulle, it would be worth fully exploring what drove the pragmatists: After all, it wasthey who decided on and executed policy in response to the French request.Finally, in the sixth chapter, Reyn argues that in the final years of the Johnsonadministration, and then under President Richard Nixon and his National SecurityAdviser Henry Kissinger, American policy moved from “divergence” to “accommodation”with France. Following the mould of his earlier chapters, Reyn focuses onpersonalities and relationships, such as the close bond between Nixon and de Gaulle.This stands in place of a more thorough consideration of policy formulation and itsexecution. Thus the decision and practise of American nuclear sharing with France– a policy that Eisenhower and Kennedy had agonized over – is rather quickly coveredin only two paragraphs. Ultimately, Reyn argues that de Gaulle had “provided a foreignpolicy paradigm that Nixon and Kissinger were to follow”. While this, perhaps,gives too much credit to de Gaulle, Reyn is clearly correct that de Gaulle, more thananyone else, defined the limits of American power in Europe (p.352)Reyn presents a staggering amount of detail to his readers. He is so deeply engagedwith his subjects that he seems unwilling to leave out any detail of their lives thatmight have influenced their beliefs – personal histories, such as those of Jean Monnet,run for several pages. Speeches and other quotes appear in frequent, lengthy blockquotes. Reyn writes well and clearly, and so this detail does not make for an onerousread. But this approach to diplomatic history raises some important methodologicalquestions. In his concern to capture what officials said and wrote, and to understandwhat they thought about de Gaulle or transatlantic relations, Reyn largely ignoreswhether and how these thoughts were translated into policy and action. There is anodd disconnect between Reyn’s history of American foreign policymakers andAmerican foreign policy in this era. This partly stems from Reyn’s decision toprivilege State Department opinions as the opinions of the United States Governmentas a whole. Reyn is entirely correct that many American officials were frustrated byde Gaulle, afraid of what his policies would do to Europe, and rabidly anti-Gaullist.Nonetheless, the United States consistently avoided any confrontation or conflict with

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 157de Gaulle. When de Gaulle insisted that any atomic weapons in France be underFrench command, the United States reacted quickly and without dissent by redeployingnine squadrons of fighter-bombers from France to Germany and Britain.When de Gaulle withdrew the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO command,alternate arrangements were made to ensure contact between French and NATOfleets. Similarly, NATO entered into negotiations with French military authoritiesafter the 1966 withdrawal to maintain a link between NATO forces and French divisionsin Germany. Americans might have despised de Gaulle, but American policyadapted graciously to his wishes. How would policy have differed if American perceptionsof de Gaulle had been positive?Reyn makes clear that he is primarily concerned with examining “American perceptionsof de Gaulle”. He explains that his is not a “study of French foreign policy[…] but of the United States’ response to this policy” (pp.13-14). Historians are alwaysfaced with the difficulty of limiting their study to practicable proportions, andthat Reyn felt this impulse to constrain his study is understandable. But the decisionto study American perceptions of de Gaulle, separate from de Gaulle’s policy andactions is an awkward choice. Reyn subscribes to the common view – shared, incidentally,by his American subjects – that de Gaulle had an unchanging vision of worldaffairs that he had set out in his memoirs and adhered to unflinchingly. But it takestwo to tango: diplomacy is by definition an iterative process. What if the United Stateshad followed through on John Foster Dulles’ 1958 promise of a nuclear submarinefor France (pp.38 and footnote 71)? And what if the United States had not been soquick to scuttle Eisenhower’s proposal of tripartite machinery on a “clandestine basis”that the President made to Harold Macmillan and de Gaulle at Rambouillet in 1959(p.58)? What if the United States had done some diplomatic spadework in Paris beforethe Nassau Agreement, had been more charitable in their definition of what nonnuclearweapons systems could be sold to France, or, for that matter, been genuinelywilling to extend the nuclear special relationship to France? There was a cycle inAmerican and French reactions, where actions of one state reinforced the perceptionsof the other. Did it have to be this way? Could the cycle have been broken by eithercountry? We cannot know without a deeper consideration of the connection betweenboth American and French policy.Finally, there remain questions about Reyn’s basic conceit that American policyrested on a search for an Atlantic Community. Reyn notes that the concept of an“Atlantic Community” was vague, and he leaves it that way. But he makes a case forAtlantic Community as the “foreign policy paradigm” that undergirded a broad, bipartisanpolicy consensus for US policy towards Europe (pp.18-19). Readers learnon the last page of the book that the “Atlantis” of the title, lost during the de Gaulleyears, was a “North Atlantic Community” (p.374). Reyn has put far too much stockin the notion that American policymakers wanted, and sought, such a community.While talk of an “Atlantic Community” can be found in the words of Eisenhower andDulles, and is notable in Kennedy’s public rhetoric, it is far more difficult to findconcrete examples of American action taken specifically to establish such a community.The word itself was considered problematic in the White House: in the Kennedy

158 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungenyears, the word “community” was deliberately and consciously replaced by “partnership”.When basic American policy towards the Atlantic nations was reconsideredin 1964, it stated explicitly that “Atlantic Commonwealth” – a synonym for AtlanticCommunity – was “beyond our capacity to accomplish and […] contrary to our interests”.8 Reyn is certainly right that some Americans dreamt of “Atlantis”. And theseAmericans, notably – but not only – George Ball and Walt Rostow, wrote prolificallywith vivid, passionate memoranda and letters studded with historical allusion. As aresult, the historical evidence they left behind makes a strong case for an Atlanticdream. This thinking, however, was almost exclusive to Ball, the European Bureau(EUR), and the Policy Planning Council in the Department of State. Other parts ofthe State Department such as Western European Affairs (WE), the Pentagon, and thestaff of the National Security Council had no time for Atlantic fairy tales. If Atlantisnever existed, it was never lost.Timothy Andrews SayleTemple UniversityLaurence BADEL, Hélène MICHEL (dir.), Patronats et intégration européenne.Pour un dialogue disciplinaire raisonné, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2011, p.175 – ISBN978-2-296-55498-6 – 17,00 €.In recent years a few voices in the field of the history of European integration haveadvocated a closer link with the other social sciences, and particularly with the growingbulk of Political Science literature on the European Union, in the conviction thatthis is a necessary step to amend the historiography of European integration from itsfundamental weaknesses. The volume under review here, issued from an interdisciplinaryseminar held in Strasbourg in March 2010, is an attempt to foster this dialoguein studying the role of the business milieus in European integration. The book consistsof an introduction and seven chapters, four contributed by historians, the others bytwo political scientists and a sociologist. The fundamental aim, as stated by the twoeditors in the introduction, is not to give “des leçons à l’autre mais de lui fournir leséléments lui permettant de comprendre et d’utiliser au mieux les recherches produites”(p.11). In this perspective, each chapter is conceived as a presentation of thebasic traits of a particular field of research. Thus, Françoise Berger’s contributionpresents an overview of the achievements and limits of the historical literature on therelation between industrial sectors and integration. Andy Smith’s chapter presents aframe of analysis of the EU sectoral policies and their impact on the European industry,inspired by a political economy approach, with a concrete application to thewine sector. Marine Moguen-Toursel and Neil Rollings offer an overview of thedevelopment of Business History and of its contribution to the historiography of8. MEMORANDUM, Revision of NSC Memorandum of April 25, 1961, entitled ‘NATO and the AtlanticNations’, 24.01.1964. Available in the online DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS REFERENCESYSTEM, Thomson Gale, Detroit, MI.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 159European integration and reflect on its complementarity with political science. ArnaudMias, in a truly interdisciplinary manner which mixes the viewpoint of the sociologistwith some of the classical historians’ crafts (use of primary sources, periodization),provides an analysis of the role of business in industrial relations and ofthe evolution of the “social dialogue” at the European level. Olivier Dard reconstructsthe development of the French historiography on the “patronat” stressing the evolutionfrom value laden and normative approaches to a more neutral and detachedstance. Guillaume Courty analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the political sociologyof the interest groups, advancing many suggestions for a possible heuristicrefinement of the field. Finally, Laurence Badel’s contribution depicts the emergenceinside the French school of international relations history of the “patronat” as anautonomous research subject, highlighting the influence of a key scholar like RenéGirault, and the contribution of this school to the development of the field and to itsprogress.Some common traits emerge out of these contributions, such as the stressing ofthe need to overcome a State-centric approach; the need to refine the research toolsin order to acknowledge the complexity of the business world, not reducible to itspeak organizations; the difficulty in assessing the delicate and ever changing balancebetween State power and transnational interests. The editors’ introduction andBadel’s final chapter do a good job in mapping up the common ground between thedisciplines and identifying new possible lines of research. However, the overall impressionthat emerges from the book is that of a difficult dialogue, in which, notwithstandingthe goodwill of the participants, in many instances the chapters fail to speakto each other. Many of the contributions (Berger’s, Dard’s, Smith’s, Courty’s), whilepresenting a useful summary of the state of the art in their field, offer little or nosuggestions about the possible ways of integration with other disciplines. Thus theyseem to neglect the fact that by now the debate on the “contamination” betweenhistory and other social sciences has gone beyond this very preliminary stage andsome concrete proposals have been advanced, especially with regards to the study ofthe role of transnational actors in European integration. 9 True, some of the contributions,such as Mias’s and Moguen’s and Rolling’s, constitute excellent examples ofan intelligent application of an interdisciplinary approach, but even in these caseswhat emerges is a sort of “unidirectionality”. Following a more general trend, historyis seen, at best, as a source of data for empirical tests, but it is ignored as a contributorof heuristic concepts or of a general interpretation. This is perfectly understandable,since very few historians of European integration care to present an original interpretationof their subject susceptible to raise the interest of scholars in other fields ofthe European studies. In fact, the historiography on European integration only recentlyhas begun to emerge from an isolation that, in the past years, had confined itin a residual role with little to offer to practitioners of other field, or even to otherhistorians, in terms of agenda setting capacity or the advancement of new interpre-9. See for ex. W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, M. RASMUSSEN (eds), The History of the European Union.Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72, Routledge, Abingdon, 2009, especially chapters1 and 2.

160 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungentations. As stated by one of the more active proponents of a new course in Europeanintegration history: “Despite recent attempts to develop a conceptually and methodologicallymore sophisticated approach, and also to enhance interdisciplinary communicationwith the social sciences, the historiography of the EU is still very marginalwithin the larger field of modern history and even to the study of the contemporaryhistory of Europe since 1945”. 10 On the other hand, historians, in the not yet so commoncases of scholars who do not ignore the debates going on in other domains ofsocial research, have the tendency to uncritically adopt concepts and definitionswhich, as Courty’s essay eloquently demonstrates, are not exempt from blunders.More fundamentally, in my view, the entire exercise would have benefited froma clearer identification of the basic questions that the interdisciplinary co-operationis supposed to answer. Between the late 1970s and early 1980s a new approach to thestudy of the relations between the economic interests and the State, the “corporatistsynthesis”, revolutionized the historiography on American foreign policy, throughthe works of authors of the like of Thomas J. McCormick, Charles Maier, MichaelHogan. They were inspired by the political science debate on the interest groups whichcentred around the contrast between the pluralist approach, which viewed the decision-makingprocess as the end product of the interplay of numerous private, voluntary,democratic groups competing with each other in a relatively coequal way in anopen society, and the fledgling neo-corporatist approach, which instead stressed theasymmetries of power and the role of the State. At the core of their approach werethe search for answers to – in McCormick’s words – “hard problems that lie at thecore of any effective system for historical analysis. Who exercises power? How?Why?”. 11 Today, much of the literature on European integration and economic interests,and some parts of the book under review here, expunges the questions ofpower and conflict from the centre of its analysis, which is, most of the time, verytheory-driven with little empirical content, focusing attention on very particular,sometime even esoteric questions, that seem to happen in a vacuum, where the dynamicsand the cleavages characterizing the European societies are not present. As aresult, one is left wondering: why should I adopt this particular set of assumptionsor, from the viewpoint of a political scientist, why should I get into this tortuoushistoriographical debate? How can it help me to answer the basic questions at theheart of my research? It seems to me that a meaningful answer to these questionsimply the overcoming of the timidity and narrowness with which the subject is approached.Especially when studying the role of pressure groups and their relation withthe political power, the issues of power and conflict are rather obvious problems toengage with. As stated by Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, the Dutch political scientist whohas produced some of the more interesting contribution on transnational business, itis important “not only to establish that the ‘politics of big business matter’ (Cowles10. W. KAISER, Bringing People and Ideas Back in: Historical Research on the European Union, in:D. PHINNEMORE, A. WARLEIGH-LACK (eds), Reflections on European Integration. 50 Yearsof the Treaty of Rome, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2009, pp.22-39 and 34.11. T.J. McCORMICK, Drift or Mastery? A Corporatist Synthesis for American Diplomatic History,in: Reviews in American History, 4(1982), pp.318-330, here: p.323.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 1611995), but also to analyse and explain ‘the politics’ or political strategies of big business”.12Francesco PetriniSenior Researcher, University of PaduaErik JONES, Anand MENON, Stephen WEATHERILL (eds), The OxfordHandbook of the European Union,Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, 893 p. –ISBN 978-0-19-954628-2 – 102,00 £.Die politische und die wissenschaftliche Debatte über die europäische Integrationkonzentriert sich seit einigen Jahren ganz auf die anhaltende Finanzkrise, die gerneund nicht ohne Hintergedanken als „Euro-Krise“ etikettiert wird. Wie einseitig dieseKrisenperspektive ist und welche Errungenschaften es eigentlich zu bestaunen undzu verteidigen gilt, lässt sich in diesem beeindruckenden Band nachlesen. Die Herausgeber,zwei Politologen und ein Jurist, haben über 60 ausgewiesene Kolleginnenund Kollegen, in der Mehrzahl Politologen, aber auch einige Historiker, für das ambitionierteUnternehmen gewinnen können, den Stand der Forschung über die EU zurekapitulieren. Entstanden sind auf diese Weise 58 höchst präzise und informativeBeiträge, die in souveräner Manier den jeweiligen Kenntnisstand und die wichtigstenForschungskontroversen präsentieren.Die Herausgeber haben die Beiträge unter zehn Gesichtspunkten zusammengefasst.Zunächst werden die einschlägigen Theorieansätze präsentiert, die zur Erklärungdes Einigungsprozesses entwickelt und erprobt worden sind, insbesondere derRealismus, der Neofunktionalismus, der Konstruktivismus und das Mehrebenen-Modell. Anschließend stehen die maßgeblichen Verträge im Mittelpunkt, vom Vertragüber die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl über die RömischenVerträge, Maastricht, Amsterdam und Nizza bis zum Vertrag von Lissabon. Auchgescheiterte Vorhaben wie die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft oder derVerfassungsvertrag werden nicht ausgespart, da auch Fehlschläge Lehren bereithalten.Der dritte Teil beschäftigt sich mit den Hauptakteuren des Einigungsprozesses,darunter mit den Gründervätern, allen voran Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, KonradAdenauer und Alcide de Gasperi, aber auch mit den deutsch-französischen TandemsHelmut Schmidt – Valéry Giscard d’Estaing und Helmut Kohl – François Mitterrandoder bedeutenden Kommissionspräsidenten wie Walter Hallstein oder Jacques Delors.Berücksichtigt werden aber auch „problematic partners“ wie Charles de Gaulleund Margaret Thatcher, denen der Autor des entsprechenden Beitrags – vielleichtetwas zu optimistisch – nur einen „comparatively limited impact on the integration12. B. van APELDOORNE, Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration,Routledge, London, 2002, p.5. The reference contained in the quotation is to M.G. COWLES, Settingthe Agenda for a new Europe: the ERT and EC 1992, in: Journal of Common Market Studies,4(1995), pp. 501-526.

162 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungenprocess“ (S. 216) zugesteht, sowie „famous non-performers“ (S. 233) wie FrancoMalfatti, Gaston Thorn oder Jacques Santer. Im vierten Teil geht es um die Mitgliedsstaaten– allerdings nicht um einzelne, sondern um Gruppen wie „große“ gegen„kleine“ Staaten, „alte“ gegen „neue“ und „reiche“ gegen „arme“ Mitglieder.Der fünfte Teil ist den Institutionen gewidmet, der sechste den wichtigsten traditionellenPolitikfeldern im Bereich Wirtschaft, also dem gemeinsamen Markt, derHandelspolitik, der Wettbewerbspolitik, der Agrarpolitik oder der Wirtschafts- undWährungsunion. Im siebten Teil werden neuere Tätigkeitsfelder wie Umweltpolitik,Sozialpolitik und Energiepolitik untersucht, anschließend die außen-, sicherheits- undinnenpolitischen Aktivitäten der EU einschließlich erster Ansätze zur geheimdienstlichenZusammenarbeit. Der neunte Teil befasst sich mit den wichtigsten Kontroversen,die den Einigungsprozess begleitet haben, etwa über das vermeintliche „Demokratiedefizit“,die Frage einer „europäischen Identität“ oder die Existenz einereuropäischen Öffentlichkeit. Im zehnten und letzten Teil wird die Frage nach demVerhältnis zwischen EU und Mitgliedsstaaten noch einmal aufgegriffen, diesmal jedochunter stärker theoretischem Blickwinkel, unter Überschriften wie „Europeanization“oder „Politicization“.Thematische Breite und inhaltliche Fülle des Handbuchs sind, um es zu wiederholen,wirklich beeindruckend, auch Historiker der europäischen Integration findendarin eine Vielzahl von wichtigen Details und methodisch-theoretischen Anregungen.Allenfalls die Dominanz der englischsprachigen Forschung in den einzelnenBeiträgen ließe sich monieren. Alles in allem also ein gelungenes, höchst hilfreichesNachschlagewerk, keineswegs unkritisch im Urteil, aber doch von einer erfreulichenGrundsympathie für das europäische Projekt getragen.Prof. Dr. Werner BührerTU München, School of Education

163PHD Theses – Thèses de doctorat – DoktorarbeitenIf you are about to complete or have recently completed a PhD in European integrationhistory or a related field, and would like to see your abstract published here, pleasecontact:Si vous êtes sur le point de terminer une thèse de doctorat en histoire de l’intégrationeuropéenne ou dans une discipline proche et vous voulez publier un abstractde votre travail, contactez:Falls Sie ihr Doktorat im Bereich der europäischen Integrationsgeschichte odereiner ihr nahestehenden Disziplin abgeschlossen haben oder demnächst abschließenund eine Kurzfassung ihrer Arbeit veröffentlichen möchten, melden Sie sich bei:Guia Migani:guia.migani@unipd.itKatja Seidel:k.seidel@westminster.ac.uk-----Alice CUNHA, O Alargamento Ibérico da Comunidade Económica Europeia: AExperiência Portuguesa (The European Economic Community's Iberian Enlargement:The Portuguese Negotiations) – Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PortugalSupervisor/Jury: Maria Fernanda ROLLO, Universidade Nova de Lisboa; MariaManuela Tavares RIBEIRO, Universidade de Coimbra; Manuel Lopes PORTO, Universidadede Coimbra; António Goucha SOARES, Universidade Técnica de Lisboa;António Martins da SILVA, Universidade de Coimbra; Nuno Severiano TEIXEIRA,Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Pedro Aires de OLIVEIRA, Universidade Nova deLisboa; and Maria Fernanda ROLLO, Universidade Nova de LisboaDate of the exam: 03.01.2013Contact: alice_mpbc@portugalmail.ptThis thesis looks at the record of the Iberian enlargement from the Portuguese pointof view. It focuses on the Portuguese accession negotiations to the European EconomicCommunity (EEC) between 1977 and 1985. In particular the political and diplomaticefforts made by the Portuguese government are under scrutiny, analysing howit coped with the many obstacles and setbacks created by member states and communityrules. It shows that there were several constraints, designed by the Councilas a whole and particularly by the member states, which used the prospect of enlargementon their own behalf as a way of achieving particular goals, such as thereform of the CAP, budgetary changes and the implementation or the creation of newpolicy programmes.The thesis begins by setting out the Portuguese foreign policy options, with anemphasis on the relationship with Europe and the first two attempts of establishing acloser relationship with the EEC. It then deals with the evolution of Portugal-EECrelationship after the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1974, where Europe is still

164 PHD Theses – Thèses de doctorat – Doktorarbeitennot considered as the main option, although the EEC was willing to support, politicallyand economically, the new Portuguese democracy, on the basis that it wouldreally become a democratic state. The last chapters introduce and examine thoroughlythe accession negotiations, examining institutional procedures and mechanisms, nationaland community actors, common policy and institutional reforms, and memberstates’ bargains.This thesis is a detailed archives-based study of the third or Iberian enlargement,examining the documentation regarding the Portuguese negotiations. It is based onextensive research conducted in the Portuguese Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático, andin the Council of the European Union Central Archives, the Historical Archives ofthe European Commission and the Historical Archives of the European Union.Aline SIERP, Constructing the Past, Shaping the Future. From a National to a EuropeanMemory Framework – University of SienaSupervisor/Jury: Maurizio COTTA and Paul CORNER, University of Siena; OliverSCHMIDTKE, University of Victoria; Marco MARAFFI, University of Milano;Pierangelo ISERNIA, University of SienaDate of the exam: 10.06.2011Contact: aline.sierp@maastrichtuniversity.nlThe doctoral thesis is an original work that aims at questioning the presuppositionvoiced by many historians and political scientists that political experiences in Europecontinue to be interpreted in terms of national history and that a European communityof remembrance still does not exist. Its central claim is that despite apparent differencesin the memory constructions in different countries some kind of convergenceon the European level can be discerned. The underlying scope of the thesis is toexamine if the increasing efforts of the EU to create a European memory frameworkare supported by corresponding developments on the national level. Following fromthat the question is raised if this might justify a greater involvement of Europeaninstitutions in a field that until now has been the exclusive domain of the nation states.It thus analyses an aspect of European integration that is still under-researched,namely the integration not only of European histories but also of European memories,where experiences of liberation and resistance stand next to the trauma of aerialbombardments and the recollection of German and Soviet occupation. By tracing theevolution of specific memory cultures in different countries and the impact of structuralchanges upon them, the thesis investigates wider democratic processes concerningparticularly the conservation and transmission of values and the definition ofidentity on different levels. It argues that the creation of a transnational Europeanmemory culture does not necessarily imply the erasure of national and local forms ofremembrance. It rather means the creation of a further supranational arena wherediverging memories can find their expression and can be dealt with in a different way.Through the triangulation of agents of memory construction, constraints and opportunitiesand actual portrayals of the past, it explores the difficulties faced by a multi-

PHD Theses – Thèses de doctorat – Doktorarbeiten 165national entity in reaching some kind of consensus on such a sensitive subject ashistory.Suvi KANSIKAS, Trade blocs and the Cold War. The CMEA and the EC Challenge,1969-1976 – University of HelsinkiSupervisor/Jury: Seppo HENTILLÄ, University of Helsinki; JuhanaAUNESLUOMA, University of HelsinkiPre examiners: Martin DANGERFIELD, University of Wolverhampton; PiersLUDLOW, London School of EconomicsDate of the exam: 04.02.2012Contact: Suvi.kansikas@helsinki.fiThe coherence of the Soviet bloc was seriously tested at the turn of the 1970s, as theSoviet Union and its allies engaged in intensive negotiations over their relations withthe European Communities. In an effort to secure their own national economic interestsmany East European countries began independent manoeuvres against theirbloc leader. Much of the intra-bloc controversy was kept out of the public eye, as thebattle largely took place behind the scenes, within the organisation for economiccooperation, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).This study investigates the negotiating positions and powers of the CMEA memberstates in their efforts to deal with the economic challenge created by the EC, whichadvanced towards establishing its customs union. The CMEA negotiations over itspolicy toward the EC began in 1970, and a policy was finally adopted in 1974. Thiswas followed by the first official meeting between the two organisations in early 1975.The story ends in 1976, when the CMEA’s efforts to enter into working relations withthe EC were frustrated by the latter.The first finding is that the Soviet Union was not in a hegemonic position vis-àvisits allies, but had to use a lot of resources to tame their independent manoeuvring.The main Soviet goal was that the bloc would have a cohesive policy on relationswith the EC. This provided the USSR’s allies with an opportunity to try to secure theinclusion of their own goals into that policy. The other finding of the study is that theCMEA – a largely neglected actor in prior integration history – was able to have aneffect on EC policy-making: because the CMEA members did not acknowledge theEC’s supranational authority, the EC had no choice but to refrain from implementingits Common Commercial Policy in full. The study uses as primary sources officialdocumentation of various CMEA bodies such as the Session and the Executive Committeeas well as Soviet and GDR policy-making documents.

166 PHD Theses – Thèses de doctorat – DoktorarbeitenFrancesca ZILIO, Roma e Bonn fra Ostpolitik e CSCE, 1969-1975 / Rom und Bonnzwischen Ostpolitik und KSZE, 1969-1975 – Sapienza Università di Roma / FreieUniversität zu BerlinSupervisor/Jury: Georg MEYR, Università degli Studi di Trieste; Oliver JANZ,Freie Universität Berlin, Christian JANSEN, Universität Münster, Antongiulio DeROBERTIS, Università di Bari, Lorenzo MEDICI, Università di Perugia.Date of the exam: 14.12.2012Contact: ziliof@pug.units.itAnhand von Akten über 84 diplomatische Begegnungen auf verschiedenen Ebenenuntersucht die Arbeit den Dialog zwischen Rom und Bonn über die Ost- und Entspannungspolitikund die KSZE. Weiter werden die Haltungen beider Länder auf derKSZE bezüglich der Themen der Unverletzlichkeit der Grenzen und der Achtung derterritorialen Integrität dargestellt. Die deutsche Haltung auf der multilateralen Ebenegilt als Prüfstein der Versicherungen über die Vereinbarkeit zwischen Ostpolitik undWestpolitik, welche die BRD Italien und den anderen Alliierten gegeben hatte.Die detaillierte Analyse der KSZE Verhandlungen zeigt Widersprüche in derdeutschen Position aufgrund von Unterschieden zwischen den Ostpolitik-Verträgenim Einzelnen und in ihrer Gesamtheit und den offiziellen westlichen Positionen aufder KSZE. Folglich wurde nicht nur die deutsche Glaubwürdigkeit gemindert, sondernauch der Zusammenhalt des Westens und besonders der EWG-Ländergeschädigt. Dies ist insbesondere der Fall als die Bundesregierung sich entschied, dieFrage der friedlichen Grenzveränderungen außerhalb der Konferenz und hinter demRücken der meisten Alliierten zu lösen, obwohl die EWG-Länder im Hinblick aufeine mögliche europäische politische Integration eine gemeinsame Haltung zumThema anstrebten. Einerseits werden damit einige Befürchtungen Italiens und andererAlliierter bezüglich der Prioritäten Bonns im Rahmen der Ostpolitik bestätigt. Andererseitszeigen die Ergebnisse der Arbeit, dass die Auslegung der KSZE als Erfolgsfallder europäischen politischen Zusammenarbeit partiell revidiert werdenmuss, da letztere gerade in der wichtigsten Frage der Konferenz wegen nationalerInteressen ignoriert wurde.Folgende Quellen liegen der Arbeit zugrunde: die Bestände AV-Neues Amt, B1-MB, B150-AAPD, B26 und B40 im Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts. Dienoch unzugänglichen Akten des italienischen Außenministeriums werden teilweisedurch die Nachlässe Moros und Nennis im Archivio centrale dello Stato ergänzt. DieUntersuchung basiert insbesondere auf dem privaten Archiv des Botschafters LuigiVittorio Ferraris, ehemaliger Bürochef für die Beziehungen zu Osteuropa im italienischenAußenministerium und später zweiter Chef der italienischen Delegation beider KSZE und später italienischer Botschafter in Bonn.

167Information – Informations – InformationenDésintégration et intégration en Europe Centrale et Orientale (1919-post-1989)Le colloque international « Désintégration et intégration en Europe Centrale et Orientale(1919-post-1989) » a été organisé par la Faculté d’études européennes de l'UniversitéBabeş-Bolyai Cluj-Napoca, en collaboration avec le Groupe de liaison desprofesseurs d'histoire contemporaine auprès des Communautés européennes et avecle soutien financier de l’Action Jean Monnet.La période pendant laquelle se sont déroulées les activités du colloque s'étendaitdu 20 au 23 février 2013. La session inaugurale a eu lieu dans l’Aula Magna del’Université de Cluj, sous la direction du Président du Groupe de liaison, le ProfesseurWilfried Loth, du Recteur de l’Université Babeş-Bolyai, l’Académicien Ioan-AurelPop et du Doyen de la Faculté d’études européennes, le Professeur Nicolae Păun.Les contributions scientifiques de plus de quarante personnalités de première importancedes Universités et des Instituts de recherche d’Europe ont trouvé leur placedans les quatre sections du colloque, chacune bénéficiant de la coordination d’unmodérateur du Groupe de liaison. Les titres choisis pour ces quatre sections couvraientl’horizon des plus prestigieuses recherches effectuées par les historiens del’intégration européenne : La fin des Empires et les tentatives de créer un nouveléquilibre (1919-1945); La fin de l’ « empire » nazi en Europe Centrale et Orientaleet la création d’un nouvel « empire » à l’Est (1945-1989); 1989: La fin de la divisionen Europe. Une nouvelle Europe à travers l’intégration; et L’acceptation par l’Ouestde l’élargissement de l’Europe vers l’Est – un point de départ pour le nouvel avenirde l’Europe.Un autre point fort de la manifestation scientifique a été constitué par la contributionde plus de vingt jeunes chercheurs aux débats organisés autour de trois thèmesmajeurs liés au sujet central de la conférence. Ainsi, trois ateliers ont été réservés àla présentation des derniers résultats de leurs recherches, dans les domaines suivantes: La Transylvanie – Dimension historique, perspectives contemporaines; LeDanube et la Mer Noire : projets d’intégration en Europe Centrale et Orientale pendantles siècles XX-XXI; et Personnalités européennes féminines et leur rôle dans l’intégrationde l’Europe Centrale et Orientale.Les actes du Colloque « Désintégration et intégration en Europe Centrale etOrientale (1919-post-1989) » seront publiés aux Éditions Nomos et contiendront 44contributions scientifiques.Le colloque a connu aussi d’autres moments importants. Mentionnons notammentla table ronde organisée pour tous les participants, autour de l’idée « Historiographiecomparative de l’intégration en Europe Centrale et Orientale », qui a bénéficié de lamodération du Professeur Charles Barthel. Les discussions ont mené à une réaffir-

168 Information – Informations – Informationenmation des principes fondamentaux qui guident l’approche de la recherche et del’enseignement dans ce domaine-clé, dans n’importe quel pays de l’Union européenne,et qui constituent des standards qualitatifs intangibles. On a également soulignél’importance de l’ouverture vers une perspective multidisciplinaire dans l’étudede l’histoire de l’intégration européenne, aussi bien que la nécessité d’aborder ceprocessus d’une façon unitaire, afin d’y inclure les expériences remarquables des paysde la partie centrale-orientale du continent. Une telle ouverture permettrait la rédaction,tellement nécessaire, d’une nouvelle histoire, plus compréhensive et avec uncaractère plus homogène, d’un processus partagé par des États avec des parcourshistoriques souvent différents, voire sinueux. Les participants ont d’ailleurs établi lesfondements d’une future base de données, soutenue par l’apport de chaque contributeuraux travaux du colloque et qui représente une forte prémisse pour la continuationdes recherches visant l’espace de l’Europe centrale et orientale, par la publicationd’une série de documents sur les moments essentiels du processus d’intégrationeuropéenne.Un autre moment remarquable a été la présentation de l’édition en langue roumainedu livre Beyond the Cold War, du Professeur Wilfried Loth, qui a été suiviepar la présentation du volume Interférences euro-atlantiques. Celui-ci regroupe lesrésultats les plus récents des recherches effectuées par le corps académique de laFaculté d’études européennes, tout en marquant la fête des vingt ans de cette Facultéau sein de l’Université de Cluj.Parmi les nombreuses activités déployées pendant le colloque, on mentionne égalementla rencontre des membres du Groupe de liaison des historiens auprès desCommunautés européennes, la présentation du Réseau international de jeunes chercheursen histoire de l'intégration européenne (RICHIE) et une activité culturellefondée sur une visite à la cité médiévale d’Alba-Iulia, guidée par l’Archevêque catholiquede la ville, représentative pour l’identité de la Transylvanie, mais aussi pourl’unité de la nation roumaine et le respect pour sa diversité ethnique et confessionnelle.Dr. Nicolae PăunProfesseur Jean Monnet Ad personamDoyen de la Faculté d’études européennesUniversité Babeş-Bolyai Cluj-Napoca

169Abstracts – Résumés – ZusammenfassungenN. Piers LUDLOWEuropean Integration in the 1980s: on the Way to Maastricht?This article seeks to identify the roots of the Maastricht Treaty that pre-date the geopoliticalearthquake of 1989-91. It argues that, vital though this wider context wouldultimately be, much of the agenda of the eventual treaty negotiations owed as muchif not more to the trajectory of the European integration process in the course of the1980s. In order to demonstrate this, the article will focus on four different ‘trends’that had emerged during the 1980s each of which fed through into the Maastrichtdebates. These trends are first the importance of treaty change as opposed to lessformalised advance, second the desire to ‘tidy up’ those aspects of the integrationprocess that had begun outside of the formal Community context, third the evergreater faith in institutional change as a means to cope with the EC’s constantlyexpanding range of tasks and challenges, and fourth a tendency towards policy spillover.All of these would play a vital role in discussions amongst the Twelve.Intégration européenne dans les années 1980: en route pour MaastrichtCet article vise à identifier les racines du Traité de Maastricht antérieures au tremblementde terre géopolitique de 1989 à 1991. Il défend la thèse que, malgré l'importancecapitale revêtue en définitive par le contexte international changé, l'essentielde l'agenda des négociations en vue du futur traité était pour le moins, sinon davantageconditionné par la trajectoire du processus d'intégration européenne pendant lesannées 1980. En vue de démontrer ceci, la contribution se focalisera sur quatre «tendances»différentes qui émergèrent durant les années 1980 et qui alimentèrent lesdébats autour de Maastricht. Ce sont, premièrement, l'importance attribuée à la consignationcontractuelle du progrès dans un traité plutôt que sous une forme moins formalisée,deuxièmement, le désir d'«ordonner» ceux des aspect du processus d'intégrationqui avaient commencé à se développer en-dehors du contexte communautaireproprement dit, troisièmement, la confiance croissante en un changement institutionnelcomme moyen pour maîtriser l'expansion constante des devoirs et des défis de laCE et, quatrièmement, une tendance vers le spill-over politique. Chacun de ces aspectsa joué un rôle central dans les discussions à Douze.Europäische Integration in den 1980er Jahren: Unterwegs nach MaastrichtDer Beitrag analysiert die Wurzeln des Maastrichter Vertrags in der Zeit vor demgeopolitischen Erdbeben von 1989-1991. Er vertritt die Auffassung, dass – trotz desletztlich kapitalen Einflusses des veränderten internationalen Umfeldes – die Agendader Verhandlungen die zum Vertrag führten mindestens genauso sehr, wenn nichtsogar überwiegend vom Verlauf des europäischen Integrationsprozesses in den1980er Jahren geprägt wurde. Um dies zu untermauern fokussiert der Artikel vierverschiedene «Trends» die sich bereits in den 1980er Jahren abzeichneten und die

170 Abstracts – Résumés – ZusammenfassungenDebatte um Maastricht animierten. Es sind dies, erstens, die Bedeutung die man einervertraglich festgelegten, satt einer weniger formalen Reform beimaß, zweitens, derWille jene Aspekte des europäischen Integrationsprozesses zu «ordnen», die außerhalbdes eigentlichen gemeinschaftlichen Rahmens entstanden waren, drittens, daszunehmende Vertrauen in den institutionellen Umbau als Mittel um den stets zahlreicherwerdenden Aufgaben und Herausforderungen gewachsen zu sein, viertens,die Tendenz zum politischen spill-over. Jeder dieser Aspekte spielte eine wesentlicheRolle in den Diskussionen der Zwölf.Antonio VARSORIThe Andreotti Governments and the Maastricht Treaty: Between European Hopes andDomestic ConstraintsThe article, mainly based on new archival material from the Andreotti archives, arguesthat in 1990, also owing to Italy’s role as chairman of the EC, the Italian authoritiesfavoured the launching of intergovernmental negotiations on both the EMUand the EU. At first Rome’s interest focused on the role of the European Parliament,for Italy hoped that a more powerful EP would take care of the country’s interestsand would be a counter-balance to a renewed French-German couple. Actually in1991 Italy’s political and economic position became weaker and the Italian authorities,especially the Treasury Minister, Guido Carli, and the pro-European “technocrats”from the Bank of Italy had to focus their attention on the EMU, trying toconvince Italy’s partners of Rome’s will to cope effectively with its economic plights.At the same time Carli and Andreotti struggled with the parliament and the partylobbies in order to push them to accept an “austerity” economic policy and a freemarket approach based on a series of privatizations.When Italy signed the Maastricht treaty there were hopes that such an agreementcould favour a closer European integration and lead to sound economic policies, sosolving Italy’s contradictions. But in a few months Italy had to face a dramatic crisiswhich involved the ousting of the lira from the EMS. The Maastricht treaty concurredin undermining the basis of Italy’s political system. Moreover it paved the way to theemerging of a new ruling class formed by the Europeanist “technocrats”, who hadnegotiated the EMU and enjoyed the confidence of Italy’s European partners.Les gouvernements d'Andreotti et le traité de Maastricht: Entre espoirs européens etcontraintes intérieuresFondé principalement sur des sources nouvelles extraites des Archives de Guilio Andreotti,l'article affirme qu'en 1990, entre autres grâce la présidence de la CE, lesautorités italiennes favorisaient les négociations intergouvernementales à la fois surl'EMU et l'UE. Dans un premier temps, l'attention de Rome portait sur le rôle futurdu Parlement européen dont on voulait renforcer les pouvoirs dans l'espoir d'en faireune institution qui veillerait à défendre les intérêts du pays tout en constituant uncontrepoids au couple franco-allemand revigoré. Ensuite, dans la foulée de l'affaiblissementde sa position politique et économique en 1991, l'Italie – notamment à

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 171travers son ministre des Finances, Giodo Carli, et les «technocrates» de la Banqued'Italie – essaya de convaincre ses partenaires que Rome serait capable de maîtriserla misère économique du pays. En même temps, Carli et Andreotti, se battaient avecle parlement et le lobby des partis afin de les pousser à accepter une politique économiqued'austérité et une libéralisation des marchés agrémentées d'une série de privatisations.Quand l'Italie signait le traité de Maastricht, elle caressait l'espoir qu'un accord del'espèce provoquerait une intégration européenne plus serrée tout en stimulant despolitiques économiques avantageuses de nature à résoudre les contradictions italiennes.Pourtant, après quelques mois seulement, le pays devait faire face une crisedramatique qui menaçait la lire d'être exclue du SME. Le traité de Maastricht contribuaitainsi à sous miner les fondements du système politique de l'Italie. En outre, ilfraya la voie à l'émergence d'une nouvelle classe dirigeante formée par les technocrateseuropéanistes qui avaient négocié l'UME et qui jouissait de la confiance despartenaires européens de l'Italie.Die Andreotti Regierungen und der Maastrichter Vertrag: Zwischen europäischenHoffnungen und hausinternen ZwängenDer Aufsatz – er beruft sich hauptsächlich auf neue Quellen aus dem Archiv GuilioAndreottis, stellt fest dass die italienischen Behörden 1990, unter anderem dank derEU-Präsidentschaft, die zwischenstaatlichen Verhandlungen sowohl über die EWUals auch über die EU vorantrieben. Zunächst lag Roms Augenmerk auf einer Stärkungdes Europaparlaments von dem man sich erhoffte, dass es die Interessen des Landesverteidigen und gleichzeitig ein Gegengewicht der vertieften deutsch-französischenPartnerschaft abgeben würde. Dann, als Konsequenz einer Abschwächung seiner politischenund wirtschaftlichen Stellung im Jahre 1991, versuchte Italien insbesonderedurch seinen Finanzminister Guido Carli und die „Technokraten” der Banca d'Italiaseine europäischen Partner davon zu überzeugen, dass Rom in der Lage sei, diewirtschaftliche Misere des Landes zu überwinden. Gleichzeitig rangen Carli undAndreotti mit dem Parlament und den Parteilobbyisten um der Annahme einer Politikder wirtschaftlichen Sparsamkeit, der Liberalisierung der Märkte und einer Reihe vonPrivatisierungen zuzustimmen.Als Italien dem Vertrag von Maastricht zustimmte, hegte es die Hoffnung, dasseine Vereinbarung dieser Art die europäische Integration vertiefen und gleichzeitigeine vorteilhafte Wirtschaftspolitik anstoßen würde, die es dem Land erlauben könnteseine inneren Widersprüche zu überwinden. Nur wenige Monate später fand sichItalien in einer dramatischen Krise wieder, die sogar mit einem Ausschluss des Landesaus dem EWS zu Ende gehen drohte. Der Maastrichter Vertrag unterminiertedaher nicht unerheblich die Fundamente des politischen Systems in Italien. Er verhalfzudem einer neuen Klasse von europafreundlichen Technokraten zum Aufstieg. Siehatten die EWU ausgehandelt und genossen das Vertrauen ihrer europäischen Partner.

172 Abstracts – Résumés – ZusammenfassungenGeorges SAUNIERThe negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty as seen from ParisBetween 1989 and December 1991, the French authorities negotiated the Treaty onEuropean Union. For them, this meant, on the one hand, to provide the Europeancontinent with a new political structure in order to cope with the situation broughtabout by the end of the Cold War, and on the other hand, to adapt the institutions ofthe European Community to its new dimensions, especially with regard to the futureEconomic and Monetary Union and a Common Foreign and Security Policy.Led by François Mitterrand, the French team in charge of this project, concludedan agreement with Germany that was aimed at isolating Great Britain wherever itblocked decisions, and formed a bloc of eleven countries in favour of adopting a textat the meeting of the European Council in Maastricht in December 1991. The resultsthat were achieved show the objectives, concessions and success realized by Parisregarding various aspects of the treaty. Our article will analyze all of this, basing itselfon material from the French archives.La négociation de Maastricht vue de ParisDe 1989 à décembre 1991, les autorités françaises négocièrent le traité sur l’Unioneuropéenne. Pour elles, il s’agissait, d’une part, de doter le continent européen d’unenouvelle structure politique afin de faire face à la situation qu’entraînait la fin de laGuerre froide, d’autre part, d’adapter les institutions de la Communauté européenneà ses nouvelles dimensions, notamment à l’égard des futures Union économique etmonétaire et Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune.L’équipe française en charge du dossier, dirigée par François Mitterrand, nouapour cela un accord avec l’Allemagne, isola la Grande Bretagne là où elle bloquaitet constitua pour cela un bloc de onze pays favorables à l’adoption d’un texte lors duConseil européen de Maastricht en décembre 1991. Les résultats obtenus montrentles objectifs, les concessions ou les succès obtenus par Paris sur les différents voletsde ce traité. Ce que nous analysons dans notre article à partir des archives françaises.Die Aushandlungen des Maastrichter Vertrags aus Pariser SichtVon 1989 bis Dezember 1991 verhandelten die französischen Behörden den MaastrichterVertrag. In ihren Augen ging es darum, einerseits dem europäischen Kontinenteine neue politische Struktur zu geben, die den allgemeinen Herausforderungennach Beendigung des Kalten Krieges gerecht wurde und, andererseits, die Institutionender Europäischen Gemeinschaft an ihre neuen Aufgaben anzupassen, besondersmit Blick auf die künftige Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion und die GemeinsameAußen- und Sicherheitspolitik.Getreu den Anweisungen von François Mitterrand, schlossen die französischenUnterhändler zu diesem Zweck eine Vereinbarung mit Deutschland die darauf abzielteGroßbritannien zu isolieren und einen 11er Block mit den übrigen Mitglied-

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 173staaten zu bilden die bereit waren auf dem im Dezember 1991 stattfindenden MaastrichterEuropäischen Gipfel der Staats- und Regierungschefs einen Text zu unterzeichnen.Die erzielten Ergebnisse zeigen die anvisierten Ziele, die Konzessionen dieman bereit war dafür zu machen und die Erfolge die Paris zu den verschiedenenThemenkomplexen des Vertrags zu verbuchen vermochte. All dies wird anhand französischerArchivquellen aufgezeigt.Wilfried LOTHNegotiating the Maastricht TreatyThe Maastricht Treaty is the result of a negotiating process that required a series ofmutual concessions on the part of the negotiating parties involved: On the one hand,Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand not only succeeded in preventing the Europeanunification process from being compromised by German reunification, but were evenable to give fresh impetus to this process. The common currency has brought abouta certain degree of integration and European state-like structures that make the Europeanunification process become irreversible. On the other hand, progress in areasespecially important to either the German Chancellor or the French President – thestrengthening of the European institutions respectively the creation of a Europeandefence system – remained far behind the requirements that would have ensuredlasting success. The deficits of the “economic governance” largely complained duringthe “Euro-crisis” of the present days are mainly the result of the influence of theGerman Bundesbank that had insisted on the independence of a European CentralBank. Ironically enough, attempts to stabilize the monetary union in the long run werethus defeated by the German defenders of monetary stability themselves.Les négociations du traité de MaastrichtLes négociations qui aboutirent au traité de Maastricht renferment la conclusion denombreux compromis: d'un côté, Helmut Kohl et François Mitterrand ont certes réussià préserver le projet européen des dangers potentiels émanant de la réunificationallemande, voire de le pousser même de l'avant. Grâce à une monnaie commune, onest effectivement parvenu à atteindre un degré d'intégration tellement poussé que laconstruction européenne est devenue irréversible. De l'autre côté, les progrès réalisésdans les domaines qui importaient particulièrement soit au chancelier allemand soitau président français – d’un côté le renforcement des institutions, de l’autre la créationd'un système de défense européenne – demeurèrent fort en-deçà du niveau qu'il auraitfallu atteindre pour en assurer le succès durable. Les déficiences du «gouvernementéconomique» dont on se plaint actuellement dans le cadre de la crise de l'euro, sonten première ligne le résultat de l'influence de la Bundesbank allemande, qui avaitinsisté sur le caractère indépendant de la Banque centrale européenne. L'ironie del'histoire veut ainsi que les efforts entrepris pour assurer la stabilité de l'union monétaireà long terme ont précisément été annihilés par les défenseurs allemands d'uneuro fort.

174 Abstracts – Résumés – ZusammenfassungenDie Verhandlungen über den Vertrag von MaastrichtDie Verhandlungen, die zum Vertrag von Maastricht führten, beinhalteten zahlreicheKompromisse: Auf der einen Seite gelang es Kohl und Mitterrand, das europäischeProjekt über die Gefährdung durch die deutsche Wiedervereinigung hinweg zu rettenund den Einigungsprozess weiter voranzutreiben. Mit einer gemeinsamen Währungwar ein Maß an Verflechtung und europäischer Staatlichkeit erreicht, das ihn irreversibelmachte. Auf der anderen Seite blieben die Fortschritte in den Bereichen, dieentweder dem deutschen Bundeskanzler oder dem französischen Staatspräsidentenbesonders wichtig waren – Stärkung der europäischen Institutionen beziehungsweiseSchaffung eines europäischen Verteidigungssystems, weit hinter dem Maß zurück,das für einen dauerhaften Erfolg notwendig gewesen wäre. Die Defizite an „Wirtschaftsregierung“,die in der gegenwärtigen „Eurokrise“ weithin beklagt werden, sindin erster Linie auf den Einfluss der deutschen Bundesbank zurückzuführen, die aufder Unabhängigkeit einer Europäischen Zentralbank bestand. Ironischerweise sindso die Bemühungen, die Stabilität der Währungsunion auf Dauer zu sichern, von dendeutschen Verteidigern monetärer Stabilität selbst zunichte gemacht worden.Guido THIEMEYEREconomic Models in France and Germany and the Debates on the Maastricht TreatyThe article analyses the public debates on the Maastricht treaty in France and Germanyin the middle of the 1990s. There was an intensive debate among economistsand public intellectuals on the convergence criteria fixed in the Maastricht treaty foreconomic convergence in the future monetary union. From a methodological pointof view the article harks back to the concept of “Wirtschaftsstil” developed by Germaneconomists in the 19 th century. This concept is based on the assumption of a closeinterrelation between political culture and the economic system of a nation. The articleshows that the monetary union was considered in France and Germany as afundamental blow against national identity of both countries. But whereas the Germancritics considered the Maastricht treaty to be influenced by French political and economicthinking, the French were convinced that the German tradition prevailed. Inthe end the Maastricht debate in the middle of the 1990s was part of a more generalcontroversy on national identity in both countries.Modèles économiques en France et en Allemagne et les débats sur le traité de MaastrichtL’article se propose d’examiner les débats publics sur le traité de Maastricht dans lesannées 1990 en France et en Allemagne en comparaison. Il y avait dans les deux paysen même temps au milieu des années 1990 une discussion publique sur les critèresde convergence économique fixés dans le traité de Maastricht. En ce qui concerne laméthodologie, l’article fait recours à la conception du «Wirtschaftsstil». Ce concepta été développé par certains économistes allemands au XIX e siècle et crée une relationétroite entre la culture politique et l’ordre économique d’une nation. L’article montreque le traité de Maastricht signifiait dans la perception de la critique une menace pour

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 175l’identité nationale des deux pays. Pendant que les adversaires du traité en Francemettaient en avant l’influence de la pensée économique allemande dans le traité,l’opposition allemande observait une dominance française. Au fond il s’agitait desdébats sur l’identité nationale des deux pays.Wirtschaftsmodelle in Frankreich und in Deutschland und die Debatten über denMaastrichtvertragDer Beitrag untersucht die öffentlichen Debatten über den Vertrag von Maastricht inDeutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich. In beiden Ländern fand in der Mitte der1990er Jahre eine intensive, in der medialen Öffentlichkeit geführte Diskussion überdie im Vertrag von Maastricht formulierten Konvergenzkriterien statt. Methodischwird hierbei auf das Konzept der „Wirtschaftsstile“ zurückgegriffen, das aus derdeutschen Tradition der Nationalökonomie des 19. Jahrhunderts stammt und eineenge Beziehung zwischen der politischen Kultur und der Wirtschaftsordnung einerNation herstellt. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass die im Vertrag von Maastricht vereinbarteWährungsunion von Kritikern in beiden Ländern als Gefahr für die nationaleIdentität wahrgenommen wurde. Während allerdings die Kritiker in Deutschland behaupteten,dass die ordnungspolitischen Grundlagen der Währungsunion von französischenVorstellungen dominiert würden, erklärten die französischen Kritiker, dassdie Währungsunion stärker von deutschen Vorstellungen beeinflusst sei. Im Endeffektwaren die Maastricht-Diskussionen in Frankreich und Deutschland nationaleIdentitätsdebatten.Harold JAMESDesigning a Central Bank in the Run-Up to MaastrichtThe paper charts the elaboration of statutes for the European Central Bank (ECB) inthe lead-up to the Maastricht Treaty. The leading figures in formulating the new visionwere central bankers themselves, first in the Delors Committee (1988-89) and thenin the Committee of Central Bank Governors. The result of the dominant role of thecentral bankers was the prominent role given to central bank independence. The developmentof central banking corresponds with a broader international movement toproduce a framework for managing globalization through the introduction of newrules but also by unburdening the political process by delegating responsibilities totransnational experts. The paper also examines why the ECB was not given an explicitrole in bank supervision and regulation, as particularly the German Bundesbankfeared that this would mean that the ECB would take on a lender of last-resort functionthat would generate moral hazard.Le façonnement d'une Banque Centrale durant la période précédent MaastrichtL'article retrace l'élaboration des statuts de la Banque Centrale Européenne (BCE)durant la période qui mène vers le Traité de Maastricht. Leur conception nouvelle estavant tout le fruit des visions partagées par les banquiers centraux eux-mêmes, d'abord

176 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungenau sein du Comité Delors (1988-1989), ensuite à l'intérieur du Comité des Gouverneursdes Banques Centrales. Le rôle éminent assumé par les banquiers centraux sereflète ainsi dans la place privilégiée accordée à l'indépendance de la BCE. Par ailleursle développement de la banque centrale correspond au mouvement internationalbeaucoup plus large visant à créer une structure à la fois pour gérer la globalisationà travers l'introduction de règles nouvelles et pour décharger le processus politiqueen déléguant les responsabilités à des experts transnationaux. La contribution expliqueégalement pourquoi la BCE n'a été explicitement chargée ni de la supervisionni de la régulation bancaires: notamment la Bundesbank allemande craignait quepareilles attributions reviendraient en dernier ressort à manœuvrer la BCE dans lafonction moralement hasardeuse de l'ultime prêteur.Der Entwurf einer Zentralbank im Vorfeld von MaastrichtDer Beitrag behandelt die Gestaltung der Statuten für die Europäische Zentralbank(EZB) im Rahmen der Vorbereitungen zum Maastrichter Vertrag. Die Zentralbankerselbst sind maßgeblich an der Formulierung der neuen Struktur beteiligt gewesen,zunächst im Delors-Komitee (1988-1989), dann im Komitee der Zentralbankgouverneure.Aus dieser überragenden Rolle der Zentralbanker lässt sich denn auch dieÜbergewichtung der Unabhängigkeit der EZB ableiten. Die Entwicklung des Zentralbankwesensentspricht aber auch der allgemeinen internationales Anforderung einInstrumentarium zu entwickeln mit dem die Globalisierung sowohl durch die Einführungneuer Regeln als auch durch die Einbindung transnationaler Experten unddie dadurch erzielte Erleichterung des politischen Prozesses bewältigt werden kann.Der Aufsatz erklärt gleichzeitig warum die EZB nicht explizit mit der Bankenaufsichtund der Regulierung betraut wurde: besonders die Bundesbank fürchtete, dass einesolche Rolle die EZB in die Funktion des letztinstanzlichen Verleihers drängen würde,wodurch sie moralischen Gefahren ausgesetzt wäre.Desmond DINANFrom Treaty Revision to Treaty Revision: The Legacy of MaastrichtUnfinished business, the need to tie up loose ends, and policy spillover explain tosome extent EU treaty reform in the post-Maastricht period. Important also are thechallenge of democratic legitimacy and the unprecedented nature of Central and EasternEuropean enlargement. Yet these developments shaped the agenda, negotiation,and outcome of the post-Maastricht inter-governmental conferences (IGCs) in waysthat severely limited the utility of treaty reform as a method of deepening Europeanintegration. Far from strengthening the EU’s legitimacy, post-Maastricht treaty reformseemed to exacerbate the “democratic deficit.” At the same time, anxiety amongnational governments over the implications of enlargement for influence in decisionmakinginstitutions intensified rivalry between the big and small member states,which dominated the conduct of IGCs and ensured unsatisfactory results. Twentyyears after Maastricht, the eurozone crisis highlights the need for far-reaching treatychange in order to strengthen the fundamentals of EMU, which may nonetheless be

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 177politically impracticable because of the legacy of treaty reform in the post-Maastrichtperiod. Given the centrality of EMU in the Maastricht Treaty, major treaty reform inthe post-Lisbon era—were it ever to happen—would constitute unfinished Maastrichtbusiness.De révision de traité en révision de traité: l'héritage de MaastrichtL’inachèvement de certains projets européens, leurs retombées politiques ainsi quele besoin de finaliser le processus d’intégration peuvent, dans une certaine mesure,expliquer la volonté de réforme de certains traités UE dans la période post-Maastricht.En outre, la légitimité démocratique et la croissance sans précédent de Europe orientaleet centrale sont autant d’éléments qui ont emporté une volonté de réforme au seinde l’UE. Ces différents facteurs ont influencé l’agenda, la négociation, ainsi que lesrésultats des conférences intergouvernementales de telle manière à circonscrire sérieusementl’utilité d’une réforme du traité comme méthode d’approfondissement duprocessus d’intégration européenne. En effet, loin de renforcer la légitimité de l’UE,la révision du traité de Maastricht semble avoir exacerbé le « déficit démocratique »de l’Union. Dans le même temps, l’inquiétude des gouvernements nationaux à proposdes implications de l’élargissement, et plus précisément des questions d’influence ausein du processus de décision des institutions, ont intensifié les rivalités entre petitset grands États membres. Ces rivalités semblent avoir eu raison de la conférenceintergouvernementale, d’ailleurs au déplaisir de tout le monde. Vingt ans après Maastricht,la crise européenne souligne ainsi la nécessité d’une réforme en profondeurdes traités afin de renforcer les fondements de l’UME. Pourtant, quoique nécessaire,cette reforme s’avère politiquement compromise, surtout si l’on prend en considérationla centralité de l’UME au sein dudit traité et les nombreuses tentatives de réformesrestées infructueuses jusque-ici. Toute réforme post-Lisbonne – si jamais elleavait lieu – ne serait donc de toute façon qu’un prolongement des négociations inachevéesde Maastricht.Von Vertragsrevision zu Vertragsrevision: das Erbe von MaastrichtUnerledigte Aufgaben, ihre politischen Auswirkungen und die Notwendigkeit loseFäden zu verknüpfen erklären zu einem gewissen Grad die EU-Vertragsreformen inder Post-Maastricht Ära. Wichtig sind auch die Herausforderungen durch demokratischenLegitimierungsdruck und durch die so noch nie dagewesene Erweiterung nachZentral- und Osteuropa. Dennoch haben diese Entwicklungen sowohl Tagesordnung,Verhandlung, und Ergebnis der Post-Maastricht Regierungskonferenzen (ICGs) ineiner Weise beeinflusst, dass es den Nutzen der Vertragsreform als Mittel zur Vertiefungder europäischen Integration erheblich eingeschränkt hat. Weit entfernt voneiner Stärkung der Legitimität der EU scheint die Post-Maastricht Vertragsreformdas “Demokratiedefizit” eher noch verschärft zu haben. Gleichzeitig hat die Unruhein den jeweiligen Regierungen bezüglich der Folgen einer Erweiterung im Hinblickauf Einfluss in den Entscheidungsgremien die Rivalität zwischen den großen undkleinen Mitgliedsstaaten noch intensiviert, was zu einem beherrschenden Thema der

178 Abstracts – Résumés – ZusammenfassungenICGs wurde und letztendlich zu unbefriedigenden Ergebnissen führte. Zwanzig Jahrenach Maastricht stellt die Krise der Eurozone die Notwendigkeit weitreichender Vertragsänderungenzur Stärkung der EWU-Fundamente in den Vordergrund, welchedennoch politisch nicht praktikabel sein mögen aufgrund der Erbschaftslast der Vertragsreformin der Post-Maastricht Periode. Aufgrund der Zentralität der EWU imVertrag von Maastricht würde eine tiefgreifende Vertragsreform in der Post-LissabonÄra – würde sie denn je stattfinden – eine unerledigte Maastricht-Aufgabe darstellen.

179Contributors – Auteurs – AutorenDINAN Desmond, ad personam Jean Monnet Chair and Professor of PublicPolicyAddress: George Mason University, 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201, USAE-mail: ddinan@gmu.eduJAMES Harold, Professor of History and International Affairs, Claude andLore Kelly Professor of European Studies, and Director of Program in ContemporaryEuropean Studies at Princeton UniversityAddress: 129 Dickinson Hall, Princeton NJ 08544Tel: +1 609 258 4160E-mail: hjames@princeton.eduLOTH Wilfried, Dr. Professor of Modern and Contemporary History, Universityof Duisburg-EssenAddress: Historisches Institut der Universität Duisburg-Essen, 45117 Essen, GermanyE-mail: wilfried.loth@uni-due.deLUDLOW N. Piers, Reader in International History, London School of EconomicsAddress: Department of International History, LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A2AEE-mail: n.p.ludlow@lse.ac.ukSAUNIER Georges, Maître de conférences associé à l’Université de Cergy-Pontoise,Chargé de mission à l’Institut François MitterrandAddress: Institut François Mitterrand, 33 rue du Faubourg Saint-Antoine, F-75011Paris, FranceE-mail: saunier@mitterrand.orgTHIEMEYER Guido, Dr. Professeur Associé en Histoire Contemporaine, Universitéde Cergy-Pontoise, Honorary Professor at the University of MaastrichtE-mail: guido.thiemeyer@u-cergy.frVARSORI Antonio, full Professor for History of international relations andhead of the Department of Politics, Law and International Studies at the Universityof PaduaAddress: Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche, Giuridiche e Studi Internazionali, Viadel Santo 77, 35123 PADOVA, ITALIAEmail: antonio.varsori@unipd.it

Wohin steuert dieeuropäische Integration?Schriftenreihe desEUROPA-KOLLEGS HAMBURGzur Integrationsforschung67Wolf Schäfer/Andreas Graf Wass von Czege (Hrsg.)Aktuelle Probleme dereuropäischen IntegrationAktuelle Probleme dereuropäischen IntegrationHerausgegeben von Wolf Schäfer undAndreas Graf Wass von Czege2012, 208 S., brosch., 49,– €ISBN 978-3-8329-7103-8Nomos(Schriftenreihe des EUROPA-KOLLEGSHAMBURG zur Integrationsforschung, Bd. 67)Der Band dokumentiert die Hauptreferate,die anlässlich der traditionellen Deutsch-Ungarischen Gespräche 2010 in der AndrássyUniversität Budapest gehalten wordensind. An diesen Gesprächen nahmen Vertretervon Wissenschaft, Politik und Wirtschaftteil. Schwerpunkte bildeten die ThemenWährungsunion und Rettungsschirme,Kohäsion, Konvergenz, Integration sowieEU und Weltwirtschaft.Mit Beiträgen von: Martina Eckardt undWerner Ebert, Balázs Ferkelt, Attila Gáspárund Andrea Gyulai-Schmidt, Georg Koopmannund Lars Vogel, Katalin Nagy, WolfSchäfer, Martin Seidel, Tamás SzemlérBestellen Sie jetzt telefonisch unter 07221/2104-37. Portofreie Buch-Bestellungen unter www.nomos-shop.de/14239

181Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene BücherBICKERTON Christopher J., European Integration, From Nation-States to MemberStates, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, 217 p. – ISBN 978-0-19-960625-2– 37,36 €.BOLDT Andreas, Leopold von Ranke und Irland, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart,2012, 278 S. – ISBN 978-3-515-10198-1 – 54,00 €.BRÜNING Franziska, Frankreich und Heinrich Brüning, Ein deutscher Kanzler inder französischen Wahrnehmung, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2012, 462 S. –ISBN 978-3-515-10096-0 – 68,00 €.DUCHENNE Geneviève, DUMOULIN Michel, Générations de fédéralisteseuropéens depuis le XIXe siècle, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2012, 213 p. – ISBN978-90-5201-862-1 – 34,50 €.ECK Jean-François, HÜSER Dieter, Deutschland und Frankreich in der Globalisierungim 19. und 20. Jahrhundert – L’Allemagne, la France et la mondialisationaux XIXe et XXe siècles, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2012, 213 S. – ISBN978-3-515-10187-5 – 42,00 €.FRÖHLICH Stefan, The New Geopolitics of Transatlantic relations, CoordinatedResponses to Common Dangers, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,2012, 324 p. – ISBN 978-1-4214-0381-6 – 28,50 £.GFELLER Aurélie Élisa, Building a European Identity. France, The United States,and the Oil Shock, 1973-1974, Berghahn Books, New York, 2012, 232 p. – ISBN978-0-85745-225-2 – 58,00 €.HENRICH-FRANKE Christian, Gescheiterte Integration im Vergleich, FranzSteiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2012, 434 S. – ISBN 978-3-515-10176-9 – 56,00 €.HÉRITIER Adrienne, MOURY Catherine e.a., Changing rules of delegation Acontest for power in Comitology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, 179 p. –ISBN 978-0-19-965362-1- 53,10 €.HEWITSON Mark, D’AURIA Matthew, Europe in crisis, Intellectual and theEuropean idea 1917-1957, Berghahn Books, New York, 2012, 350 p. – ISBN978-0-85745-727-1 – 65,84 €.KROTZ Ulrich, SCHILD Joachim, Shaping Europe, France, Germany, and embeddedbilateralism from the Elysée treaty to twenty-first century politics, OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, 2013, 340 p. – ISBN 978-0-19-966008-7 – 64,63 €.

182 Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene BücherNEYER Jürgen, The justification of Europe A Political Theory of SupranationalIntergation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, 215 p. – ISBN978-0-19-964124-6 – 74,30 €.NIELSEN-SIKORA Jürgen, Das Ende der Barbarei, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart,2012, 145 S. – ISBN 978-3-515-10261-2 – 36,00 €.OSMONT Matthieu, ROBIN-HIVERT Émilia, SEIDEL Katja, SPOERERMark, WENKEL Christian (dir./eds), Européanisation au XXe siècle – Europeanisationin the 20th century, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2012, 215 p. – ISBN978-90-5201-850-8 – 32,50 €.PFEIL Ulrich (éd.), Mythes et tabous des relations franco-allemandes au XXesiècle, Peter Lang, Bern, 2012, 312 S. – ISBN 978-3-0343-0592-1 – 64,60 €.ROODE Sven Leif Ragnar de, Seeing Europe through the Nation, Franz SteinerVerlag, Stuttgart, 2012, 269 p. – ISBN 978-3-515-10202-5 – 46,00 €.ROTH François, HENNEQUIN Jacques, Robert Schuman Conseiller général dela Moselle 1937-1949, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2012, 132 p. – ISBN978-2-87574-015-1 – 26,80 €.WILKENS Andreas (éd.), Willy Brandt et l’unité de l’Europe. De l’objectif de lapaix aux solidarités nécessaires, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2012, 510 p. – ISBN978-90-5201-786-0 – 47,50 €.

ISBN 978-3-8487-0528-3Genshagener Schriften –Europa politisch denkenh-französische Zusammenarbeit in der Europapolitikieren Autoren aus beiden Ländern Verlauf und Erfolgsmmunikationin vier zentralen Handlungsfeldern derlreiche Interviews mit Entscheidungsträgern in Berlin,emesmay leitet seit 2009 das Programm Frankreich/bei der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politikgeschäftsführendes Vorstandsmitglied der Stiftungchaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Fachbereich für Deutschlandtoise.Demesmay | KoopmannThorel [Hrsg.]Genshagener Schriften – Europa politisch denken | 2Genshagener Schriften – Europa politisch denken | 1Claire Demesmay | Martin Koopmann | Julien Thorel [Hrsg.]Martin Koopmann | Joachim Schild | Hans Stark [Hrsg.]Die KonsenswerkstattDie KonsenswerkstattDeutsch-französische Kommunikations- undEntscheidungsprozesse in der EuropapolitikNeue Wegein ein neues EuropaDie deutsch-französischen Beziehungennach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges2NomosNomosDie KonsenswerkstattDeutsch-französische KommunikationsundEntscheidungsprozessein der EuropapolitikHerausgegeben von Claire Demesmay,Martin Koopmann und Julien Thorel2013, Band 2, 231 S., brosch., 36,– €ISBN 978-3-8487-0528-3www.nomos-shop.de/21029Wie funktioniert die deutsch-französischeZusammenarbeit in der Europapolitikkonkret? In zehn Fallstudien analysierenAutoren aus beiden Ländern Verlauf undErfolgsfaktoren deutsch-französischer Kommunikationin vier zentralen Handlungsfeldernder Europapolitik. Dafür haben siezahlreiche Interviews mit Entscheidungsträgernin Berlin, Paris und Brüssel geführt.Neue Wege in ein neues EuropaDie deutsch-französischen Beziehungennach dem Ende des Kalten KriegesHerausgegeben von Martin Koopmann,Joachim Schild und Hans Stark2013, Band 1, 217 S., brosch., 36,– €ISBN 978-3-8329-7914-0www.nomos-shop.de/19940Der 50. Jahrestag des Elysée-Vertrags am22. Januar 2013 bot einen geeigneten Anlass,die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen neuzu vermessen. Die Analysen der verschiedenenWirkungsfelder deutsch-französischerPolitik seit 1989 kommen zu dem Ergebnis,dass auch unter den neuen Rahmenbedingungendie deutsch-französischeVerantwortungsgemeinschaft für Europafortbesteht.Bestellen Sie jetzt telefonisch unter 07221/2104-37Portofreie Buch-Bestellungen unter www.nomos-shop.de

ISBN 978-3-8329-7223-3Four Dimensionsof the EU´s ActornessKratochvíl [ed.]Petr Kratochvíl [ed.]Content: This book innovatively explores various facets of European integration, wherebythe unifying theme is the EU´s actorness. Four individual dimensions of its actorness are explored –the EU´s legitimacy, its external recognition, its attractiveness and its power to frame policy. Thesefour dimensions are explored both theoretically and in the context of several empirical case studies.The book will be of utmost interest to both practitioners and students of European integration.The Author: The editor of this book, Petr Kratochvíl, Ph.D. is Director of the Institute of InternationalRelations. His research interests cover European integration, Central and Eastern Europe, the religionpoliticsnexus and international political philosophy. He is the author of the first Czech textbookon theories of European integration. He has published about a hundred academic texts, includingmonographs, edited volumes, book chapters, and articles, among others in the Journal of CommonMarket Studies, the Journal of Contemporary European Studies, and the Journal of InternationalRelations and Development.The EU as a Political ActorThe EU as a Political ActorThe Analysis of Four Dimensions of the EU’s ActornessThe EU as a Political ActorThe Analysis of Four Dimensionsof the EU’s ActornessEdited by Petr Kratochvíl2013, approx. 199 pp., pb., approx. € 34.00ISBN 978-3-8329-7223-3Approximate publication in June 2013NomosThis book innovatively explores variousfacets of European integration, whereby theunifying theme is the EU´s actorness. Fourindividual dimensions of its actorness areexplored – the EU´s legitimacy, its externalrecognition, its attractiveness and itspower to frame policy. These four dimensionsare explored both theoretically and inthe context of several empirical case studies.The book will be of utmost interest to bothpractitioners and students of Europeanintegration.To order please visit www.nomos-shop.de/14373, fax (+49) 7221/2104-43 or contact your local bookstore.

Schriften zur europäischenArbeits- und SozialpolitikSchriften zur europäischen Arbeits- und Sozialpolitik | 10Schriften zur europäischen Arbeits- und Sozialpolitik | 9Ines VerspohlClaudia NospickelHealth Care Reforms in EuropeConvergence towards a Market Model?Armutsbekämpfung in den mittel- undosteuropäischen Mitgliedstaatender Europäischen UnionNomosNomosHealth Care Reforms in EuropeConvergence towards a Market Model?Von Ines Verspohl2012, Band 10, 328 S., brosch., 59,– €ISBN 978-3-8329-7071-0www.nomos-shop.de/14193Marktförmige Gesundheitsreformen wurdenin Deutschland, den Niederlanden undSchweden gleichermaßen diskutiert, aberin unterschiedlichen Dimensionen undRadikalitäten umgesetzt, weil die gleichenProbleme – demographischer Wandel, EuropäischeIntegration, Staatsverschuldung– auf unterschiedliche nationale Institutionenund Diskurse trafen.Armutsbekämpfung in den mittelundosteuropäischen Mitgliedstaatender Europäischen UnionVon Claudia Nospickel2012, Band 9, 320 S., brosch., 59,– €ISBN 978-3-8329-6577-8www.nomos-shop.de/13583In der Transformationsphase der 1990erJahre entwickelte sich Armut zu einem gravierendenProblem in den Staaten MittelundOsteuropas. Am Beispiel der LänderEstland, Tschechien, Polen und Ungarnzeichnet die Studie diese Entwicklungbis zum Beitritt zur EU nach und stelltdie Frage, wie die neuen MitgliedstaatenStrategien der EU zur Armutsbekämpfungaufgreifen.Bestellen Sie jetzt telefonisch unter 07221/2104-37Portofreie Buch-Bestellungen unter www.nomos-shop.de

Nationales Verfassungsrechtin der Europäischen UnionClaus Dieter ClassenNationales Verfassungsrechtin der Europäischen UnionEine integrierte Darstellung von 27 VerfassungsordnungenNationales Verfassungsrecht inder Europäischen UnionEine integrierte Darstellung der27 VerfassungsordnungenVon Claus Dieter ClassenNomos2013, 322 S., brosch., 34,– €ISBN 978-3-8487-0119-3Im vorliegenden Werk werden die nationalenVerfassungsrechtsordnungen der EU-Mitgliedstaatenin integrierter Form (Grundprinzipien– Staatsorgane – Staatsfunktionen)dargestellt, die für das Verständnis derIntegration immer größere Bedeutunggewinnen. So werden die Gemeinsamkeitenin grundsätzlicher Hinsicht werden ebensoerläutert, wie die zahlreichen Unterschiedein den Details.Bestellen Sie jetzt telefonisch unter 07221/2104-37. Portofreie Buch-Bestellungen unter www.nomos-shop.de/20265